Oh God, not another thread about the blasted war! Well yes, but I’ve two questions on the subject that I want your thoughts and opinions on, see if they’re in line with my own.
Question the first: Why, in the Potsdam Declaration, wasn’t it made clear that unconditional surrender actually had a tiny “*well, you can keep a ceremonial Emperor” next to it?
The second: If it had been made clear to the Japanese that they could keep the Emperor before the flight of the Enola Gay, how much would history have been altered?
My own attempts at answering the first question - that Truman thought beforehand that unconditional meant exactly what it said and wasn’t willing to budge an inch on the subject. Only after dropping *Little Boy *and Fat Man finding it an obvious sticking point and one that clearly wasn’t worth extending the war by another day over.
On the second, and this is the more controversial question especially for opponents of the Atomic bomb droppings…I think ‘not by much, if at all’. I’m certain Hiroshima would still have been bombed and have serious doubts whether the Japanese accept that sole condition without the pressure of Nagasaki and the Soviet declaration of war spelling out that they were, to put it mildly, fucked.
But that’s just like, my opinion man. Do you agree with my take, am I projecting any misconceptions, do you think history would have been different if it were made clear in the Potsdam Declaration that Japan could keep a figurehead Mikado?
We let Japan keep the emperor because it was felt they would work better as an occupied country that way. We didn’t make it part of the terms - we could have just as easily removed them if we wanted. The idea behind unconditional surrender is that the winner dictates the terms - ALL the terms.
I doubt very much. All of Japan’s previous peace feelers showed Japan’s military leaders just weren’t in touch with reality. All of the peace offerings were Japan trying to call ‘Time Out! Let us go and we’ll solve all these things we’ve done!’ rather than realize that their position was hopeless and suicidal.
It wouldn’t have been a simple thing to revise the terms of Potsdam – IIRC, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin had all signed off on it, and revising it would have meant getting agreement of all three. I suspect that the terms were intentionally made the same as the terms to Germany had been, and I think there would have been a great deal of resistance to offering Japan “special” terms. And in particular, there would have been resistance to giving the emperor a pass, as there was great determination to hold the leadership of the governments personally responsible.
Unconditional surrender means that the loser could not dictate terms of the surrender. They would be totally at the mercy of the winner. However, it does not mean that the loser could not participate in the decisions that would affect it’s future, if the winner allowed their participation.
It’s obvious that the U.S. did not want to govern post-war Japan without the input of the Japanese. If keeping a Japanese emperor made the job, or the transition to a non-military government, easier, so be it.
I doubt that Imperial Japan’s position would have changed, even if Potsdam had made it clear that the Emperor’s job was secure. Imperial Japan still believed it could win the war, or at least keep it’s areas of conquest. And there was talk about military trials. The prospect of a conditional surrender might have given the military government the hope that it could protect itself from retribution?
Even more significantly, you still have to end up with a solution that the loser can live with long term.
For example, the WWI-era Treaty of Versailles created such a negative environment that WWII was virtually inevitable. Economic burdens on Germany were a very real problem. Nationalist burdens (like limiting German military forces) were more of a perceived problem than a real one, but it was certainly something that most Germans were unhappy about. Unhappy enough that it didn’t take a whole lot to whip them back up into nationalistic fervor for another war.
If letting Japan keep an Emperor gets you 100 years of peace instead of 20, it makes a lot of sense to let them.
These exact terms were expressly rejected as being unacceptable to Japan when the Japanese ambassador to Russia told his government that they were the best terms that Japan was likely to get. Japanese diplomatic codes were hopelessly compromised, and this message was read in Washington at the same time the Japanese read it, if not beforehand. See Richard B Frank’s Downfall:The end of the Imperial Japanese Empire pg. 239
For years the senior American Representative in Japan, Douglas MacArthur, travelled all over Japan with no armed escort, despite traveling in a nation filled with burning hatred for him and the fanatical mindset to do anything to bring him to harm.
Not one Japanese person would bring the shame and dishonor on themselves and their family that would come with disobeying a sitting Emporer. He submitted, and so must they.
Got any support for the assertion that Japan was “a nation filled with burning hatred for” MacArthur? And after the war, the Emperor has zero, exactly zero, authority to command anyone’s obedience. I think you may be romanticizing the attitude towards the Emperor before and after the war. There were even plots against the Emperor during the war. That kind of goes against your idea that "not one Japanese person"would risk shame of going against the dude.
