Why would God exist in the same moment in time as us mortals. God exists throughout time. God doesn’t predict the future, God has experienced the future.
Didn’t you ever read Slaughter House 5?
It doesn’t. God would already know the outcome regardless of the number of universes, would he not? No need to examine on judgement day, because that result was already known to god. And since he knows this result before you were born, he is basically creating people and sending some straight to hell for eternal torture.
I think the idea is that we send ourselves to whatever punishment awaits us if our souls aren’t capable of entering the presence of God. If you fail the test, you can’t very well blame the teacher who grades the test, especially if that teacher gave you all the answers in advance, and lets you refer to the textbook throughout the test. How can it possibly matter what God knows in advance … you don’t know it.
Isn’t this, basically, Calvinist doctrine?
You can choose a ready guide in some celestial voice. If you choose not to decide, you still have made a choice.
Right.
I think the very concept of free will is a mess; inconsistent and/or incoherent, and a lot of the reason is because of the religious baggage. The need to define free will such that we are responsible for our actions, but god is not.
Ultimately such wriggling doesn’t work. My actions are the product of what kind of entity I am (whether I’m consciously aware of that or not, and whether that involves souls or whatever else), and my environment. Both designed and made by omnimax god, if he existed.
Meanwhile, in the real world, sans omnimax god, I think it is possible to define free will sensibly in a way that’s compatible with a deterministic universe.
When I make a choice, and I think through the pros and cons, that thought process really is how I make my choice. It’s not that my choice has already been made, and it’s an illusion. My brain, my personality, is an integral part of my choice.
I suppose, ultimately, omniscience would have to operate across “multiverse” lines. I still “like” the multiverse version, because it expands our options – our definition of self – to all the things we might have done.
If God judges us on our thoughts and feelings, and on the things we “should have done but didn’t,” then why not also on the things we might have done, but couldn’t? If someone who has all the natural talent for surgery loses his hands in an auto accident…should he be judged for all the lives he was unable to save?
In the multiverse schema, he gets credit for those lives…but also judged harshly for all the evil things he might have done.
God isn’t the only one who might exist “outside of time.”
(Note, of course, that I don’t actually believe in this; I’m throwing it out as an idea, hopefully thought-provoking.)
I haven’t read Lewis, but I have read Daniel Dennett and others I can’t recall the names of, arguing for compatibilism. They and I agree on what’s going on (I’m an incompatibilist no-free-willy), but we just describe it different ways.
The compatibilist position seems to be “sure, we don’t have that kind of free will, the libertarian kind that all those religious people talk about - that’s just incoherent - but if you re-define free will in just the right way, then we do have it and I like to think of it that way.”
I think you (and CKD, and many others) miss the real issue: if you know *everything * and you built the child then what the child does in a particular situation is no more free than a bell is free not to ring when it’s hit.
Knowing what happens doesn’t mean you determined what happens. It just means you can see the future.
Why not, if from the child’s perspective, he’s free to do whatever he likes?
Many agree with you. I still can’t see it: maybe it’s me. Consider this wind-up toy. Wind it up and I know what the teddy bear is going to do. It’s going to beat its toy drum. I know that. But the bear is moving the drum sticks. Similarly, God’s knowledge doesn’t affect the fact that I make decisions. It does create some complications with the idea of personal responsibility. And in a deterministic world, one can doubt whether free will exists. But those are separate arguments. Unless, the last one only seems to be a different argument…
Wiki has a set of scriptural quotes implying God’s omnipotence, which subsumes omniscience. Omnipotence - Wikipedia
I don’t interpret them that way either. Aquinas apparently interpreted the passages to mean that God can do all things that are possible. My take is that none of the writers of the Bible were actually taking measurements: it’s poetic.
Sure you do. I’ll admit I don’t see what the problem is here. There seems an obvious distinction to me between knowing what choice a person makes and compelling a person to make a certain choice.
Look at it this way. I know that Seattle won this year’s Super Bowl. Does that mean I somehow made the Seahawks win that game? Obviously not - I’m just aware of what happened without having had any influence over what happened.
God has the same knowledge of who will win next year’s Super Bowl. But just because he’s already aware of the outcome doesn’t mean he will cause the outcome just as my awareness of the outcome of this year’s game doesn’t mean I caused that outcome.
What the bell thinks is not determinative of the truth. The bell could be mistaken about that. The bell could have a little mind that truly believes it can either ring or not ring when hit, but if (as is the reality) the bell will ring when it’s hit and cannot but do so, then does it have free will?
If you think so, your definition of free will and mine are quite different.
Bells don’t have free will. Children do. Children ring bells when they feel like it.
Clearly, since I don’t think bells think, make mistakes, have a mind (little or otherwise), believe anything, or have a will of any sort. Tell me, do these bells answer you when you talk to them? Do you think other inanimate objects have little minds?
Your post quite eloquently summarizes why the concept of free will is an incoherent mess, completely independent of religious belief. Assume there’s no God: it’s every bit as difficult to define free will meaningfully.
Martin Gardner laid this out in his writings. When I make a choice and think through the pros and cons, how I identify the pros and cons and how I weigh them against each other is 100% a product of my genetics, my environment, my culture, and my upbringing. In other words, my choices are determined completely by all of the forces that made me the person that I am today, all of which are outside my control. This is true even if I’m consciously deciding to rebel against those forces, because something along the way made me into the sort of person who rebels in such a way.
Okay, that’s an interesting approach. The free will question through the first cause perspective.
If God had alternative choices of how to create the universe and he was aware of all of the events which would occur in each of these alternative universes, then didn’t he cause those events to occur by choosing which of the alternative universes he would actually create?
I’m going to have to think about this one.
If God knew this, at the time he created the universe, then, most certainly, he “caused” it all to happen. This is the problem when you add too many “omnis” to the mash. Omniscience and omnipotence and creator of all that is all – basically, you’ve given up everything to the guy. Why did he even bother?
It turns it into a kid playing with dolls.
Which kind of leads to another question: how does the quality of available information bear on free will? We expect specific effects of our actions, but would we make those choices if we were aware of the unintended/incidental consequences? If there is missing, erroneous or deceitful information, is the freedom inherent in our choices valid? (I am looking at you, Mary Baker Eddy.)