On September 4, 1941, the Japanese Cabinet met to consider the war plans prepared by Imperial General Headquarters, and decided that:
Our Empire, for the purpose of self-defence and self-preservation, will complete preparations for war … [and is] … resolved to go to war with the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands if necessary. Our Empire will concurrently take all possible diplomatic measures vis-a-vis the United States and Great Britain, and thereby endeavor to obtain our objectives … In the event that there is no prospect of our demands being met by the first ten days of October through the diplomatic negotiations mentioned above, we will immediately decide to commence hostilities against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands.
The “objectives” to be obtained were clearly defined: a free hand to continue with the conquest of China and Southeast Asia, no increase in US or British military forces in the region, and cooperation by the West “in the acquisition of goods needed by our Empire”.
On September 5, Prime Minister Konoe informally submitted a draft of the decision to the Emperor, just one day in advance of the Imperial Conference at which it would be formally implemented. According to the traditional view (again, contradicted by Bix’s research), Hirohito was deeply concerned by the decision to place “war preparations first and diplomatic negotiations second” and announced his intention to break with centuries-old protocol and, at the Imperial Conference on the following day, directly question the chiefs of the Army and Navy general staffs — a quite unprecedented action. Konoe quickly persuaded Hirohito to summon them for a private conference instead, at which the Emperor made it plain that a peaceful settlement was to be pursued “up to the last”. Chief of Naval General Staff Admiral Osami Nagano, a former Navy Minister and vastly experienced, later told a trusted colleague “I have never seen the Emperor reprimand us in such a manner, his face turning red and raising his voice.”
Nevertheless, all speakers at the Imperial Conference were united in favour of war rather than diplomacy. Baron Yoshimichi Hara, President of the Imperial Council and the Emperor’s representative, then questioned them closely, producing replies to the effect that war would only be considered as a last resort from some, and silence from others.
At this point, the sovereign astonished all present by addressing the conference personally, and in breaking the tradition of Imperial silence left his advisors “struck with awe”. (Prime Minister Konoe’s description of the event.) Emperor Hirohito stressed the need for peaceful resolution of international problems, expressed regret at his ministers’ failure to respond to Baron Hara’s probings, and recited a poem written by his grandfather, Emperor Meiji which, he said, he had read “over and over again”:
Methinks all the people of the world are brethren, then.
Why are the waves and the wind so unsettled nowadays?
Recovering from their shock, the ministers hastened to express their profound wish to explore all possible peaceful avenues. The war preparations continued without the slightest change, however, and within weeks Cabinet would replace the insufficiently belligerent Konoe with the hard line General Hideki Tojo, formally chosen by Hirohito under the Constitution (but whether he was in fact favored by Hirohito remains disputed). On December 8 (December 7 in Hawaii) 1941, in simultaneous attacks, Japanese forces struck at the US Fleet in Pearl Harbor and began the invasion of South-East Asia. From here, there was no turning back.