First, let me observe that should, and perhaps I am engaging in sheer optimism here, we be looking to medium and long term results, then petty playground sandbox politics is not a particularly productive path to take.
A few sociological observations first, for those who have missed my thread.
First, the celebrating and looting, etc., with the end of the regime is not seen in this region as “Iraqis,” an undifferentiated group, but by the social layers that people here know exist. Shiite vs Sunni is also a class difference. Many of those being looted, or in the case of government offices, having their offices looted are Sunni, the majority in fact. The celebrators-looters are without doubt largely Shiite, for that is the sociological reality of the regime, the Shiite majority was shut out. Have care not to dupe yourself into thinking things are simple. As I argued in my thread, it is now that the real danger starts, with a head that will come up in I would estimate 6 months to a year.
If one follows either my thread or the many links therein, one clear picture emerges, whatever sort of ideological pimpery may claim otherwise: Many Iraqis wanted to be rid of Sadaam, few wanted an invasion and none, excluding perhaps the exiles who may need protection if installed as pro-consuls, want the Americans to rule or otherwise revamp their country in an American image. Arab nationalism, emerging and fragile Iraqi nationalism together.
The threat here is Beirut, 1980s. Roula Khalaf in the Financial Times has it on the money. There will be little patience on the Iraqi side for a second colonial experience, and many, many hidden agendas, jockeying for power and influence. And in a country awash in arms.
Second, the entire operation has had little to no international legitimacy. Celebrating Iraqis is helpful but not the entire game, for all that anyone who looks closely knows there is a clear socio-economic and ethnic divide to take into account (as well as it being important to recall the habits of a dictatorship do not disappear overnight, one day chanting for Sadaam, the next USA, but where the real feelings lie? With neither in the end, for the moment). Pre-emptive attack on a fairly prostrate country by the worlds most powerful nation generates fears and resentments, and not just in dictatorships. These are not merely trivial jealousies but also reactions to a rising perception of threat coming from a United States that many perceive as not being willing to abide by the same rules it wishes to impose on others. Certainly the Wolfowitz crowd make arguments that fit this precisely. This implies lack of trust, lack of trust implies impaired cooperation in other fields. Impaired cooperation implies rising opportunity costs to achieve policy goals, and indeed perhaps excludes certain win-win kinds of multinational cooperation.
These are important problems, less evident perhaps to the simplistic one off analysis, but they became very evident when one looks at the failure of US diplomacy, truly unprecedented given the circumstances, in the past year. Very clearly, the Blair Government understands this and is pressuring, publicly and privately, to get Iraqi policy back on a multilateral track – and short-circuit the ‘spoils of victory’ mentality I see here. Just as obviously, a failure in this regard will be serious political blow to Blair having staked his reputation on these items.
Very clearly then, spreading the responsibility is akin to spreading the risks. The profits to be had from Iraq, while perhaps important for smaller to medium sized companies, are not that great in the end. Iraq may end up rich, but not overnight. Serious money will have to be invested to repair damage, heal wounds, buy loyalties, patch over rivalries and spread enough good will to help allow the first seeds of civil society to take root. None of this will be easy either. Should the Bush team actually be thinking as prudent strategists, they should be thinking of spreading the risk for what is now the real challenge: defeating a second rate army crippled by ten years of sanctions was trivial – although a very decent job was apparently done of doing so and largely minimizing Iraqi civilian casualties. For all that I know some, which makes it hard to step back and be analytical, for me personally.
What purpose then, excluding the French and the Germans and the Russians? To show political immaturity and childish peevishness? To engage in pointless self-indulgence? What rational policy goals are served? Certainly in the case of private companies and participation in rebuilding Iraq, excluding private companies such as TotalFinaElf on the basis of their ‘nationality’ is not only ludicrously childish but also sends a number of bad policy signals.
