Depends on the type. A few years ago in Germany my wife and I were cycling around in the fields outside Duesseldorf, where I lived, and passed a field of maize. We figured that the farmer wouldn’t miss a few corncobs and took four back home. We noticed that it looked a sort of brownish yellow as opposed to the usual golden yellow, and realized that it was quite a different sort when we ate it. Or tried to eat it. It was tough and did not taste that good. We put it back and boiled it longer, but it still obstinately remained woody. Evidently we had deprived some poor animal of its lunch.
Food of last resort? A couple of now elderly Germans who had trekked out of what is now Poland in 1945 told of being fed with groats en route by the locals. Nostalgia? They couldn’t eat them after the war.
We probably should add Japan to the list- It’s hard to comprehend the short sighted wishful thinking that led them to try to win their endless quagmire war in China by starting an even bigger war with the U.S.
They imagined giving the US enough of a setback that Japan could consolidate its gains sufficiently that the US would then decline to strike back. I’ve also read that they underestimated the US industrial potential because in 1941 so much of that potential was unused due to the continuing effects of the Depression.
For Germany, it wasn’t a given that it woud be war. The re-occupation of the Rheinland, unification with Austria, and the occupation of Czechoslovakia were unopposed despite prior rhetoric from the allies. There was reason to believe the partition of Poland might not have any consequences. Then when France and GB declared war, after a brief Sitzkrieg, things got going for real, and Germany in fact proved strategically and tactically surperior. France was defeated, England badly beaten and neutralized.
Of course no tactical doctrine remains superior. Unless you defeat the enemy and entirely remove them from the fight, they will adapt and improve. At which point, in modern warfare, industrial capacity takes over as the deciding factor. Russia alone would be able to out-produce Germany - helped along by the fact that the answer to “Wollt Ihr den totalen Krieg?” Turned out to be: “sorta yes, as long as we get to go home by 5 every day” (most plants never went to 3 shifts).
Germany was always going to lose in a war that had he US on the other side. Even if they didn’t start war with Russia in the early 40’s, eventually there would have been war with Russia. But Germany would always start a war with Russia: it was part of their fundamental outlook: Lebensraum im Osten.
Do you think Nazi Germany would have had more success if it had stopped at continental Europe; Borders at the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the English Channel and the line defined by the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact? Presumably, it would have eventually muscled in on Italy, Spain and all the other European fascists or they would have been reduced to mere clients because that’s how fascists work.
The Allies/Union seem to have been much better at learning from failure, adapting and improving than their opponents.
Politically might have made continuing the war untenable.
I agree a “peace” would have been like the various peace that were declared during the Napoleonic war, with the UK quickly looking for an excuse to resume hostilities after it had licked its wounds.
But might have ended that stage of conflict.
The problem with this question, is that for Germany, their central, in some ways only goal was the defeat, dismemberment and occupation of the Soviet Union. As has been mentioned earlier, if Germany could have avoided war with France (and to a much, much greater extent Great Britain) they would have quickly foregone that in order to defeat the Soviet Union.
A key factor was that Hitler saw himself as a unique force of destiny. He believed he needed to do everything that needed to be done in his own lifetime because the people that would succeed him would lack his vision; they would just be caretakers for what he had built.
And Hitler didn’t believe he had a lot of time. Most of his family members had died at early ages and he expected he would also. Hitler turned fifty in 1939 and he thought he only had a few years left. So things like the extermination of the Jews and the conquest of Russia couldn’t be put off to a more propitious time.
I’ve said before that one of the deciding factors of WWII was that every time the Soviets lost a battle it made Stalin more willing to listen to his generals next time and every time the Germans lost a battle it made Hitler less willing to listen to his generals next time.
The funny thing (at least we can laugh about it now) is that Germany had all the oil it needed; it just didn’t know it.
