As I mentioned in a prior thread last year on this topic, the way to stop piracy is to kill the pirates on the spot and never negotiate; never pay a ransom.
In the short run, this will cost hostage lives and outrage the weak-minded and feeble of purpose. It’s likely it will also cause public outrage among the naive. Nevertheless, in the long run it will end piracy, which is done for money and no other reason. Unfortunately, there is a misguided concept of due process, which is applicable in a lawful society and abused in an unlawful one. There is also a willingness to pay ransom for my friends while not accounting for the fact that more people down the road will die if I do.
I have little sympathy for tourists who electively take risks. International shipping is another thing altogether and should be protected. I sort of thought eventually even namby-pamby Western governments would figure out how to deal with piracy, but apparently they are very very slow learners, and now face increasingly powerful pirates backed by increasingly well-funded resources. Duh.
Why the sudden outrage? They have killed victims of other nationalities and no one around here posted a similar thread. Double standards? American lives are worth more than other nationalities?
I’m an American and have been following the Somali piracy situation (and there have been earlier threads here) for a few years now, but not everyone has. I’m sure no American Doper thinks American lives are worth more than those of citizens of other countries, but for some people, the loss of your own countrymen in a faraway hotspot will get your attention focused on the situation in a way that little else will.
The board is for fighting ignorance, not perpetuating it. AMISOM is sanctioned by the UN and is their primary means for providing institutional support. UN humanitarian and relief agencies continue to play a major in helping establish a stable government. The US left. The UN did not.
And most people are advocating not a military occupation of the country, but myself and others would support a naval blockade. It would have to be with the support of the transitional government. Something I think they would support since the money from piracy is the main source of funds for the opposition factions.
And naval blockades are the only effective means of controlling illegal activities. Except in the industrialized world, we use coast guards to implement it, not navies. And since Somalia has neither, the international community should create one, first using naval forces which have greater force projection, and then build up a coast guard.
Establishing safe corridors is only a temporary solution. And proving ineffective as well. Open ocean patrolling will never succeed as long as the pirates have safe home ports. Reading the history of piracy, it is never controlled until those ports are ‘sanitized’. We could go medieval and bomb the crap of them, or we could blockade them and interdict any boat heading to open water. If they are fishermen, let them pass and check to see what is actually in their hold when they return.
Will it be expensive? Lets look at the numbers. The US Coast Guard spends about $10 Billion to protect about 20K km of coastlines. Or about $500,000 per km. Somalia’s coast is about 3000 km. So using US level resources it would cost about $1.5 Billion. But that is an unrealistic comparison.
Let’s look at India. Their total naval budget, which includes their coast guard, is about $250 million to protect about 7500 km, so about $32,000 per km. So for Somalia, about $96 million could provide comparable protection.
Since OECD countries would be the major beneficiaries of that protection, let them pay it. Divide it equally by the 34 OECD countries, and each countries share is whopping $2.8 million per country.
Or consider that $96 million is a whopping 0.00034% of their total GDP, and a whopping 8 cents per person of those countries.
The naysayers are right. It is too expensive. No way we can afford that during these tough economic times.
While it’s useful to have some ongoing military protection, its main purpose should be to strike when pirates are found, sinking their vessels on the spot without much hoopla. Mother ships, in particular, should be expeditiously dispatched to the sea floor.
The only way to get rid of piracy, though, is to not make it pay. That means never pay a ransom; never negotiate. Decide on a case-by-case basis if a military attempt at rescue is possible, but never never never pay a dime.
Generally speaking, Westerners are too soft–too sophisticated; too genteel and often too selfish–to execute such a policy. They are definitely too divided to execute it consistently. So the next-best solution is for individual countries and/or shipping lines to take the policy of non-negotiation. President Obama or Nils Andersen, for example, need to set a policy of non-negotiation and non-payment. Over the long run pirates will turn to softer targets than US citizens or Maersk vessels.
I suspect eventually even the bleeding hearts will begin to think it’s not such a good idea to extend due process and timidity toward international muggers. Perhaps not, but at least they can be the countries whose citizenry pays the toll.
Quite. Declare war on them. Go on the attack. Don’t wait for an incident and then stand around wringing our hands. The Times today said there are something like 94 ships being held to ransom at this moment including huge oil tankers.
Enough is enough. It’s ridiculous that a bunch of thugs in little more than armed fishing boats can operate with impunity like this in the 21st century.
Actively hunt down and pre-emptively sink pirate vessels. Track them back to their ports bomb the crap out of them in harbour.
And all the while go after the money and the big guys at the top of the tree in London or wherever.
Again; they look just like all the other little fishing vessels. You’ll just end up killing a great many innocent fishermen. And by the same token, they are replaceable. There’s nothing special about them, the only distinguishing feature about them is that they have pirates aboard, pirates who look like everyone else.
Maybe a better solution would be to patrol the Somali costal water and board and hand the crew of European fishing trawlers and Indian ships dumping toxic waste to the Islamic courts?
