“Not enough mana for casting spell” 
You just cant win if you start war against Russia Empire, Britain Empire, French Republic in same time.
I seriously doubt the allies (even the US) could have invaded and occupied all of Germany, so it’s kind of a moot point.
Well, that’s why we’re discussing this, isn’t it?
We do know what happened in Germany post WWI. The Nazi’s used the “stab in the back” sham to help them (I wrote help, not guarantee) get in power.
And we do know that that certainly didn’t happen in WWII, and Germany certainly couldn’t have argued that they would have/could have/should have won the war post WWII.
Ahh . . . yeah . . . what does any of that have to do with WWI???
Try all you will to argue, what ever the hell that is up there, but Germany certainly wasn’t treated any more poorly after WWI than they treated France after the Franco-Prussian War, reparations and all. And they bear at the very least equal responsibility for the war.
By mid 1918, Gen. Ludendorff was a raving maniac who was close to a mental breakdown (he later began to worship the old Germanic god Wotan). Ludendorff vacillated between a final offensive (that would have led to large scale mutinies) and immediate surrender. Strangely, the Kaiser was kept out of all this. Ludendorff’s behavior eerily presaged Hitler’s final days in the bunker, 27 years later.
In 1918, I assume you mean. Because the Allies most certainly did invade and occupy all of Germany in 1945.
Yes. The situations for the allies between 1918 and 1945 were completely different. Both the UK and France were on the brink of collapse and I doubt the US could have logistically supported an invasion and occupation army into Germany in 1918…and this leaves aside the fact that we know the Spanish Flu was going to hammer everyone’s military as well the next year. So, at least as far as I can see, there is simply no way that the allies could have invaded and occupied Germany, and this assumes that Germany would essentially not be fighting back in any sort of coherent way.
From reading this thread, it almost seems like Germany was a sprinter in a marathon. They had the resources and tactics to make gains but they were too costly and they wouldn’t be able to sustain what they’d gained. The sprinter had a leg cramp and bowed out before things got worse.
There was some famous personage who I can’t recall right now, who said something to the effect that you can only hope that you and your allies don’t get tired of the damned war before the other guy does. The allies basically outlasted Germany, and the influx of fresh troops from the US was likely a factor in that.
I’m not sure on what basis you reckon Britain and France were on the point of collapse. As I understand it both powers were fully committed to an offensive to win the war in 1919. Yes, manpower resources were stretched but not exhausted, there were still a lot of troops in Britain defending against a potential invasion 
By some measures both countries were bankrupt but this wasn’t a problem while the US was willing to lend money for them to buy American munitions and food. There was some industrial unrest but nowhere near revolution - and seeing the armies actually advancing after four years of stalemate was a great tonic to public opinion.
To drive home that the German army had been defeated it probably would not have been necessary to occupy all of Germany. The main thing would have been to make the German troops on the Western Front lay down their arms and formally surrender. As it was, they were allowed to march home where the were greeted with flowers as unconquered heroes. The problem was on 11 November the Allies didn’t really realise how bad things were in Germany and how near complete collapse the German army was. As it was the British and French were keen to end the fighting asap. Pershing, whose army was still increasing in power, was in favour keeping going until the Germans surrendered unconditionally.
Of course, it’s a pretty big jump between making it harder for the stab-in-back myth to take root and saying the Nazis would not have come to power and WW2 avoided.
The German people felt humiliated by the Versailles treaty. The British public wanted to “Hang the Kaiser” and “Make Germany Pay”; France saw that as the soft option. The Russians just wanted anything they could lay their revolutionary hands on. President Wilson, whose health was failing, wanted America to concentrate on itself and let Europe sort out it’s own backyard.
Apart from losing huge parts of what was once Germany (Alsace-Lorraine, Eupen and Malmedy, Northern Schleswig, Hultschin, West Prussia, Posen and Upper Silesia), the army was limited to little more than a regiment, no air force, no submarines and only six naval ships.
Add in the he infamous “War Guilt Clause” which said that Germany had to give the Allies a blank cheque for reparations and you can begin to see why the ordinary German, who had little or no idea why he was fighting his former friends and allies in the first place, would be a little disgruntled.
