No. Because it is not really about intelligence per se, the weather is a chaotic system, and so the limiting factor is how precisely you can know the state of the system as an input to your model. Engineering limitations strongly constrain this, but even beyond that, ultimately you would need to know perfect information about quantum states, which is impossible in principle (as we currently understand quantum mechanics).
It’s an interesting side question to wonder how far in the future we could hypothetically predict the weather just based on having perfect classical information about the system. But it’s tangential to the question at hand.
No, for the same reason, but also more:
Let’s say I offer you coffee or tea, and I am going to truthfully tell you the specific prediction of which one you will choose. However, my awareness of your personality also tells me that whatever I say, you will choose to defy me and pick the other thing.
What happens next?
This paradox illustrates that the notion of being “locked in”, in a fatalistic way to some future state is a misapprehension. Determinism is not Fatalism. And perfect predictive power, even if quantum physics allowed it, also depends upon the context in which that prediction is used and how we will interact with the system.
Whether is chaotic for people with our intelligence but if intelligence wasn’t a factor it could possibly be easy to predict exact whether. But we are talking theoretical intelligence that we would never encounter. Most things at atomic level are predictable but currently we say that there is an inherent level of randomness which is very low. Maybe 95% of everything is predictable and whatever 5 or less is actually random and that you could say is free will. But I’m just talking off the top not really a thesis or theory
Perhaps you are thinking of “chaotic” as just being an adjective meaning random or something. But actually, when we are talking about chaotic systems, we are talking about the mathematical concept of Chaos Theory which means something specific and is not the same thing as randomness or complexity.
There are many chaotic systems that are defined by very simple, 100% known algorithms. The issue with predicting the behaviour of these systems is not to do with our understanding of the algorithms but in how accurately we can measure the initial state of the system. And there seems to be physical laws that prevent anyone from having perfect information of the initial state of a system – so let me repeat this and underline it: it’s nothing to do with intelligence.
I would not say that because I would not define free will as being random.
My position is that choices are necessarily deterministic; what we even think of as a choice is a weighing of alternatives based on knowledge and personal preferences. Even if the universe is not deterministic, “choice” necessarily exists within the deterministic part.
Criminal punishment as a deterrent for the benefit of society survives determinism, but so far as I can tell, the concept of personal responsibility must fall away. I’m not comfortable with the idea of criminal punishment in the absence of personal responsibility, although I acknowledge it still benefits society. For some, that is justification enough; not for me, IMO that line of thinking leads to dark places. That is why jcklpe attempted to argue that restorative justice is compatible with personal responsibility.
Yes, more or less. I mean, I would say we need to be careful by what we mean by “responsible”, but broadly-speaking I agree. And indeed upthread I argued that the justice system should be about rehabilitation, public safety，restoration and deterrence. Only.
Justice systems based on a notion of punishment for evil actions taken out of “free will” are going to struggle as we understand more of how the brain works. We are inevitably going to find neurological features strongly correlated with particular behaviours. At the least we’d end up in a situation where there is “diminished responsibility” for almost every crime.
I would say that’s a bait and switch. I can defend restorative justice without believing in personal responsibility. I can believe that if an agent’s brain is wired to do X, and X causes material harm, then they need to pay up for X.
Perhaps this might seem unfair, and we can talk about that but there is no inconsistency in such a policy.
I wouldn’t say that you alone are responsible for making that family whole. I would say society at large has a responsibility. It’s not solely yours merely because you had capacity to save someone and didn’t for whatever reason.
I think this is a pretty good response to the drowning person idea above.
Sociopaths exist. people with anxiety disorders exist. People with distorted perceptions of reality to the point of being classified as “psychotic” exist.
Do I really care if someone is punished for misdeeds or do I want to insure that mistakes are not repeated in the future?
Justice as retribution is deeply seated in our in our psychology. It’s probably an evolutionary adaption. But it’s not very useful in the grand scheme of things when we have better alternatives.
Indeterminacy isn’t “free”.
