A magnificant post, Abe! Lots of food for thought there.
Oh yeah, I meant to add, along the lines of the stuff about the President trying to increase the power of the Presidency, a part of that has been the withholding of information. (After all, information is power.) Here is a report that Senator Waxman has just released on Secrecy in the Bush Administration.
Problem: The left is losing the game.
Solution: Change the rules!
The “left” isn’t the only side losing the game, in so much as the entire country is suffering the consequences. True, the Democratic Party has suffered defeat at the polls, but both Democrats and Republicans have lost jobs (more than 1,000,000 jobs lost during the Bush Administration, IIRC), have to pay steadily increasing costs for simple health care, and, I suspect, both Democrats and Republicans are getting killed in Iraq.
No, it’s false all right.
No, still unfounded.
Abe’s post seems to be a series of “that doesn’t count” assertions. Saddam’s support for Palestinians terror bombers doesn’t count, because they are Palestinian, and therefore (presumably) it isn’t supporting terrorism to encourage Palestinian terrorists to kill Israeli civilians. Terrorism against Turkey and Iran (and presumably, Kuwait) doesn’t count either, because it occurs in the Middle East (if I understand his point correctly). Jabir Salem doesn’t count because Radio Free Europe is a legitimate target for Iraqi terrorist attacks (again, if I understand his point correctly). Abdul Rahman Yasin doesn’t count, even though
So I am not sure why this doesn’t count. He is a terrorist, he lives in Iraq, but for some reason this does not constitute links to terrorists.
As regards Abu Abbas and Abu Nidal, we get simple denial:
Again, lived in Iraq, engaged in terrorist activities, but that is not evidence that Iraq had any terrorists. Or something.
Again, no particular reason that this should not be considered part of a history of links to terrorism.
So, I’m sorry, but I can’t parse this any other way than “Bush was lying when he said there were links between Iraq and international terrorism, even though we have found that international terrorists lived or are living in Iraq and engaging in terror.”
Because, as I have said before, “Bush was lying even if what he claimed has been shown to be true” is a statement that doesn’t work very well.
“There is no evidence that Saddam was planning to acquire nukes” even if nuclear parts and plans are found buried in somebody’s back yard. “There is no evidence that Saddam was planning attacks on the US” even if Putin says he had evidence that Saddam was planning attacks on the US. And so on.
If it helps, certainly Bush expected to find large stockpiles of WMD in Iraq. But so did practically everybody else, before the invasion, and so characterizations that “BUSH LIED!” don’t really address the reality of the situation.
Oh well. I don’t suppose one more iteration of “Did not! Did so! Did not! Did so!” does any harm.
Regards,
Shodan
This cuts both ways. Bush was drawing massive numbers of protestors at his appearances, so he changed the rules to establish “free speech zones” and segregated pro and anti. Texas Republicans were being blocked from taking extraordinary steps to redistrict the state to pack more Republican reps into congress. They changed the senate rules of procedure so they could force the issue with less than the 2/3 majority they would have traditionally needed.
If we want to play high-school debate “No, YOU shut up!” games then both sides could do it in perpetuity. I’d rather move to discussions of how we can eliminate the “game” and have a nation of adults who wield their political power with reasonably complete information about the candidates they are being asked to invest it in. Ways to limit the ability of incumbents and candidates to deceive the public during both their time in office and during campaigns. Greater visibility into the activities of these representatives.
I can’t speak for jshore or speak to his motives, but I’ve been disgusted with politics for as long as I can remember. Growing up the child of a very politically involved family I saw first hand the deceit politicians use to woo support. My personal feelings are that if your position is actually superior then you don’t need to lie or spin. I also feel that deceit is an abuse of the trust relationship implicit in the representative-constituent arrangement. Representative democracies do not send proxies(people empowered only to vote as the constituents have specified) but representatives, empowered to use their own judgement and charged with representing the best interests of their base. There are many ways to abuse this trust in the current system and I have called for more accountability(FOIA and similar acts, eliminating ‘roll call’ votes where no record is kept of how individual representative votes, etc.) for years, regardless of who is in power. I have been very pleased to see more and more online presence from the government and I think this is definitely a good step. I have been very displeased at things like Executive Order 13233 which offends me in two ways, firstly by its existance(I feel it treads on seperation of powers by adding additional controls on FOIA requests for presidential records which are not present in the FOIA), and secondly in the manner in which it has been used. The present administration has blocked large portions of former president Reagan’s records from being released under the FOIA by using this non-legislatively introduced loophole.
