No, guns are not actually equally adept at killing people. Thus the presence of the “rolleyes” smiley following my pronouncement.
But the differences between handguns are not all that dramatic when it comes to being able to kill. The most modest .22 target pistol and the most fearsome .500 handheld cannon are both able to kill with a single shot. For purposes of this analysis, I’m not sure the fact that the .500 can kill more reliably is relevant. Intermediate scrutiny requires that the government’s objective is significant, substantial, or important, and there is a reasonable fit between the law and the government’s objective, such that the law is not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s objective.
A one-day cooling off period will still remain in place. So the question is: is the government’s interest in a cooling-off period vindicated by a one-day period? Can the government somehow show that ten days is NOT substantially broader than necessary to allow cooling off?
The burden was on the government to make this showing, at trial, and they didn’t.
They presented no data or studies showing the 10 day period was particularly effective. The government witnesses could recall no cases in which the ten day period was shown to have been a factor in anything.
Why intermediate scrutiny? Didn’t Heller and McDonald find that private ownership of firearms is a fundamental right? What other rights mentioned in the BOR are relegated to intermediate scrutiny?
More likely the extra time will make it more difficult for a poor woman to get the abortion she wants, but might not be able to afford.
I don’t think the gun waiting period is reasonable after the first one. But no waiting time is reasonable for an abortion. No one is hurt from an abortion.
The two pronged analysis seeks to first determine if the right is implicated. It then seeks to determine to what extent that implication is. If it impacts the right more significantly it could trigger strict scrutiny. Impact at the periphery would more likely trigger intermediate scrutiny. Rationale basis is not appropriate per Heller. This is similar to the framework for the first amendment. This analysis is described towards the end of the opinion.
I’m not sure I agree with the level of scrutiny. That analysis in the opinion seemed quite weak. It amounted to ‘well both sides think intermediate would work so let’s go with that’. Weak as that is - it’s not even the argument the plaintiff was putting forward. The plantiff said that if it failed intermediate scrutiny then it would fail strict scrutiny. The judge decided that the plaintiff was then okay with intermediate scrutiny. Pretty weak IMO.