There are no such official documents.
In theory they had the Austro Hungarian Empire, the Turkish Empire and the Italians on their side. so it want as lopsided as you make it out to be. The Italians were backstabbers and the AH empire turned out to be a paper Tiger.
Also known as Larry, Curly and Moe :p.
Oh, the math shows that, does it? Does the math also show the damage caused by the Germans in WWI vs. the damage caused by the French in the Franco-Prussian war? I’ll also note that you have no comment on the comparison with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.
That was what Schlieffen thought as well: Germany couldn’t win a two-front war, so knock France out first and decisively before Russia could mobilize, and then fight the Eastern Front while the UK was dithering about trying to launch what amounted to a D-Day invasion without what we’d consider modern landing craft or airplanes capable of softening up the invasion site.
The hitch was that it involved going through neutral Belgium and, allegedly, killing a Hell of a lot of nuns. That brought the UK in, and then France managed to stop their offensive, and the war was lost right then. They just didn’t really see it at the time.
That was because they knew Russia was in pretty bad shape, and that the Bolsheviks were pretty eager to get out of the war. It wasn’t a case of punishment, it was a case of what they could get away with.
This.
Which is not too far off what Yamamoto thought about WWII in the Pacific.
It continues to amaze me when strategic thinkers believe in short sharp decisive wars at relatively low cost to the aggressor.
One would think after this many centuries’ experience demonstrating the folly of that attitude folks would grow up. But no. Even as recently as the 21st Century GWB (Cheney?) did it in Iraq. It’s arguable whether any subsequent strategic-military adventures by other leaders or powers are in quite the same category, but the century is yet young.
They still pushed it too far. The Bolsheviks were eager to end the war but the Germans insisted on a treaty that was so outrageous even the Bolsheviks refused to sign it. As a result, the Germans had to launch another offensive to convince the Bolsheviks to sign.
The problem for the Germans was that they were on a deadline. The whole plan had been they would force the Bolsheviks to surrender quickly so they could redeploy troops from Russia back to France for an offensive there before the Americans arrive. By insisting on their harsh treaty terms, they delayed this for several weeks.
The result was that Germany lost the 1918 offensive in France and thereby lost the war. It was forced to give back all the territory it had taken from Russia and also sign the Versailles Treaty.
It often seems like the effective force against Germany was Germany itself.
Some more reasons. With the loss of the Balkans, the Germans would lose their oil on top of everything else not going their way.
This graph shows how much the Allies increased their front-line rifle strength while German strength fell in half in 1918.
Except of course, had the Germans done just a little better in the West and knocked out the French, it would have been a different story.
I’m sure you are using Yamamoto as a shortcut for the military planners in Imperial Japan, but he was one of those more ambivalent about their chances, famously said
That quote was often taken out of context to suppose that he believed it would be possible to win against the US, while the opposite was true.
While opposed to the war against the US, he also was the architect of the Pearl Harbor raid and believed that the loss of the US battleships would seriously affect public morale.
Along with those you’ve listed, we must add Hitler who was so confident of quick victories that he didn’t put German on total war footing until far too late.
This is overly simplified and incorrect.
Germany had structural problems with the offense, and poor logistics prevented bringing ammunition the food to the storm troopers, among other problems. They lacked a clear, overall plan and squandered many of their chances.
They had tied up one million soldiers in occupying Russia, and were losing the best of the troops in the offense. The Allies had developed better defenses, so it’s not this simple case of losing because of a couple of weeks of timing.
It was a treaty with terms that Germany considered acceptable to impose on one of the Entente powers that lost in the very same year that Germans were whining about what big meanies the Entente powers were for the Versailles treaty. The idea that Germany considered taking 1/3 of the population of the Russian Empire a completely reasonable thing to do really weakens complaints about Versailles going to far.
What ‘many centuries experience?’ In 1870 Prussia fought a war againt France that lasted less than a year and resulted in a lot of territorial and financial gain at France’s expense, plus prompted the southern German states to merge with Prussia into Germany. That wasn’t even 50 years before World War I, it was still living memory. And shortly before that were the second Schleswig War and Austro-Prussian war, both of which were quick and profitable Prussian Victories.
When your country was forged out of short, sharp victories it’s pretty easy to see why you’d think planning for a sharp war is a good idea. Ignoring facts on the ground (the Schlieffen plan required more troops than Germany had, for example) and expecting things to work out is bad planning, but that doesn’t make the whole concept invalid.
Around 5% of all Humans on Earth died, in 9 terrifying months.
Still cool? :dubious:
If you don’t laugh you’ve gotta cry…
I had always thought Germany was essentially starved of supplies and fighting men. Continuing the war would have caused the populace to revolt.
The Germans and the Prussians before them had had good experiences with winning quick wars and fighting while outnumbered from several sides, much like Israel has. In WWI and WWII, quick decisive victories only partly came which then lead to being ground down from both sides.
Those interested in this discussion may be interested in two past threads concerning WWI:
Why was WWI such a stalemate?: Why was WWI such a stalemate? - Factual Questions - Straight Dope Message Board
How was the WWI stalemate broken?: How was the WWI stalemate broken? - Factual Questions - Straight Dope Message Board
It is arguable that the Schlieffen Plan was nothing more than a concept to state what Germany could have done with a few more Corps. It was, in effect, a plan to recruit more troops- and if the Kaiser had invested in that instead of a Navy that was effectively bottled up for the war it would have been really interesting. Some arguments state the pla was in the keeping of the elderly sisters of Schlieffen and it was resurrected later to explain the unthinkable defeat of a Prussian led army. (Terrence Zuber)
Basically the war was lost for Germany due to the Naval Blockade by the Royal Navy. Germany lost access to things such as rubber, petroleum and more importantly fertilizers that crippled the farming industry.
The American intervention was of course important, and possibly decisive, in Operation Michael.
However, fighting a two front war was always going to be difficult. Russia was close to a basket case and going to war was the thing they could not afford to do. However, national pride took them there and it occupied German forces 3 years before the inevitable revolution.
Of course, Germany’s allies were pretty useless eventually as they were all relying on Germany for hardware.
In the end a long war was not going to end well for them:mad:. There is a discussion (for another time) that it would have been better if they had won- no Hitler etc.