Great post bob++ but my lingering question on this (one that I’ve been pondering for decades since college) is this:
To what extent is our negative reaction to the Versailles treaty merely a function of almost 100 years of evolution and hindsight, with the truth being that the treaty wasn’t that unusual or out-of-step in 1918, especially in light of the Treaty of Frankfurt at the end of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870?
In this same vein I’d love to know (unknowable I realize) what terms would have been dictated by Germany had she one. I believe that they wouldn’t have been all that different from the Versailles treaty. Certainly Germany was willing to relegate Russia to a slave state 20 plus years later, so Europe wasn’t all that enlightened in the early 20th century.
In short, the allies have to be judged by the social and diplomatic mores of the day. And I’m not convinced by that yardstick, Versailles was that out of line. I’ll willing to be swayed to the contrary of course.
Assuming that the occupation was possible, the Nazis could have used the “those traitors gave our country away” argument as effectively as the stabbed in the back argument.
Germany in 1945 was in ruins, and total failure of the madmen who ran the country for 12 years was obvious. Germany in 1918 was not. And there weren’t the atrocities of the Nazi era to discredit the old government.
If an occupation was feasible, I don’t think it would have stopped the rise of at least some sort of extremist party.
The essential history of World War I ran like this: Britain declared war on Germany on August 4, 1914. Britain imposed a naval blockade on Germany by the end of 1914. Germany tried to break the blockade but failed. The blockade caused the German economy to collapse by 1918 and Germany could no longer maintain its military forces. Germany was forced to surrender.
This summation explains why Germany lost the war even though it appeared to be doing well. It lost the naval war and that was the war that mattered. The land war, while it got most of the attention, wasn’t as important.
There are German records of what they planned to ask for if they had won the war. And the terms they wanted were much harsher than the terms they ended up receiving.
Versailles was objectively a pretty reasonable treaty. The only problem was that Germany refused to accept a reasonable treaty.
Why go back 40 years or forward 20 years when we can look at what terms Germany felt was reasonable to impose on an Entente power in that very same year? Germany felt that it was perfectly reasonable to demand that Russia give up the territories of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, and the Ukraine to German control, and Ardahan, Kars, and Batumi to Turkey. Poland also remained in control of the Central powers, though they didn’t mention it in the treaty. That was roughly a third of the Russian Empire’s population, half of her industry, and 90% of her coal mines. Russia was also required to pay six billion marks in reparations on a much shakier economy than Germany.
You did just fine.
The certain and unequivocal knowledge that they had been beaten to the ground with no two ways about it may have changed German attitudes following the war, especially in removing the basis for the stab-in-the-back legend. I think it would have changed them, and I think that would have been a change for the better.
Although the message of Garman defeat was clear even before the last ditch German offensive, the absolute final nail in the coffin was the Italian victory at the battle of Vittorio Veneto. Austria was decisively beaten, and the prospect of a new southern front opening up was a distinct probability.
Germany was already defeated on the Western front and simply could not support another front line.
The Italians and their allies were almost in a position to walk into Germany unopposed, all they needed was to move their armies there was no prospect of an organised resistance.
That’s going way too far.
Of course the blockade was important but so was the land war. Blockade, even if applied with full rigour from 1914, which it wasn’t: too much respect for neutral’s rights, especially when the neutral in question was the USA - would not have brought Germany to its knees in four years without the enormous strain imposed by fighting the three Entente powers. Without the drain on resources of the land war the Dual Alliance could have maintained itself almost indefinitely.
I think the math shows the Versailles treaty was about ten times harder than the Treaty of Frankfurt.
Basically, it was the arrival of the Americans. We were fresh but everyone else was ground down to mud.
This is not true. There’s a memo from one German official, but not by anyone who had any real authority.
*Although today it is reasonably clear that Germany fought the war with the general aim of transforming itself from a merely continental power to a true world power, the fact is that at no point did the German government know just what its peace terms would be if it won. It might have annexed Belgium and part of the industrial regions of northern France, though bringing hostile, non-German populations into the Empire might not have seemed such a good idea if the occasion actually arose. More likely, or more rationally, the Germans would have contented themselves with demilitarizing these areas.
From the British, they would probably have demanded nothing but more African colonies and the unrestricted right to expand the German High Seas Fleet. *