Pearl Harbor attack - was it Japan's wisest course of action?

The attack killed ~2400 servicemen and damaged or sank all eight of our battleships anchored at Pearl Harbor. It shocked America.

Legend has it that Japanese Admiral Yamamoto said “I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve.”

Did Japan have a realistic better option than striking at Pearl Harbor? Could they, for example, have worked around American interests and not gone to war with us while still accomplishing their imperial designs? Would an open declaration of war, and not a surprise attack, have led to lowered US fervor in continuing the war and thus given Japan a better opportunity for victory or favorable cease-fire terms?

I do wonder what the US would have done, had Japan invaded everything between Shikoku and Australia *except *American possessions. Tried to buy those with the fruits of their plunders maybe, or just waiting until the clamour for independence was high enough, maybe amplify it a little as they went… Would the US have moved then, I wonder ? I mean, I know the US was already helping out China a little, but not quite decisively, exactly.

Mythology aside, the decision to attack Pearl Harbour was sound and it succeeded. The US Pacific Fleet was a non issue in the war for six months and the Far East fell like dominos.* The underlying decision which led to it; go to war, was lousy.
*
War was coming attack on Pearl or not. Its very unlikely the US would not have seen an attack on the Philippines as a declaration of war, or an attack on Wake or Guam. Not attacking American possessions, is a non starter, they are needed as bases, staging areas and oh…in of themselves for Japan’s war aims.

The actual Japanese war objective was to take a lot of territory then force America to accept a peace leaving them in control of the territory. The attack on Pearl harbor failed utterly at assisting with that goal, because it was seen as a cowardly stab in the back that could not be overlooked. The idea was that the attack would shock the weak democracy into crying and begging for peace, and instead it cemented American resolve to win the war and to make damn sure it wasn’t just a short pause like the one between WWI and WWII. Did it do damage? So what, most of the US fleet wasn’t even finished building yet.

Pearl Harbor was about the worst decision Japan could make. They could have given up the campaign in China that they lost anyway and been content with holding on to island posessions, Korea, and Manchuria. This was IMO their only hope of victory of any sort, but it was completely unpalatable to Japanese leadership. They could have launched an attack that didn’t include a massive sneak attack on American forces in the hopes that the US would see this as a sideshow and focus on Germany. Doesn’t seem real likely, but it’s at least more plausible than the Pearl Harbor concept.

So they don’t attack the US PacFlt. Then what? It sorties and engaged the Japanese in major fleet actions from Dec '41 onwards. Two years of very bloody combat ends with a Japanese defeat.

The strategy was sound. It was their only realistic hope of a favourable settlement once the decision to go to war had been made.

I have said before that the Japanese misread America’s willingness to start a war. Roosevelt and some others were in favor of intervention. But they were held back by a very strong isolationist movement.

In my opinion, the only thing that could have brought America directly into the war was a declaration of war against the United States; which Japan and Germany did. I feel that as long as Japan and Germany held off from starting a war with America, America would have limited its responses to economic and diplomatic opposition.

So I believe the Pearl Harbor attack was a mistake. Japan could have safely ignored the American military forces in the Pacific and attacked British and Dutch colonial possessions. The American government would have strongly protested this but American forces would not have fired on Japanese forces.

One of the things I like about the Dope is the number of Dopers who know military history better than I do.

Tactically, good idea. Destroy the US fleet and run riot in the Pacific for six months. Strategically, not so much - the idea “those Americans are soft and no match for our samurai spirit - they will sue for peace and our Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere will reign forever” was one of those goofy notions extremists talk themselves into.

Maybe they were misled by Hitler - Herr Schickelgruber said no one would do anything if he invaded Czechoslovakia, and he was right. He also said he could conquer France in a few weeks, and he was right. Then he invaded Poland and the Soviet Union, and found out he had bitten way the fuck more than he could chew. “The US won’t do anything, and if they do, we will defeat them the way we did the Russians in 1902” is a combination of those two ideas. Then came Midway, and it turns out both ideas were wrong.

I wonder what other choice they had.