I’m in a particularly bad mood about the present administration because everywhere I turn I see activities designed to divorce the people from the information they need to make informed decisions. I see a wide gap between reality and the perception of reality as evidenced by continued poll results about Iraqi complicity in 9/11 or Weapons of Mass Destruction. I don’t like deceit in advertising and I actively avoid products which use deceitful advertising. I like deceit even less in people empowered with the trust and political authority of hundreds of thousands, or more, of my fellow citizens.
Enjoy,
Steven
Well, yes, as a matter of fact. The rules of campaign finance, for instance, favor the party with the most access to oodles and gobs of corporate cash, and the generous affection of rich folks. Some of us wild-eyed radicals regard that as anathema to the democratic spirit. We would like to change the rules. Of course, the rules governing changing the rules were made by the very same set of civic minded patriots, deeply concerned that the stability of the Republic not be upset by such as we.
So, yes, Debaser, your point is entirely accurate. We are, point of fact, intent on changing the rules. First on the list is the Golden Rule: “He who has the gold, makes the rules”. Given your avowed patriotism and fervent devotion to democratic principles, we anticipate your enthusiastic support.
would that this were true. it seems this thread is about how if you can lie and spin with the best, you don’t actually need a superior position.
by way of solution, the first thing that has to happen is to make this dream a reality. we can’t simply add new rules to make people want to be more informed. we first need an honest and likable candidate who doesn’t use deceit to win the election. if the democratic presidential campaign maintains its current disdain for such tactics as we’ve seen cheney et al employ in recent months and still pulls out a victory, i’d say we’ve advanced a step (though to be honest, i’d almost rather see them take the gloves off).
it would be nice if everyone who saw a political ad got to see the factcheck analysis of it immediately afterward, but there’s no real way to enforce that sort of mandate. perhaps we need to find some way to profit off of keeping people informed (as well as entertained, obviously) about how much each candidate says that is naught but bullshit, and then we could have a funded purveyor of truth that the public would actually like to hear, to dispel myths that any campaign is churning out.
in short, we need to give the candidates a reason to run an honest race, and that would be by way of showing them that it works better than running a dishonest one. the way to do that is to find some way to keep the public informed of their dishonesty. in my opinion, the mass media has failed miserably at performing this task, which, in my opinion, is their most important charge.
Meaningless drivel. One could call anything that anyone does through the political process “changing the rules!” Was Bush’s tax cut “changing the rules”? Was Bush’s request to Congress for authority in Iraq “changing the rules”? Were the various changes the FCC made in the media ownership rules “changing the rules”? Was DeLay’s redistricting plan in Texas “changing the rules”?
But, I’ll give you one thing, rules that are set up in such a way so as to keep people as ignorant as possible and not allow them to hear alternate views to the deception being fed to them certainly do seem to favor the right. I can understand how you’d want to keep them that way.
[I am also amused that **Bricker** is saying we must propose alternatives if we think the system has problems and you are implying that we shouldn’t.]
Great strawman. You are subtlety changing the claims to a point you can win on. Sure, there were “links between Iraq and international terrorism” if you don’t define what you mean by links. There are also links between Saudi Arabia and international terrorism, Pakistan and international terrorism, and the U.S. and international terrorism.
The question wasn’t whether he might have plans…or, more to your point, might not have 100% completely burned all possible bridges in regards to nuclear aspirations. Rather, the question is whether he had a program to do so that represented any sort of credible threat of his acquiring nukes.
Putin has said that the KGB received reports and passed them on. I am willing to bet that they have also received reports of alien landings in Siberia on occasion. What he didn’t say that these reports were credible and what “planning” meant, e.g., if it meant drawing up eventualities in the case that the U.S. attacked Iraq. After all, we were planning attacks on Iraq too by that standard and surely have been since 1991. And, the fact that this doesn’t change Putin’s view on the war suggests that Putin didn’t find the evidence to be all that compelling.
Of course, we don’t need to beat around the bush in terms of how Bush was using intelligence. We can look as I did at what intelligence analysts were saying about how the President was using intelligence, as reported in the N.Y. Times articles I referenced in leading up to the war:
What you don’t say is:
(1) Many people believed this in large measure on the basis of the certainty with which the White House was claiming that this is the case.
(2) Most people’s solution was to try to find out if he did have such stockpiles by allowing the inspectors to do their job. Bush’s solution was to allow the inspectors to look around for a while until they began to report back to him that the U.S. intelligence didn’t seem to be panning out at which point, with the evidence starting to crumble, he decided to go to war. [And, to subsequently make completely false statements about how Saddam didn’t allow the inspectors in.]
