MT, I would be interested in hearing you describe, after 261 posts, what you believe the discussion is really about. You seem to enjoy arguing against points that have not been made. This is not unlike looking for a lost key under a lamppost only because the light is better over there.
Well, yes, I suppose that it is important to note that idea. Of course that idea was noted many times before througout the last couple hundred posts. We agreed with it then, as now.
I don’t expect my analogies to prove anything, do you yours? For the most part I make analogies to help illustrate or clarify by comparison, one or two points that I consider germane to the discussion. There may be a modicum of abstractness involved, but I think that their not making sense may be less my problem than yours.
Well, language, religion and electric scooters are kinda, sorta constructs of consiousness…but I do like the implied quiet ambiguity of, “platonic essence”.
Funny, I don’t remember ever saying or impying that there ever was any such difference? For about 6 or 7 pages, now, I’ve said just the opposite. To any outside observer there is no difference. All duplicates will be convinced they are the original. They are all valid. You are your memories. Your duplicate has your memories, so he is you. All in agreement. You just can’t accept the possibility that there may be two separate “you’s”, unlinked.
Funny, I don’t remember saying or implying that any atoms are more important than any other atoms? In my eyes, all duplicates are created equal (no bigoted duplicist am I). I just wouldn’t kill myself and expect to float into their brains, that’s all.
Hold on, let me look it up in my Funk and Wagnall’s<<<reading>>>, yep, pretty much what I thought. Now, if you will put down this months issue of Crystal Power and crack open your own Funk and Wagnall’s…
If you want to gaze at an alien landscape through the eyes of your duplicate on planet *Mangetout * while you sit on your Barcolounger in the UK, who am I to complain? Or, if you want to put on that dog-and-pony show that ol’ whatsisname is porported to have performed a couple of millenii ago (have your duplicate assembled a few days after you die, then resurect), I’ll buy a front row seat (but, I understand you need friends in high places to pull it off properly). I guess no paradoxes ever exist in Bizarro world.
I’m quite sorry that some of these thought experiments make you so verklempt. It may help to realize that we are talking about imaginary people In imaginary situations. I don’t really expect you to undergo mitosis or even take a trip in a transporter.
(promises, promises)
Actually, I don’t recall that you ever did bother to argue with me…someone else, perhaps. You are good at making assertions that everyone already agrees with. You are good at focussing on the least important and most abstract points in analogies, then complaining about their irrevelency and lack of concretness. You are good at not discussing your assumptions and assertions on the subject at hand, figuring that if you don’t throw em up, they can’t be shot down. Indeed, you are good at shouting down some assertions, only, they are not my assertions
Perhaps, I’m not a gifted hymn composer, and Anssi may sing a little off key, but I believe that we appreciate the same genre of music…not that Gangsta Rap that you’re tapping your feet to . I don’t want to speak for Anssi, and he can tell me if I’m mistaken, but many of his comments thus far do support my position.
It sounds like Anssi is suggesting that if you wait until your duplicate is made, you will realize that the two of you do not share a link and killing yourself in anticipation of shifting into the duplicate is futile. That is my position in a nutshell.
I have always asserted that a paradox existed in this type of situation. Let me describe how I understand the *Failed Source Pod *senario:
Teleporter (what I erroneously called Transporter-A from above): Trip takes 1 minute.
Source Pod: Painted blue inside.
Arrival Pod: Painted red inside.
While in the source pod, someone asks if you anticipate seeing red in 1 minute. You reply, “yes” and you are correct. When you arrive at the arrival pod, you will say that everything worked fine and you felt “shifted” from the source pod.
But what if (as Anssi speculated) the source pod fails and you remain in the source pod as well as transport to the arrival pod? Nothing has changed with “you” in the arrival pod-you will say that everything worked fine and you felt “shifted” from the source pod.
What about the original “you” that remains in the source pod after that 1 minute. Do you see blue? Unless you went blind, the answer must be “yes”. But, do you also see red?
“Yes, I see red”: This means that you anticipated correctly and you shifted into the “you” in the arrival pod. But, how can you see blue and red (be here and there) at the same time? This appears to me to be a paradox.
“No, I do not see red”: This means that you did not anticipate correctly. The original you did not “shift” into the arrival pod. Had the source pod not failed, the original “you” would have died.
This failed source pod teleportation scenario is basically the same as all the other duplication schemes. I assert that #2 is the correct answer (that has been my position all along). I infer from SM’s and MT’s argument that they choose #1.
