Tokyo, the most relevant portions of your posts, very quickly:
That runs counter to available intelligence cited. I have addressed why, and provided even more links (although the timeline should prove sufficient, if you can access it) in almost every post I made in this thread.
You are talking about governments. I discussed that aspect already, and I provided an article explaining how some governments (specifically Saudi Arabia) face increasing difficulties thanks to the War on Terror. When 49% of Saudi agree with Osama bin Laden’s philosophy according to one poll, it is difficult to claim that the WoT has won more friends than not in the region, although governments have cooperated well once it was in their interests to do so (and thus, precipitated further difficulties involving populations at odds with such support – you see it in Saudi Arabia, in Pakistan, even in solidly anti-terror Egypt).
At any rate, a jaunt through the region should quickly convey to you the impression that, if anything, hostility to the US has risen. That didn’t just happen in MENA, it’s taken place over the whole world, but is IMO particularly evident in the MENA region.
This isn’t simply the usual issue of the US meddling in the region at the expense of Arabs and gains of Israel, or similar items that rankle Arabs and Muslims; this is about arrogant, imperial, above-the-law behaviour based on documented misdirections, misrepresentations, and even outright falsehoods. This is the US swaggering around and telling the world “we do what we want for whatever reason we wish”. These are the problem issues.
The bulk of your response seems to be discussions on specific items relating to the weapons inspections and so forth. I can appreciate your take on it but I don’t see any support for it, and as I said earlier some of it appears to be in direct contrast to available information (at least on a quick read).
Certainly been a lot of captures and detentions.
There’s also a lot more money and manpower devoted to it these days from all sides.
Several of these polls whose accuracy you doubt show an increase in the numbers of those who find US foreign policy objectionable.
What would be interesting would be quantifiable benchmarks recorded from 2001-09-11 to present.
As to the criteria used for choosing metrics consider some of what’s said about Pakistan’s unprecedented cooperation:
[INDENT]“We don’t know how much of this is action and how much is merely activity,” said Husain Haqqani, a former Pakistani ambassador and adviser to three past prime ministers who is now at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
“Pakistan needs the numbers (of arrests) to claim the prize: $1.7 billion in assistance that goes annually from the international financial institutions, $700 million in bilateral aid from the U.S., and close to another $1 billion in rent for facilities that the Pakistani military is extending to the U.S.,” he said.
“The problem is you’ve always had overlapping membership,” said Christine Fair, a Pakistan expert at the United States Institute of Peace. “The Pakistan government has a problem when the net of al Qaeda interfaces with militant groups that are still a strategic asset to Pakistan.”
European Union Counterterrorism Coordinator Gijs de Vries said on a trip to Washington this week that the string of arrests would not necessarily mitigate the threat of attacks because al Qaeda had become a diffuse web of groups without one, central command-and-control structure.[/INDENT]
I just want to address the issue of differentiating governmental support for the War on Terror with popular support for America especially in the Middle East. I agree with your position that governmental support is not the same as popular support. However, in the past what we had was a significant lack of popular as well as governmental support. What we have now is a lack of popular support with much more governmental support. Is it your contention that the former situation is really better? That incfreasing governmental support dispite continued lack of popular support is not an improvement?
I understand your position if you are saying that current policies have increased the lack of popular support beyond any benifit from the increase in governmental support. But can you prove this? Specifically can you prove that popular support for America has fallen far enough below pre 9-11 levels to counteract any benifits from the increase in support from governments which were previously hesitant to support any operation like the War on Terror?
It’s not as simple as “support for America.” A number of things American (including the general populace, technology, and goods) remain relatively unaffected.
Where the shift has occurred has been in the feild of our foreign policy.
What we have now is a growth of popular antipathy to American foreign policy opposed to merely a lack of support.
No.
It’s more than a “continued lack of popular support.” It’s about a decrease in popular support, an increase in antipathy.
Fairly close, but not exactly.
What constitutes proof?
Would an increase in terrorist activities worldwide have any bearing? Who knows?
What I’m saying is that the populace can exercise more influence over the fortunes of terrorists and terrorist groups than the govs. via recruiting efforts etc.
It’s not enough to merely eliminate terrorists. The flows of recruits must be stanched as well.
The invasion of Iraq has served to lessen the support of and increase the resistance to American foreign policy amongst the populaces in general. The benefits that the US gets in return for this is that the low probability that Hussein would attack the US w/WMD (directly or by proxy) is now a very low probability.
