Explain in detail why democracy cannot exist in a republic

[SuaSponte]

*Originally posted by AHunter3 *
Why, no, actually… I favor the PLANET becoming a direct democracy.

I don’t even think it would be that difficult to structure. An absolute confederation, decentralized, structured according to a hierarchy of meeting sizes, meeting periodicity (how often the meetings occur), and permanence of decisions made would give you a good start without at any point having to put someone (even temporarily) in a position of power over others.

Serious questions:

1. For major, global questions, such as global warming, fr’instance -
   a. How is all of humanity going to get to the meeting?
   b. scads of logistical questions arise - location, feeding and lodging, etc.
   c. if the meeting is lengthy (remember, in a direct democracy, the people have to be informed of the issues, and time for debate would have to be set aside - and everyone who wants to speak would have to be accomodated), and I’m sure it would be for such issues, what happens to the world economy (or even crops) during the meeting?

2. Same questions, on a smaller scale, for any issue that requires the involvement of, say, over 5 million people.

Sua

[Groundskeeper_Willie]

This is a long post, but several posters have considered Athenian democracy to be simply referenda of the citizens.

These are quotes from Aristotle’s The Athenian Constitution

From Part 43:

All the magistrates that are concerned with the ordinary routine of administration are elected by lot, except the Military Treasurer, the Commissioners of the Theoric fund, and the Superintendent of Springs. These are elected by vote, and hold office from one Panathenaic festival to the next. All military officers are also elected by vote.

The Council of Five Hundred is elected by lot, fifty from each tribe. Each tribe holds the office of Prytanes in turn, the order being determined by lot; the first four serve for thirty-six days each, the last six for thirty-five, since the reckoning is by lunar years. The Prytanes for the time being, in the first place, mess together in the Tholus, and receive a sum of money from the state for their maintenance; and, secondly, they convene the meetings of the Council and the Assembly. The Council they convene every day, unless it is a holiday, the Assembly four times in each prytany. It is also their duty to draw up the programme of the business of the Council and to decide what subjects are to be dealt with on each particular day, and where the sitting is to be held. They also draw up the programme for the meetings of the Assembly.

Another Assembly in each prytany is assigned to the hearing of petitions, and at this meeting any one is free, on depositing the petitioner’s olive-branch, to speak to the people concerning any matter, public or private.

Part 44:

There is a single President of the Prytanes, elected by lot, who presides for a night and a day; he may not hold the office for more than that time, nor may the same individual hold it twice. He keeps the keys of the sanctuaries in which the treasures and public records of the state are preserved, and also the public seal; and he is bound to remain in the Tholus, together with one-third of the Prytanes, named by himself. Whenever the Prytanes convene a meeting of the Council or Assembly, he appoints by lot nine Proedri, one from each tribe except that which holds the office of Prytanes for the time being; and out of these nine he similarly appoints one as President, and hands over the programme for the meeting to them. They take it and see to the preservation of order, put forward the various subjects which are to be considered, decide the results of the votings, and direct the proceedings generally. They also have power to dismiss the meeting. No one may act as President more than once in the year, but he may be a Proedrus once in each prytany.

Elections to the offices of General and Hipparch and all other military commands are held in the Assembly, in such manner as the people decide; they are held after the sixth prytany by the first board of Prytanes in whose term of office the omens are favourable. There has, however, to be a preliminary consideration by the Council in this case also.

From Part 45:

The Council passes judgement on nearly all magistrates, especially those who have the control of money; its judgement, however, is not final, but is subject to an appeal to the lawcourts. Private individuals, also, may lay an information against any magistrate they please for not obeying the laws, but here too there is an appeal to the law-courts if the Council declare the charge proved. The Council also examines those who are to be its members for the ensuing year, and likewise the nine Archons. Formerly the Council had full power to reject candidates for office as unsuitable, but now they have an appeal to the law-courts. In all these matters, therefore, the Council has no final jurisdiction. It takes, however, preliminary cognizance of all matters brought before the Assembly, and the Assembly cannot vote on any question unless it has first been considered by the Council and placed on the programme by the Prytanes; since a person who carries a motion in the Assembly is liable to an action for illegal proposal on these grounds.

