Free Will - Does it exist?

[begbert2]

[QUOTE=Mangetout]
I’m not forgetting anything - you keep talking about only the very top layer of the mechanism (the desires and genetic predispositions) - if there isn’t really any free will, then it goes all the way down to the atoms and beyond - your actions, despite their appearance of choice, are in fact ordained and mechanically scripted in such a way that - given sufficient information about the initial state - could have been computed fully in advance before you were even born - you’re just going through the motions.

Either that or if there isn’t such computable determinism, the mechanism is the same, but the variations in the script are just the result of a cascade of events tweaked by some random pop of an electron or some such.

Either way, you’re bound by your desires, your desires are bound by their chemistry; their chemistry is bound by its physics, and nothing you’re actually doing, or experiencing, is really in any way controllable by you.
[/QUOTE]
The last word of your post is the crux of your problem: the word “you”. What “you” are you talking about here? Clearly not the collection of atoms acting together to make your body and brain, since those atoms and their interactions (however deterministic) clearly do control your actions. Clearly you’re not talking about an external spirit, or you’d have mentioned it by now (and if you did, you’d just be adding another turtle, not resolving any problems). So, if you’re not your brain, body, or a spirit, what are you? Answer that, and unless I miss my guess you will have answered your own objections.

[Mangetout]

[QUOTE=begbert2]
The last word of your post is the crux of your problem: the word “you”. What “you” are you talking about here? Clearly not the collection of atoms acting together to make your body and brain, since those atoms and their interactions (however deterministic) clearly do control your actions. Clearly you’re not talking about an external spirit, or you’d have mentioned it by now (and if you did, you’d just be adding another turtle, not resolving any problems). So, if you’re not your brain, body, or a spirit, what are you? Answer that, and unless I miss my guess you will have answered your own objections.
[/QUOTE]

Not really. This goes back to what I (think I) said earlier - the implication of no free will is that there is no ‘you’ - just an automaton following an ordained path.

[Digital_Stimulus]

[QUOTE=Sophistry and Illusion]
Okay; I think I get the gist of what you are saying. I guess my question to you would be, in a non-surjective relation, what determines the value of the output?
[/QUOTE]

Thank you for wading through the tedium. As loathe as I am to say this, as it’s not what I actually think, I believe anything akin to “soul” or “spirit” would do the trick. Any uncaused cause. But a more palatable answer? I don’t know…if I did, I’d like to think I would rightfully deserve a place in that pantheon of philosophy. To expound some and explore the topic, I’ll prattle on just a bit…maybe it’ll be interesting to some, maybe only to me, but that’s true of any post, right?

The part about non-surjective is important (I think) because it allows an effect (i.e., an element in the codomain) to exist without any (apparent) cause (i.e., elements in the domain). The parenthetical “apparent” is in there because I think it would play a key role in explaining why no one has formulated a decent theory. Specifically, it might refer to that “mechanism” that is analogically similar to natural selection in evolution (which led me to post to this thread in the first place).

Another way of looking at that idea stems from something one of my professors said in a lecture, “In computer science, every problem can be solved by another level of indirection.” ISTM that any such mechanism has to be of such a sort – a non-obvious, indirect influence on our actions. Which is also one point where non-injection enters the picture – not being able to isolate (or possibly even identify) contributors in the backwards causal chain makes specifying one a mystery.

And that leads me to seek some clarity on the following:

@Diogenes the Cynic

@Digital Stimulus

The fact that the causes further back in the chain are not “wants” themselves doesn’t eradicate the autonomy of the “want” at the top of the heap. Does it?

Well, sure, but then you’re just right back to determinism.

Why is that? More explicitly, your answer seems to assume that the act of identifying the backwards causal chain requires that the forward formation of that chain is deterministic. Must it be? After all, that’s not how we experience time. Is there some proof of that (something Feynmann cone-like, I guess)?