It seems as though Anssi and I may have a few differences of opinion concerning the mitosis experiment, but there’s plenty of time for me to rescue him from the Dark Side
Precisely, correct. None of them wants to die, so they would avoid being split, teleported or killed after duplication. By Jove! I think he’s finally got it! My work here is nearly complete.
This kind of situation is when the non-editing policy on this board really pays dividends; our statements in this thread are a matter of static record, so…
I don’t recall using many analogies, certainly not heavily relying on them as you have been.
Bullshit; I have been arguing the possibility of two 'you’s since the first page; in post #9, I said:
Again, bullshit. You’ve been asserting it right the way through this thread; that’s what this whole train wreck has been about. even on this page; most recently in post #260, you say:
I’m not at all upset by your so-called thought experiments, I was mildly peeved about the methods by which you expect to conduct this kind of debate, but I’m over that now; I’m now peeved about your gross misrepresentation of my position, but I daresay I’ll get over it.
I believe I have been addressing the fundamental issue in this thread; I don’t seem to be the only one seeing it this way, so I’m fairly content that I’m not hallucinatiing or anything. Oh well. I really am done now, so no more baiting if you please.
Like I said, it is impossible to draw a schematic which would indicate where a POV goes because our intuitive concept of “POV” is somewhat screwed. It is thought experiments like this that should demonstrate this fact.
The further you dwell into the nature of matter, the harder it becomes to point out what is a physical continuum. (And here we get philosophical
Take a piece of rock. Contrary to our everyday thinking, the rock is not just sitting there doing nothing. It is in fact held together by fundamental forces. It is completely fair to say that the building elements of atoms is ultimately just energy. Matter is energy. If this energy were to disappear, matter as we know it would simply cease to exists.
So how fair is it to say that it is the “same energy” that manifestates itself as a “rock” all the time? In fact, it doesn’t matter at all whether the rock is the same rock or if it is changing every nanosecond into “different” energy, whatever that means. What matters is that there exists stable patterns. The rock is a stable pattern, regardless of the dynamic process that manifestates itself as a rock.
That is how our bodies are. In a sense, it is not fair to say anything in ourself remains physically constant very long at all. It makes absolutely no difference to our POV whether something in our body remains static or not. Strictly speaking, our POV is nothing physical, it is merely a stable pattern = worldview = memories.
So what matters is that our body is a stable pattern, our brain is a stable pattern, and our “mind” (worldview) is a stable pattern that is a manifestation of the physical features of our brain (enabling the learning process).
To demonstrate this, let’s imagine someone managed to create synthetic synapses that act just like the synapses in our brain. And if we replaced a synapse in your brain, the synthetic one would act EXACTLY like its natural counterpart did and you could not notice any difference.
Now we could start replacing the synapses in our brain one by one, preserving the connections between synapses just like they were (and all other natural properties that have been affected by your learning processes and now manifestate themselves as your worldview).
Eventually all the synapses had been replaced, but we should expect you to still have your POV. There’s no original matter left inside your skull in any sense anymore (in fact it is not fair to say it ever did), yet “you” have not been destroyed. How so?
You are not a POV shifting anywhere at any moment. You just remember what you remember, that’s all. The important feature of the above example is that you EXPERIENCE the physical act of synapse replacement. This experience IS very tangibly part of you and remains with you for the rest of your life. You are only your experiences, that’s all. Because it is a real experience that is performed to my body, I WOULD agree with the above operation (and live a thousand years with my superbrain
Does the above contradict your view Tibbycat? And would you agree to have that operation?
The above does not mean I would agree to get teleported. Because;
If instead of replacing your synapses, they built another dude next to you bearing those synthetic synapses with the same physical arrangement as the real synapses in your own skull, this would be basically like the teleportation experiment. The other guy would feel like me, but nothing was done to my original body. I did not gain a physical experience that would enter into my worldview as memories of entering another body, or anything like that. I would be just sitting there. It may be a semantical issue whether the other person is me or not, but then I am now two different learning machines, and I, the original, would still refer to myself as “I”, instead of to the other guy. I would be all if they killed me now.
All you guys seem to have a pretty good grasp at what it means to be just a physical manifestation of the laws of nature (I was quite surprised you had resolved so much of the issue already when I entered), but it seems like you aren’t quite hearing each others on the details.
One important detail is that this teleportation stuff can also be seen as a semantical issue over what a learning machine might choose to think he is. While I would not agree to get teleported in that manner, I know it would probably be a wrong choice from an evolutionary point of view. If we did have such a technology, then people who would choose to go to places through teleportation - knowing well that they kind of kill themselves every time - might just be more succesfull in propagating their behaviour, or their teleportation culture, in the gene/meme pool. Pretty soon everybody would be so used to teleport all over the place that they couldn’t care less about the destruction stuff. They’d have so many experiences of succesfull teleportations already that there would be no reason to stop. And who’s to argue.