So, Shodan, you still haven’t addressed this issue about the way that the U.S. apparently allowed sites with nuclear materials, and what would have potential been WMDs had they existed, to be unsecured and looted. Does that not bother you? Were you so dead-set at getting rid of Saddam Hussein that you think allowing these things to fall into the hands of terrorists was worth the risk?
I subscribe to at least one of the positions mentioned. I hope that’s enough to qualify.
The answer to both of the questions lies in debunking the idea of sheeple. The significant fact is not so much that there are some who’re more easily led than others as it is that there are those who choose to pay attention more than others.
The crux of the entire biscuit is what influences/motivates the choices to pay attention or not. This very, very interesting field of study is Public Choice Theory- specifically, ‘rational ignorance’.
Try this on for size:
Painless Primer on Rational Ignorance
What should be done about it?
To start, I think that just as we don’t grant artificial persons the right to vote, neither should we grant them the rights to contribute to election campaigns nopr should we allow them to lobby our legislatures. (Did you know that special interest lobbyists sometimes write legislation for our Congresscritters?)
This would force PACs to take their cases to the electorate in the light of day rather than to legislators in the proverbial ‘smoke filled rooms’.
This isn’t a magic bullet, but I think it’d sure go a long way toward keeping the lawmaking process honest.
What’s that saying about sausages and legislation?
A little bit on ‘Artificial Persons’.
No, it is Shodan that is still in error.
You have missed the point. It is much simpler than you are making out. However I’m prepared to make an effort to explain it in a simplified form to you.
Bush made statements about Iraq based on what intelligence agencies were telling him. I don’t think you have missed that point.
Point 1 that Shodan has missed: We aren’t discussing possession of WMD in this case. Are not.
This leaves the other parts of his claim about Iraq. That it posed an immediate, undeterrable threat to the US:
- Iraq has or will have a co-operative relationship with terrorists
- Iraq is non-deterrable in its hatred of the US
- There is a real risk of Iraq passing on its instruments to terrorists.
Do you follow so far? These are what we are discussing.
OK good. Now the point about these is as follows. Watch carefully because this is the important bit. Watching? OK.
Bush sought and recieved advice from the intelligence agencies on these points.
OK, now let that sink in. We are talking about the advice Bush received. The advice on these points.
That advice: what was it? Thankfully I acknowledge Abe’s contribution to this discussion.
There you have it, this establises the tenor of advice Bush was receiving. Remember, it is advice on things other than possession of WMD. That is what we are discussing.
Now the finale. Take a deep breath and read on.
Point 2 that Shodan has missed:
- Bush made claims that were contrary to the professional intelligence advice he was receiving.*
Granting for the moment that the intelligence advice was telling him there were WMD. Granting that, OK? He made up the claims that:
- Iraq had operative links with the terrorism that threatening the US.
- Iraq was not deterred from using or passing on its WMD.
- Iraq posed a threat to the US.
Debating points we might make here about the quality of links to whoever, our assessment of the threat etc, are not relevant. It is much simpler than that. 2 things are relevant:
- What the intelligence agencies told Bush;
- What Bush told us.
The 2 are not the same. See General Zinni’s recent speeches for further evidence of this. The position is uncontroversial and I believe incontrovertible. If you believe otherwise, furnish the evidence.
Summary: The intelligence agencies told Bush that Iraq was not a threat to the US.
Actually Shodan, I think the reason why Abe’s post was a series of “that doesn’t count” assertions is because my post was essentially a list of “that does count” assertions and he was trying to systematically disprove them in response to that.
RayJay, you are right that only one of the ten Iraqis who were accused of directly attempting to assassinate George Bush confessed to the plot, but your statement mischaracterizes this as the only evidence there was at all. Most importantly, two others also gave a fairly detailed confession that they were working for Iraqi intelligence. Although they absolutely denied that they were plotting to assassinate Bush, they did state that they were told to bomb a shopping center in Kuwait City. The rest only said that they were attempting to smuggle drugs and alcohol, a story which I doubt since they had spent the last night together and on the day of arrest were found with what the media described as a “remote control bombing device.” I think it’s more likely that the majority of the accused were lying, as opposed to the three who admitted they were planning to use the bomb. Kuwaiti intelligence said their sources in Iraq had tipped them to a plot to organize an attack during Bush’s visit. Many of the accused had not yet had a chance to give testimony when Clinton declared that he had “compelling evidence” of “top-level” Iraqi involvement which reportedly came from “CIA and FBI investigations.” In response, he ordered strategic targets in Baghdad to be bombarded for one day in July, 1993. Canada was suspicious about the evidence, but France, Britain, and Russia all essentially thought it was justifiable.
