Over in the secret-agent TV show thread, I remembered the premise one of those shows was built around: a character (a) who‘s perfectly willing to get recruited by a given spy agency, with cover identities and front companies and so on, (b) meets a guy who talks like a recruiter for that agency…
…except, see, he’s not. Oh, sure, he’s got a cover identity working for a front company while in fact secretly working for a spy agency; but, well, it’s not that spy agency, is all.
A classic of the genre, of course; but the Cafe Society part is only relevant insofar as it’s the jumping-on point for a real-world question: if someone who’d love to agree with a shadowy recruiter from Agency A instead meets a shadowy recruiter from Agency B who just says he works for Agency A — and who explains, shhh, hush-hush, secrecy is paramount, we sure don’t want the wrong people asking why you’re meeting with known employees of Agency A — then what’s the sensible response, the one that characters in fiction keep not making?
I rather doubt there’s a GQ answer for the right way to be clandestinely recruited as a shill / informant / double agent for an agency.
Now if you want to get recruited to be employed by somebody like the CIA (even in a clandestine role) you can just visit their website and deal with them in an aboveboard fashion. Same for NSA. They’re not hard to find; they “hide” in very plain sight.
To try to answer your question in the spirit asked, the would-be recruit ultimately needs the shadowy recruiter to “prove” they’re really with Agency A and not just a front for Agency B, C, … Z. You didn’t mention this possibilty, but the recruiter also needs to somehow “prove” they’re not a double-agent shilling for Agency B, C, … Z in addition to actually working for Agency A.
I put “prove” in scare quotes because it’s really “adequately satisfy the recruit’s worries / adequately dispel the recruit’s doubts to the recruit’s satisfaction”. And the last bit is the rub. The recruit is not an expert … yet. And being satisfied to their own satisfaction is far from a guarantee that they aren’t making a (fatal?) mistake. Especially not when dealing with well-resourced professional dissemblers.
In short, there’s no foolproof way for the recruit to outsmart the whole of Agency B’s effort to make it look like this interaction is actually an Agency A op. Such is the stuff of spy thrillers; nothing is trustworthy. Everything is simply a tissue of lies and any resemblance to the truth is mere coincidence at best, deliberate artifice at worst.
If you’re talking about a handler recruiting an asset, there’s really not any good way for the asset to know for sure. Recruiting an asset under a false flag is something that actually happens in the real world; it’s tradecraft 101.
If you’re talking about an actual agent being recruited under a false flag, undergoing weeks or months of training, collecting a paycheck and benefits, and so on, well, the fact that a “CIA” recruit never sees the HQ at Langley, for example, might be a giveaway.
It would take a lot of effort to fool an employee about what organization they’re actually working for. And what would be the point? Why would you intentionally recruit an agent who would be actively trying to work against your actual interests?
For example, if the Russians want to conduct intelligence operations against China, what in the world would be the point of an elaborate deception to recruit patriotic Americans under the pretense that they’re working for the CIA? If the Russians want to target the U.S., there might be some point in recruiting Americans, but how would pretending to be the CIA help? They’d have to both convince the patriotic Americans that they’re really the CIA while also somehow convincing them that it makes sense for the CIA to be spying on U.S. targets.
There are a lot simpler and more effective ways to conduct intelligence operations.
Rather than an employee I can at least imagine an “agent” being the subject of a false-flag recruitment. I can imagine a guy in Ruritania or Sarkhan or Val Verde who is happy to provide information on the local political situation–and even on his own country’s military forces–to the noble freedom-loving American CIA, but who would never dream of playing ball with the dirty Communists (or alternatively, would be happy to assist the KGB in their efforts at world liberation, but would never stoop to aiding the American capitalist-imperialist pigs), and who is therefore told that he’s working for the CIA (KGB), but secretly he’s really providing information to the KGB (CIA).
It would be interesting to know if there has ever been any documented case of such a thing, though.
