Bricker and Dewey seem miffed that I am taking them at what certainly seems to be their word – that no right that is not explicitly spelled out in the Constitution is protected, except perhaps by statute that can be repealed.
Shodan seems to hold that rights are not natural (a stange position for a conservative Christian, but that’s his privilege) but either spelled out in Constitutional guarantees or “created” by “judicial fiat.”
So what I would like to do here is to have the three of them correct any misperceptions I have as to their positions – and anyone else who tends to decry “judicial activism” is invited to clarify their own position too. And we will explore how and where rights are identified/created/whatever-verbed and what the proper limitations on that are.
My own stance is that there are unenumerated rights, which are discovered on a case-by-case basis when a statute, ordinance, or regulation encroaches on them, having been assumed without conscious thought up until that point. How they are identified is in (1) the common consent of all humanity – e.g., the right to marry subject to statute, or to travel, is inherent in being a free person, and few if any reasonable people would suggest otherwise, or (2) by the implications of enumerated rights. E.g., the right to privacy can be founded in the Fourth Amendment guarantees, with contributions from First and Fifth. The security that one has in one’s person, house, paper, and effects against unlawful searches and seizures would be obviated if any governmental instrumentality or private person may violate that security so long as they are not committing what the court deems an unlawful search or seizure. For example, a rotating team of police cannot decide to remain in your home 24/7 just against the chance you might decide to commit a crime, being very careful not to commit an unlawful search in the process. This is similar to but different from the silly “penumbra” doctrine – what it suggests is that the right guaranteed is not delimited by the language, but includes such implications as a reasonable man might draw from them. My classic example that freedom of speech includes the right to be heard by willing listeners.