Maybe you’re using a particular definition of “personal responsibility”. In this case I don’t really know what you mean by it.
Let’s look at some definitions from a quick google search to get a reference point:
Personal responsibility is the willingness to both accept the importance of standards that society establishes for individual behavior and to make strenuous personal efforts to live by those standards.
To have personal responsibility you should be accountable for your actions and willing to face the reactions of your actions, whether positive or negative.
I don’t see how any of these are in opposition to anything I’ve said?
It also might help for you to make more explicate what “dark path” you are worried about in regards to a restorative justice worldview.
You’ve denied the premise I asked you to presume for the sake of argument. I copied the example from you (see below where I quote you). It could just have easily been written with this (hopefully) less controversial premise:
Presume, for the sake of argument, that I agreed to watch your child at the pool; specifically, I have a responsibility to prevent your child from drowning if I am physically able to do so. If I fail, I am responsible to you for my failure.
The only actions I am physically able to do are those that I actually do. Actions I do not take were always beyond my physical capabilities. (determinism)
Therefore if your child drowns under my watch, I was always physically unable to prevent your child from drowning. Under no circumstance will I ever be responsible for a child who drowns under my supervision.
See the problem?
…And so it goes for all laws where responsibility for the act is a requisite of responsibility for its consequences. Determinism precludes responsibility for the act, and therefore no system of justice may rely on responsibility to determine consequences. Quod erat demonstrandum, determinism gets rid of a coherent concept of responsibility in regards to justice.
I’m using your own definition, which we previously agreed to:
You came back after two weeks later to just repeat your own disingenuous definition of physically able?
1
If I am not at this exact moment watching an MP4 file on my computer, do we therefore say my computer was physically incapable of playing an MP4 file? If I walk into the kitchen, was I therefore physically incapable of walking into the bedroom?
No, nobody uses these words this way, whether or not they subscribe to Determinism, because that isn’t what those words mean.
Physical capability to do X means, for a range of possible scenarios, there is at least one that results in X.
2
We typically make a distinction between the physical and the mental. We accept that we are agents making choices. It’s only Strawman Determinism that teaches otherwise.
So if the child drowned because there was a sudden catastrophic mudslide, and you did everything you physically could to save him/her, we don’t hold you responsible. If you decided “meh, I don’t care”, we do hold you responsible, even though, from a god’s eye view, you are not responsible for being born a jerk.
IOW, we hold people responsible for their choices, but this does not imply we have to believe anything could have played out differently.
3
Finally, how is any of this different in a non-deterministic souls (or whatever) model?
Once again, how do you think decisions are made, and how are they immune to us retrospectively saying that the only choice you could have made is the one you made?
So in normal everyday conversation, if I were to say my computer has the capability to play MP4 files, what I mean by that is that there is exactly one scenario, one chain of events, in which an MP4 file plays?
What are you talking about?
In my “normal every day” conversation, if someone says a computer has the capability to play MP4 files, I take it to mean “if I want to play MP4 files on this computer, it will work”. Determinism or indeterminism isn’t part of that colloquial conversation at all; the capability is predicated on a hypothetical scenario where a test is actually performed, and the possibility of that scenario matching reality is irrelevant to the truth of the statement.
That’s why we can have sentences like, “She is capable of achieving great things, but she never will”.
“Mr. Shen, you are charged with criminal negligence. A child you were supposed to be supervising has drowned. After extensive review, the court admits that it was physically impossible for you to prevent the drowning of a child, but in alternate hypothetical scenarios you could have prevented this tragedy. As such you are found to be criminally negligent and will be responsible for compensation…”
Exactly. So the way in which you’re using “capable” as a core part of your argument, is not at all what the word means. If I don’t save a drowning child it doesn’t follow at all that I was incapable of saving the child, because capable does not mean “the one scenario that actually happened”.
Well before we start let’s agree that our notion of “capability” necessarily must include a degree of reasonableness.
We wouldn’t say that a person who has never learned to swim, and in fact has a phobia of water, has the capability to beat the world freestyle record, even though that’s a physical possibility (they might thrash their limbs just right).