Libya had been taken over by Germany’s ally Italy in 1911. And there were vast oil reserves in Libya. But they weren’t discovered until the fifties. If that oil had been discovered twenty years earlier, Germany and Italy would have had all the oil they needed.
On a separate note, the allies were aware of the German army’s dependence on horses. At one point late in the war, they wrote up a plan to begin bombing horse breeding farms in Prussia and Poland as part of the campaign to cripple German transportation. Eisenhower supposedly vetoed the plan because he didn’t like the idea of deliberately targeting horses.
I’ve read that the Japanese thought that, to secure access to rubber and other South Pacific resources, war with the U.S. was inevitable, and that their only chance of winning that war was a crippling surprise attack. What’s more, had they destroyed the fuel reserves at Pearl Harbor the American ability to strike back would have been much weaker. That oversight – combined with only destroying a few ships and not the entire fleet in Pearl at the time – doomed them from the start.
Might have been a lot tougher than Hitler’s use of oil from Romania; the oil from Libya would have had to be shipped by sea. Although then again, Hitler’s plan to capture the Caucasus and use the oil of Maikop and Grozny would have required a great length of pipeline or some land transportation that would have been hampered by excessive distance, too.
The IJN — or at least the Naval General Staff, as opposed to Yamamoto’s Combined Fleet — seemed wedded to Mahan’s “decisive battle” doctrine (as, it should be noted, was the USN before Pearl Harbor). According to this doctrine, control of the seas would be decided by a Jutland-like slugfest between two fleets of dreadnoughts.
One reason for the Japanese thrust into the Central Pacific, which gained them little in terms of the raw materials which were a primary goal of the war, was to establish a series of bases from which they could chip away at the US fleet as it steamed west toward its inevitable destruction somewhere around the Philippines.
You are in fact the one ignoring the key historical context as far the War of 1812. Which began as a sideshow to the Napoleonic Wars. But it was still going on when Napoleon was completely defeated and deposed in the spring of 1814, leaving the US as the only active combatant v. Britain. However rather than turning its full might against the US, Britain in August accepted negotiations to end the war which were concluded in December, on basically ‘status quo ante’ terms, before Napoleon’s return for the 100 days in March 1815. Because, pursuing the war to total victory was not viewed as being worth it regardless of Britain’s greatly larger economy and total military forces compared to the US.
The point is the country or side with larger military potential not judging it worth the candle to fully apply it. Whether that’s because the stronger country has other adversaries (the USA also had to worry whether it would weaken itself more against potential adversaries ca. 1860’s by losing the South or by the cost of keeping it), or is just tired of war though no other immediate adversaries (Britain after Napoleon’s initial defeat in 1814) or some combination (US in 1973 in Vietnam) the point is still valid.
The American Civil War could very plausibly have ended likewise. The North’s much larger and more industrialized economy was a necessary but not sufficient condition to insure the South’s failure in its war aim to be left alone to go its own way. Southern failure, especially given the what turned up to be generally superior military military performance per unit of combat power by the Confederate over Union forces, especially in the earlier part of the war, depended on Northern will to persevere in a costly war of attrition. That was a fairly close run thing after certain setbacks, and could have gone the other way with different leadership.
Actually what you said does not counter what I said, remember what I said is that it was “a little bit plausible” as in: of course it could had gone the other way with things like different leadership, but then again, different leadership (if a more ruthless leader had been there instead of Lincoln) the north would had gone into total war mode early and dismissed timid generals like George B. McClellan sooner.
IMHO resources and the alliances that were not there for the South then told the North to press on regardless of the setbacks that the North had. If there had been less resources for the North then I do think that the South would had better chances to do what you think, but because it was not like that those better chances were between fat and slim and leaning towards unlikely.