Although no single one of my charges constitute a “smoking gun”, in aggregate I think that it is a fair statement to say that Iraq was, in 2003, among the world’s current significant sponsors of foreign terrorist movements. Unlike Saddam’s open support for Palestinian suicide bombers and knowing shelter of international terrorists, Al-Qaeda does not have any state sponsors, which is why I believe that Bush’s diplomatic strategy of pressuring nations to crack down on terrorist funding internally will be important in the “War on Terrorism.” I think that Saudi Arabia is only one example of a nation that in the post-9/11 period is now preoccupied in ensuring that it becomes a closer ally of the United States. I recall not long ago that the Saudis even launched an advertising campaign in the USA to try to convince Americans they were friendly towards the new anti-terrorist program. I want to firstly point out that Saudi anti-terrorism efforts did begin before the May, 2003, attacks. After 9/11, Saudi Arabia immediately condemned the attacks and expressed its support for the War on Terrorism. I would like to contrast that to Iraq, which declared that America had brought 9/11 upon itself. Saudi Arabia has long been at least a vocal supporter of anti-terrorist measures, speaking out in favor of agreements at the United Nations and G20 against the funding of terrorism, including signing the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Saudi Arabia began freezing suspected terrorist assets within several months of the September 11th attacks, and by the end of 2002 had frozen 5.6 million dollars in assets. In June, 2002, Saudi Arabia arrested thirteen Al-Qaeda terrorists, and in August facilitated a transfer of sixteen Al-Qaeda terrorists from Iran to the United States. At the beginning of 2002, Crown Prince Abdullah recommended that a new international resolution combating terrorist financing should be passed, with consequences for those who refused. Saudi Arabia clamped down on Al-Qaeda extensively at the end of 2002 by auditing charities and setting up a commission to monitor the flow of funds out of the country’s borders. This was in my opinion almost certainly in response to rather open criticisms/threats from the Bush administration to shape up in “90 days.” It’s clear from your cite that fundamentalist terrorism is currently a serious threat in Saudi Arabia, but it would be interesting to see statistics to find out more precisely how much it has increased. I would argue it was also a major issue before September 11th. In 2001 there were four major terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia, two of which were shortly after 9/11. In terms of the number of casualties, I think the most serious terrorist attack in Saudi Arabia remains the Khobar Towers bombing of 1996 with almost 400 casualties.
I also want to express some concerns I have about a few things you mentioned in your last post. Firstly, I have reservations for the time being about the veracity of Tariq Aziz’s statement that he attempted to turn over Yasin in 1994. If the proposal did occur, I suspect it was before March, 1994, when the trial of the other four plotters was completed and a multi-million dollar bounty was formally placed upon Yasin’s head. I would like to know the circumstances that surrounded the United States turning down the handover of someone who they were willing to pay millions for. The other quotes in the article are rather ambiguous and it’s hard to tell if they detail the 1994 or 2001 attempts. After September 11th, the United States raised the bounty on him to five million (and to twenty-five in 2004). Iraq did try to turn him over in 2003 as I mentioned, but it occurred just more than a month before the invasion and at the time I viewed it as a cynical attempt to curry the world’s favor. I also find that you are understating Saddam’s harboring of Abu Abbas. Saddam knowingly allowed him to stay in the country for years despite the fact he was already sentenced to death in absentia in Italy. He described Iraq as his “second homeland” (the first being the Gaza Strip) and praised Saddam for his donations to suicide bombers. Also, if it’s worth anything, Israeli intelligence accused Abu Abbas of collaborating with Saddam. All the reports I’ve read so far say Abu Nidal was welcomed into Iraq in 1999, and I believe he didn’t fall out with the regime until a later date.
I disagree with this statement. I think that virtually every government in the Middle East is cooperating to a fair extent with the United States, in some instances at levels that would have been unthinkable before September 11th. Saudi Arabia, Libya, Pakistan, and Morocco have all been vocal for their support of anti-terrorist efforts. Even Iran and Somalia are now involved in arresting and turning over al-Qaeda suspects. I think the Bush administration has made the Middle East more friendly towards the USA’s War on Terrorism campaign.
I wouldn’t say that that was my argument. In fact, I never criticized UNSCOM directly, I only said that the experience of 1991 to 1998 was a debacle. I think this was largely because of Iraq, not because of UNSCOM. One difference between UNSCOM’s situation and UNMOVIC’s that I want to point out is that Iraq had far longer to hide or conceal evidence of weapons of mass destruction between 1998 and 2003 than in 1991.
