I mean North Korea now (and since the end of the war now that I think about it). Needless to say, North Korea doesn’t want to, and can’t defeat the US militarily, while the US would like to see regime change. Korea just needs to wait the US out. Not losing equals victory.
For the South, it ended up being ‘total war’, as Sherman and Sheridan took actions in 1864 to wear down the logistics and transportation systems of the South. By the end of the conflict the South was pretty much devastated (one can argue it never did recover fully). The North, on the other hand, except for a few minor invasions that didn’t last long, was nearly untouched, it’s industries and trade booming, and while several hundred thousand soldiers died, nearly 800,000 immigrants poured into the North during the 1861-1865 time period (source was one of Bruce Catton’s books). LIke another poster mentioned, the North never came close to fighting a ‘total war’; the South was finally forced to just to have a bare chance of survival.
For the South shortages of an industrial base for the first true industrial war and a lack of logistics (railroads as mentioned above); for Germany, oil was the most critical element they lacked (horses were used by the Wehrmacht throughout the war to move supplies).
I’ll defer to Chronos giving his POV, but he may mean that there was a considerable Anti-War/Anti-Eastern Establishment in the Mid-West (Indiana/Ohio/Illinois) that wanted the war ended and talked about breaking away and making their own peace with the South (see Copperheads). And of course in the South, with secession an established fact, those wanting to go it alone (hello, Texas) could break away.
I do think he overstates it, though, and I also would like to hear his views
Probably three times; (1) Very early in the war, before Northern troops got into DC (the rail lines were cut by Pro-Confederates in Baltimore and troops had to march to the city–but that wasn’t likely since Virginia had just succeeded and no Confederate troops were at hand. (2) After the First Battle of Bull Run, which ended in a rout of the Union forces, some Confederate officers (Stonewall Jackson, for one), wanted to march on Washington; the officers in command decided not too (their forces were nearly as scrambled in victory as the North’s were in defeat) and besides, Jackson at that time was a not-well-renowed Brigadier who had been a military teacher not long before. (3) In July 1864 Jubal Early brought a Confederate force to the outskirts of Washington D.C., but the defenses had been strengthened considerably and two veteran divisions arrived to fend him off.
The rail lines in Baltimore weren’t cut. They just didn’t connect. The B&O took you south and west, the Pennsylvania took you north. Everyone had to get off the train in Baltimore and walk or take a carriage took the next station. I don’t think the line was continuous until the 1930s.
I’m not sure that without Lincoln the Union would have won.
Lincoln went all out. He jailed those who disagreed with him. He nationalized the railroads. He pushed the draft and was willing to send troops to put down anti-draft riots and all that were part of the “Lincoln Dictatorship”.
Most important, he refused to give up Fort Sumter and resupplied it knowing the rebels would fire on it and he could declare war.
What must have been frustrating was the months between his election in November and taking over in January when the pro southern members of the leadership were able to send weapons and supplies to the south, knowing darn well they would be seized by the confederates. Luckily the Secretary of the Navy saw this coming and ordered all Union warships to foreign ports.
Fair point, but the good citizens of Baltimore first tried to prevent the troops from transferring stations (which led to some shooting and bloodshed) and the Mayor and Governor (who was pro-Union) asked Lincoln not to send any more troops via Baltimore. In the end, the North sent military forces via Annapolis, but later re-established the link via Baltimore. (This also led to Lincoln suspending habeus corpus for several jailed persons, which is still a debated topic today (but not debated here, not on topic).
To develop this point further, both Lincoln and Churchill (and Stalin) were men who would not give in, not give up, and would play every card they had to defeat their enemy. The Confederates and Nazis both had had successes from those who would compromise, who would rather not face the prospect of war and would do almost anything to avoid it. When they faced men determined to win despite what it cost, they lost their impetus.
To quote from a Science Fiction series I’m fond of, they might have said to Hitler or Jeff Davis: “Why is it that people like you think you’re more ruthless than people like me?”
The Union imprisoned the state government at Fort McHenry, and placed canons on Federal Hill pointing at the city. The canons are still there. You can’t get troups to Annapolis by train, and the Sky Line that was going to connect Baltimore, Annapolis, and DC was never built. I have been to all three train museums in town with a little boy whose first sentence was “I like trains.”
Once the Confederates fired at Fort Sumter, Lincoln didn’t need to declare war. The war had already been declared by the other side.
I’m sorry but taking Dunkirk just wasn’t going to happen unless you remove all the efforts to evacuate the British troops and leave them to rot on the beach. The German armies in the area were *severely *overextended and wearing out (the armored units in particular). The French defense was very stiff and well entrenched in the region and Dunkirk is not an easy place to assault with tanks or infantry: its basically marshy wetlands
To put this in perspective, when the Canadians attacked Dunkirk in '44 with a vastly better circumstances than the overextended German army they took heavy casualties and needed several days just to capture nearby towns. The region was put under siege for the rest of the war rather than attacking it since the casualties from an assault would not have been the worth of the region.: Siege of Dunkirk (1944–1945) - Wikipedia
Hitler’s ambition was East - Poland, Russia, Ukraine. He didn’t particularly want to fight France, he definitely did not want to fight Britain, and he wasn’t even thinking about the US.