Keeping the above in mind, we cannot really say what does it even mean in this context that POV survives or “shifts forward”. Or what is “original consciousness”.
All that matters is that a physical brain has a stable worldview. One that tells the person just “who” he is.
That’s a good example though in that it demonstrates how going into ice, getting cut in half, and being re-assembled from the same physical parts feels semantically more like you’d be the same person. This is because it is more in line with our everyday thinking of what we are. We’d be very much inclined to think we’d be the same person because, after all, we consist of the same physical matter as before the split. Even I’d be inclined to think this way. Even though the examples you gave are semantically very different, technically they are both the same thing.
Here too it is the very meaning of “experience of being shifted” that needs to be taken into careful consideration.
As the OP I feel a responsibility to continue in order to sort things out. I am not baiting you (though I often feel baited), I simply feel justified in defending charges against me that I believe to be unwarranted.
First, I’d like to condense the positions as I view them:
**
Position 1 vs Position-2**
A.(One brain, time-1) – B.(same brain, time-2)
The experience of feeling shifted exists from A to B. A will predict living on upon reaching B. The mechanics of how this process (or illusion of a process) takes place is irrelevant, it is simply important to realize that the experience feels real. I will refer to this experience feeling as an “unbroken link”.
AB (one brain over time) vs. D (duplicate).
Position 1:
Believes that a paradox exists in Position-2.
Believes that POV is non-transferable.
Believes that an unbroken link (cellular contact) exists from A to B
Believes that the link breaks at bifurcation points between generations (O to D)
Will not agree to mitosis, teleportation or any duplication method that entails the original not surviving because agreeing to do so means agreeing to commit suicide.
Position 2:
Does not believe that a paradox exists.
Believes that the link does not break at bifurcation points between generations (O to D…etc)
May or may not agree to mitosis, teleportation or any duplication method that entails the original not surviving, but does not feel that agreeing to do so will be agreeing to commit suicide.
I adhere to Position-1. Looking over my past posts, after quickly abandoning the idea of a shared consciousness, my adoption and refinement of Position-1 has been clear and unambiguous.
I have a high degree of confidence that SM adopted Position-2 for a couple of reasons.
He argues vigorously against my position (clearly Position-1). Anti-Position-1 = Pro Position-2.
Many of his explanations, assertions and inferences are aligned with Position-2.
His answers to experiment questions (example: Black Socks) are aligned with Position-2.
MT’s position is less clear to me. He has not specifically given his opinion as to what occurs at the bifurcation points from original to successive generations, and has not answered the experiment questions in such a manner that I can clearly tell which of the two positions he takes. Indeed, many of his posts appear to support my position (Position-1). However, I have a mild-moderate degree of confidence that MT ascribes to Position-2 for a couple of reasons.
He argues incessantly against my position (clearly Position-1). Anti-my position = alignment with Position-2.
He aligns himself with and is aligned by SM (Position-2). .
I was arguing Position-1 vs. Position-2. You stating that I could have saved 23 days effort implies that you already adhere to Position-1 and/or do not adhere to Position-2. However, even your link to post #88 appears to align you with Position-2, therefore I felt justified in continuing the argument.
If you wanted to answer this question as a Position-1 adherent, you would be more inclined to answer:
No, I believe he (or they) may be conscious after being split…
Or, as I (strongly Position-1) would answer:
No, I would not remain conscious (shift) after being split, although my two soon to be created identical twins will be conscious (and they are as valid a version of me as I am)
That wasn’t the question. You charged me with thinking my analogies prove something. I said that I did not expect them to prove anything (proof not being an analogy requirement). When asked if you believe your analogies prove anything, you skirted the question (see above). I didn’t ask how many you used, or how much you relied on them; simply, when you do use them, if you consider them proof. Minutia? Perhaps, but it was you who made the original misguided charge against me, I felt justified to defend against the charge.
O = Original, 1, 2, 3=Successive generation duplicates.