After seven years of constant trickery and deceit against UNSCOM I think I agree with Wolfowitz on the first paragraph you quoted. The only real threat Saddam had to face from UNSCOM was the periodic missile bombardment that the United States launched in response to his intransigence. This is perhaps why UNSCOM could not find Iraq’s secret laboratories and weapons of mass destruction they had concealed between 1991 and 1995, when Hussein Kamel Majid’s defection forced Iraq to declassify the documents that led to their discovery. The United Nations was unsure of the extent of Iraq’s former chemical and biological weapons program until 1995.
That being said, here are changes in UNMOVIC that the timeline mentions.
I can see how these changes would be desirable, as the inspections that the United Nations wanted might not have happened without them. However, I question whether they would actually have made the organization more effective at locating weapons of mass destruction. It also didn’t prevent Saddam from accusing UNMOVIC of gathering intelligence in January, 2003.
I found the irregularities UNMOVIC encountered in disarming Saddam to be painfully familiar to those of UNSCOM. I mentioned numerous in my previous post of which surprisingly few were noted by the timeline you cited. Another particularly blatant example was that Iraq only agreed to supply the names of 480 scientists who worked on the government’s former WMD programs, even though UNSCOM noted 3,500 scientists who worked on such projects. At the time when Blix mentioned that Iraq had not “come to a genuine acceptance” of disarmament, he made a comparison to post-1994 South Africa which, unlike Iraq, had fully cooperated with weapons inspectors, who left the country after dismantling its WMD programs. By the time that report was issued, every one of the Iraqi scientists that UNMOVIC had requested private interviews with had said they would only do so only if accompanied by an Iraqi official. Shortly after the war, Brigadier General Alaa Saeed confirmed what was already suspected; the Iraqi government had ordered them to do this and threatened to kill their families if they refused. The article was entitled, “Iraqi Weapons Expert Insists Search Is Futile”, because Saeed denied the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. I think that parts of the timeline give an overinflated picture of the extent to which UNMOVIC itself believed to have completed its task. Most of the affirmative quotes in the timeline regard Iraq’s nuclear program, which as I noted before Iraq was able to provide substantial documentation for. On the other hand, many chemical and biological samples were unaccounted for. Although the UNMOVIC inpsectors announced that they were making “progress” a week before the American invasion, they did not believe they were finished, and as I said before I believed the progress they were making was being severely trammeled by Saddam Hussein.
By the way though, I was wrong in my last post about the inspections only being of military facilities. That was something the Iraqi government wanted on November 17th to add to the original resolution, but it failed in its appeal to have its implemented.
I’ve only been able to read the first one and a half pages of the timeline since it seems to have gone offline for several hours starting at around 5:00 PM today. However, the part I have read seems to include only evidence that supports its anti-war thesis. I don’t think the list was made with the intention of it being a comprehensive timeline of the Iraqi disarmament crisis, but rather, a comprehensive reference source for those with anti-war affiliations. I intend that statement as my observation and not a disparagment, and I say it because there are some important events that are left out despite the fact that it is extremely thorough at listing relatively inconsequential editorials and soundbits that ostensively support the author’s argument. Therefore, rather than being “not compatible with what is actually known”, I think that my arguments have in fact merely been left out of the timeline. I want to go over two points that could have been put into a similar timeline supporting a pro-war argument.
Firstly, it ought to be mentioned that one of the attacks the United States launched in reponse to Iraqi noncooperation, Operation Desert Fox, resulted in Clinton signing the Iraq Liberation Act. This act essentially made it the official policy of the United States government to overthrow Saddam Hussein. If it had been mentioned in the timeline, it would explain in part why President Bush came into power seeking his overthrow, but did not yet have a plan on how to implement the basic ideas that already essentially had bipartisan legislative support. Secondly, an anti-war timeline naturally emphasizes the weapons inspectors, intelligence agents, and Iraqis who asserted that WMDs did not exist in Iraq, such as Alaa Saeed, who I mentioned earlier. A pro-war timeline would focus on contrary evidence, such as the numerous Iraqi defectors, many of whom were not affiliated with the INC, who asserted the opposite.