That’s what the sympathies of the publics were traded for. The question is was that worth it. We’ve somewhat decreased the probability of Hussein attacking the US yet have increased the probability of multiple Mohamed Mint Teas looking the other way from, assissting, or, God forbid, particpating in attacks on the US and her citizens.
Well, the question is how sustainable this is. Because if there is enough of a divide between the people and the government and it lasts long enough then either the government has to keep in control by repression or the government is going to end up being destabilized. And, a destabilized Pakistan, for example, with their nuclear weapons is something to lie awake nights worrying about!
Well I must concede you make a good point, in that the guerrilla and terror tactics were facing seem more professional and competent and determined than they did just 6-8 months ago.
It could be a sign that we’re losing control, or that simply all the incompetant terrorists have been caught or killed, or that Iraq’s attracting foreign terrorists and we’re fighting them in Iraq. I don’t know, but it is troubling.
As for the security costs going up, I’m not really sure what to make of this. I would guess that after the initial phases of consolidation and rebuilding that the costs of protecting what we’ve consolidated and rebuilt would go up. Frankly, 10% doesn’t seem all that much. I say double it.
Liberia, if we must name a comparison or any of a host of war torn Nations. Perhaps even Kosovo. I mean look at some of these countries like Yugoslavia with peace-keeping forces from the UN and what not, and it takes several years at a minimum to quiet down the tempest.
Well yeah, it would be nice to wish away the insurgents. If we could then things would be a lot nicer. I really can’t imagine any plan for the aftermath that would have made them simply go away. Can you? Positing that you are going to oust Hussein and take the country, What do you differently to combat the insurgents?
There’s a simple and obvious idea you came up with yourself before you even asked the question.
Why not some more troops overall (Shinseki) as well as more troops who’re appropriately trained for the tasks they face while you’re at it?
Consider that: the 10% figure was from May; the fees for providing securiy are being paid even though recon projects are woefully hamstrung; the amount of money actually spent on reconstruction is about 5%; and, recently, State has gone to Congress to get permission to use another $3.46bil to, in part, help with security concerns.
No, this is unlikely. The resulting boost to the average skill level of attackers would not account for things becoming less secure. There has to’ve been an increase in the sum effects of insurgents’ actions.
Or that more Iraqis are taking up arms against their occupiers.
That’s a pretty obvious one that you neglected to mention.
While you would guess this, oddly enough, those who planned and executed the plans for post-war Iraq did not. The expectation was that as recon continued, Iraq would become more stable.
You’ve provided another answer to your question about what should’ve been done differently.
If, as you suggest, Iraq is ‘relatively stable’, then this reveals yet another glaring lack of competent planning for the post war period.
Even in this ‘relatively stable’ post-war enviroment we can’t keep the Green Zone secure.
One’d think that with proper planning we could secure an area in a ‘relatively stable’ country, yes?
You’d admit that we should’ve realized that in a ‘relatively stable’ country we’d not have enough troops in our entire armed forces to maintain the necessary staffing for the occupation of Iraq. You do remember that we’re operating above legal limit on members of the armed forces, don’t you? Did you know that the GAO reported that we will be unable to maintain the level of troops deployments that the Pentagon expects for the next 3-5 (100,000 - 140,000) years unless we change the deployment rules of the guard and reserves?
Surely you’re not saying that part of the plan all along was to stretch the US military thin securing a ‘relatively stable’ country, are you?
Were US troops in these countries really subject to ~80 attacks/day?
Interesting question, but another time perhaps. What’s under discussion is the execution of plans that would not have encouraged the growth of insurgent groups, rather than one that makes them “simply go away.”
The answers that you’ve provided to your own question make me wonder about you.
The simple answers to your question, " What do you differently to combat the insurgents?" involve listening to the reccomendations of the career pros in the Joint Chiefs, the CIA and the State Dept (remember the FIP?).
I’d’ve allowed Garner to use the FIP work (instead of the four months of planning that came out of Fieth’s office) and allowed him to hire the director of the FIP as he requested. This alone would’ve addressed many of the issues that have apparently taken Team Bush unawares and encouraged the growth of insurgent groups.
There’s absolutely no reason to believe that the fuck-up in Iraq is the best America can do. It isn’t a case where the Admin engaged in due diligence and executed well and things ended up ‘relatively stable’ anyway. There was not due diligence on the part of Team Bush.