What I mean by no atoms being more important than any other atoms/all duplicates being equal: There is no qualitative or quantitative difference between duplicates. And the only difference between the original and the duplicates is that O acquired his memories in real-time; Gen 1 to 3…etc, acquired their memories all at once from the previous generation (s). That small difference has no bearing on the validity of the duplicates-they are all valid versions of the same person. So far as the teleporter is concerned, O transports to Gen-1, Gen-1 transports to Gen-2, Gen-2 transports to Gen-3 etc. There is no difference; it just depends on which generation you start with. Start with Gen-1 and he becomes in every sense of the word, the original that transports to the next generation, then he becomes the original etc. The only difference between one generation +time, and the succeeding generation + time is that at the bifurcation point, the first generation does not “shift” into the next generation. Any duplicate may be considered the “original”, it is relative to your perspective only-that’s what I meant by my above assertion.
Example: Gen-1 is in the source pod and must place a bomb in one of the 2 pods. If he places the bomb in the source pod and the source pod fails, he has committed suicide. If he places the bomb in the arrival pod, is he going to commit suicide or homicide? My choice is homicide. However, if the bomb is a dud in the arrival pod, he will be convinced that he was spared an attempted suicide, not homicide. It is solely dependant on the reference point.
This is another example of you addressing the wrong point. The two unlinked “you’s” that I am referring to is between an original and it’s duplicate, or between an original and a splone, not between duplicates and not between splones (as you answered above). It is apparent that the 2 splones exist only after the split (bifurcation), so saying that no link exists between splones still does not tell me whether you believe that a link exists between the original and a splone (i.e. between different generations, not between individuals within the same generation). A small distinction, but with regard to the argument, the only one of importance. The only link that I have been arguing about all along has been that at bifurcation points between generations. That should have been obvious.
It does not contradict my view (at least with regard to paradox, my main concern). As long as only one original POV exists at a time, there is no paradox. One-by-one prosthetic brain part replacement assures that only one POV exists, therefore it is theoretically possible for me to remain “me” throughout the procedure. I would not agree to the operation if, instead of one-by-one-replacement, the parts were replaced all at one time, however, because I believe a vital link would be broken.
I agree with the distinction that you are drawing. In fact, it is very supportive of my position. Slowly rebuilding my brain into a superbrain is theoretically possible (no paradox); Building another dude next to me with identical prosthetic synapses etc. and expecting him to be “me” I believe constitutes a paradox, therefore he must, from the perspective of the original “me” always be a “him”. Greedily, I would always choose my life over his, if a choice had to be made. To put it another way, shooting “me” will be suicide, shooting “him” will be homicide. To put it yet another way, from the perspective of the original “me” the other dude would be nothing more than my identical twin with whom I can reminisce with remarkable accuracy.
But, would I undergo the “superbrain” operation? Yes, with qualification. I would need assurances on two fronts:
Originally, I felt that simply having my brain cells in constant contact over time would be enough to harbor my “stable world-view”, and that this cell-contact “link” would be broken during any type of duplication, preventing the possibility of the paradox of multiple identical POV’s existing in parallel. It was brought to my attention (see earlier posts) that something more permanent was needed to differentiate the original brain from the duplicate brain at the point of bifurcation (reasoning that without a more permanent difference, there was nothing to prevent the original POV from also existing in the duplicate). Feeling that I could not allow this paradox to occur, I took the bait and went on a quest to find some type of permanence in the brain. At this point, I went down the road of unexchanged atoms, particles etc. Although, I believe that I found valid brain permanence at the atomic level, I have since reassessed the situation. Feeling that I was on a wild goose chase (“the road was too long and perhaps it was the wrong road to be on”), I posted my revised hypothesis at the bottom of #260, which is basically the same as my original assessment: cellular contact is all that is needed to contain my POV (stable world-view), and creating a duplicate by any method breaks that contact (link). Replacing the brain one-by-one with prosthetic parts still maintains this “cellular” contact, therefore I should remain “I” throughout the procedure. Building the other dude with a prosthetic brain next to me, breaks the link and makes him “him” instead of “me”. So, if I were assured that my original and lately, re-interpreted assessment of the changing brain is correct, I would agree to the operation (I would remain “me”). I would still like assurance that my “middle thread” assessment has no bearing whatsoever on my unique POV (I wouldn’t want to wake up from the operation with a severe personality disorder,dementia or as my twin).
