In analyzing what the decision in BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA v. DALE (99-699) means, it helps to understand what was decided. Clearly, some posters here don’t understand what was decided (specifically, for example, Esprix is incorrect in stating that the Court has held the BSA to be a ‘private’ organization). We will start with the issues presented by the case, and briefly review its history, then look at the actual decision and its meaning.
Originally the Plaintiff, Dale was an assisstant scoutmaster for a troup of Boy Scouts in New Jersey. He is gay, acknowledges his gayness, and according to the evidence not only openly advocates “gay rights” but also works as an activist to obtain such rights. The Boy Scouts of America (BSA) found out about his activities and terminated him from the position of assistant scoutmaster, claiming that homosexuality is inconsistant with the philosophies of the organization, which include being “morally straight” and “clean”. Dale sued in New Jersey state court, claiming that New Jersey’s law banning discrimination against gays by “public accomodations” was violated by the BSA’s action. The suit was initially dismissed by the trial court, but on appeal the appellate court reinstated it, and the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld that determination. In pertinent part, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the BSA was a “public accomodation”, that firing Dale was a violation of the New Jersey law, that the right of the BSA to “expressive association” was not violated by this determination because the state has a compelling interest in stamping out discrimination against gays, and the application of the law was narrowly tailored to meet that interest. The New Jersey Supreme Court felt that forcing the inclusion of Dale in the BSA would not hinder the effort of the BSA to promote its message, neither by forcing it to promote Dale’s message, nor by stopping it from promoting its own official message.
The BSA applied to the United States Supreme Court for a Writ of Certiorari (they asked the USSC to review the decision). The USSC was not interested in the application of the “public accomodations” law to the BSA, since that was a determination of state law, and outside the jurisdiction of the USSC. But the BSA asserted that the application of the law in this instance violated a federal constitutional right, over which the USSC does have jurisdiction. Cert was granted, and the case heard, with the decision issuing Wednesday.
What the decision said
The USSC held that application of the New Jersey law in this case violated the BSA’s right of “expressive association”. This right has been read into the First Amendment since 1958 (see NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), Justice Harlan writing for the unanimous court); a quick review of the First Amendment will show that it doesn’t exist there literally. [Poster’s side note: one of these days the USSC will stop its improper terming of constitutional rights; the right in question as regards federal action would be covered by the Tenth Amendment (all non-enumerated rights); as regards state action, the right is a Fourteenth Amendment right, selectively incorporated from the First Amendment] The first cases protected the right of the NAACP to associate without undue burdens being placed on them by southern states; application has been extended to political parties (Democratic Party v. LaFollette, 45 U.S. 107 (1981)) and student organizations (Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972). One of the ways that right may be unconstitutionally burdened is by forcing the organization to accept a member it does not desire (Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
The Court first had to decide if the BSA was a group to which protection would be applied, that is, did it engage in “expressive association”. As was made clear in the Jaycees case, there is less protection if your association is not for the purpose of advocating certain opinions and ideas. The Court determined that the BSA does practice “expressive association” because the youth members are constantly inculcated with the organization’s credo. Next, the Court determined that forcing the BSA to accept Dale as a member would place a significant burden on this “expressive association”. This is where the main disagreement with the New Jersey Supreme Court occurred. The USSC decided that forcing the BSA to accept Dale as a member would force the BSA to accept Dale’s exposition of pro-gay opinions, which the BSA asserts is contrary to its organizational belief system, an assertion the Court accepted without much review. It didn’t matter that not all BSA members agree, nor did it matter that the BSA actually asks members not to talk about sexuality. As long as the BSA has as part of its credo that homosexuality is not right, and inculcates its members in that credo, it is burdened by accepting a member it does not want who espouses a different credo on the subject.
Finally, the Court determined that the application of the state law was not sufficiently limited to curtail a compelling state interest. Interestingly, the Court glosses over this issue in its opinion [likely because if it addressed it head on, it would be fed its opinion in the Jaycees case and forced to either conclude in writing that protecting women from discrimination is more important that protecting gays, or to conlcude the BSA had to accept Dale]. Relying mostly on the decision in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995), where it refused to require that a parade accept gay marchers, the Court refused to force the BSA to accept a member with contrary views regardless of whether the law in question promoted good conduct instead of harmful behaviour.
In short, the USSC simply said that the BSA asserts it is anti-gay in its beliefs, organizes for the purpose of associating to communicate and promote those views (among others), and can’t be forced to accept a member who openly espouses a contrary viewpoint, even under a law designed to reduce discrimination against gays. It did not address whether the BSA was a ‘public’ or ‘private’ organization, because that ‘issue’ was not before it; it was not germane to the discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment right of the organization.
NOW, knowing this, one can get into all SORTS of interesting discussion as to the meaning of this decision. Does it apply only to a situation as narrow as the one presented (e.g., a member who espouses an opposite viewpoint)? Does it mean that homosexuals get treated differently by the court than women, or was the result in the Jaycees case different solely because that organization wasn’t felt to be involved in “expressive association”? If so, just how many groups would be covered, and do they simply have to openly avow a discriminatory position to get the same result?