From Part 47:

The Council also co-operates with other magistrates in most of their duties. First there are the treasurers of Athena, ten in number, elected by lot, one from each tribe.

Then there are the Commissioners for Public Contracts (Poletae), ten in number, one chosen by lot from each tribe, who farm out the public contracts. They lease the mines and taxes, in conjunction with the Military Treasurer and the Commissioners of the Theoric fund, in the presence of the Council, and grant, to the persons indicated by the vote of the Council, the mines which are let out by the state, including both the workable ones, which are let for three years, and those which are let under special agreements years.

From Part 48:

The Council also elects ten Auditors (Logistae) by lot from its own members, to audit the accounts of the magistrates for each prytany. They also elect one Examiner of Accounts (Euthunus) by lot from each tribe, with two assessors (Paredri) for each examiner, whose duty it is to sit at the ordinary market hours, each opposite the statue of the eponymous hero of his tribe; and if any one wishes to prefer a charge, on either public or private grounds, against any magistrate who has passed his audit before the law-courts, within three days of his having so passed, he enters on a whitened tablet his own name and that of the magistrate prosecuted, together with the malpractice that is alleged against him. He also appends his claim for a penalty of such amount as seems to him fitting, and gives in the record to the Examiner. The latter takes it, and if after reading it he considers it proved he hands it over, if a private case, to the local justices who introduce cases for the tribe concerned, while if it is a public case he enters it on the register of the Thesmothetae. Then, if the Thesmothetae accept it, they bring the accounts of this magistrate once more before the law-court, and the decision of the jury stands as the final judgement.

From Part 49:

The roll of the cavalry is drawn up by the Commissioners of Enrolment (Catalogeis), ten in number, elected by the Assembly by open vote. They hand over to the Hipparchs and Phylarchs the list of those whom they have enrolled, and these officers take it and bring it up before the Council, and there open the sealed tablet containing the names of the cavalry.

The Council also examines infirm paupers; for there is a law which provides that persons possessing less than three minas, who are so crippled as to be unable to do any work, are, after examination by the Council, to receive two obols a day from the state for their support. A treasurer is appointed by lot to attend to them.

From Part 50:

There are ten Commissioners for Repairs of Temples, elected by lot, who receive a sum of thirty minas from the Receivers-General, and therewith carry out the most necessary repairs in the temples.

There are also ten City Commissioners (Astynomi), of whom five hold office in Piraeus and five in the city.

They also provide that no collector of sewage shall shoot any of his sewage within ten stradia of the walls; they prevent people from blocking up the streets by building, or stretching barriers across them, or making drain-pipes in mid-air with a discharge into the street, or having doors which open outwards; they also remove the corpses of those who die in the streets, for which purpose they have a body of state slaves assigned to them.

From Part 51:

Market Commissioners (Agoranomi) are elected by lot, five for Piraeus, five for the city. Their statutory duty is to see that all articles offered for sale in the market are pure and unadulterated.

Commissioners of Weights and Measures (Metronomi) are elected by lot, five for the city, and five for Piraeus. They see that sellers use fair weights and measures.

Formerly there were ten Corn Commissioners (Sitophylaces), elected by lot, five for Piraeus, and five for the city; but now there are twenty for the city and fifteen for Piraeus. Their duties are, first, to see that the unprepared corn in the market is offered for sale at reasonable prices, and secondly, to see that the millers sell barley meal at a price proportionate to that of barley, and that the bakers sell their loaves at a price proportionate to that of wheat, and of such weight as the Commissioners may appoint; for the law requires them to fix the standard weight.

From Part 53:

The Forty are also elected by lot, four from each tribe, before whom suitors bring all other cases. Formerly they were thirty in number, and they went on circuit through the demes to hear causes; but after the oligarchy of the Thirty they were increased to forty. They have full powers to decide cases in which the amount at issue does not exceed ten drachmas, but anything beyond that value they hand over to the Arbitrators. The Arbitrators take up the case, and, if they cannot bring the parties to an agreement, they give a decision. If their decision satisfies both parties, and they abide by it, the case is at an end; but if either of the parties appeals to the law-courts, the Arbitrators enclose the evidence, the pleadings, and the laws quoted in the case in two urns, those of the plaintiff in the one, and those of the defendant in the other. These they seal up and, having attached to them the decision of the arbitrator, written out on a tablet, place them in the custody of the four justices whose function it is to introduce cases on behalf of the tribe of the defendant. These officers take them and bring up the case before the law-court, to a jury of two hundred and one members in cases up to the value of a thousand drachmas, or to one of four hundred and one in cases above that value. No laws or pleadings or evidence may be used except those which were adduced before the Arbitrator, and have been enclosed in the urns.