Would the prosthetic brain really be better? Many people are under the impression that prosthetic devices and materials are necessarily better and/or more durable that the original biological parts. This impression is usually wrong. Evolution really has created morphology and physiology that is almost always better than man-made. Let’s consider, as an example, a total joint implant arthroplasty operation. This is replacing a damaged joint with an implant. The implant is often made of metal (i.e. titanium) to simulate bone and a polyethylene material to simulate cartilage. Would you rather have this man-made seemingly durable implant in your body, or the original somewhat brittle cancellous bone, non-scratch-resistant cartilage and arthritis-prone synovial fluid producing joint capsule that you were born with? I’ll take the factory-installed parts every time. The main reason that the original is better is because biological parts repair themselves, prostheses don’t (maybe nano-repair-bots may even the playing field in the future). Micro-stress fractures occur in metal and plastic and they worsen over time. The interface between hardware and biology is particularly prone to failure (fatigue). Admittedly, you’re not likely to get a stress fracture in your brain by thinking too hard (not quite as mechanical as a joint), but other prosthetic problems would still come into play. Also, due to the low regeneration rate of brain cells, the brain is not quite as self-repairing as other parts of your body, but it does it’s best under the circumstances. So, taking this all into account, would I still agree to the superbrain operation? Perhaps, but only if I were assured of having the prosthetic parts replaced on a regular basis.
Anssi, I would be interested in your assessment of my “black socks” experiment. It’s too difficult for me to find the post number, so let me paraphrase it here:
Assumption:Self preservation is important to you.
You are wearing nothing but a pair of black socks and looking at the Duplication Room. Someone tells you that you must go into that room and have 2 copies of yourself made. You are told that the machine does not duplicate rayon, so the copies will not be wearing socks. Each of the 2 duplicates will be given 1-$million, but you will be given nothing. You are told that 2 of the 3 people must be destroyed and only 1 may walk out of the room. Which one do you choose to walk out the door, black socks guy, duplicate #1, or duplicate #2?
(I chose “black socks guy”. SM chose duplicate #1. MT refused to answer on moral grounds)
I wish that I could think of thought experiments that did not involve death :eek: , but since my main focus is on the survivability of ones POV, I find it hard to avoid.
OK, let me NOT skirt it; here is my answer: What analogies? I don’t recall using any.
It’s stupidly obvious that I don’t consider analogies to constitute proof; that was the entire basis of my objection against your reliance upon them.
I’m sympathetic to what you now appear to be saying; that all along you’ve just been gravely misunderstood or that the point has been missed, but in all honesty, I don’t think it’s a legitimate claim; if the debate has become derailed, you really only have yourself to blame, because of all this discussion of identity being ingrained upon specific persistent atoms, for example.
I will try to restate my position in this debate as precisely and unambiguously as possible, it is this:
-Mind, consciousness, identity (hereafter MCI) is a pure and entire function of the physical brain, brought about by the purely physical arrangement of the neural connections - the machine that is a brain creates the MCI when it is switched on and functioning.
-The reason that an instance of this MCI considers itself to be the same MCI that existed previously is due only to the memories that it inherits.
-So a duplicate system performing the same function upon the same memories will have exactly the same quality of experience as the original; in fact there is nothing of substance that the original possesses or enjoys that could not equally be said of the original.
-So, as long as I wake up in the morning, there’s no way for me to tell whether I’m the original machine that lay down to sleep last night, or whether it was destroyed and replaced by an exact duplicate during the night; there is no meaningful difference at all - the continuity of the MCI that is ‘me’ is performed in either case.
-The MCI is ‘transferred’ from instance to the next only by virtue of its function; it shifts from my wakeful state in the evening to my wakeful state in the morning by a process that would have no more or less validity if it happened to be copied into one or more duplicates; in the morning, a machine awakes that performs the function that is ‘me’, making ‘me’ feel that there has been an unbroken chain of identity; two or more copies would have the same experience of waking with an unbroken sense of identity.
-In summary, my position in this thread is that I, right now, am an ongoing working copy of a process that occurred in the past; nothing is violated if this process bifurcates into two or more independent instances. Both (or all) of them have nothing more or less than I have right now; the sense of continued identity as a pure and entire function of the process.
Black socks guy, assuming that the duplication occurs in the same manner as in the teleportation example. The learning machine that is my brain undergoes an experience of entering a room, two guys spawning, and then (hopefully) walking out from the room. I do not wish to enter a room and have a spawned guy walk out.
(Of course killing the duplicates now become ethically just as questionable as killing any person, but hey, as far as it’s not “me”…)
Well, there’s a Google Ad at the bottom of this page saying “Kill Duplicates in Excel”
Anyway, the above example is pretty simple, taking into account that you only know what you experience and your so-called “POV” is just what you remember has happened to you.