According to this BBC News article, East German Stasi agents pretended to be members of a Western peace organization to recruit West German secretaries as assets. That’s the first example I found after a few seconds of googling. Recruiting assets through false flags is absolutely a thing that happens in the real world. Your hypothetical is absolutely the type of thing real world intelligence agencies actually do.
Not quite the same, but there’s a novel about a guy who starts getting payments of a $1000 a month when he’s in his twenties. Turns out that a bartender in his college town was a recruiter for the Soviets - who was cheating the Soviets on the side. He’d send in the names of students he “recruited” and then pocket the money he was supposed to disburse to his agents. Then the fake recruiter is transferred (or something - I forget the exact details) and the money starts going directly to the unknowing suspected agents. Twenty years on, the Soviets start looking for the guys they think are working for them… Hijinks ensue.
And there’s always Flagg “I’m with the CID ; although I told your boss I’m with the CIA. It throws people off who think I’m with the CIC.”
As others have said, you don’t generally run a false flag operation to recruit somebody as an official employee. You do it to convince somebody to join a cause which is illegal but which they feel a sympathy towards.
So for example, you find an NSA employee. You tell him you’re part of the Taiwanese government. You’re asking for intelligence about China. You tell the guy that Taiwan isn’t looking to harm the United States with this intelligence; they’re just looking to protect themselves from China, a country which is also hostile to the United States. So they’re not being disloyal to the United States by helping Taiwan.
But in reality the guy who is claiming to be a Taiwanese agent is actually a Chinese agent and the Chinese are trying to find out how much American intelligence knows about them.
If the OP means when an intelligence agent represents themselves as working for Country A when in reality they work for Country B? On the hypothesis that the target would be better disposed to A rather than B? Then yes, it happens many times and there are documented examples.
But the part that interests me is: given a target who, as you say, would be plenty disposed to A but not B, what’s the sensible response to an intelligence agent claiming to work for A?
Granted, potential recruits could keep B at bay by simply refusing; but since the whole point is that they would enthusiastically work on the quiet for A, is there some obvious baby-with-bathwater approach that’s just not occurring to me?
I remember a case where the Soviets had recruited a guy who worked at embassy X (South Africa, maybe). He then built his own network whose members thought they were working for Country X, but all the intel they provided was funneled to the Soviets. The Israelis are masters at this, recruiting agents from various Arab countries who would be quite comfortable spying on behalf of another Arab regime, but not so much for the Mossad.
Interactions between the officer and the target would vary. If say a Pakistani agent is operating in Germany s/he can be very confident that the target would be uninclined to help ISI but might be happy to work with MOSSAD. But, he or she does not have to “act Israeli” (whatever that means) justs simply drop hints and nudge the mark to make that deduction. Probably more effective.
(A Turkish orgin German might be the opposite so an Israeli agent might do the same).
And the opposite, pretending to be Israeli, has been done by Russian and Arabs in Europe and N America.
In the real world? Probably nothing, really. If you’re really concerned, you could insist on a (furtive) meeting inside the embassy or consulate of the country involved. But, for example, a legitimate CIA agent might legitimately not want a potential asset to risk being seen going into the U.S. Embassy, which is going to be very closely watched by not just the host country’s intelligence and counter-intelligence services, but also the intelligence services of just about every nation active in the host country.
For a potential asset working for a foreign intelligence service, there’s really no fool-proof way to be sure the recruiter is actually working for who they say they’re working for without significant risk of exposure for everyone involved.
Your best rule of thumb to avoid accidentally committing treason is to just, well, not commit treason, even on behalf of an “ally.”
You need to have some message that is meaningless by itself but could only be sent by the actual organization your recruiter is claiming to belong to.
To use my example, you could ask the supposed Taiwanese agent who is trying to recruit you to have President Tsai mention Scandinavia in a speech she is delivering next week. If the agent who has contacted you is a genuine representative of Taiwanese intelligence, his agency would presumably have access to President Tsai and would be able to aske her to cooperate. But if the agent is lying to you and is actually a Chinese spy, his organization is not going to be able to produce this result.