However, neither France or Britain wanted a powerful Germany dominating Europe, and so treaties etc arose. One of Hitler’s biggest mistakes was in believing that Britain would continue to ignore treaty obligations and not fight (as they hadn’t fought for either Czechoslovakia or Poland). Even after Dunkirk, Hitler did not want to fight Britain anymore. His ideal scenario was Germany dominating Europe, and Britain dominating the developing world via Empire.
Another mistake was aligning himself with Mussolini - this led to Germany having to have soldiers in the Balkans and North Africa, fighting the British and/or bailing out the Italians.
If Hitler could have fought Russia without needing to keep troops stationed in Vichy France or Africa, and without having to keep thousands of military personnel tied up defending the Reich from the British bombers, things might have gone differently.
Germany lost the war - but it wasn’t the war they wanted to have.
(Sorry if I conflate Hitler and Germany as one entity).
Yeah, this was the biggest effect from the strategic bombing – German production was either level or increased despite the bombing, and even if one argues that it would have increased more if the bombing had not taken place, the direct damage caused by the bombing wouldn’t have outpaced the double digit percentage of German production that was going to domestic air defence as a result of the bombing.
Everyone sees that now, and it’s been discussed ad nauseum by generations of historians.
But at the start of the civil war did anyone say that? Was anyone in the South (or elsewhere) like “hold everyone we’ll never win this thing, the North has too much industrial capacity!”
A fair point. But also worth noting is that the South tried it’s best to grab forts and arsenals to equip their army and bought large numbers of weapons (those they could get past the blockade) from England and France. So they knew quite early that they needed to develop a weapons program with very little (that they accomplished so much, i.e. ironclads, is worth noting).
As mentioned above, neither side thought the war would last very long, one big battle and it would be over. It was only when the war stretched out and larger and larger masses of troops came into service that the South realized that they were way behind the curve.
Everyone sees that now, and it’s been discussed ad nauseum by generations of historians.
But at the start of the civil war did anyone say that? Was anyone in the South (or elsewhere) like “hold everyone we’ll never win this thing, the North has too much industrial capacity!”
Analysis of wars is highly subject to hindsight bias, I agree. Which I think is just compounded by putting together two very different conflicts like WWII and the US Civil War. Hardly anything in common except both being wars, and it being the general cultural norm in the ‘Union’/US to view the Union/US in both as having had the morally superior position. Which is not to debate whether that’s true, I personally believe it generally is more true than not. But it’s not of much significance in understanding the outlook of the quite different ‘bad guys’ in those two cases.
As has been mentioned and is obvious, the bar for success for Nazi Germany was far higher than for the Confederacy. The former sought to conquer other nation states on a vast scale, with no apparent limit depending on the success as it went along, in the event eventually lining up a coalition of enemies far beyond its original opponents of 1939. The Confederates had a far more limited and well defined war aim: to be allowed to withdraw from an originally voluntary political union. There was every possibility the Union would at some point decide the fight was no longer worth it. Saying that Union industrial superiority made Confederate success impossible is like saying the far greater total size of the British economy meant it would inevitably totally defeat the US in the War of 1812 (which wouldn’t have happened because by the same logic Britain would have put down the colonial uprising in the 1770’s as it would have been known). No, because both wars were eventually viewed in Britain as not worth pursuing to total victory. That was an altogether plausible outcome of the US Civil War also. Not that it was impossible WWII might have ended that way too, but Nazi Germany had proven itself a far greater threat to the basic political order and way of life in the opposing countries than the Confederacy ever did wrt the Union. Two basically different situations.
Arguably, Lincoln and Scott were thinking that way - that’s why Scott developed the Anaconda plan, which didn’t rely on set-piece battles, but on incremental destruction of the South’s ability to continue to operate as a nation.
I still see it only as just a little bit plausible, a very underwhelming point because it ignores context. Historians in Britain often see the War of 1812 as a minor theater of the Napoleonic Wars. The British were then more worried in defeating the Corsican General that was hell bent into ending their own empire than worrying more about Mr. Madison’s War.
And again, the french in the 1770’s and other enemies of Britain gave decisive help to the American revolution.
Britain didn’t have any treaty obligation with Czechoslovakia. You might argue that they had some kind of moral obligation but you could argue that the United States or Sweden or Brazil had a moral obligation as well. None of them fought for Czechoslovakia either; why single out Britain?
France did have a treaty with Czechoslovakia. But they announced that they would not honor the treaty to fight alongside Czechoslovakia if it was attacked unless Britain also declared war. So you can certainly say the French were dicks about the situation but Britain was just trying to broker the best deal that Czechoslovakia was going to get out of the situation. And it had no obligation to even do that, let alone any more.
As for Poland, Britain did sign a treaty with them. And when Poland was attacked by Germany, Britain declared war on Germany. Which looks to me like they stood by the treaty.
And it would just be nitpicking to point out the Franco-Prussian War was fought in 1870 to 1871 and only lasted seven months.