That wrong certainly should be righted and it is what first precipitated the pirating by enraged and desparate fishermen but it was so lucrative that the organized criminal element moved in and they now dominate the activity. They’re the ones that have extended the danger zone from just along the Somali coast out to include The Red Sea and much of the Indian Ocean.
Firstly, AMISOM is an African Union mission with a UN mandate; it is not a UN mission. The UN left in 1995.
Secondly, you are flat wrong about the cost of military intervention. The current cost of military operations against Somalian piracy is about $2bil per year. Drastically increasing military intervention would not cost less.
Thanks for crunching the numbers. Perhaps a fee could be levied on each ship which transits the waters and wishes to avail itself of the multinational task force’s protection and help?
Those figures are for India patrolling Indian coastal waters. India doesn’t really bother with power projection; the Indian Navy doesn’t operate outside the Indian Ocean. Where are your hypothetical Somalian coastal water patrols going to be based?
AMISOM is the successor to UNISOM II and has the full cooperation and support of the UN. And the UN is more than just peacekeepers. Other UN agencies have operated in Somalia continuously. And that $2 Billion is using modern navies, but I wonder where they got their data. They offer no support for that figure. The EUNAVFOR escort task force only has a budget of about 8M euros. Add in all the other ad hoc task forces and patrols, its possible it costs $2B. If that is the case, we are certainly not getting much bang for our buck, considering India protects a coast over twice as large as Somalia’s for only $1.6 B.
From your cite: Total direct costs of piracy in 2010 is thus estimated to be between $7 billion and $12 billion. (Though also mostly unsubstantiated.)
Do you really think that outfitting and staffing 50 cutters, 20 helicopters and interceptors (about the current level of India’s Coast Guard) would cost more than that? And Somalia may not even need that high a force level.
I’ll stand by my revised estimate of $600 million. Which is probably on the high side if anything.
[QUOTE=Really Not All That Bright]
Those figures are for India patrolling Indian coastal waters. India doesn’t really bother with power projection; the Indian Navy doesn’t operate outside the Indian Ocean. Where are your hypothetical Somalian coastal water patrols going to be based?
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No, the Indian Navy doesn’t operate much beyond its coastal waters and neighboring oceans. Which is why it is a valid comparison. A modern US-level naval force is not needed - a modern Indian-level force I would hope be sufficient. Somalia does not need to project force either beyond the Indian Ocean.
As far as bases, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is building a base in Bosaso on the northern coast. Facilities in Djibouti and Sanaa (where the IMO helped build a regional information sharing center similar to the one used in South Asia) could be used as well along with Mogadishu - the TFG currently controls the port. Kenya has facilities also. Capabilities exist.
[QUOTE=Elendil’s Heir]
Perhaps a fee could be levied on each ship which transits the waters and wishes to avail itself of the multinational task force’s protection and help?
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Until Somalia is stable enough to take over operational control and can levy enough taxes of their own, that seems fair to me. Add it to the transit charge for the Suez canal. (Which made $4.52 B last the fiscal year)
The only thing I see lacking is the political will to address this issue and craft a permanent solution. Sending an occasional warship that isn’t busy doing PR work, and sending various delegates to conferences that continue to propose ineffective actions is not working.
Why are you so hung up on this fantasy scheme of yours that is NEVER going to happen for the dozens of reasons that have already been explained? Did you have relatives or friends who knew these people, or what?
Not initially. First let’s use those $2B warships to enforce a blockade, but any long term solution will require Somali operational control. But the TFG does need to be in the loop from the beginning. The goal should be a fully functional Somali coast guard within five years with a UN task force until it is achieved.
A modest infrastructure is starting to be built, but I am advocating a much more intense focused effort. The longer we lest this fester, the longer it takes the TFG to establish a stable government. I really don’t want to see similar threads ten years from now because of we of the industrialized world could not get our act together.
We know what the problem is. We know what resources are needed. We are not re-inventing the wheel. We just need to do it.
[QUOTE=Nadir]
Why are you so hung up on this fantasy scheme of yours that is NEVER going to happen for the dozens of reasons that have already been explained? Did you have relatives or friends who knew these people, or what?
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I knew none of the victims personally. Nor do I know any of the 600+ mariners being held hostage. Nor do I know any of the sailors stationed there risking their lives. Nor do I need to. It is called compassion. Try it sometimes.
And I am not hung up on this scheme - I am investigating the issue, gathering data and offering possible solutions, and then addressing critiques of those possibilities. On this topic and several others. I am seeking to contribute to the greater debate. Something I have not seen you offer in any post. I have no desire to ask your motives though. Your actions speak for themselves.
I did, a few times way back in the day. Funny thing, it didn’t seem to work quite as well for me as I’d been led to believe. Expensive, time-consuming and usually resulted in spoiled, ungrateful compassion recipients.
