I assume you are talking about modern Jordan, by the way and meant to include transplanted Palestinians as the fourth group.
However I’m curious about the assertion above. So in your estimation, would you consider the Arabs of the pre-WW I West Bank, East Bank ( in the sense of those settled Arab agriculturalists described above ), and southern Syria to be more or less a homogenous cultural bloc, with subsequent differentiation being purely a twentieth century political phenomena? I can certainly buy that ( makes sense at least for the East Bank-West Bank dichotomy ), but I got the impression that there was at least some regional distinction in even the earlier period. Could be misremembering or reading on my part, though ( i.e. I may have confused East Bank snobbishness towards West Bankers as being more historically rooted than it really is ).
Of course, it still wouldn’t change the fact that the Hashemites derived their early support from their own tribal base, not the settled Arabs already extant in the region.
A big tip of the hat to Tamerlane and Collounsbury for filling in much of the explanation regarding Jordanian history and demographics of which I was only vaguely aware, and which I could not have done justice.
And a similar nod to Alessan for making me look up the fact that Elon, like the late Ze’evi, is a member of Moledet. I guess it’s telling that his biggest stateside allies include Gary Bauer and Tom DeLay; I imagine (and hope) that he’s got about as much credibility in Israel as those two have got here.
Homogenous cultural bloc is a bit strong. I’d hazard the opinion the the West Bank-Upper TransJordan-Lower West Syria area shows a great deal of commonality in social structure and habits. There are regional-sub regional differences, in dialect for example, but overall they’re more similar than say compared to the Bedou or perhaps the upper Syrians or the coastal Lebanese. Certainly strongest contrast is between the Bedouine descended groups and the old settled peoples.
I am certain there are ancient micro-regional tensions, snobbishness etc. Indeed even on village by village basis that is endemic. This is not a region where there are well developed national/regional identities, it is highly localized.
On the other hand I do feel that literature often lumps East Bankers (a-c) together where one might, if one wanted to be really careful differentiate btw the groups I noted. I personally have found the NW Jordanians more sympathetic to the P’s than the Circassians or the Bedouine tied people.
No, no, not at all, nor that the three groups all look down on the Palestinians. Nuances.
I might add I should not have implied the Circassians were dominant pop. in the center, still a minority but a singificant one relative to the early pre-refugee influex.
The message which history shouts at us at deafening volume is surely that radical solutions do not work. It seems to me that the harder you squeeze the Palestinian Authority the more militants will spurt through your fingers to become out-and-out dissident terrorists under no juristiction of and authority whatsoever.
If I might point to perhaps the best (or at least least disastrous) example of conflict resolution in recent times, the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland was reached by direct negotiation with the bombers themselves, no matter how much this might stick in one’s craw.
So, just as members of the IRA, UDA, INLA etc were invited to highest-level talks instead of being summarily arrested, so must members of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and any other such group be targetted for negotiation not assassination.
But the problem is that groups like Hamas won’t come to the table. They’re not willing to negotiate because they’re not willing to admit Israel even exists. The Good Friday agreement could come about because, even if some of the groups didn’t think Northern Ireland should be part of the UK, everybody was willing to agree the UK was there. Hamas won’t do that, and won’t even acknowledge that other groups can do that. So, Hamas is an enemy not only of Israel, but the PLA too.
Ethnic cleansing is “The systematic elimination of an ethnic group or groups from a region or society, as by deportation, forced emigration, or genocide.” Killing is just one delightful method by which this can be achieved.
And…?
Yet again this argument, that I just don’t get. Yes, there was no homeland, but the people now known as the Palestinians were on the land now known as the Occupied Territories. I don’t see this argument has any weight at all. Prior to colonization of North America there were loads of tribes living there. Should their lack of nation statehood preclude Native Americans’ rights?
Well, the argument is that the formation of Israel didn’t take anything away from the Palestinians. It’s not like the Palestinians had their own state that they lost when Israel was founded.
When Israel was founded, you had two nationalities, both of which were pursuing exclusive claims to the same land. Ultimately the Israelis won, but it could have gone the other way. The British were extremely pro-Arab, and when Israel declared indepence, it was attacked by all of it’s neighbors. The Iraqi army got within 10 miles of Netanya. If it’s advance hadn’t stalled, and it had taken Netanya, Israel probably would have been destroyed.
I am yet to be convinced that comparable efforts have been made to do so. Should they ever, then of course the negotiation would begin from a position of utter intransigence: that is what negotiation is about, even with terrorists.
Are you serious? I’m not a big fan of the argument that something is wrong just on the face of it, but I think this is one of those cases. The only way this plan could “work” is if the Palestinians were wiped off the face of the earth. I can’t believe that anyone even halfway serious about getting his arms around the I/P problem would give this plan one nanosecond’s consideration.
Maybe, but for Hamas to negotiate with Israel would require it to abandon a large part of its ideology, which is that Israel doesn’t exist. It probably would be better to marginalize them as far as possible, improve conditions for the Palestinians to discourage their growth, and negotiate with the PLO, who, from the Israeli perspective, with all their faults, at least doesn’t want to kill every single Israeli.
OK, but still, this plan is far out there it’s fantasy. It gives everything to Israel that that country could want and is contrary to the needs and desires of the Palestianians and the nation of Jordan.
Yes, I think Israel will basically be in a constant state of war with it’s neighbors as long as it does survive.
Interesting. I have no hope or expectation that Palestine will survive. I expect to see Israel eventually (probably quite rapidly) annexe the West Bank, leaving a tiny, servile, “mini-Palestine” in Gaza as a sop to world opinion, which Israel will effective run as an occupied military state on the spurious argument of “security.”
I see recent Israeli restraint in the face of the last terror attack am hopeful. I see Israel considering more prisoner release despite being threatened about it and despite that such was never part of the roadmap agreed to by both sides. I see PA and IDF forces working together to apprehend a terror suspect who is then placed under arrest by the PA and see some real action, albeit small, on the PA side. I think that both sides have identified leadership that really wants to make the small step by step long walk … heck, crawl towards peaceful co-existance. Both sides also have elements that want anything but, as well, of course.
What I do not get is why the militant Palestinian elements are mostly willing to stand down for now. There are a few possibilities:
They could want to regroup and recover from Israeli actions that have seriously handicapped their infrastructure to attack again another day. If so, then the gamble they take, and that I hope that they lose, is that Abbas may gain strength and support in the interim, and be able to take them on later with Israeli concessions delivered.
They could be pressured into standing down by their backers and other interested parties (SA, Syria, etc). These are the same parties who previously had a vested interest in keeping the Israeli/PA conflict roiling as it provided a straw man to blame for all that was wrong in the Arab world, and a common enemy to distract the people with from the abuses put upon them by their own leadership. If so, then why this pressure now? I’d hate to give any credit to Dubya’s efforts to impose an American hegemony in the region, so someone give me another explanation please.
Any thoughts? I am particular curious about Tamerlane’s considerations, and what the fuck Coll thinks.
