Well they allegedly offered too a few years ago.
And what was more interesting was this alleged comment.
Well they allegedly offered too a few years ago.
And what was more interesting was this alleged comment.
I think by now Americans are pretty much skeptical that any strategy in the Middle East will work. We saw beforehand how training and arming the regime failed in Iraq. We just recently heard about how it spectacularly failed in Syria. It comes as no surprise it failed in Afghanistan.
The difference between South Vietnam and today is that we have instantaneous access to information, so such debacles are harder to cover up. Should we be outraged? It’s another fuckup to add to the list. We’re out of tears by now.
And the result was the Taliban got smashed as collateral damage when Al Qaeda attacked the United States. Now that the Taliban is recovering back into power, they might be wiser in their choice of allies.
Can we bring back Zahir Shah (ex-king)? His reign was pretty peaceful.
They are still allied with Al qaeda, so the answer to that is no.
And they will not be permitted to return to power, because you can’t have that kind of virulent fanatical rule without terrorism being an essential part of it.
Are you joking? The man is dead.
The difficulty with Afghanistan is that it has never been one nation with clear borders and an all-for-one and all-for-all population. Instead Afghanistan is a melange of tribal fiefdoms which range across other nations such as China, Pakistan, Iran, and Azerbaijan.
The British army were humiliated in the 1850s. The Russians humiliated in the 1980s.
No outside force (ok maybe Alexander for a few decades) has ever owned Afghanistan.
Not many inside forces have either. And never for very long.
That’s correct but it’s not a “difficulty” if you resist imperialist domination of your land and culture, it’s a strength.
I haven’t heard any news reports recently that confirm he is still dead…
The USA is not staying in Afghanistan because it’s the decent thing to do. They do so because they believe it serves their geopolitical objectives best. I think they’re mistaken, and they don’t owe anything to the Afghans. At some point the Afghans will have to stand up and fight for their own country, or not - according to how they feel about it. If ten+ years isn’t the time, then it never will be.
I hate to be cynical (well, not really), but this latest change in withdrawal date sure seems like a strategy to make sure that when the disaster happens, as it surely will, it will happen when someone else is president.
I’m not too worried about that. No Republican will let Al Qaeda or the Taliban move back in and Hillary Clinton sure as hell won’t either.
I think it’s more that Obama knows what needs to be done but wants to be a President that saw relatively few body bags come home. Let the next President take the heat.
Why don’t we do what the British did in the 1890s (and Petreus did in Iraq)-buy out the warlords? Since it costs us about $15 million to kill one “insurgent”, it would be cheaper to just pay them to play nice. Face it-we have spent something like $1.5 trillion on this war-with that kind of money you can buy off a lot of warlords.
Especially nice if you can pay the various warlords to make war on each other. That’s how the Byzantine Empire survived for half a millenium or more. But it kinda never work out as planned, and the Danegeld price would seem to have a tendency to increse each season and before you know it you have Normans sitting on your throne in Washington.
That was the strategy when he US first went into Iraq - stories of palettes of $100 bills delivered by helicopter to the Northern Alliance, etc. realpolitik.
Trouble is the Taliban don’t want a condo in Palm Beach.
They absolutely do. Dubai and other places in the Gulf are full of corrupt Afghan (& Iraq & Palestinian) officials who have stuffed their pocket with US money and taken the first flight outta there.
It’s difficult to watch documentaries or listen to people who’ve actually been there, especially soldiers, and be particularly optimistic about the future of Afghanistan once America leaves. It seems like a general consensus that the national army will fold like a lawn chair without American support and that chunks of the population will immediately fall in line with the Taliban just out of self preservation.
Have you seen “This is What Winning Looks Like” by VICE? This is basically their conclusion. Go to 40:48 to see some local councilmembers basically roast us.
It was interesting watching the reaction to the rise of ISIS. Some people blamed Obama for leaving, but it seemed most directed their ire at the Iraq army. Lots of indignation that we spent X years and Y money and they didn’t do what we wanted.
I know. See above. But not Taliban.
I think a lot of you aren’t super well informed on what’s going on in Afghanistan.
Before I go into that I will say this, though–any country’s stability in the long run can largely only occur when the people of that country make it happen. For that reason it must be understood the U.S. can never stabilize Afghanistan, only Afghans can do that.
Now, the reality is the current situation in Afghanistan does not mirror the situation in South Vietnam during the Vietnam war at all. The Taliban are a fringe group in Afghanistan, there is no meaningful evidence they have the manpower or popular support to ever again control 90% of Afghanistan’s territory. In fact the people who continually talk like the Taliban is just waiting until we leave to topple the government I think show a deep ignorance of the situation on the ground in Afghanistan.
South Vietnam was toppled by another militarized state with far greater military resources, and South Vietnam’s government had minimal popular support.
The real risk in Afghanistan is not the Taliban, the Taliban is too small and too marginalized to ever rule all of Afghanistan again. The circumstances on the ground with the Mujahideen who had fought the Soviets and the Afghan Civil War that followed and resulted in the Taliban largely winning simply no longer exist in Afghanistan. The real risk for Afghanistan is the government in Kabul being able to continue to function and rule as a united entity. Failure in Afghanistan if it comes will be when the various factions that have agreed to form a government in Kabul break apart and go to war with one another.
This is a very realistic possibility. The current President of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani, made the runner up in that election, Abdullah Abdullah, a part of his government and they are supposed to be working together to collectively name cabinet ministers. It’s almost a “power sharing” arrangement. There was legitimate fear that Abdullah’s supporters would go to war (real war) with the government in response to Abdullah losing the election. About a year in, that hasn’t happened yet, but it’s still a very tenuous thing.
The Taliban is a scourge in Afghanistan, but right now they’re more like a group of bandits hiding in the hills. Even powerful Kings and Emperors sometimes had trouble dislodging bandits like that. Afghanistan is not a super settled and advanced society, it’s a place where, if thousands of fanatics want to hide in the mountains and be terrorists it’s going to be very difficult to ever fully stop that. In fact Pakistan is a much more powerful country than Afghanistan and they’ve had that same scenario going on for years and years now.
A “successful” Afghanistan will domestically look like Pakistan, the central government will be very powerful in most of the country, but there are going to be “bad areas” where the government has minimal power and where lots of bad people in the Taliban operate.
A “failed” Afghanistan is the Ghani and Abdullah factions going to war, and likely those factions, which themselves are kind of meta factions, will fracture themselves and all of a sudden we’re back to like a 15-sided civil war. That’s what failure looks like. Failure does not look remotely like the Taliban playing the role of the North Vietnamese and rolling into Saigon, that belief is ignorant of reality in Afghanistan.