But as soon as one includes options of mitosis or (more or less) gradual replacement of brain synapses, the line between one POV and another does get very much fuzzy. This is what should demonstrate how “POV” is really just a brain thinking what it is. Whether these memories are “real” or “illusion” cannot be distinguished by anything really. If we call the memories of the duplicate illusions, we should call the memories of the original illusion too since there is nothing tangible there that the original possesses but the other one doesn’t. It makes no difference whether one has acquired his memories in real time or if they have been copied; the physical appearance of these memories is exactly the same.
That is why this is a nonsensical assertion:
The experience does feel very much real for the duplicate, and I suppose this is why SM & MT think they could just as well die and re-born again. We are, after all, just a semantical token in our worldview.
So I think to summarize, I think you are quite right to avoid getting copied and then killed, but with stuff like mitosis you shouldn’t get tripped into your intuitive idea of what a POV is or how it might feel for a POV to get shifted from one place to another, because in any case a POV is nothing that could feel this per se. You can only remember where you have been and what has happened to you.
I think it might become slightly easier to think about this if you assume such a philosophy of self that says your “POV” is destroyed and re-created every moment over and over. So the timeline in mitosis is more like:
GHIJKLM
F
ABCDE
N
OPQRSTU
Every POV-moment has an “experience of connection” to any POV-moment that has appeared BEFORE it on the timeline. But it cannot be said any has a tangible connection to the future.
It is difficult to imagine this because, well, we are not capable of executing a mitosis like that. If we could, we would probably think of it as the most natural thing in the world; our assumption of “self” would be different than what it is now.
Evidently from this idea SM & MT made a conclusion that it might be a good idea to agree on the black socks experiment and go for the million dollars. After all, you are not “more valuable” than the other guys from the perspective of the world. But I can assure you that you will think otherwise as soon as you realize you have just experienced two completely different guys spawning into the room and now they are going to put a bullet in your head. The other guys, realizing they DID make the jump to another POV - just like they expected - would probably just be happy and wonder who the heck is that whiny bitch inside the original
Or to be more precise, if you chooce duplicate #1 to be the one who survives, it is the survival machine that first recognizes itself as the duplicate #1, who would be happy he made the right choice, and laugh at these other two jackasses… Note that from his perspective it really was HE who made the choice, not “you”.
(Incidentally, I have thought one should make a movie out of these concepts. It could be funny as hell, and it would make people really think about these issues
I think the key point in understanding this is to understand really solidly what this so-called POV really is and how it is simply screwed to think of it as something that comes with you inside your physical body and defines “you”. It is kind of revealing (and uncomfortable) to really understand how your “self” is so insignificant in this respect.
Your “POV” can be copied all over the place, which just means there’d be many survival machines that are convinced they lived your life, and it is only the events that led to all these copies that could give any hint as to whom should be considered “the original”, which is also ultimately a semantical issue and sometimes the original cannot be picked up from the copies at all.
For what it is worth, with the possible exception of the colored areas below, I agree with everything else in your restated position from post #271:
Red: as stated, I agree with this clause. The process does indeed produce copies that are as valid as the original. To address my point of contention, however, I would replace the word “validity” with the words “significance to the original ‘me’". In that restated form, I disagree. Do you agree or disagree with that restated form?
Green: Again, as stated, I agree with this clause as well. But, the “me” that you are eliciting this response from is not the original “me”, it is the duplicate “me”. Using the teleportation model (the source pod empties after teleportation), I maintain that the original “me” will not feel that there has been an unbroken chain of identity, although the duplicate “me” will feel that there has been an unbroken chain of identity. Do you agree or disagree with that statement? In this discussion everything is relative to the person that you ask.
Since the person who is asked to undergo mitosis or teleportation is the *original *person, he should not agree to proceed. If, after the fact, you ask the splone or person in the arrival pod, he will say the procedure worked flawlessly. Relativity.
Final question: If the person in the source pod plans to have the person in the arrival pod killed, is he planning to commit suicide or homicide?
By answering my questions (in orange) above, you will finally, unambiguously tell me your position with regard to my main area of focus.
In as far as I understand what the distinction is that you’re trying to make (which is not much), probably yes.
No, I still disagree, because the ‘original me’ is gone regardless of whether it just went to sleep yesterday, or whether it was destroyed yesterday and replaced by a duplicate; in both cases, the original is no more and all there is now is a construct that remembers being me; no difference, no more or less broken chain of idenitity in either instance.
[quote]
Final question: If the person in the source pod plans to have the person in the arrival pod killed, is he planning to commit suicide or homicide? Both. Really.
Anssi:
I think that we are in complete agreement concerning the
Black-socks experiment: Black socks guy.
Teleportation: Avoid it
Gradual replacement of brain synapses: Go for it (with certain assurances).