First, it undermines the credibility of the argument this is not a colonial game. It is hard to overestimate the danger of this, for both Iraqi and pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic opinion are inclined – with the good reason of historical examples – to see this as a colonialist power play to seize the Iraqi market for the US. I personally find this to be a silly argument on a rational basis (as much as I find to be absurd and incoherent, even hypocritical, the frequent pimping of the claims that France et al aligned themselves with Iraq for commercial reasons, based on trivial private contracts and debt – which is more likely to be repaid now than before). However as noted there are rational historical, if not factually supported, reasons for the developing world to see things in this manner.
Second, it rather undermines what should be a policy of promoting adherence to commercially based free market contracting. American insertion of American preferences for no better reason than ideology and childish peevishness into the contracting processes does nothing more than set a bad example in a neighborhood already replete with bad examples and poor corporate and other governance. Should we actually wish to succeed in the stated aim of helping the Iraqis build a viable civil society with viable economics, then policies had best be based on a clear-sighted vision of medium term goals and results, not near term inanities about who was ‘against’ us.
I am likely going to be a part of financing certain aspects of this, and I certainly do not see anything good in the medium and even near term from adopting a “US” first program in Iraq, for the examples that will be set, and for the already stunning challenges one will find in operating in this environment. I speak to this as an on the ground operator, and I may add since we have American capital, I may be speaking against narrow self-interest but for a larger overall pie in the end.
Finally, on the corporate front, the spreading of participation also means the spreading of potential risk, especially blame, when things go wrong. While it may be superficially attractive to own the whole pie, this also means owning all of the blame, or all of the risk. Not a very good idea, in my opinion, and I know this region – this is not Kansas. Already the US by arrogating to itself the right to change this regime has bitten off a large portion of risk for success and failure in Iraq in the next 5-10 years. Whatever happens in the next half-to full decade here will be pinned on the US, for better or worse. While I am sure our navel gazers here will thoughtlessly throw up their shoulders in a so-what shrug, if one wants positive results from the policy, one has to follow it through. Given the challenges I have outlined elsewhere, I do not believe it prudent, for no particularly compelling long-term policy reasons, to exclude portions of the private sector for what should be ephemeral political tiffs.
As to the political side, while I can see reasons not to welcome French political meddling on one level, it strikes me once more from experience that getting potential stake holders and game spoilers in one the game is the best way to minimize interference. Already this process begins with little to no regional or international legitimacy. That needs to be changed to manage the risk, and to help increase the somewhat long odds for success.
For example, lack of French and German, and other European recognition for the Government would, as in the case of the Security Council vote, give political cover and critical mass for developing world countries, including those in the region not to recognize the government. One disaster scenario would be to end up with a result approaching the Turkish Republic of Cyprus, a country only recognized by Turkey – obviously less extreme in this case, but when the weight of international legitimacy is not there, your operating costs rise dramatically. No WB access, no IMF – difficulty in shaking the colonial label, with attendant loss of legitimacy internally if this is a long-term problem.
I will not go on to delve into this further; I believe this is sufficient to show that the comments to date reflect at best an impoverished understanding of the requirements for moving forward successfully, and the myriad attendant dangers. I am personally deeply concerned with these issues for the very reason noted above, it has non-theoretical impacts on me. However, beyond that, I believe the analysis is clear – short sightedness got the US into the position where there was a Sadaam with the moderate regional threat capacity that he had – cold war support for the Baath, cold war support for his war with Iran, etc. More short-termism, however superficially appealing on some self-indulging emotional level, will simply create medium to long term problems.
I should say in closing I continue to be amused by the bizarre statements about how “France’s vote” “will be seen” and that somehow France will lose its position in the UN and even lose cred. in the EU. Really quite the contrary, the inverse indeed. Certainly in responsible levels, French opposition expressed the widely held belief that someone had to say no to the Bush Administration’s transparently fabricated case for toppling someone they did not like when they wanted to and fuck the views of others. That this did not stop the war, I would say is considered perhaps less important than, as in the case of the failure of getting the rest of the Security Council on board despite pressure etc,
This isn’t exactly a new thing here. Personally I find it less annoying then when someone starts an OP with “I’m not going to give you my opinion until I hear what other have to say.”