Did Stalin have any input on Potsdam? I thought it was just the USA, UK and China since the USSR was still officially neutral in the war against Japan. On the latter point, after the bombs, was there a great deal of resistance to the idea that Hirohito would be left as the Emperor as a ‘special’ term?
Agree with all your post as you could probably figure from the OP, and history has proven the decision a correct one. Hopefully you won’t misconstrue my questions as questioning the decision itself; but I have heard it frequently brought up in the context of discussing the atomic bombings, in that if we could live with the Emperor why didn’t we make it more clear to the Japanese before we dropped them, couldn’t that have spared Hiroshima and/or Nagasaki. Personally I doubt that very much, just wanted some more input on the notion.
Indeed, there was a long history of patriotic insubordination in Japan - Gekokujō - which was frequently justified as being done in the name of the “true” wishes of the Emperor over the actual expressed wishes of the Emperor. Probably the most blatantly against the expressed wishes of the Emperor was the Kyūjō Incident, an attempted coup d’état to prevent the broadcast of recordings of Hirohito’s acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration and to continue the war. War Minister Anami was aware of but neither took part in nor attempted to stop the coup plotters and committed suicide after its failure. Other such incidents include the Manchurian Incident leading to the invasion of Manchuria which was carried out by the Kwantung Army against orders from Tokyo, the March Incident, the October or Imperial Colors Incident, the League of Blood Incident, the May 15 Incident and the February 26 Incident.
Often, it’s better to think of the Emperor of Japan as more like the religious head of the Shinto religion than a secular head of state. Historically, the Emperor’s political power has often been minimal. In some ways the Emperor was very similar to the Roman Catholic Pope in feudal Europe.
The Emperor was very important, yet had lacked power nearly a thousand years. The symbolic power was immense, however: Japan had and has the Emperor, who virtually embodied (and perhaps still does embody) Japan as an ethnic and cultural identity. It’s notable that the Emperor didn’t and basically couldn’t issue a statement or express a public opinion - and had to sneak the message out to get it over the air. That he did so in order to surrender hammered home that things were changing.
But it wasn’t that the Japanese were fanatic slaves of the Emperor. I would argue the Imperial line was something akin to the Constitution. The Constitution is ultimately some ink and paper, but the symbolic importance of it makes it weigh far more heavily than a mere contract.
In fact, if anything MacArthur enjoyed considerable popularity in the postwar occupation of Japan. He may have been a former enemy, but the United States occupation, if not especially pleasant, was basically free from violence, looting, and rapine. America helped get Japan back on its feet, and MacArthur himself was both a successful soldier, old but not weak, and in person rather loomed over most Japanese. That kind of impression was not at all unimportant in Japan. And in the postwar economic and social breakdown, an awful lot of people couldn’t have cared less about the Emperor as long as they could get blitzed.
So Sitnam is horrendously, horrendously wrong.
I think Pleonast meant that as an analogy. Shinto has very little theology as such, and no real head in practice. I recall the Emperor does perform some official ceremonies, but I believe has no specific authority over anyone other Shinto priest or practicioner in that sense.
This is my understanding as well. Once the Japanese people accepted defeat, they genuinely accepted the defeat.
MacArthur is probably to thanks for keeping the Emperor on, for one thing. The President basically gave him complete ownership of Japan and its reconstruction, and MacArthur took advantage of that to make decisions, like this one, that weren’t necessarily what the USA had expected. But, by all accounts, they were generally the right decisions and popular in Japan.
I recommend Embracing Defeat, which is a historical study of how the Japanese adapted to the postwar realities. It isn’t a detailed study of all the events, but focuses strongly on how the people reacted and muddled through a difficult period. including looks at attitudes about the Emperor.
Actually, it’s kinda weird, but the postwar period in Japan resembled the post-WW1 period in Germany (especially Berlin). It’s a somewhat similar story of an industrial society facing social and economic collapse, and people’s individual responses tended to mix varying degrees of despair, determination, and hedonism to get by.
When I lived in Japan, every single time–and I mean every time bar none–the Emperor performed any Shinto ceremony, there was a backlash against him, the imperial system in toto, the Imperial Household Agency in particular, and the government of the day for violating the SOCAS. That’s because the ceremonies he chose to perform were those that required big bucks and those bucks came from the national coffers. The biggest uproar was over one ceremony involving his Shingo “ordination” (sorry, I don’t recall the exact word for the event) as Emperor.