And I agree with you that the mitosis experiment is quite a bit more fuzzy. I lean heavily toward recommending avoidance of mitosis, however. Here is my reasoning:
I view the Mitosis experiment as very similar to a version of the Black-socks experiment where the original black-socks guy (BSG) gets killed and the two duplicates walk out. Before being copied, BSG can accurately predict that he will see through the eyes of BSG if he walks out the door. BSG cannot accurately predict that he will see through the eyes of both duplicates, however. I believe for that prediction to come true would constitute a paradox (parallel minds separated in space). To BSG, the duplicates are similar but separate. Likewise, I believe for the pre-mitotic guy to accurately predict seeing through the eyes of both post-mitotic guys also constitutes a paradox.
What shrouds the mitosis experiment in mystery and indeed makes it fuzzy, I think is twofold:
No obvious broken link. In the black-socks experiment, it is apparent that there is a break in physical contact between the black-socks guy and the duplicates. It is easy to tell from the beginning, that they are separate beings with separate brains. In mitosis, the 2 new brains form from the original brain, so the chasm appears to be non-existent.
No dead body. In the black-socks experiment, death of BSG is apparent as soon as you open the door and see a dead body wearing black socks. However, in the mitosis experiment, there is no corpse. I’ve suggested in earlier posts that the pre-mitotic guy actually was killed by the grueling process of splitting each cell in half. In essence, the two halves of the “corpse” were then used as templates on which to create two new “identical twins” as valid as the two black-socks duplicates.
Yes, I agree that thinking of consciousness in those terms is quite valid. In the case of mitotis, however, I would slightly modify the schematic to look like:
.…….….………H I J K L
…….….……G
A B C D E F
……….….…M
…….…………N O PQ R
Different colors=different people.
I believe that “A” may accurately predict that he will see through the eyes of “F”, but that he will be wrong to predict that he will see through the eyes G and/or M. G can predict to L; M can predict to R; F,L and R have total recall back to A.
I would not agree to undergo mitosis for the same reason that I would not choose either duplicate to be the sole survivor in the black-socks experiment.
My only reason for taking this position in the mitosis experiment is because of the paradox that I perceive. If I did not think that the anticipation of seeing through the eyes of two individuals constituted a paradox, I would accept the premise and I would agree to undergo mitosis…it would be a blast.
I agree, it would make a great movie! Let me know if you are ever interested: I can write a funny screenplay, and I do video editing as a hobby.
Duplicate Ethics:
Let’s say your significant-other goes and gets duplicated. Would it matter to you which one you chose to come home? Stick with the original for sentimental reasons? Go with the duplicate if she comes with a free toaster?
A person on the lam for murder gets duplicated. If caught, should they both go to prison? If not, this may make the ultimate “get-out-of-jail” ticket in the future. If a fugitive got duplicated, no one could tell who the true guilty party was, even the duplicate would fail the polygraph test. The legal system would have to adapt…maybe a writ of habeas duplicorpus?
Here is a question to ponder:
The scene: You are going into a duplicating machine and will have one duplicate made. The room can not be tampered with. The process of duplication is instantaneous and complete. You each have the same chance of leaving the room first. Before duplication you know of a buried treasure that you will not be able to dig up until after the duplication process. Can you think of any way to assure that you will get to the treasure before your duplicate?
RE: MT’s post # 274: Don’t consider this assessment of your last post as criticism. I’m actually in awe of your talent for befuddling me. I posed three questions, the answers to which I felt would give me a bullet-proof indication as to your position on the question at hand. I was, alas, wrong again:
Question # 1: was in the form of, “do you agree or disagree?” You gave the definitive answer, “yes”. Now, if I could just figure out whether you meant, “yes, I agree” or “yes, I disagree”.
Question #2: was also in the form of, “do you agree or disagree?”. To this you answered definitively, and syntactically correct, “No, I still disagree”. This time, your answer was clear, but your explanation that followed seems to place you neither here nor there with respect to adhering to position #1 or position #2.
Question #3: was in the form of, choose “A” or “B”. You added and chose “C”: all of the above.
Indeed, you would make a good spy: If charged with espionage by the other side, their interrogation of you would yield no damaging state secrets. You would also make a good American president: Both Democrats and Republicans would swear you were one of them.
One more question:
Would you agree to be teleported (Star-Trek style), and why?