Then, we next consider that in terms of negligence or whatever, we are mostly concerned with the choices made, rather than a gods eye view of the physical situation. So, simply put, would it seem, to a typical person, that there was a reasonable chance of saving the child? If you couldn’t swim, did you try to call for help? And so on.
So, I think you’re trying to rhetorically make the idea of culpability seem absurd in a deterministic universe, but I think you’re failing to do this. You’re having to resort to judging actions in a way that nobody does, and that would be equally absurd in a non-deterministic universe.
I admit this. Unfortunately my argument still stands, because “physical capability” in this conversation is not synonymous with “capability” in the colloquial usage. Your definition:
My position remains as it was before. Determinism implies only one set of possible scenarios, the scenarios which actually come to pass. Therefore, the only physical capabilities are those which actually have been or will be exercised.
This argument in particular works in my favor; assuming determinism the chance of saving a child that actually drowns always equaled zero. The absurdity of there being no such thing as chance disappears when we abandon the assumption of determinism.
No, that’s simply the disingenuous way you’re choosing to use the word “capability”, not some standard way it is used in this context.
Look, if you just phrase it as “Under Determinism, the only thing that could have happened, is what did happen”, then we’re golden. But that’s not the same thing as an agent’s capability. The fact that I didn’t open my kitchen window yesterday is not at all a synonym for being incapable of opening the window.
The point is why the child drowned. The following three scenarios all result in a child drowning but it remains important for us to make a distinction in the legal system:
Person at the shore is a sadist, who chose to watch the child drown. Legal system: try to rehabilitate the sadist, punishment to deter others from standing by and watching children drown.
Person at the shore cares but is a weak swimmer and saw that it was a torrential mudslide and judged it to be highly unlikely that they could swim to save the child. They called for help.
Legal system: no punishment
Person at the shore cares and swims to try to save the child but fails. Legal system: no punishment
So this is what I meant about reasonableness of the chance of saving the child. We don’t need to assert that things could have played out any differently.
I was incapable of doing things which I could not do. That follows colloquial usage. I am physically incapable of doing things I physically cannot do. I think it is a contradiction to admit the validity of “could not”/“can not”/“could not physically” but reject “incapable of”/“physically incapable of”.
It would be the sadist who asserts the impossibility of doing otherwise. His argument would look like mine: responsibility is predicated on physical capability, and assuming determinism he was physically incapable of saving the child. Therefore he bears no responsibility for his actions - in my opinion a logical conclusion which is morally absurd.
Huh?
I am saying that “capable” and “physically possible” are synonyms. This is the exact opposite of accepting one and rejecting the other.
What I am rejecting is the idea that either of these concepts is synonymous with “the one thing that actually happened”.
For the fifth time, this is not what capability means, and no-one, but you apparently in this thread, uses the word in this way.
In terms of responsibility, I am explicitly holding the person responsible for their choices. If you chose to do a bad thing because you’re a jerk, we hold you responsible for that. But, importantly, “hold you responsible” does not mean punish, per se. It means we try to rehabilitate you while deterring others from making that same choice.
When you challenged my argument, you jumped into a conversation where jcklpe and I had already stipulated to the first premise (“responsibility is based upon who is able to respond”, which I have most recently paraphrased as “responsibility is predicated on physical capability”). I don’t believe you intend to challenge this premise but I might be mistaken.
The second premise reads “assuming determinism he was physically incapable of saving the child”. If you can deny that premise, you can deny the absurd conclusion. So the sub-debate we’re having about physical capability is, in my opinion, all about proving or disproving this second premise.
I think the conclusion follows logically if both premises are valid, even if it is absurd. I do not know your opinion on whether the conclusion (“Therefore he bears no responsibility for his actions”) follows.
Does not Determinism imply that the only things which could happen are the things which actually will happen? You said so yourself. Things that could happen are things that are (or were) physically possible - I don’t think that is a controversial assumption. The conclusion would be that the only things which are physically possible are those which actually happen. This contradicts your position.