Join the club (both begbert2 and myself have explicitly called ourselves compatabilists in this thread)
I would be considered by others to be Compatibilist, but I generally avoid the term myself.
Saying I am Compatibilist seems to implicitly say I think the term “free will” is meaningful, and that the debate over “free will vs determinism” is a valid, coherent one, and I don’t think it is.
But yes, I would agree we make free choices. Which of course are based on past data and some internal predispositions because that’s the only kind of “choice” anyone has even been able to define.
If your personal philosophy is a form of libertarianism, as mine is, then reliable prediction of brainstates (based on a causal or stochastic model) contradicts the underlying premise. Small sample sizes could be written off, but if your model accurately predicts millions of brainstates based on nothing but the previous scan, we would have to find a new philosophy of free will.
Such accurate predictions as you describe in the OP will effectively rule out the entire left column of this chart:
| Indeterminism | Determinism | |
|---|---|---|
| Free Will | Libertarianism | Compatibilism |
| No Free Will | Hard Incompatibilism | Hard Determinism |
As mentioned by others, the difference between compatibilism and hard determinism is the semantic definition of free will. For me, determinism implies hard determinism with radical implications for moral culpability.
~Max
whoops! sorry I tried to do a word search before I posted that! Apologies.
I think this is the most common and convincing argument for libertarian concepts of freewill.
I understand it, as this was the argument that I operated when I believed in the libertarian concept of free will but I think that it has become less important to me as my moral understanding of justice has changed.
There is one concept of justice which is primarily retributive. People who do bad things should be punished. People who do good things should be rewarded.
But these days I adopt a more restorative idea of justice. The purpose of “justice” has changed from “punish evil, reward the good” to “heal the sick”.
Part of what me shift in this opinion was my experiences with mental health and learning about drug addiction. I am not myself an addict, but learning more about that field has shifted my understanding of addiction.
When I was 21 I was diagnosed as ADHD with a learning disability. I’d always been that “weird smart kid” and had gotten through school mostly by being good at reading and remembering what I read, and being good at expository writing, but that wasn’t enough when trying to learn intermediate German.
Prior to that I had thought of drug addiction as physical dependence on a substance. A person was “addicted” to morphine when their body became physically dependent on it. This fit nicely with my moral worldview. Addiction was a nice clean category with a clear dividing line.
But this isn’t really how clinical psychologists define addiction. Instead they define it according to how it effects your life. Many people who are alcoholics never reach the stage of being physically dependent on it. No one becomes physically dependent on weed, or sex, or video games.
Instead in clinical contexts addiction is thought of something whose desire for disrupts the individuals life priorities. Gabor Mate talks about this more fully in his book In the Realm of the Hungry Ghosts, the title of the book is a reference to Buddhisms concept of Hell. It’s a rather virtue ethics sort of concept, similar to St. Augustine’s concept of "rightly ordered loves
But living a just and holy life requires one to be capable of an objective and impartial evaluation of things: to love things, that is to say, in the right order, so that you do not love what is not to be loved, or fail to love what is to be loved, or have a greater love for what should be loved less, or an equal love for things that should be loved less or more, or a lesser or greater love for things that should be loved equally.
I believe the focus on “justice” in a retributive sense is a product of the deontological influence of Kant. I prefer the virtue ethics personally.
I prefer it because it makes more sense to me. I take Concerta everyday. If I don’t take Concerta then it takes me a few days to return to a “baseline” normal. I am physically dependent on Concerta. It does not interfere with my life though. It improves my life, as long as I can take it regularly under the right conditions in the right amounts.
In my view all moral issues are a matter of “disordered loves”, as Augustine put it. Instead of seeing Justice as a matter of punishing evil or rewarding good, I see it as an attempt to bring reality back into alignment with telos.
“Pleasure and pain moreover supply the motives of desire and of avoidance, and the springs of conduct generally. This being so, it clearly follows that actions are right and praiseworthy only as being a means to the attainment of a life of pleasure. But that which is not itself a means to anything else, but to which all else is a means, is what the Greeks term the Telos, the highest, ultimate or final Good. It must therefore be admitted that the Chief Good is to live agreeably.” — Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum , Book I
I believe it was William James who put forth most clearly the objection to determinism on moral grounds right?
To me his objection, while understandable doesn’t really make sense in a virtue ethics framework. He wrote about it in terms of determinism getting rid of a coherent concept of “responsibility” in regards to Justice. But does it?
In my mind, thinking in terms of virtue ethics and restorative justice, responsibility refers to the who is able to respond. Who has power over a situation. If I see a man drowning in a lake, I am able to respond, it is me who is responsible. I am not responsible because I pushed him in the lake or it’s my fault he was pushed in the lake, or because I swore some blood oath contract, it’s because I am able to respond.
Assuming determinism, your response is inevitable, it is merely an automatic reaction unworthy of moral weight. What is the value of virtue without agency? I may as well pass judgement upon the water for drowning the man.
~Max
Bolding mine - I haven’t generally heard libertarianists admit that they are pinning their free will argument on supernatural souls, because that’s a great way to get scoffed at. But yes, the spooky magical free will owes its identity to the religious argument.
However you’re wrong about this answering my position, because I have already explicitly covered the possibility that human bodies are people puppets of extraphysical souls, and even if they are that doesn’t introduce a single solitary shred of libertarian free will. The reason for this is because if souls are in fact nonfictional then they have to actually function. And if they have to actually function, then they must function with some combination of determinism and randomity, because there is literally no other option. You souls either made decisions for reasons, or they don’t. There is no escape.