Yeah, the Japanese were already fighting Western-backed China while relying on U.S. imports for oil, scrap iron, and copper. At the time, Japan was worried that a sudden U.S. embargo would cripple the war machine, plus the existential threat of a Soviet invasion. Japan invaded Vichy Indochina to block Chinese supply routes (Sept '40), then officially joined the Axis. Days later the U.S. expanded the Japanese embargo to include scrap metal and parts, although they did not yet cut off the oil supply. Roosevelt moved the fleet to Pearl Harbor as a deterrant. Japan continued fighting against pockets of resistance from the Second Unified Front (Kuomintang+Communists) which wasn’t really unified at all.
The Nazis invaded Soviet Russia in June of '41, which meant Japan could move troops down to Indochina in anticipation of an invasion of British Singapore and Brunei for rubber, tin, and oil deposits. The Japanese thought an invasion of those British colonies would cause America to declare war, so they attempted to negotiate. The U.S. wanted a Japanese withdrawal from China, which the Japanese refused. The U.S. cut off Japan’s oil supply on August 1, '41, and negotiations broke down in late November. Japan had some oil reserves, I think it was a year or two worth.
Still thinking an invasion of the British colonies would start a war with America, Japan saw war with the U.S. as inevitable and decided to launch a preemptive strike against Pearl Harbor. The Japanese also thought the upcoming war would be determined by battleships, so the attack targeted battleships instead of carriers, submarines, and buildings. The attack was carried out on December 7, '47. Japan intended to give the U.S. a 30-minute warning before the attack, but due to decryption delays this warning was delivered hours after the attack.
It was only an issue because Hitler never saw the Mediterranean as a important theater. He didn’t see that Germany had any important strategic interests in North Africa so he only sent a token amount of troops there.
But if his oil supply had been coming from Libya, he would have gotten serious. Germany could have taken and held Gibraltar and Aden if they had wished to. And with both ends of the Mediterranean under German control, they could have easily mopped up any British and French resistance that was left behind.
Japan saw the war with the U.S. as inevitable not only for because of the competition over resources, but because they had their version of a “Manifest Destiny” over Asia which would inevitably conflict with America which would not sit back and watch Japan’s attempted domination over other Asian countries.
The ultra national fanatics in the Japanese military had been furious with the US for more than a decade, far before the question of resources came up.
The question about not destroying oil been dealt with before, and it would not have been easy to destroy them. However, even if they had destroyed the oil tanks, it wouldn’t have changed much.
Second, they simply didn’t have the capacity to destroy the entire fleet at PH. They didn’t have enough bombs, and it would have required too many attacks. The second attack saw two thirds of the Japanese losses. Already one forth of the available planes where either shot down or damaged. Out of the 350 planes in the two wave, they only have 265 available for a possible third wave.
You mean ’41 of course. There was a conflict in priority between Yamamoto and Minoru Genda, the chief planner. Yamamoto was much more concerned about sinking battleships and Genda was more concerned about the carriers. Both were targeted in the attack, but obviously the carriers weren’t there.
The carriers simply didn’t have the ordinance to destroy the facilities at PH, including the sub base. That would have required land-based bombers which were clearly out of range. Alan Zimm in his book, “Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions” calculates considering the necessity of leaving one third of the remaining planes for antishipping if the US carriers appeared, they would only attack with a maximum of 280 250 kg bombs. For normal calculations this would destroy only 6% the Navy Yard, and probably less than half of that. The US found later in the war that bombing buildings didn’t necessarily destroy the contents.
The message to be delivered was actually a vaguely worded statement and not a declaration of war, which occurred later that day. The Fourteen Part Message, as it is commonly called, ends by stating:
The actual declaration of war had no problem being direct
While there were things had Hitler and Germany done differently, or if the Winds of War blown just a little more their way, it may have been possible for Germany to have one. Not really for Japan. She just was too weak to take on the US.
The Japanese did not target battleships instead of carriers; they targeted battleships because there were no carriers to attack. All the carriers were out, by sheer chance. Enterprise was delivering planes to Wake Island, Lexington was delivering planes to Midway, and Saratoga was in San Diego.
Had the carriers been in port they would have been attacked.