From Part 54:

The following magistrates also are elected by lot: Five Commissioners of Roads (Hodopoei), who, with an assigned body of public slaves, are required to keep the roads in order: and ten Auditors, with ten assistants, to whom all persons who have held any office must give in their accounts. These are the only officers who audit the accounts of those who are subject to examination, and who bring them up for examination before the law-courts. If they detect any magistrate in embezzlement, the jury condemn him for theft, and he is obliged to repay tenfold the sum he is declared to have misappropriated. If they charge a magistrate with accepting bribes and the jury convict him, they fine him for corruption, and this sum too is repaid tenfold. Or if they convict him of unfair dealing, he is fined on that charge, and the sum assessed is paid without increase, if payment is made before the ninth prytany, but otherwise it is doubled. A tenfold fine is not doubled.

The Clerk of the prytany, as he is called, is also elected by lot. He has the charge of all public documents, and keeps the resolutions which are passed by the Assembly, and checks the transcripts of all other official papers and attends at the sessions of the Council. Formerly he was elected by open vote, and the most distinguished and trustworthy persons were elected to the post, as is known from the fact that the name of this officer is appended on the pillars recording treaties of alliance and grants of consulship and citizenship. Now, however, he is elected by lot. There is, in addition, a Clerk of the Laws, elected by lot, who attends at the sessions of the Council; and he too checks the transcript of all the laws. The Assembly also elects by open vote a clerk to read documents to it and to the Council; but he has no other duty except that of reading aloud.

The Assembly also elects by lot the Commissioners of Public Worship (Hieropoei) known as the Commissioners for Sacrifices, who offer the sacrifices appointed by oracle, and, in conjunction with the seers, take the auspices whenever there is occasion. It also elects by lot ten others, known as Annual Commissioners, who offer certain sacrifices and administer all the quadrennial festivals except the Panathenaea.

An Archon is also elected by lot for Salamis, and a Demarch for Piraeus. These officers celebrate the Dionysia in these two places, and appoint Choregi. In Salamis, moreover, the name of the Archon is publicly recorded.

From Part 55:

All the foregoing magistrates are elected by lot, and their powers are those which have been stated. To pass on to the nine Archons, as they are called, the manner of their appointment from the earliest times has been described already. At the present day six Thesmothetae are elected by lot, together with their clerk, and in addition to these an Archon, a King, and a Polemarch. One is elected from each tribe. They are examined first of all by the Council of Five Hundred, with the exception of the clerk. The latter is examined only in the lawcourt, like other magistrates (for all magistrates, whether elected by lot or by open vote, are examined before entering on their offices); but the nine Archons are examined both in the Council and again in the law-court. Formerly no one could hold the office if the Council rejected him, but now there is an appeal to the law-court, which is the final authority in the matter of the examination.

I am leaving out a lot more of the same kind of material.

Bill

[AHunter3]

Sua:

1. For major, global questions, such as global warming, fr’instance - a. How is all of humanity going to get to the meeting? b. scads of logistical questions arise - location, feeding and lodging, etc. c. if the meeting is lengthy (remember, in a direct democracy, the peoplehave to be informed of the issues, and time for debate would have to be setaside - and everyone who wants to speak would have to be accomodated),and I’m sure it would be for such issues, what happens to the world economy(or even crops) during the meeting?

a) We’re at it now. This planet is as good a place to have our meeting as any, don’t you think? OK, seriously –

The lack of hierarchy of people over other people doesn’t mean a lack of hierarchy altogether. I suggested a hierarchy of meeting sizes / absolute confederacy / decentralized / hierarchy of decision-permanence / hierarchy of how often meetings occur. I guess I should make that mess less abstract?