This is sort of a completely different subject, but it’s worth noting that I’ve never claimed to be certain that the physical universe is deterministic. (Particularly at the subatomic level.) I simply maintain that the more randomity/nondeterminism there is in your decision making, the less of a volitional agent you actually are, because coin flips aren’t volition.
You do pass judgement on the water - you note that the water is potentially dangerous, assess whether the water is likely to drown again, and if so decide whether it is societal advantageous to either confine the water to places where it is unlikely to get the opportunity to drown again, or perhaps try to eliminate that body of water altogether if you feel it will never be safe to reopen it to the populace. You could also try to rehabilitate the water into containers or pools that the populace can interact with without fear.
In a deterministic universe (and also the world we live in), morality is an assessment of how something behaves as compared to what has been decided to be acceptable behavior. If we consider the meat machine’s behavior to fail to meet the standard, we consider that to be reflective of how the meat machine works, and consider that as indicative of the meat machine’s moral fiber - which, in turn, is suggestive of how it may behave in the future.
The general idea behind free agency is that you have this agent whose decisions are neither causally determined nor randomly determined. Think of it as a third category of event causation.
FWIW I’d bet that the majority of people, both worldwide and just in the U.S., believe in souls and free will.
~Max
Moral judgement assesses how people behave. We do not normally speak of lakes as moral agents.
~Max
As a former substance dualist, conservative christian with an interest in apologetics, I can confirm that this is in fact a real position, and it’s one that I held when I was younger. I don’t know if I got the argument exactly from C.S. Lewis or something else but it’s not unheard of by any means.
This is a bit like saying “think of it like something that is simultaneously neither equal to 3, nor not equal to 3.”
It’s a category that flatly does not and cannot exist. Which can easily be demonstrated by the fact that all the proponents of it flatly refuse to even consider how it could possibly work enough to accomplish what it supposedly does.
The majority of people both worldwide and in the US believe in stupid bullshit of one flavor or another. Often multiple different flavors of stupid bullshit simultaneously.
Come now, at this instant we’re pretty much literally having a discussion about a specific arcane branch of theology. You can’t possibly be surprised if the argument “lots of people believe in it” doesn’t fly with everyone present.
There are sort of two things that were being discussed in that specific comment exchange - whether “virtue without agency” is valuable, and whether there’s any point in passing judgement on things that could not have resisted behaving as they did.
My first paragraph was attempting to point out that virtually every reason we have for employing a justice system applies equally well to humans, lakes, and murderous killbots. All the motivations for a justice system still exist when dealing with killbots. If something is committing crimes, it doesn’t matter why they’re doing it, or whether they could have helped it. What matters is that they did it, how likely they are to do it again, and what can we do about it.
As for your assertion that we don’t normally speak of lakes as moral agents, well, I’m not entirely sure that’s true - I’ve heard nature get anthropomorphized numerous times. But supposing you’re correct, that does raise the question of what you consider the purpose and function of morality. Is it only for self-analysis, perhaps? I mean, I could see that. We only speak of people as having morals, because morality is a rational assessment of the consequences and impacts of your actions, and which actions and outcomes you consider acceptable as a result. Something that is incapable of consciously weighing these factors and outcomes isn’t doing, or possessing, morality.
Which obliges me to point out, if you think that deterministic agents never consciously weigh factors, then you don’t understand the cognitive models under discussion here. It is my unflinching position that morality is an inherently deterministic analysis, in that the morality of a situation or behavior is 100% dependent on the facts at hand. What is moral depends on the situation and the rules - both of which are fixed factors. If your moral determination is non-deterministic, then you are by definition ignoring those factors and making your decision independent of morality.
I think this is probably the strongest argument I’ve heard for the position. When you point out this also applies for nonphysical souls, that was a lightbulb moment for me.
I agree but a small addition: it matters why they did it, in so far as that information helps us prevent them doing it again.
Virtue is virtue. It value is as an end of itself. Agency doesn’t change that.
But also I don’t believe that determinism actually effects agency, if you think of agency as simply meaning “the ability to act according to your will”.
ETA: I got ninja’d by about 4 people 
Right, but it seems that you’re missing the point: What third way? Rather than talk about what things don’t decide free choices, what things do?
Even if we throw in the concept of souls, we can ask “How do souls make decisions?” or “Are souls blank slates? Or did my soul from birth differ from yours?”
It doesn’t help.
That’s why I say the non-existence of (spooky) free will is a fact about free will, and its definition, not a fact about our universe. Because no-one can even state a way that this kind of free will can exist in any flavor of universe.
Naked appeal to popularity? I am a little disappointed at that.
Personally, I like a “Little from Column A, Little from Column B” approach.
Sometimes, yes, restorative justice is the way to go. Even most times. But it sucks at addressing structural inequities and at addressing pure evil. Which I do believe exists.
And when it comes to those, I believe in justice like New Model Army does. I believe in getting the bastards.
I should also add that sometimes other models of justice are more applicable. I’m currently learning more about transformative justice, for instance.
As relates to the OP there is a third state between determined and random - generalization.
A simple example is a neural net that is trained with two data sets:
2+2=4
4+4=8
When the net is tested with the input 3+3 it will generalize with the output 6. That is a condition the net has never ‘seen’ and it has no specific structure wired to yield that answer, so the generalized case is volition or free will.
How did it do this? Magic, or by following some set of internal rules about how to generalize? If the latter, this is still causal.
I believe causal implies a direct link between cause and effect. The net was never ‘told’ that 3+3=6. Of course there is a mechanism that performs the generalization. Otherwise it would be a ‘soul’.
BTW: I’m half way through the book you suggested 21 Lessons, very interesting discussion.