Congratulations - using my Magic Time Travel/Shape Shifting/Espresso Making Transmogrifier, you are now Head Honcho of the Japanese military forces in 1941. You are tasked with successfully concluding a war in the Pacific, to the greater glory of the divine Emperor. Your orders will be obeyed implicitly, and you have the additional advantage of a complete knowledge of what did happen 1941-1945 at no extra charge.

We await your orders, Your Gloriousity.

Regards,
Shodan

Not sure why Admiral Yamamoto gets all this credit for recognizing that an attack on America would awaken a sleeping giant. After all, despite that insight, he is the person most responsible for pushing Japan into the direct attack on the United States. Pearl Harbor only came about because Yamamoto and his staff at Combined Fleet threatened to resign if the Pearl Harbor attack did not take place. Combined Fleet doctrine was built around the theory of the decisive battle, that one naval battle could dictate the outcome of a conflict and loss at sea would force the opponent to the negotiating table as had happened in the Russo-Japanese War after the Battle of Tsuhima.

Japanese Imperial General HQ as well as the Japanese Naval GHQ were both opposed to an attack on Pearl Harbor. The belief at HQ was that the US would not be interested in sending its young men to die on little known islands that were colonies of European powers. As there was still a fairly strong isolationist movement in the United States, I think IJHQ and NGHQ were more correct in their assessment of the situation. As long as Japan did not strike the US directly, there would be no casus belli.

And besides, there was no strategic reason to expand into the western Pacific. For all the islands that Japan captured, and this includes the Philippines, they added not one whit to Japan’s ability to wage war. In fact, they likely subtracted from it. None of the islands they occupied were self-sustaining or capable of contributing raw or finished materials directly to the war effort. None could be used to produce ships or aircraft in their own defense, much less the food, fuel, and bullets needed to sustain a garrison. All had to be shipped in with precious little of value worth returning to Japan. The island defensive perimeter was more useless then the Maginot line was.

So, the wiser course of action? Avoid armed conflict with the United States. Strike for strategically valuable areas with resources and industrial capacity on mainland Asia or European colonies. Play the Chinese Nationalists and Communists against each other and be seen as a liberator or at least a law-and-order influence that brings peace and security to the Chinese population (although the last would be difficult given Japanese attitudes of racism at the time). In essence, focus on developing the economic and logistical power needed to sustain an empire so that a US embargo means little.

Not sure if war with the Soviet Union would be a good idea. An attack on the USSR would have forced Stalin into fighting on two fronts and would have relieved some of the pressure on the German armies. Hard to say if that would have been enough to change the outcomes at Stalingrad or Moscow, doubtless Stalin would have given up Vladivostok and Siberia as Moscow and the land east of the Urals was clearly the prize and I don’t know that Japan had the wherewithal to advance all the way across the continent and through the mountains anyway.

I think one important factor was that Japan didn’t comprehend what a massive economic advantage America had. In 1941, Japanese and American naval power was approximately equal. But Japan had committed a huge proportion of its economy to building its navy while America had built its navy with just a small fraction of its economy.

The Japanese, like people everywhere, tending to see other countries from their own perspective. If they had suffered a Pearl Harbor-like attack, it would have crippled their navy for a decade or more. And while they realized on an intellectual level that the American economy was different, they didn’t really have the feel of what that meant. They ignored the differences and acted as if their attack would have the same effect as it would have had on them. They wouldn’t have believed it was possible for a country to build over a hundred aircraft carriers as the United States went on to do during the war.

How? The Japanese IRL needed the Philipines as a base to operate in the Dutch East Indies and in the Indian Ocean, they actually moved formations from Philippines to the Dutch East Indies during the campaign once the had secured parts of the Islands. Without the Philippines, operations in the East Indies (already strecthed) would have been unfeasible.

In the EastPac; without Wake or the Marianas, forget about having any logistically feasible offensive.

[QUOTE=Shodan]
Tactically, good idea. Destroy the US fleet and run riot in the Pacific for six months. Strategically, not so much - the idea “those Americans are soft and no match for our samurai spirit - they will sue for peace and our Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere will reign forever” was one of those goofy notions extremists talk themselves into.
[/QUOTE]

Strategically? Destroy the enemy fleet and cripple his ability to fight. The strategic mistake was going to war period.

Encapsulating the goal as weakening the US Navy in the Pacific for a period of 6-12 months it was a success and wise decision. If the goal included some kind of end game that didn’t result in their total destruction then it wasn’t so wise.