Please go to your [tiny local group] meeting now. You will be meeting with ~25 other people in your local area with whom you have interests and shared projects in common. You will make whatever decisions affect primary just you folks, and implement them amongst yourself unless more people are necessary (in which case it involves them as well anyway). You will also meet each other’s needs vis-a-vis cooperative endeavors insofar as you are able. You may at this time make simple low-permanence decisions, which could at some late date be un-made with equal ease. You could discuss modifying more permanent decisions, but there would be a structural mechanism in place requiring that such decisions be brought up more formally for the group to consider over the course of more than just this one meeting before you would modify it, which is what makes it more permanent.

Every third such meeting will coincide with the meetings of two other groups of similar size. The focus at these larger meetings is/will be stuff that affects the larger group and/or needs the active labor and input of the extra people in order to accomplish.

Initiative and decision-making authority is concentrated at the lowest level at which it is feasible (which makes it an absolute confederation).

Once you get above a certain point, meetings are largely ceremonial. Social organization is somewhat tribe-like as a result, but not necessarily technology-barren. (If we want to assemble grand pianos or touring cars, we’ll assemble grand pianos and touring cars. It’s simply a question of how many folks need to be involved in toto, and then dividing up specialty areas and, again, concentrating workflow control locally rather than centrally).

[2sense]

I will thank you for curing my ignorance, Willie.
And great thanks for the link.
I nearly had an orgasm exploring the Constitution Society Home Page!

AHunter3:

I guess I would need to see of more your idea to judge its feasability but I find it interesting. It seems to me that while it is commendable to seek to not to have a hierarchy of people over others I’m not sure it can be done. Those serving on the commitees that were making decisions would necessarily have power over regular folks. And then there is defense, militaries without hierarchies don’t win wars.

---

Just my 2sense
WHAT!!! i’m not good enough for you…is what you’re saying…i’ll have you know i’m prime random icq chat material - concrete

[AHunter3]

What committees? At the meetings I described, the people in attendance have authority to determine the activities of themselves, no one else.

What militaries? This system would exist in lieu of nations as we know them.

[brad_d]

*Originally posted by AHunter3 *
**2) Insofar as the system I propose will (of course and by both necessity and convenience) replace the organized structures of the economy as well as those of government, we will have, as individuals, at least 40-some-odd hours per week to devote to the meetings and the organized activities of daily social living that result from same.
**

Unless I’m mis-reading this, I think this illustrates the problem that I have with this notion. 40+ hours/week devoted to governance? On top of whatever other job I have? My initial thought is “No thanks.”

To me, this trade-off for a more direct personal role in government sounds like a very poor one.

[AHunter3]

*Originally posted by brad_d *
**

*Originally posted by AHunter3 *
**2) Insofar as the system I propose will (of course and by both necessity and convenience) replace the organized structures of the economy as well as those of government, we will have, as individuals, at least 40-some-odd hours per week to devote to the meetings and the organized activities of daily social living that result from same.
**

Unless I’m mis-reading this, I think this illustrates the problem that I have with this notion. 40+ hours/week devoted to governance? On top of whatever other job I have? My initial thought is “No thanks.”

To me, this trade-off for a more direct personal role in government sounds like a very poor one.
**

You’re mis-reading this. Try again.

[Lemur866]

OK, I think that most people who repeat this idea are trying to stress the constitutional nature of our government. That is, in a democracy we could vote for bills of attainder, we could vote to take private property for public use without due compensation, we could vote for searches and seizures without probable cause, etc.

And AHunter…the thought that my neighbors are going to get together and make binding decisions about our lives sends chills down my spine. How about this…everyone makes binding decisions about THEIR OWN lives, and leaves me out of it? We need LESS collective decision making, not more.

Other than that, your proposal seems similar to an institution that already exists, the corporation.

[brad_d]

*Originally posted by AHunter3 *
You’re mis-reading this. Try again.
**

Quite right…I believe I see what I misunderstood - thanks.

So, I will try again. It seems like you’re saying that many/most people would not need “jobs” in the sense that it’s currently understood, so we’d have the 40+ hours/week currently spent working free to devote to governance.

Is that closer?

[Boris_B]

I meant to reply to this a lot earlier. I had three-quarters of a reply typed out, and then my machine crashed so I went to bed.