I am making a historical analogy; not really speaking about present conditions. Many Americans hear “Emperor of Japan” and think of someone who had political power like the Tsar of Russia. The Emperor had little political power, but moral suasion instead. And even after the Meiji changes, the Emperor was still very constrained.
So, in terms of where in the mind-space the “Emperor of Japan” should be, it’s closer to a religious head than a head of state. Neither are particularly good analogies.
After the “MacArthur changes”, regardless of what many people think due to their ignorance of the matter, the Emperor of Japan is prohibited even from “moral persuasion” of the government or the society. His job is the ultimate sinecure.
Today, the Emperor of Japan is neither the head of state nor the head of a religion. According to the Constitution of Japan, the people are the sovereign. The Emperor is a symbol with zero power. He does have a short list of responsibilities (which he has no say in whether to do them or not–the Diet says do it and he does it). Here’s the short list from the constitution:
[ul][li]Promulgation of amendments of the constitution, laws, cabinet orders and treaties.[/li][li]Convocation of the Diet.[/li][li]Dissolution of the House of Representatives.[/li][li]Proclamation of general election of members of the Diet.[/li][li]Attestation of the appointment and dismissal of Ministers of State and other officials as provided for by law, and of full powers and credentials of Ambassadors and Ministers.[/li][li]Attestation of general and special amnesty, commutation of punishment, reprieve, and restoration of rights.[/li][li]Awarding of honors.[/li][li]Attestation of instruments of ratification and other diplomatic documents as provided for by law.[/li][li]Receiving foreign ambassadors and ministers.[/li][li]Performance of ceremonial functions.[/ul][/li]
To be perfectly clear as to what the man’s ruling powers are, check out Chapter I, Article 4 of the Constitution of Japan (I’ve bolded the important point):
Regarding SOCAS, check out Chapter III, Article 20 of the constitution:
While the Emperor has no governing powers, he is still a state organ.
In short: the Emperor of Japan is the Diet’s “wind-up” toy. He does what they order him to do and it damn well better not have anything to do with him acting like he’s any kind of ruler, governor, or even king. Note also that short list cited from the constitution above does not include him acting like the head of a religion.
Yeah. There was a big kerfuffle about the Emperor, the Imperial Household Agency, the imperial system, and the government of the day’s involvement in a Shinto rite just a couple of months after I moved to Japan.
That’s OK, we forgive you but only if you agree to continue.
While I understand this is referenced as a shorthand for the actions when resulted in the surrender of Japan, the Soviet entry into the war should IMHO be referenced each time as that was inseparable from the bombing in forcing their hand. You do below but it’s so intrinsically tied up that they both need to be taken as a set.
No, this was actually debated before hand, and it was eventually, again IMHO, correctly left out.
Desperation.
This is the key point.
There were a number of points which the military government was attempting to negotiate. Disarming themselves. Holding their own war crimes trials. No occupation.
The big one outside on keeping the emperor was allowing Japan to retain the kokutai, a word maddeningly difficult to translate. It has been rendered as “national system” in English as well as several others, but the best may well be the rather loosely translated “way of life.”
The military had held and increasingly stronger choke hold on Japanese society in that the military interests overshadowed that of the nation. What was good for the ultra nationalistic nuts was good for Mr. and Mrs. Tanaka, their children and their elderly parents.
“Better Dead Than Red” is a slogan not easily forgotten by people of my generation, no matter how much we agreed to not with the sentiment. Would we not fight for our basic rights and apple pie rather than to capitulate to the godless Commies?
This ultimately became the sticking point between the pro surrender and anti surrender factions within the Big Six on the the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War. Only one of the four members who were active duty officers agreed to this term until forced to accept the package deal.
If the carrot of retaining the imperial system were readily given, it may have encouraged the hardliners to hold out all that much more.
Historically, sort of except that Shinto is more of a custom than a religion in the same sense which Westerners are familiar with. It was his responsibility to perform certain rites, but there was not a set of dogma or organized priests with real religious power over people’s lives as would be in a Christian tradition.
The Roman Catholic Pope in feudal Europe actually held far more real power than the traditional role of the emperor.
People often misunderstand the idea that the emperor was a “living god.” He was only such in terms of a reverence but without any particularly special divine powers. Certainly, he commanded reverence, but not strict obedience.
Yeah, as wrong as anything I’ve ever seen written on the subject.
That’s correct. I didn’t see this when I typed my reply above.
The Japanese people themselves had not enjoyed a choice in either going to war, nor quitting it. The nation was beat, and no one except for the fanatics in the IJA and some in the IJN wanted to continue.