I read a disturbing article in the Times that suggests that Magyar will have a problem getting bills that have passed the parliament signed by the president who is an Orban appointee and cannot be replaced by the prime minister, although the prime minister appoints them.
The article even suggested that the current guy might resign while Orban is still in charge so that Orban can appoint a new one to a new five year term. I have not seen this story elsewhere, so maybe it is not as serious as suggested.
Under the 2023 constitution, if the president refuses to sign a bill into law because he believes it is unconstitutional, he can refer it to the Constitutional Court, but if they then rule the law to be sound, he has no choice but to sign. If the president disapproves of a bill for any other reason, he can return it to the legislature once only, and if they send it back to him, he is once again obliged to sign. If he refuses to sign, then two thirds of legislators can require the Constitutional Court to begin impeachment proceedings against him.
Magyar’s party holds more than two thirds of the seats, so the president alone can’t do anything more than somewhat delay the passage of bills. I think it’s only if the Constitutional Court colludes with the president that legislation could be brought to a standstill: the president could frivolously refer all bills to the Court, which could either slow-walk each case or simply rule in his favour. If impeachment proceedings are initiated, the Court would do the same.
The fifteen members of the Constitutional Court are elected by the legislature to serve twelve-year terms, and are supposed to be non-partisan. All the current members must have been elected under Orbán; I have no idea if a majority of them would be so corrupt as to collude with the president on the sort of scheme described above.
Probably just in time before Rumen Radev, the winner of the Bulgarian elections, forms a government and takes over Orbán’s role in the EU’s Ukraine policy.
Radev has been described as centre-left,[52] populist,[53] and a moderate nationalis..
but yes-
The Atlantic Council warned that a Radev-led government could “replace Hungary as Putin’s proxy inside the EU and NATO”, to the detriment of Ukraine, although it assessed that the influence would be “nowhere near that of Viktor Orbán, at least initially.”[59]Politico included Radev as one of five “possible successors to Orbán as a key destabilizer in the EU”, alongside Robert Fico of Slovakia and Czechia’s Andrej Babiš, further adding his pro-Russian stances had drawn a strong rebuke from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in 2023.[60]Reuters reported that Radev’s campaign drew comparisons with Orbán when he talked about improving ties with Moscow and resuming the free flow of Russian oil and gas into Europe.[61]Raidió Teilifís Éireann commented that Radev could find common ground with Fico and Babis on euroscepticism, adding there is a risk he becomes the next EU disruptor after Orbán if he pushes to restore Russian oil imports to Bulgaria.[62] The European Council on Foreign Relations published an analysis arguing that Radev would be closer to Fico than Orbán and that he is ready to criticise the European Commission, especially on the European Green Deal and EU enlargement; however, it predicted that Radev would generally not try to block major EU decisions, such as on Ukraine, in fear of losing EU funds.[57] …
Basically, he is not like Orban, but his policies towards Ukraine are not yet known.
Describing him as “a successor to Orban as a key destabilizer in the EU” makes it sound like there necessarily must be someone in the office of EU Destabilizer. Positions like that don’t really have successors. You can have multiple at once, and you can have none.