Well, as expected, the thread has basically been ruined by the usual suspects. The short version, if you want a serious answer, is that it’s not a “Conservative” strategy at all.
Let’s step back a minute. Way back when, a group of prominent liberal thinkers favored a more muscular approach to American foreign policy. They were more or less Kennedy-ites or FDR-Rooseveltians, and they disagreed with evolving “the USSR-is-here-to-stay-and-let’s-kotow-to-our-glorious-masters” ideology. However, they were essentially driven out of the Democrats and wound up joining the Republicans, although they differed on just about everything (still being liberal).
Neocons believe that maybe a semi-isolationist foreign policy once worked, but with the rise of global ideologies endorsing terror and destruction it was no longer feasible. Fight them over there or fight them here. This was originally about confronting Communism, but they consider the dangers of Islamic terror, too, and well before 9-11. But the goal is not to punihs or destroy or make an example of anyone per se, but rather to minimize threats.
Pres. Bush is not a Neocon. In fact, he’s not a doctrinaire conservative of any stripe. That’s hardly unprecedented. For whatever reason, however, he did adopt a couple Neocons as advisors. (For the record, Wolfewitz is, but I don’t think any other Bush advisors are.)
Jump to 9-11. The invasion of Afganistan was essentially a Neocon strategy. We had no ability to stop attacks - defensive thinking could never guard all possible points of entry. The only answer as they saw it was to eliminate the threat over there. That said, the situation was hardly under our control and we had a lot of issues with the complicated troubles.
Why don’t we cross over into Pakistan? For the same reason we ultimately invaded Afganistan: our security. Pakistan is not now our enemy, but strong elements within would like it to be. It is in our interests not to give them any excuse, and we are pushing it already with drone surveillance and remote attacks. Any serious attack into Pakistan would require vast numbers of forces, who would have to cover huge areas and deal with the pakistany military - and that is a country with a hundred or so million people.
Likewise, why wouldn’t we respond to Iranian efforts to “help.” Simple: we really don’t think they were serious, and would likely use any knowledge or influence to betray us. Any “help” they gave is likely to backfire because the Mullahs’ interests are directly opposed to ours. Iran is part of the problem, supporting terrorism across large portions of the globe from Syria to Sumatra.
The point of invading Iraq was more complicated. Though very difficult and slow, the strategic goal was to alter the perceptions of the entire Middle East. truth be told, the Middle East just plain sad. It produces virtually nothing of value; the sole industries of note are oil and some tourism. But they produce nothing of greater value, have no significant value-added, service, or high-tech fields, have horrific education opportunities, and create virtually no art or literature. And they are ruled by idiot wanna-be Hitlers. Well, we wouldn’t care, except that this was feeding islamic terror. While I don’t think poverty itself makes people into criminals or terrorists, poverty is one aspect of a failed culture, which is what we were facing. And that failed culture led people to embrace extremism as a means of reclaiming a worthwhile self-identity.
Probably we’d have liked to get rid of the Sauds more than anyone else. But that was problematic, since they were kinda-sorta our nominal allies (even as they were bribing terrorists left and right). Next targets were Syria and Libia. But Libia had been quiet for a while and Syria had not given us a casus belli at any time. Iraq had promise though. A lot of peope didn’t like that we failed to take out Saddam beforehand. Plus, his piss-poor assassination attempt on Bush I kinda pissed us off. There was a lot of historical baggage which we could take avantage of. Iraq was almost literally the crossroads of the Middle East.
But the purpose of the invasion was not to fight Islamic terror direfctly. Instead, it was a flank attack. We were trying and are succeeding in showing the Mideast that they don’t have to live with third-rate nations and no future. It’s slow, because our target is not a man but a movement.