In February, 2000, a member of one of Saddam’s special security organizations called the Amn al-Has escaped with his family to another, undisclosed Arab country. He was anonymously interviewed and said that not only had Saddam reconstituted his chemical weapons program, he had ordered Amn al-Has to ensure it remained a secret. Then in September, 2001, a “senior” Iraqi scientist formerly of the “Atomic Energy Organization” told the Sunday Telegraph in an interview that Saddam was expanding his chemical and biological weapons program. He said that Saddam had dismantled his nuclear weapons program because it was too expensive to maintain. In November, 2001, Nooruz Ali Rezvani, who was a “high-level” member of Mujahedeen Khalq and lived in Germany at the time, said that the mujahedeen had recently been convinced by Saddam to hide chemical and biological weapons in the terrorist organization’s several dozen bases which exist across Iraq. He said the reasons why Saddam was keen on having them keep the weapons was because throughout UNSCOM’s entire existence it had only searched a mujahedeen base once, and because the United States specifically avoided targeting the bases for bombardment since they were being used to attack Iran. Interestingly, another member of Mujahedeen Khalq accused him of being an Iranian spy. Perhaps the defector who was most influential on American policy was Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri, who defected in August, 2001 with the INC’s help, and was first interviewed in Thailand two months later where he was in exile. He was a civil engineer who was part of the government’s “Military Industrialization Organization,” and claimed to have first-hand knowledge of Iraq’s extensive chemical and biological sites, including several that were built underground and in residential locations in order to foil weapons inspectors. In June, 2003, a former Brigadier General in Saddam’s army was interviewed anonymously by the Los Angeles Times because he was still loyal to Saddam and was hiding from American authorities. He told the Times that Iraq had several scientists who did not produce WMDs, but rather worked on computers in small “bunkers and back rooms” in order to make plans on how to reconstitute Saddam’s WMD programs in case the sanctions were lifted. Hussein Kamel Majid, who is briefly mentioned in the timeline, made a similar statement in 1995. He said that the Military Industrial Commission that controlled Iraq’s WMD programs intructed him to hide documents and blueprints so that once the inspectors had left “the first step to return to production” would be smooth.
There were also other sources of doubt regarding Saddam’s WMD programs. Scott Ritter resigned from UNSCOM in 1998 to protest Saddam noncooperation with the weapons inspectors and declared that “Iraq should be subjected to a major campaign that seeks to destroy the regime of Saddam Hussein.” Nevertheless, in time he became one of the Bush administration’s most vocal critics. Other inspectors, such as Richard Butler, the head of UNSCOM between 1997 and 1999 and author of “The Greatest Threat”, strongly believed that Iraq was once again producing chemical and biological weapons. I might as well point out that Richard Butler occupied a higher position in UNSCOM than Scott Ritter who, despite his important position was certainly not the “chief” inspector, but rather, a team leader on more than a dozen specific assignments. Other weapons inspectors such as Terence Taylor have expressed strong reservations about Iraq’s inability to account for large numbers of biological samples.
In addition, the timeline does not mention that both President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and King Abdullah of Jordon told the American military before the war that they also believed Saddam had begun creating weapons of mass destruction. I first learned about this event in the book “American Soldier”, by the former head of US Central Command General Tommy Franks.
I deny that these sources are superior to the opposing ones discussed in the timeline, but together with Iraq’s defiance of the weapons inspections (which I maintain was always Saddam’s policy) I think it does constitutes a case that would be considered by many reasonable people to be equal to the anti-war case. I think that this is an extremely fair assessment, but I also want to acknowledge a mistake. My opinion is that this balance has in retrospect completely changed with the the failure of America’s post-war efforts to locate any significant weapons of mass destruction. By far the most important justification for war with Iraq has been eliminated the way I see it. However, I maintain that the case for WMDs was perfectly plausible before the American invasion and that whatever deceit the Bush administration did use was not necessary or important in making the pro-war case legitimate.
David Kay, a former UN weapons inspector and a person I respect highly said after his final report that the pre-war case for war was such that “it would be hard to come to a conclusion other than Iraq was a gathering serious threat to the world.” However, the statement was climaxed with a solemn: “we were all wrong.” Those who were right all along should be pleased with their prescience and foresight, but since I advocated the war and helped to convince others to do the same, I bear full moral responsibility for the conflict. I’m often racked with an inexorable worry when I consider whether this decision will lead to a better future for Iraq. I think that I will probably remain generally supportive of American actions in Iraq, so long as the standard of life and political development of Iraq are significantly improved from the nightmare of Saddamite totalitarianism, a govenment that I found intensely revolting and deeply terrifying.
Contrast these sentiments with the fact that the budget for security costs in Iraq has risen.*
Also for contrast examine the fact of the ‘no-go zones’. To some, these would represent evidence that Iraq is not yet done being ‘taken’ and that as such the costs cannot yet be tallied.
When you use the phrase “relatively stable” what exactly is this stability relative to?