Troops and spending are not necessarily the same thing. The goal is to help the Iraqis get online in terms of maintaining their own securty. That implies an initial large presence of troops as the Iraqis will have no such ability until we create it. Creating it takes the money, but as it comes online one would hope the need for a US troop presence that does everything will decline.
I don’t know that I understand your objection. An increase in skill implies an increase in effectiveness, does it not?
Granted, that’s an obvious alternative as well. I missed it.
More stable yes, but also more vulnerable. I have no problem with the thesis that insurgent activity is higher than the planners expected. It clearly is.
We’re firmly in the realm of semantics now. “Relatively” would imply imperfect stability which would suggest a degree of ongoing difficulty which might be characterized by things like the “Green zone.”
As I’ve mentioned part of the increased costs would be in helping the Iraqis reach the point where they can be responsible for their own security thus ameliorating the need for a huge and ongoing US presence.
I disagree with the idea that our actions encouraged insurgency. They require no encouragement and are responsible for their own actions. I blame the insurgents for their acts of terrorism.
Well. I am a wonderful person. So I guess that’s good.
I doubt the FIP is a magic bullet, but find you’ve made a valid criticism here.
Thing’s could be better. No doubt. I think that hardly qualifies as a fuck-up. Any valid criticism of past actions (and you have many valid ones) must contain the awareness that hindsight is 20/20 and that not all problems are forseeable and not all outcomes are perfect. You simply do not oust a regime and rebuild a country without making mistakes. Mistakes were made in every major conflict, you know, but that does not automatically qualify them as fuck ups.
I mentioned an increase in the average skill level. I didn’t mean to say that taking the less skilled off the street would somehow make teh remainder more skilled, only that the average would increase because the bottom had been removed from the averaging process. In such an instance, the average would rise, but the overall total would decline.
Speaking of semantics…
You may not have noticed (because maybe the link expired, my fault) but the phrase used was “no longer.” This carries with it the implication that previously (before Iraq became ‘relatively stable’ no doubt) the Green Zone was secure. And thus represents a degradation in the state of security.
Here’s a better link : Green Zone is ‘no longer totally secure’ By James Drummond and Steve Negus in Baghdad
Published: September 15 2004 22:03 | Last updated: September 15 2004 22:03
At a briefing earlier this month, a high-ranking US officer in charge of the zone’s perimeter said he had insufficient soldiers to prevent intruders penetrating the compound’s defences.
If ‘relatively stable’ describes the situation when the GZ’s not as secure as it was, then previously the situation must’ve been even more stable. What adverb would you suggest for modifying ‘stable’ to describe how Iraq’s been up til now?
How 'bout ‘created conditions that allowed the insurgency to thrive’? More palatable to you?
I have no doubt on this matter.
Even Wolfowitz’s been willing to utter the ‘mistakes were made’ line.
But in the end, ‘fuck-up’ is not a factual statement, but rather a matter of opinion.
Not all mistakes were in spite of the US’s best efforts. There’s been a steady string of ignored warnings from the CIA, State Dept and Pentagon-commissioned outside experts.
Team Bush chose to believe that the ‘candy and flowers cakewalk’ was a likely scenario. That they used the utmost worst case estimates of the threat from Iraq and the best case estimates of post-war Iraq to sell the war is bad enough; but, the fact that they tried to get away with using the same best case scenarios to actually plan forthe post war period shows willfull disregard for due dilligence.
Whether this willfull disregard was the result of incompetence of perfidy remains to be proven.
Most apologists are choosing incompetence these days.
Perhaps I misunderstand what you mean by appologist. Certainly you do not mean Bush supporters, do you? If so, then I may indeed need a cite for a Bush supporter who suggest that incompetence is the explanation for the things which went wrong in Iraq.
On another note, what exactly would have been different in post war Iraq if Bush had listened to the voices you say he ignored. A couple hundred thousand more troops? Stationing the troops outside the cities? Not firing the Bathists? Or are you only talking about those who said we should not invade at all?
Speaking of mistakes, do we have a good non partisan list of the mistakes made in Iraq?