The wisest course would be chilling out, maybe reflecting on an old Nagarjuna quote or two.

Even from the imperial ambition POV wasn’t Pearl Harbor a tactical failure? I was under the impression the valuable ships just so happened to be elsewhere at the time of the attack and Japan mostly sunk stuff America didn’t care about. I don’t know what I’m talking about, though.

While it was fortunate for America that our fleet carriers were not at Pearl Harbor during the attack, I don’t think it’s correct to say we “didn’t care about” the other ships that were damaged or destroyed. We went through a hell of a lot of trouble to raise several of the sunken ones from the harbor floor, and repair most of the damaged ones and return them to service. If it was really just old junk, we wouldn’t have bothered.

How much difference would it have made if the Japanese had gone further and done a more thorough job? Really wipe out all the onshore facilities and a solid sweep for away ships? Maybe mine the crap out of the harbour?

We pretty much know that Japan would have gotten away with it.* Yes, FDR would have started looking for a excuse, just like he did with the Nazis, putting American ships in harms way and sending massive aid.

But the sneak attack galvanized a apathetic and isolationist America, one who was angry that the Brits had fooled u into WWI, and then then & France pissed all over our plans for extended World Peace.

Maybe, maybe the Japanese sinking of some USN cruiser “by mistake” or something similar might have gotten Congress to declare war, sure. But it would not have had the effect of Pearl Harbor.

The sneak attack was the very worst thing Japan could have done. It was a colossal blunder. Even if they had gotten a carrier, even if they had hit the oil. The absolute worst thing.

  • Some experts say, in hypotheticals, this might have been one way for the Axis to “win” WWII> America not entering the war until two years later? USSR collapsing. Britain suing for peace.

You are correct, except maybe here just a show of force on the border from many Japanese divisions and a strike force, might have been helpful to the Nazis.

What would have changed the outcomes at Stalingrad or Moscow is that Stalin and the Russian people would have know there was no help coming. No massive American aid. No second front. They would have to beat the Germans all by themselves.

Stalin made it clear they couldnt do it, that American aid and a second front were needed.

My take:

If you assume Japan had concluded that war was either inevitable or in its best interest, the Pearl Harbor attack was genius*.

Both Japan and the US wanted the same resources in the South Pacific - oil (esp. for Japan), rubber and jute (rope was still a huge issue).
Even if they had studiously avoided the “Sleeping Giant” (I hate that expression), we and they would have eventually come to blows over competing interests.

What was their biggest mistake was NOT going after the carriers.
By Midway, the change in importance in carrier v battleship was complete.
Maybe, just maybe, the attack left the US with no battleships, so our tactics changed from “send really big battleship to sink the other guy’s ships” to “use airplanes to attack both ships and land”.

That change in strategic planning was THE big naval news of that war.

75 years later, and we still think the Carrier is King.
The next war will prove that the $1 million super-cruise missile is the new King - your $4 billion carrier is now scrap metal at the bottom of the ocean.
Just hope your planes got off before it sank. And hope that there is still a huge chunk of strong, flat and level concrete with an intact fuel depot withing range of those planes.
And really, really hope your aerial tankers are still up and have lots of fuel - those super attack and interceptor planes are thirsty.

    • remember, in 1941 the Battleship was THE capital ship - and this attack destroyed the US Fleet’s battleships

They had Viet Nam.

Not much. Maybe six more months before we nuked them.

No, they didn’t need the Philippines as a base. They already had bases all along the coast of occupied China and French Indochina, which were just as close to the target areas in British Malaysia and the Dutch East Indies.

The strategic importance of the Philippines was that it was well positioned as a point of counter-attack against any Japanese moves in East or South-East Asia. But that’s only a concern if the counter-attacks are actually made.

The Japanese had after all been making military attacks in East and South-East Asia since 1937 and the American military forces in the Philippines and elsewhere hadn’t opposed them. Japan should have read the signs and realized they were safe from an American attack unless they provoked one by attacking American possessions.

As far as Wake Island and the Marianas, their only use was as bases for an attack further on. If Japan wasn’t planning on attacking Hawaii or the American mainland, it didn’t need bases in the mid-Pacific.