Bogain Barnus: If we are contending with “terrorist incidents and guerrilla fighting” after “the next two years or so” then…
Pretty much the same except instead of the car-bombs, ‘no-go zones’, periodic beheadings there’d be electricty, oil exports, and enough petrol to supply the needs of an oil rich country of ~25mil.
In the line of fire
By Nicolas Pelham, Joshua Chaffin and James Drummond
Published: May 5 2004 21:48 | Last Updated: May 5 2004 21:48
Financial Times
“…the coalition’s Program Management Office in Baghdad admits,
security provision has risen to 10 per cent of the $18.4bn the US has earmarked for investment in Iraq.”
Gov’t Analysts Pessimistic About Iraq’s Future
Thursday, September 16, 2004
Copyright 2004 FOX News Network, LLC
The “War on Terrorism campaign” didn’t exist before the Bush Admin.
Second, who exactly are you identifying as the ME? Are you discussing the populations, the governments, or who exactly?
Despite the American intel community’s assessment that there was a low probability of Iraq initiating an attack on the US directly or by proxy with WMD?
I meant that I think the overall situation in the conflict against al-Qaeda, or War on Terrorism, has improved greatly since it formally began on September 11th. It would be difficult to prove whether the people of the Middle East, excepting Iraq, have become more hostile or more friendly towards the United States, since I doubt accurate polls on this matter exist in most Arab countries for the 2000 to 2004 period, but as I mentioned previously I was specifically referring to the governments and their recent campaigns to crack down on internal terrorist activities.
A simplistic, but more or less correct interpretation. These items of intelligence related to “terror” and Iraq are so piddly, of such questionable value and accuracy, so shoe-horned by special interests, and so removed from the present context that they simply “don’t count”. Small potatoes, as I said in my earlier message.
I have little time so I won’t be dwelling on points already covered by other folks since my last visit (thanks, guys!).
Now now, Shodan, is that really what I said? Or did I say “The direct evidence I have seen [of anything even remotely connected to Palestinian terrorism] is of money being donated via Palestinian organizations to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers and others who die in the conflict.”
Additionally we’re not talking about institutionalized regular monetary support, but more of a PR stunt that happened a few times – look to the Saudis, among others, for the same behaviour. It’s been argued and driven home several times on these boards, this is simply not terrorism support or international terrorism in any meaningful way.
So, unless you have good material showing Saddam’s direct support for the bombers and similar militants, I take it this issue can be laid to rest.
The point, as I believe I explained, was that this particular item is about terrorism that Iraq may or may not be involved with, as a result of or with Western support, against Iran. And in a regional conflict among uneasy neighbouring enemies and several factions in each country. If you start “counting” these alleged offences, from any period at all, your list of culprits will be rather long and your noble efforts to stamp out terrorism would be seriously daunted and hampered. In fact, given that the US has armed and trained numerous militants in the past --one particular set resulting in the emergence of al Qaeda-- and has subverted a number of governments etc., it is particularly dishonest and a glaring sign of neocon double standards to latch on to such minutiae as this particular item of “evidence”.
Regarding Turkey, well once again small potatoes. That is, charitably assuming the “intelligence” on PKK is accurate information in the first place, although I see I may have skipped a sentence in my reply. If I may quote another poster, I think he was able to address the grossly inflated concerns about the PKK with more clarity and detail:
Well, let me repost my exact words, with just a little bit of added emphasis:
"Regarding Jabir Salim, the version of what happened has not been confirmed to my knowledge. At any rate, assuming it is accurate that Iraq was sponsoring an attack against Radio Free Europe (one version claims this matter was about an arms deal) this is not necessarily terror in the conventional sense, but a limited strike to disable an element considered an enemy (they’d set up Radio Free Iraq and a Farsi service of Radio Free Europe). This information comes largely from the Czech press; Czech officials have not commented.
“If this is true, it may be the strongest item in support of the terrorist activities of Saddam’s Iraq, but it’s still fairly small stuff.”
Notice the last sentence again. This was an alleged plan. Not an attack. No bombs in sight, no chemical or biological agents. No supporting documentation or intelligence. No corroboration. The one source of information was the Iraqi spy himself, whose cover was blown. To my knowledge nothing was found to confirm his story, either in Prague or in Baghdad more recently. For all we know he just wanted to defect, since Saddam had the unpleasant tendency of punishing perceived failures or those who displeased him with torture and death.