On a final note, friend SimonX, are you not attempting to attribute just a little too much consistency in news reports? If a story appears which says that Green Zones are “no longer totally secure”, it might imply that they were before, but it certainly does not prove it. It could just as easily mean that the Green Zones are no longer totally secure and this information just came to light. That is the situation on the ground might not have changed. The news outlet might simply have a recent estimate for the security of the Zones.
Perhaps your quest to uncover not lies has led you to a not truth?
Perhaps incompetence is too strong of a word. The gist of the assertions are, “They couldn’t help it. They did the best they could.” Which sounds a lot like, “Bless their little hearts. They just weren’t capable of doing any better than the mess they’ve made, the poor dears.”
What are you looking for here? What is a non partisan list?
The phrase was put in quotation marks because it’s the one that the ‘high-ranking US officer in charge of the zone’s perimeter’ used.
I see your point now. At the same time I hope you see mine, which is that as time goes on one would expect the insurgents to become better organized and get better at what they are doing, while naturally we are first catching the easiest, and most incompetant ones. one expects the remaining insurgents to learn and become more effective. Ideally this bell curve tops out somewhere and the total effectiveness begins to go down. You may argue that we should have already crested the hill. I would argue that that it is still reasonably expected to be further down the road. We come to a matter of opinion.
Ok, good link. Again, one does not expect a straight move towards entropy as we stabilize Iraq. One expects there to be flare ups in previously stable areas from time to time. While this fact in the green zone is indeed troubling, it is not clear that it represents a net destabilization effect or a flare up.
“Relatively stable” is more a generic than a specific descriptor. Flare ups in certain zones do not necessarily change this.
Not really. It implies that we, the US are responsible for the insurgency. I believe this stance of yours is undemonstrated no matter how you phrase it.
Indeed.
Yes, that’s true, but hardly troubling. In an undertaking such as this, no matter what course you take, you are going to have well-informed, responsible, but strong dissent. Had we chosen another course in the reconstruction (and I’d love to hear good ideas,) doubtless that would have not worked perfectly either and those that disagreed would be casting blame, too. Simply saying “This isn’t going well,” may or may not be true, but it is certainly not constructive unless an alternative course is offered that can be judged. Without the alternative, it’s really just whining.
I strongly disagree. Throughout this whole thing Bush has always been careful to stress about how far we have to go, and the difficulties to be faced. His optimism is more along the lines of “we are resolved, and will win.” I don’t think I ever heard the “Candy and flowers cakewalk” scenario argued by anybody in the administration. But, if you have a link to somebody in the administration saying how easy they expected the reconstruction to be, I’d love to see it.
Thanks for the link, Tokyo. Pretty good piece by Diamond, I hadn’t seen it yet. He’s interesting to read because he was initially opposed to the war (he wanted broader international support, for good reason) but with the end of the main offensive he was eager to help and even optimistic… until he got directly involved. He toured Iraq under military protection, collected and analyzed information, gave speeches, met key people, and did his best to encourage the democratic process. Much of his (frequently spot-on) advice has been systematically ignored by the people orchestrating this war and the subsequent engagement (as they ignored several other experts whose views did not match the views of a select few in the administration, which is the same way it was decided that Iraq had WMD stockpiles and programs).
This was in response to the perfectly reasonable charge that the US “created conditions that allowed the insurgency to thrive”.
The US is indirectly and in some cases directly responsible for the predicament, including insurgencies and various other problems in Iraq. Consider yet again: who removed, without an honest review of the evidence and without legitimate reason, the element that had precluded insurgency and kept order for decades? Who aggravated ethnic and religious tensions by blundering in unprepared and oblivious to national and regional sentiment? Who inadvertently (but predictably) invited foreign militants into the conflict and speeded up militant recruitment, thereby bringing terrorism to the country? Who failed to secure critical borders, and why? Who failed to provide adequate security, which Larry Diamond in Tokyo’s link calls “the central pedestal that supports all else” in “postconflict situations in which the state has collapsed”?
And so forth. Just as you have routinely phrased your responses in a heavily US-apologetic manner, it is possible to be far, far more critical of US planning and execution than this thread has been, yet still retain a fair modicum of material support. However the comment you responded to above was a fair one, hardly an extremist or left-wing one.
The above is apolospinning of available information. SimonX was talking about several explicit warnings from a number of experts and government agencies directly involved in the Iraq affair before and after invasion, as well as consultants, academics, experts, etc., some of whom were hastily muffled or threatened by the administration. It’s difficult to spin this one effectively, Scylla, and it’s pretty much impossible to deny unless you resort to the proverbial fingers in the ears and loud singing.
