In this old column Uncle Cecil said that we still pay for our lease on Guantanamo but that Cuba “won’t cash the checks!”.
OK, but do we really send them checks? If so, do we actually send a check? Who is it made out to? From what bank does it come? Who do we send that money to? Do we send it to some embassy, or just mail it to Havana?
So my WAG would be that it really is done the way one would imagine: The Treasury issues a check on paper, payable to some extinct Cuban government official designated in the 1934 treaty, mail it to the Castros (they might mail it to Cuba’s representation in the U.S. - there is no Cuban embassy in Washington, but Cuba has an interest section within the Swiss embassy), but the Castros don’t cash it, putting them either in their desk drawer or into some museum.
Seems like we’d want to deposit it electronically. I mean, are we making a show of paying to the letter of an old contract to an old government, or do we want Castro to take the money? His not depositing the check is a political statement; if we deposit electronically, then we take that away from him. Petty? You becha.
You’re addressing one of the most complex problems in public international law - the relationship between domestic law and international law (which can be made up of customary law or treaties). Basically, there are two possibilities: Monism, where one of the two legal systems (usually international law) is superior and voids colliding domestic law, or at least makes it inapplicable; and dualism, according to which domestic law is to be applied domestically irrrespective of what international law says, because - according to dualism - the two legal orders are distinct and do not interfere with each other. This results in the possibility of a dilemma: A state can be obliged under international law to do something which it may not do under domestic law. If the state obeys its domestic law, responsibility for a violation of international law will follow.
It is settled in international law that every nation may decide whether it follows the monist or the dualist approach. The U.S. follows the monis doctrine:
This means that American authorities may do something which is illegal under statutory American law, if treaties to which the U.S. is a party demand that, because the treaty supersedes the statute.
Helms Burton (and other existing sanctions) doesn’t restrict governmental activities, just commercial business. (Other restrictions are applied on cultural, educational, and other activities, but are not restrictions on what Uncle Sam may wish to do.)
So the discussion of treaty law vs. domestic law doesn’t really apply in this particular case.
The portion of the Constitution quoted establishes the supremacy of federal laws and treaties over state laws and constitutions; as to each other, they’re coequal. Treaties may abrogate statutes, and vice versa. “By the Constitution, a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is given to either over the other.” Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888). Not really applicable here, though, for the reasons Ravenman stated.