Fulda Gap

[Johanna]

If you remember back in the 70s and 80s, the strategic analysts were always talking about the “Fulda Gap.” We had this phrase constantly ground into our brains: the spectre of “Soviet Bloc tanks rumbling through the Fulda Gap” which was supposed to be the start of nuclear war.

Nobody talks about it any more.

The GQ is: looking at a topographic map of Germany, I don’t see anything like a “gap”, I just see a lot of hills all over the place in the region between Erfurt and Frankfurt. Any Soviet Bloc invasion would have to take a rather wiggly course to get through there. But US strategists stationed our boys there, expecting the Ruskies to attack there. Because the Allies had gone east through there on the way to get Hitler in 1945. What was that about generals always planning for the last war?

And why would the Ruskies even want to attack West Germany anyway? With the American army there? Did we think they were insane maniacs? What could they expect to get out of such a move anyway? Even though the Cold War is only a few years in the past, when I look back on it, the whole thing seems so wack.

[Tranquilis]

*Originally posted by Jomo Mojo *
** …I don’t see anything like a “gap”, I just see a lot of hills all over the place in the region between Erfurt and Frankfurt. Any Soviet Bloc invasion would have to take a rather wiggly course to get through there. But US strategists stationed our boys there, expecting the Ruskies to attack there. Because the Allies had gone east through there on the way to get Hitler in 1945. What was that about generals always planning for the last war? **

Nope, it’s about understanding the logistics and capabilities of modern armor, armies, and war. The Fulda Gap presented the best possible route (shortest w/acceptable terrain) for a modern army to meet what we presumed to be the most likely Soviet goal(s). The rest of the East-West German boarder was far less amenable to modern warfare (it provided lots & lots of places to provide the Ruskies a nasty blood-letting). Check your maps for hill gradents and forrestation, and you’ll get a clearer picture.

**And why would the Ruskies even want to attack West Germany anyway? With the American army there? Did we think they were insane maniacs? **

Yup, we really did think that, and yes, for some time, had they wanted to press the issue, the Soviets could’ve done it, even with the American, German, English, Dutch, other NATO Allies, and (maybe) French armies in the way.
It’d have been damned expensive, but they could’ve succeeded. Read The Third World War by General Sir John Hackett, if you want a fictionalized account of one of the more common war-games analysis of a Soviet attack.

**

What could they expect to get out of such a move anyway? Even though the Cold War is only a few years in the past, when I look back on it, the whole thing seems so wack.**

Yup, it was wack allright, but it was also real. As for what the USSR might’ve gotten from such an attack, the above book addresses it to some degree, but basically, the Soviets didn’t trust the West in general, and Germany specifically. They were looking for a bigger buffer zone. And a bigger empire, and to spread world communism, but mostly, they wanted Germany in a position to never threaten them again. Germany had, after all, kicked-in the Russian’s teeth twice in one generation. It didn’t matter that Germany lost both World Wars, all Russia saw was the devestation. They weren’t going to let it happen again, and no amount of protesting how Germany had changed was going to make them let down their guard. Never mind the reality, it was perception that counted, and all the Russians could percieve was that Germany was a threat. Had they ever thought they could take West Germany at an acceptable cost, they’d have done it.

[paperbackwriter]

Well, one big part we don’t hear many “Fulda Gap” scenarios anymore is that the border in that area is gone. The Fulda Gap was on the East Germany/West Germany border just north of where Czechoslovakia used to be. The general axis ran from NE to SW East of Kassel and West of Erfurt. If you look at your German topos, the northern part of the old border, from the Baltic down to about, say, Magdeburg (yes, Magdeburg is a bit E of the old border, but about that latitude) is nice and flat, with some important German cities nearby. The problem is that there are a lot of towns, cities, rivers, lakes, canals, etc., all of which slow down large massed armor formations. South of this area, you run into the Harz mountains, with the famous Brocken (1142 meters) almost dead center, and farther south is the Thuringer Wald, a range of large, forested hills, and then the W. German-Czech border featured the Bavarian Alps. The Fulda Gap was in between the Harz Mts and the Thuringer Wald. Futhermore, it was less heavily populated than the northern part of W. Germany, with few major streams, and lead almost straight to Frankfurt and the Rhineland, W. Germany’s industrial and population center. It wasn’t flat, but it wasn’t bad, either. All in all, the best operational area for a large armored thrust from E. to W. Germany.

To clean up some side points:
The Allies did not make any large moves through that area in WWII, most of the effort was farther north.

The Cold War is over, East and West Germany are one country, Czechoslovakia is two, and the Soviet Union is God know how many. All of which moves the whatever future superpower conflicts may occur off the ground in Central Germany.

The American Army, and in fact the whole of Nato, were numerically far inferior to the opposing forces. IIRC, the Warsaw Pact had something like 2-3 times the ground forces available (depending on the time chosen) during the period from 1968-1989. Western strategists were very aware of the Soviet response to Germany’s tactical and equipment superiority on the Eastern Front, and the high cost in men and materiel the Soviet strategists were willing to bear.

Any other points I missed?