From Tokyo’s link, with plenty of my emphasis:
That naive reasoning, which you seem to be trying to defend, which clearly failed to work, and which took into consideration precious little of Iraqi reality, has been strongly and consistently criticized from the very beginning by multiple agencies and parties as well as outside counsel. In response to your point that constructive criticism must include alternative courses (not true IMO – in cases like this just knowing something will work poorly or not at all already seems pretty damn constructive to me), well, alternatives were provided! More troops were recommended, adequate preparations and resources to ensure levels of security were emphasized, warnings were issued, and, generally, a healthy avoidance of wishful thinking as well as arrogance was propagated by several sources (including Collounsbury and others on this board, as you no doubt remember).
Staying with the same non-partisan analysis here (since my other non-partisan mentions such as The Economist seem to have little impact on Scylla) back in early 2003, Larry Diamond warned against a repeat of the “engagement with Afghanistan, which has been ad hoc, haphazard, inadequately funded, tardy in reconstruction, and utterly unwilling to deploy and utilize the military force necessary to secure the new political order.” There was no blind spot in this situation, and, while it is obvious that hindsight is 20/20, it has been repeatedly demonstrated that foresight in the Iraq affair was pretty sharp too.
Or perhaps the assertions are simply that the undertaking is very difficult and problems are to be expected. There does not need to be any aspertions as to the motivations or capabilities of those involved.
Yes, but then was used to imply something that may not have been the case. The implication is that something changed drastically recently. The fact is that more attacks are happening. A not truth, perhaps?
I have to ask you guys, do you really think the presence of a couple hundred thousand more troops would make the insergents less nasty? Do you really think that American MPs beating down more doors and hauling more Iraqis off to Abu Graihb would win thier hearts and minds?
I think valid complaints about the Iraqi war can be made. But there is little need for the vitriol. Everytime someone makes a suggestion and it is not followed the charge that the administration is hung up in ideological blindness makes its way into the conversation. Shinseki did offer an opinion that more troops might be needed. His opinion was weighed with others and they decided to use the force they used. We could certainly criticize the assumptions or methods used to come to the conclusion that this force was adequate. But it is simple sophistry to say that the only reason such methods or assumptions were used is ideological.
Remember that for every policy there was an expert complaining that it was wrong. The existence of such an expert after the fact does not constitute proof that ideological considerations trumped practical ones.
Thanks, TokyoTakarazuka for the links. I object to a few characterizations, but they are very good.
The case is made that the mess in Iraq was not for a lack of trying on the part of Team Bush.
Unless one believes that the results in Iraq are the best America could’ve done up to this point, then one has to conclude that the results are direct results of poor decisions on the part of Team Bush.
Could you clarify the meaning of this sentence?
A lack of manpower was cited by the officer. If the difference between adequate staffing and inadequate staffing is the result of a change in the enviroment in which the staff operate (thereby changing the criteria for what constitutes adequate staffing) rather than a difference in the availability of staff then I’d have to say that my point about the characterization of Iraq as ‘relatively stable’ still stands. If it’s merely the result of necessary staff being unavailable then not only does my point about the characterization of Iraq stand, but the point about Team Bush’s ‘poor decisions’ is supported as well.
perv
The extra troops suggested by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs before the invasion would’ve made their difference if they had been inserted at the start of the invasion. It’s not a suggestion that they would make the insurgents less nasty, rather that they would***'ve*** made the insugency less popular and thus less nasty. It’s a point about how various suggestion from more than one appropriate quarter were ignored.
Already actively remembered. Consider statements as being made with this in mind.
It’s a criticism of the assumptions or methods used to come to the conclusion that this force was adequate.
Even more to the point are the subsequent suggestions made that have also have not been implemented.
It’s very clear that the projections that were more pessimistic than Team Bush’s were the more informed ones.
That’s a pretty old argument. I guess there was order in Berlin, and the Furhrer kept the trains running on time. Yes, point conceded here. Saddam was very very good at precluding insurgency.
Who framed Roger Rabbit?
I am not an apologist. We have nothing to apologize for. We should be proud of what we did, and what we are doing. For the past… three years? I guess it’s been that long, mostly what I’ve heard from the left about the wars whether they be in Iraq or Afghanistan has been pessismism. This is going to be a quagmire, that is going to be a disaster. We can’t do this. We can’t do the other. We’re gonna fail. We’re stupid. etc. etc. etc.