[begbert2]

[QUOTE=Mangetout]
Not really. This goes back to what I (think I) said earlier - the implication of no free will is that there is no ‘you’ - just an automaton following an ordained path.
[/QUOTE]
I’d say it’s pretty trivially obvious that there is a ‘you’ - I mean, come on, that’s what’s having that illusion of free will that we keep talking about. (If not it, then what’s having that illusion?) And sure, that “you” might be an automaton, carving out a path based on it’s mood at the time. So what? Is there some actual problem with that scenario? That you don’t have to undefine “you” to express?

[Mangetout]

[QUOTE=begbert2]
I’d say it’s pretty trivially obvious that there is a ‘you’
[/QUOTE]
Which is why I’m having trouble accepting that there is no free will.

[begbert2]

[QUOTE=Mangetout]
Which is why I’m having trouble accepting that there is no free will.
[/QUOTE]
Well, I’m having trouble keeping track of which definition of free will we’re using. I mean, there are two or three floating around in this thread, right? Which one did you just refer to?

Me, I think the problem is that determinism is a relatively foreign-feeling concept, since it seems unintuitive that we can both come to decisions by choosing amongst various options, and also be operating in a system where there is a single theoretically-predicatable outcome. (It’s not actually a conflict, of course.)

Oh, and we’re also humanocentric. We resist any definition of ourselves that could include robots too.

[Sophistry_and_Illusion]

[QUOTE=Digital Stimulus]
Thank you for wading through the tedium. As loathe as I am to say this, as it’s not what I actually think, I believe anything akin to “soul” or “spirit” would do the trick. Any uncaused cause. But a more palatable answer? I don’t know…if I did, I’d like to think I would rightfully deserve a place in that pantheon of philosophy.

[quote]

I agree that libertarian free will is *really * a non-starter if materialism is true. Because even if it is conceivable that you could have an uncaused cause that gives the libertarian what he wants, that type of cause is certainly not characteristic of physical systems. But I think the problem with libertarianism is conceptual, and so the move to dualism doesn’t help either.

The part about non-surjective is important (I think) because it allows an effect (i.e., an element in the codomain) to exist without any (apparent) cause (i.e., elements in the domain). The parenthetical “apparent” is in there because I think it would play a key role in explaining why no one has formulated a decent theory. Specifically, it might refer to that “mechanism” that is analogically similar to natural selection in evolution (which led me to post to this thread in the first place).

But I still want to know what determines the value of the output in a non-surjective relation. The parallel with evolution is interesting, but again, I would need someone to show me the goods (i.e., an actual description of what libertarian causation looks like) before agreeing that it makes sense. I mean, I am no mathematician, but if a relation is non-surjective, then there is nothing at all determining the value of the output. The output seems, then, arbitrary. I know, I’m like a broken record, but I can’t get past this point.

Another way of looking at that idea stems from something one of my professors said in a lecture, “In computer science, every problem can be solved by another level of indirection.” ISTM that any such mechanism has to be of such a sort – a non-obvious, indirect influence on our actions. Which is also one point where non-injection enters the picture – not being able to isolate (or possibly even identify) contributors in the backwards causal chain makes specifying one a mystery.

But this is an epistemic problem, not a metaphysical one, right? If the relation is non-injective, that just means we cannot infer the cause from the effect. But there is a determining cause, even if we cannot know what it is.

[Mangetout]

[QUOTE=begbert2]
Well, I’m having trouble keeping track of which definition of free will we’re using. I mean, there are two or three floating around in this thread, right? Which one did you just refer to?
[/quote]
Well, any time I try to define it as volition not necessarily caused or absolutely constrained by any external influence, I get told that would have to be just random (of which I am not convinced yet).