Assume: Teleportation has become ubiquitous; You have talked to many people who have gotten out of the arrival pod, and they all say, “the trip was fun, and didn’t seem to hurt me or anyone else”; teleportation is cost effective and you can afford it; the arrival pod is close to a friend of yours whom you really want to visit. I think I’ve covered all the bases…
Another question to ponder:
You are the designer of a teleportation machine. The financial backers want to assure that the person in the source pod does not “die”, leading to a “new” person (with total recall) in the arrival pod. Can you conceive of any way to accurately test whether or not this is the case?
Yeah, I think the only thing we have a different idea of is what makes “you” you. Because in my view it would not be possible to even think about “self” in terms of…
…“seeing through the eyes of” / “being in” some future body, even a single one. It is a bit misleading way to view self-consciousness.
If copying our “self” around becomes trivial, it just becomes impossible to point out…
…what does it even mean to kill a person. The whole above quote is completely subject to semantical interpretation. I feel to view it as someone getting killed would not be quite accounted for since both halves would view the mitosis as something that clearly happened to them and therefore they would not think of the event as anything or anyone having been lost in the process.
The philosophical questions that get raised before the mitosis are subject to how we view our self in a world where we are not capable of mitosis.
Have you thought about, what if you were to lose all your memories forever? You would return back to what you were at birth, and had to learn everything about the world all over again. Would not that mean basically death to your “self”? You’d only exist in old photos and the new you would never remember what it was like to be the old you.
I think it would be interesting to ponder how the legal system would adapt to that. I think the writer of such a screenplay should not give an opinion about it, but of course all the other characters in the story should have a strong opinion and think they know better than others
Hmmm, can I place a tazer on the table close to where I am standing at the moment of duplication?
Of course the duplicate would realize immediately what is about to happen since it was “he” planning the whole thing just a moment ago… That would be funny… “I’m the duplicate? Oh nooooo”
If we did live in a world where we could perform a mitosis, then if it happened that you needed to do something really dangerous (shut down a radioactive reactor or something), then it would make sense to split and send only the other one in danger. But which one? How would you choose?
Tibbycat, just because you desire that my answer to your questions should fall neatly into one or the other of your neatly pre-chosen categories, doesn’t necessarily mean it will, or that it can. I don’t particularly care if this inconveniences or confuses you. Have you stopped beating your wife yet? Yes or no?
Answer: No, I still beat my wife every opportunity I get, it’s a good way for her to learn from her mistakes. *****
I’m not so much confused about whether or not your answers fall into one of my neatly pre-chosen categories, it’s that your answers themselves are confusing (i.e. an agree or disagree question is not normally answered with a “yes”). And frankly, I’m a little hurt that you don’t care if I’m particularly inconvenienced or confused. Keep that attitude up and you’ll be off my Christmas card list.
I’ll put you back on my list if you answer my “one more question” from post #276
***** Are we speaking of Trivial Pursuit or Bridge (I beat her at both)? You seem to be as imprecise with your questions as you are with your answers.
Welll, one can neither agree nor disagree with a statement that, for example, one does not understand - because both agreement and disagreement imply that the statement has been grasped.
I would probably be reluctant to step into the transporter, despite assurances that it was safe, despite my personal (intellectual) conviction that what steps out at the other end would be me in every meaningful sense of the word; my reluctance would be based upon visceral fear that I would die and be replaced by a soul-less duplicate; silly, I know, but there you go; My decision would be significantly swayed by an emotional judgment that, on an unemotional, rational level, I believe to be completely false.
I don’t find anything particularly worrisome in this though because, as I have said previously, emotional real-world decisions very often do not reflect cold, hard reality - you could explain for hours that some squirming, semitransparent protoplasmic sac of invertebrate life was delicious, nutritious and cost effective; that it would promote vibrant health and that eating it would make women want to have sex with me - and all of this could be based on empirical fact - but you’re still unlikely to convince me to eat a live bug, because it involves eating a live bug, which is icky.
So ‘Would you…?’ questions don’t necessarily tell us anything useful at all about how what something is, how it works, or what it does.
Back to the question in hand, I don’t know if I can explain my position any differently than I already have done; ‘I’ am a device that perceives itself to have enjoyed continuous existence by pure virtue of the function currently being performed by the device, upon the memories stored and processed by the device; if there’s a device standing here tomorrow performing a similar function upon a similar set of memories, then it will consider itself to be ‘me’ and it will be correct.
Continuity of existence is only appreciable retrospectively and that retrospective view is available to any device that shares or mimics the processes and memories of ‘me’. What one can predict is irrelevant; all that is matters is what one can do and remember.
. I don’t want to speak for Anssi, and he can tell me if I’m mistaken, but many of his comments thus far do support my position.
if they killed me now.