I believe in a healthy skepticism, Abe. I really do. I beleive these things need to be questioned. But Jesus Christ, man! Every single little thing, any minor setback is pounced upon. We could never take Afghanistan, we didn’t have enough troops to take Iraq. We would never be able to make a Democracy work. We should cut and run… and on and on…
I sit here, and I wonder; do they realize what this looks like? These constant pronouncements of doom and pessimism? I think they do hurt our efforts, you know? Not that you don’t have the right to make them, and should make them if you feel you must, but are you aware?
Are you aware how the left today seems to be tying itself to failure, depending on it? Failure in Iraq, failure economically, failure in te global community? The more failure, the worse things get, the better it is for Kerry, the better it is for the left?
I dunno if it’s being done on purpose. I doubt it. But that is the effect.
I’ll tell you what I believe, pure and simple. We did the right thing. We’re making the world safer. Those countries that opposed us, did so for cynical economic and geopolitical reasons, not because we were wrong. France and Germany had huge financial interest in the then current regime. Oil for food was corrupt.
We stood up, and we did the right thing in a difficult situation, and we can fucking make it work. It’s a stupid cliche, but it’s a cliche because it’s true. Pessimism doesn’t accomplish shit.
Just consider the possibility that Saddam was a very bad man, consider the fact that for us, the war on terrorism is the war on militant fundamentalist Islam, and that Saddam on top of being genocidal tyrant, was our self-professed enemy. Consider that we have been at war with Iraq in a very real way since the inspectors left. What we did was we finished that war. Consider the possibility that we can win a peace, with a free Iraq. We will make mistakes, we have made them. We’ll make more. We’ll win though because we simply won’t accept any other alternative. Unless of course we start beleiving the pessimists and just give up.
We’ve done much harder things, you know?
What’s there to explain. There are all always doomsayers. There always will be.
Oh shit! “Criticized.” We’re in trouble now. Can’t have criticism. Better just give up. Sorry Iraq. You’re on your own now. We’re being criticized.
Yeah, there’s criticism. Other people supported it. Other people thought it was a good idea. Other people thought it might work. Other people still do. Other people think, that on balance, we’re doing pretty damn good. I have no doubt that there will be a contingent that tells us how we’re screwing up and how we’re gonna fail right up until we win. After we win they’ll tell us how it wasn’t worth it, or how it would have happened anyway if we had done nothing. There are always such people.
Then go with that.
Yeah, I remember how the entire community was gonna rise up and fight us, how Saudi Arabia would become our enemy, how Syria and all these other countries we’re going to take the opportunity to charge in, and what a hopeless mess it would be.
It all sucks. We’re screwing up. We’re gonna fail. This is your argument.
No one doesn’t. One could very well believe that the principles did the best they could and yet the results were not the best possible. One could believe that many did the best they could, but again, the results were not the best possible. Finally, one could believe that some of the decisions were the best effort by those involved while others were not. One is free to add up the decisions and decide if more were less than adequate or more were best efforts. One does not need to fall victim to the fals dichotomy that either Bush and his administration is incompetant or Iraq is all roses and milk.
For you, anything.
My only point was that the quote itself might not say what the article implies. The green zones could be less safe simply because more attacks are aimed at them. I could, in fact be the information needed to know when to upgrade the zone’s defences. Feedback works that way.
Again, no. You are leaving out the middle ground. The time between this report and the availability of new troops might not have expired yet. There are no unlimited resources. There are no clairvoyant leaders.
Yes, maybe.
Except it is not valid. Those suggestions were made and considered inside the pentagon. We only know about them because Shinseki and the Democrats choose to make them public. If you look at his statement, I think you’ll find that he was not the one designated to make the final decision. That is, he had an opinion, but acknowledged that he was not the one with the most information on the subject.
Fair enough. I have my own criticisms.
But this is were we get into more murky territory. Can you point to a request from any Generals on the ground which were ignored?
Again, I’m not at all sure about this. I linked several speeches in which Bush himself said the war would be long*. I said I never got the impression that the war would be easy or short. This impression that the Bush administration had wildly optimistic plans for the war is just as silly as the idea that Kerry is wildly flip flopping on his position on the war. Its simply not accurate.