Anyway, what I was going to do was put some links to examples on this site of people saying that republic and democracy were mutually exclusive. Oblong and barbitu8 said it on various threads, and it was insinuated a couple of times in Dr. Pinky’s “Eulogy for Democracy” thread. The main reason I was going to provide these links was just to show that I’m not making stuff up.

On the whole, I’m pleased with the response, although I seem to have attracted mainly the wrong people (i.e. those who agree with me).

[AHunter3]

*Originally posted by brad_d *
**

*Originally posted by AHunter3 *
You’re mis-reading this. Try again.
**

Quite right…I believe I see what I misunderstood - thanks.

So, I will try again. It seems like you’re saying that many/most people would not need “jobs” in the sense that it’s currently understood, so we’d have the 40+ hours/week currently spent working free to devote to governance.

Is that closer? **

Definitely closer. I’m not sure I’d characterize the time we spent during the week as “governance” any more than as “industry”. It would, in fact, be an interwoven mixture of the two. And as Lemur says, it has a lot of similarities to the way a corporation works.

OK, look folks–those of you who would prefer to have complete freedom rather than your neighbor having jack to say about anything are preaching to the converted when you say it to me. In those little groups I have been describing, you–the individual–cannot be dictated to by the group majority. All decisions are made by consensus. If you chose to be totally uncooperative, you could keep official group decisions from happening, I suppose. On the other hand, the other individuals, as individuals, might decide to whop you over the head once they get tired of your shit and there’d be no law or law enforcement mechanism preventing them from doing so. So if there are, in fact, things you actually DO get out of organized interaction with other people, making decisions and pooling your abilities and labor and whatnot, ain’t it better to get these things in a context without bosses and salary reviews and pink slips and the threat of being written up for violating the fucking dress code? Likewise, vis-a-vis other people intruding on my in the political sense, wouldn’t you rather run as much of the show as you can with as few other people directly involved as possible for the issue under consideration? What I’m describing is effectively a functional model for a pragmatic anarchy, and you’d have far less interference in your free will than you do under the current (representative democracy) situation, I daresay.

Heck, I bet your duly elected representatived don’t even recognize your name.

[beergeek279]

OK, I think that most people who repeat this idea are trying to stress the constitutional nature of our government. That is, in a democracy we could vote for bills of attainder, we could vote to take private property for public use without due compensation, we could vote for searches and seizures without probable cause, etc.

That’s precisely the point that at least I’d like to stress anyway. In the US, we have the Constitution/Bill of Rights which explicitly lays out the boundaries of a limited government (not that those haven’t been ignored…but that’s a different thread ) and these are the parameters in which the government (should) operate. Direct democracy, however, really has no such guidelines. The aforementioned bills are certainly excellent examples of how this idea of mob rule could take effect. Remember that Hitler was originally voted into office…does that mean that what he did was legitimate since he had majority backing???

(I suppose someone could bring up the idea of referendums, but those are limited to decidely hot topics…and realistically, when’s the last time one of these were held when it wasn’t challenged in the courts the day after the election???)

[2sense]

I think that some people don’t want America spoken of as a democracy because then they don’t wish to see their undemocratic positions undermined.
Maybe I’m just cynical.

---

Just my 2sense
Partisan mudslinging is Great Debates. - David B

[hawthorne]

Posted by RugbyMan
and these are the parameters in which the government (should) operate. Direct democracy, however, really has no such guidelines.

It’s been a while, but I think the Athenians had the graphe parranomon [spelling is almost certainly wrong]. This was (effectively) a motion that held that a person who had previously been found persuasive had been acting as a demagogue and should be expelled. This was meant to constrain the potential for majoritarian abuse which existed in a direct democracy. They also presumably had some form of procedural rules which were taken to govern the conduct of meetings. [And various other non-crude things which we can see thanks to Groundskeeper Willie’s very helpful post. Thanks.]

I guess I see the point that Boris B is making is that all democratic systems – whether direct or representative – have rules which govern the conduct and range of voting and that the particular system of the US makes it a type of democracy rather than another system, and that to say “the US is a republic rather than a democracy” should invoke a “your point being?” rather than a nod of the head.