[begbert2]

[QUOTE=Mangetout]
Well, any time I try to define it as volition not necessarily caused or absolutely constrained by any external influence, I get told that would have to be just random (of which I am not convinced yet).
[/QUOTE]
What would be the third alternative? That it makes decisions about the world without knowing about the world? (As such knowledge would be an external influence.) You’re talking about decision without context. And a decision without context obviously cannot be directed in any meaningful way; any meaning would have to be external. Thus, the options are that it ‘chooses’ completely at random, or that it makes no choice at all (or rather, that there’s no nondeterministic element influencing us at all).

Or at least, that’s my understanding of it; I could be confused myself.

[the_PC_apeman]

A quick poll: I’m curious how well the free will/non-free will divide lines up with non-science/science divide. Is there anyone here who believes…

1. humans have libertarian free will,
2. humans are a product of evolution starting from simple proteins,
   AND
3. humans acquired libertarian free will through evolution?

[Sophistry_and_Illusion]

The board isn’t letting me post in this thread. Let me try again:

[QUOTE=Digital Stimulus]
Thank you for wading through
the tedium. As loathe as I am to say this, as it’s not
what I actually think, I believe anything akin to
“soul” or “spirit” would do the trick. Any uncaused
cause. But a more palatable answer? I don’t know…if
I did, I’d like to think I would rightfully deserve a
place in that pantheon of philosophy.

[quote]

I agree that libertarian free will is *really * a
non-starter if materialism is true. Because even if
it is conceivable that you could have an uncaused
cause that gives the libertarian what he wants, that
type of cause is certainly not characteristic of
physical systems. But I think the problem with
libertarianism is conceptual, and so the move to
dualism doesn’t help either.

The part about non-surjective is important (I
think) because it allows an effect (i.e., an element
in the codomain) to exist without any
(apparent) cause (i.e., elements in the domain). The
parenthetical “apparent” is in there because I think
it would play a key role in explaining why no one has
formulated a decent theory. Specifically, it might
refer to that “mechanism” that is analogically similar
to natural selection in evolution (which led me to
post to this thread in the first place).

But I still want to know what determines the value of
the output in a non-surjective relation. The parallel
with evolution is interesting, but again, I would need
someone to show me the goods (i.e., an actual
description of what libertarian causation looks like)
before agreeing that it makes sense. I mean, I am no
mathematician, but if a relation is non-surjective,
then there is nothing at all determining the value of
the output. The output seems, then, arbitrary. I
know, I’m like a broken record, but I can’t get past
this point.

Another way of looking at that idea stems from
something one of my professors said in a lecture, “In
computer science, every problem can be solved by
another level of indirection.” ISTM that any such
mechanism has to be of such a sort – a non-obvious,
indirect influence on our actions. Which is also one
point where non-injection enters the picture – not
being able to isolate (or possibly even identify)
contributors in the backwards causal chain makes
specifying one a mystery.

But this is an epistemic problem, not a metaphysical
one, right? If the relation is non-injective, that
just means we cannot infer the cause from the effect.
But there is a determining cause, even if we cannot
know what it is.

[begbert2]

[QUOTE=the PC apeman]
A quick poll: I’m curious how well the free will/non-free will divide lines up with non-science/science divide. Is there anyone here who believes…

1. humans have libertarian free will,
2. humans are a product of evolution starting from simple proteins,
   AND
3. humans acquired libertarian free will through evolution?
   [/QUOTE]
   Libertarian free will includes purely random variances in behavior, right? Having not been shown compelling evidence otherwise, I entertain the possibility that some randomity occurs in nature. If that is so, some randomity would exist in the functioning of the brain, and some of it might not be corrected for in the normal course of brain function and therefore might influence decisions that are very borderline (or might have larger effects, say for example if there’s some randomity in whether a given fact or memory will be recalled at any given time).

If that’s the case, I’d buy both 1) and 2), but not 3, because the randomity was present prior to and continuously during the process of evolution.

[the_PC_apeman]

S & I, if you miss closing a {quote} with a {/quote}, your post may not show up. It’s a condition the software doesn’t handle well. Perhaps a passing mod will take pity on you and fix them.