Just as a matter of interest assuming that the spy’s story is true, I would argue that the station was a strategic target, not necessarily (or solely) a terrorist one. Had he hit the Radio Free Europe station, Saddam would have been neutralizing a target openly hostile to him, broadcasting propaganda (whether accurate or not) to separatist elements problematic to his sovereign rule in his own country. Certainly reprehensible, but nothing on the scale that the White House and State Department are insinuating, of course assuming any of it is true in the first place.
Well, let me aid your vision, Shodan, with another repeat of what I actually said and what you seem to have ignored in your assessment:
“Since then as you report Cheney has been busy spouting incandescent accusations as is his norm, but you’ll forgive me if I don’t take his word for it, utterly devoid of credibility as it is; your other cite is from “sources close to the White House” – effectively one and the same source ultimately, and not an item of genuine intelligence as far as we can tell. Again, there is not an evident link to terrorism, only unverified claims and speculations.”
Where is the evidence? Those accusations, at this late date when desperation is mounting, actually originated in Laura Mylroie’s 1990s theories developed at the neoconservative American Enterprise Institute, desperately seeking and fashioning any connections between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda, going so far as to try to prove, without foundation or good reason, that al Qaeda was actually a front for Iraq.
Heh.
The evidence is suspect, the circumstances and people involved are suspect, the motivations of the specific accusers are abnormally suspect to say the least, and the entire matter is not recent – on top of which it is US officials who allowed Yasin to go free in the first place, and Saddam allegedly offered him back to the US once he had him. So, if and when Abdul Rahman Yasin is found, or more evidence comes to light, we may learn more on this particular matter – as I already said.
By such facile and simplistic standards, almost every country “has terrorists”. The idea here is not an imperative to find Iraq guilty of terrorism under any circumstance; rather the objective is or should be the elimination of terrorist networks and plots, in particular those that threaten the US. Which means, in essence, al Qaeda and other dangerous international entities, not a myriad little “freedom fighters” confined to known regions and operations, picked and chosen according to US predilection and for the emotional impact that such claims have on the propagandaphagi reluctant to question the words of dihonest leaders. The War on Terror is already a ridiculous matter, in fact as far as Iraq is concerned the WoT is demonstrably an excuse. It hardly needs more selective reading and forced applications.
Yes, but what is the context here? He worked with Saddam Hussein in the 70s and early 80s. He was a mass murderer – almost cost me big time since I happened to be in Vienna the day of the Rome-Vienna bombings-- but his last known militant action was an attack on a PLO officer, one of Arafat’s people. Over a decade after that, having withdrawn from the stage apparently because of increasing paranoia and madness, he was allegedly allowed to retire in Iraq to get treatment for skin cancer.
While it is entirely possible a deep connection between Abu Nidal and Saddam Hussein did exist decades ago, it hardly seems likely it still did at the time Abu Nidal died. It is suspected he was killed in a murder orchestrated by Saddam, an alternative being that Abu Nidal shot himself multiple times in an attempt to commit suicide.
So, instead of going after the really dangerous current terrorists, we have a government relying on the American population’s fears and gullibility to emphasize decades-old relationships that were frowned upon but often tolerated prior to 9/11; after that, Bush made his announcements on protecting and harbouring terrorists, and upped the stakes.
I don’t think shooting Abu Nidal dead counts as protecting and harbouring terrorists. Nor do I think it suggests they were on good terms.
Now, Shodan, for a quick revisit of another bit of text:
It seems to me the poster also clearly stated (but you cut out) that “Bush made claims that were not only not supported by intelligence analysis, but contrary to what the analysts were telling him.” That statement is indeed well supported by a number of my posts, including the time-line and numerous extracts I quoted in recent days. It’s a shame you selectively avoided the bulk of Sevastopol’s (and my) points in favour of your attempts to cast Iraq as a terror hub.
That statement actually works well. Even if it turns out Iraq was the foremost sponsor of terrorism in the world, the best connected state to global terror networks, a training grounds for the deadliest terrorists, etc., etc., it still doesn’t change the fact that the US administration was dishonest on this matter, manipulating and selecting evidence to establish in the people a specific belief not warranted by the intelligence, rather than announcing an honest demonstrable conclusion based on the available evidence.
So, if Bush and co do turn out to be right – a big and unlikely “if” – it will be by coincidence. That needs no further comment. Here’s an article from a year ago for all those who still haven’t caught up with what is actually going on; it’s also a reminder that this cretin referred to Iraq as “the central front” on the war on terror:
Slate - Mission Creep: Bush’s perversion of the “war on terror.”
I can’t be bothered to quote from it because my break is up, but the only item that is “news” in this discussion is how marginalized, decrepit, retired, and/or dead terror suspects and terrorists can possibly render Iraq a “central front” on the WoT.