[Sophistry_and_Illusion]

[QUOTE=the PC apeman]
S & I, if you miss closing a {quote} with a {/quote}, your post may not show up. It’s a condition the software doesn’t handle well. Perhaps a passing mod will take pity on you and fix them.
[/QUOTE]

Maybe that’s what I’m doing wrong. Let me try again:

[QUOTE=Digital Stimulus]
Thank you for wading through
the tedium. As loathe as I am to say this, as it’s not
what I actually think, I believe anything akin to
“soul” or “spirit” would do the trick. Any uncaused
cause. But a more palatable answer? I don’t know…if
I did, I’d like to think I would rightfully deserve a
place in that pantheon of philosophy.
[/quote]

I agree that libertarian free will is *really * a
non-starter if materialism is true. Because even if
it is conceivable that you could have an uncaused
cause that gives the libertarian what he wants, that
type of cause is certainly not characteristic of
physical systems. But I think the problem with
libertarianism is conceptual, and so the move to
dualism doesn’t help either.

The part about non-surjective is important (I
think) because it allows an effect (i.e., an element
in the codomain) to exist without any
(apparent) cause (i.e., elements in the domain). The
parenthetical “apparent” is in there because I think
it would play a key role in explaining why no one has
formulated a decent theory. Specifically, it might
refer to that “mechanism” that is analogically similar
to natural selection in evolution (which led me to
post to this thread in the first place).

But I still want to know what determines the value of
the output in a non-surjective relation. The parallel
with evolution is interesting, but again, I would need
someone to show me the goods (i.e., an actual
description of what libertarian causation looks like)
before agreeing that it makes sense. I mean, I am no
mathematician, but if a relation is non-surjective,
then there is nothing at all determining the value of
the output. The output seems, then, arbitrary. I
know, I’m like a broken record, but I can’t get past
this point.

Another way of looking at that idea stems from
something one of my professors said in a lecture, “In
computer science, every problem can be solved by
another level of indirection.” ISTM that any such
mechanism has to be of such a sort – a non-obvious,
indirect influence on our actions. Which is also one
point where non-injection enters the picture – not
being able to isolate (or possibly even identify)
contributors in the backwards causal chain makes
specifying one a mystery.

But this is an epistemic problem, not a metaphysical
one, right? If the relation is non-injective, that
just means we cannot infer the cause from the effect.
But there is a determining cause, even if we cannot
know what it is.

Okay, the formatting is screwed up, but at least the content is there.

[Sophistry_and_Illusion]

[QUOTE=begbert2]
Libertarian free will includes purely random variances in behavior, right? Having not been shown compelling evidence otherwise, I entertain the possibility that some randomity occurs in nature. If that is so, some randomity would exist in the functioning of the brain, and some of it might not be corrected for in the normal course of brain function and therefore might influence decisions that are very borderline (or might have larger effects, say for example if there’s some randomity in whether a given fact or memory will be recalled at any given time).

If that’s the case, I’d buy both 1) and 2), but not 3, because the randomity was present prior to and continuously during the process of evolution.
[/QUOTE]

Except libertarians admit that randomness is not what they are after either; how would a random act be one for which we are responsible? They want a type of causation that is neither deterministic, probabilistic, nor random. This is my beef with libertarianism. So I buy 2, but not 1 or 3.

[Sophistry_and_Illusion]

[QUOTE=Mangetout]
Well, any time I try to define it as volition not necessarily caused or absolutely constrained by any external influence, I get told that would have to be just random (of which I am not convinced yet).
[/QUOTE]

Well, I think I’ve shot my bolt. If my brilliant rhetoric and impeccable logic haven’t convinced you, then nothing will.

[the_PC_apeman]

[QUOTE=begbert2]
Libertarian free will includes purely random variances in behavior, right? Having not been shown compelling evidence otherwise, I entertain the possibility that some randomity occurs in nature. If that is so, some randomity would exist in the functioning of the brain, and some of it might not be corrected for in the normal course of brain function and therefore might influence decisions that are very borderline (or might have larger effects, say for example if there’s some randomity in whether a given fact or memory will be recalled at any given time).
[/quote]
I don’t think libertarianism traditionally accepts randomness as free will. Randomness lacks purpose and doesn’t provide the kind of free will usually considered necessary for responsibility.

If that’s the case, I’d buy both 1) and 2), but not 3, because the randomity was present prior to and continuously during the process of evolution.

Then do/did all the inhabitants of the evolutionary tree have free will?

[begbert2]

[QUOTE=the PC apeman]
I don’t think libertarianism traditionally accepts randomness as free will. Randomness lacks purpose and doesn’t provide the kind of free will usually considered necessary for responsibility.
[/QUOTE]
Well, by my reckoning, the agent is responsible for its actions, even if it is purely deterministic, for the simple reason that I see blame as being assignable to purely inanimate objects. It’s the nail’s fault my tire is flat. The leaky toilet tank is responsible for my bathroom rug being soaked. It’s not anthropomorphism; these words are valid descriptors of cause, be it sapient or not.

(We also have another thread wrapping up that seems to have reached agreement that not only is it sensible to speak of blame and responsibility for the deterministic, it’s also reasonable to speak of punishment for them. Which is good enough for me.)

However, if randomness-based unpredictability in decision making isn’t considered sufficient to count as libertarianism, (as you and S & I seem to agree), then I don’t accept 1), either.

[QUOTE=the PC apeman]
Then do/did all the inhabitants of the evolutionary tree have free will?
[/QUOTE]
Well, this clearly depends on how you define “free will”. I think that I just conceded that I think that nothing has libertarian free will.

More and more I’m inclined to define “free will” (for my own purposes) as something that applies to anything that’s carrying out actions based on analysis of a cache of information stored and retrieved from some form of retained internal ‘memory’ (though it may have been collected externally at some point in the past), and to not care whether that analysis is deterministic or not. Of course, by that definition, not only humans, but most larger animals would have it, and also all the computers, the DVD players, many cars, and possibly some toasters. I’m pretty sure nobody else would accept my definition of free will, though, but I’d say that whatever free will there is, if we have it, then all those other things have it too.

[Mangetout]

[QUOTE=Sophistry and Illusion]
Well, I think I’ve shot my bolt. If my brilliant rhetoric and impeccable logic haven’t convinced you, then nothing will.
[/QUOTE]

The bit I’m referring to as not being convinced of, is the notion that if something has no cause, it must be random - granted, that is one of the possible definitions of the term ‘random’, but it doesn’t seem like it stops there - what’s been asserted is that if something has no cause, it must be haphazard - which is also a possible definition of the term ‘random’, but one with quite a different meaning to ‘uncaused’.

[II_Gyan_II]

Sophistry and Illusion, pardon me for being dense, but I don’t see how anything is changed.

[QUOTE=Sophistry and Illusion]
But since we have little or no voluntary control over our beliefs, then we cannot be obligated to believe anything in particular.
[/quote]

Whether we have voluntary control or not is precisely what’s under debate. I’m presuming our starting point in a free will debate is agnosticism.

For example, we cannot be *obligated * to infer Q from P, even if P entails Q, because inferring involves the formation of a new belief (Q), and we have no control over that. Thus, while belief and inference might be subject to some sort of epistemic evaluation, they aren’t subject to *that * sort of evaluation.

Then, neither are we obligated to infer that: belief is not subject to that sort of evaluation.

But of course (one of) our epistemic goal(s) is truth, and so you could evaluate a person’s performance relative to how likely their behavior is to lead to the formation of true beliefs.

But if there’s no voluntary control over beliefs, then how is this evaluation made possible and valid?