So let’s get this clear Chuck. When you use the term “natural history” to refer to humans, you are using it as a synonym for “anthropology”?
Because if that is what you mean, why the fuck didn’t you simply say “anthropology” rather than using these obfuscating terms? Could it be because you know damn well that no race has anything like consistent anthropological similarities?
And if that isn’t what you mean, then quoting someone that does use the term as a synonym of anthropology is not in any way “an example of someone referring to human natural history in a manner that is compatible with your usage”.
At this stage I am not even going to comment on the obvious fact that “anthropology” isn’t even tangentially related to “phylogenetic history”, which is what you claimed that “natural history” refers to.
Let’s just clear up whether you now want to use “natural history” to mean “anthropology” as you reference does, or if you are simply introducing yet more obfuscation without actually providing an example of someone referring to human natural history in a manner that is compatible with your usage.
A small difference in a group that is utterly undefined, that may not exist and for which we have no evidence, may produce a 1/10th of a second difference in something else, or it may not, but we have no evidence either way. But the fact that the 1% difference might exist proves the validity of the undefined group, and that proves that the difference between it and other equally undefined groups exists, and is large.
Yeah sure. You’ve convinced me with this compelling argument. Clearly racial differences can be large. You have shown that now.
Because if we accept that races are real, then 10 people (out of a sample of 7 billion people) who may or may not belong to this ill-defined race will run 1% faster than people who may belong to another race, though they may also belong to the same race.
No evidence that any race exists.
No evidence that the specific race exists.
No evidence that good runners belong to that race.
Lots of evidence that poor runners also belong to that group.
No evidence that belonging to that race contributes in any way being good runner.
And the difference in performance is less than 1%.
But if we accept that races did exist, and if we accept that this this race was one of those races, and if we accept that the fastest runners all belonged to this race and if we accpet that racial membership has some effect on their running ability and if we accept that 1% is a profound distinction in a sample with a variability of 60%…
(draws breath)
If we accept all that, then that proves that racial differences can be profound
Consider me convinced. I always base my beliefs concerning objective reality upon arguments that are constructed by begging the question in a total evidence vacuum with no statistical support.
I’m sure you have convinced everyone else as well with this highly cromulent argument.
I already directly replied to you 3 times and you utterly ignored the reply.
Completely false. I gave you a very simple yes or no question, which you ignored repeatedly. Now you claim that you answered it but you refuse to link to the post where you did.
Chuck said that his populations “share unique natural histories.” Blake argued that this was impossible, as "Human natural history is a tautology,” because "natural history means observing animals in their “natural environment,” and because by some definitions humans don’t have a “natural environment.”
Chuck showed that there are multiple definitions of “natural history”, and that some don’t preclude humans (for example, “Descriptive ecology and ethology”), and therefore that Blake’s argument has no legs to stand on. Moreover, Chuck showed that people do refer to “human natural history.” He pointed out that some refer to biological anthropology as “human natural history.”
Blake retorted that Chuck has been obfuscating in using the term “natural history.” But it was Blake who argued in the first place that Chuck’s populations didn’t have natural histories. Chuck, in fact, started with a definition of subspecies that included the term “natural history.” He didn’t substitute terms. Chuck has since been arguing that the term “natural history” has wider meaning than that Blake thinks (quote: “neither more nor less than the observation of organisms in their natural environment”) and that there is no tautology in referring to human natural history.
Blake has since argued that “natural history” does not include “phylogenetic history.” Even if this were the case, Blake would be wrong in this original contention.
This brings us to the second point.
(2) Only tangentially related
According to Blake “anthropology” isn’t even tangentially related to “phylogenetic history.”
Wiki for “Biological Anthropology” (also know by some as “human natural history”):
Wiki for molecular “Molecular anthropology”:
Isn’t it even tangentially related to “phylogenetic history”?
Whatever the case, chuck is not saying that “natural history” in context to the subspecies concept exactly means “biological anthropology”; (What would it mean to say that populations have unique “biological anthropologies,” after all?) Rather, he is saying that humans can have “unique natural histories” as the term is (ambiguously) used. Based on the definitions provided by Blake, he said above that: “So the natural histories of the members can refer to their interactions with the environment and to their evolutionary history.”
So that would be a big “No” on your ability to explain how natural history can be applied to humans?
And an equally big “No” on your ability to provide an example of someone referring to human natural history in a manner that is compatible with your usage of “phylogenetic history”.
That pretty much settles the issue then.
Lot’s of Google bombing, but o actual evidence of anyone else using "natural history: in the way that you do and no ability to explain how it can be applied to humans in a way that doesn’t make it synonymous with history/anthropology.
Since you can’t even tell us what “natural; history” means, clearly it can not be applicable to human races.
I have been referencing a definition of subspecies. In that definition the term “natural history” is used. No definition of “natural history” is provided. I am not saying that “natural history” as used in this definition means “anthropology.” To me, that wouldn’t make sense, since it is being used to refer to properties of organisms, to things that they share – if anything, it should refer to the things about individuals/populations that anthropologists study. What I am saying is that “natural history” as used does not preclude humans. For one, if it did, why would Ernst Mayr, who helped create this definition, say that human populations fit it? For another, when other people describe the natural history of subspecies, they describe things that human populations have, such a phylogenetic history.
I could be, though, that as you argue “natural history” and “human” are inconsistent, such that it is a priori impossible for human populations to share these. I show however, that there is no inconsistency. Humans can share natural histories.
Wow. Ok. You won’t admit that you were wrong. Wow.
You: “How can “natural history” be applied to humans?”
I said:
And then I gave numerous examples. Wow.
You: "your ability to provide an example of someone referring to human natural history in a manner that is compatible with your usage of “phylogenetic history”:
And I cited "“Biological Anthropology: The Natural History of Humankind, Second Edition, 2005.”
Ok. I guess we are done. I will discuss this topic with others, though.
So that would be a big “No” on your ability to explain how natural history can be applied to humans?
And an equally big “No” on your ability to provide an example of someone referring to human natural history in a manner that is compatible with your usage of “phylogenetic history”.
That pretty much settles the issue then.
Lot’s of Google bombing, but o actual evidence of anyone else using "natural history: in the way that you do and no ability to explain how it can be applied to humans in a way that doesn’t make it synonymous with history/anthropology.
Since you can’t even tell us what “natural; history” means, clearly it can not be applicable to human races.
Issue settled.
So, races don’t meet the “natural history” requirement of subspecies.
And races don’t have any shared geography, as already established.
And races don’t share any distinctive morphological features, as already established.
And races don’t share any ancestral commonality, as already established.
So races don’t exist in any biologically meaningful manner.
Gee, I sure got roasted in this thread didn’t I Chuck? Your own references established that races are not biologically meaningful.
Chuck,
It might be that “natural history” as used in Mayr’s geographic subspecies definition specifically excludes humans. After all, sometimes – though, granted, not at all times, as you have shown --“natural history” excludes humans.
My reply:
Blake,
But Mayr himself describes human populations as races. If he meant to use “natural history” in a way that excludes humans why would he describe human populations as subspecies.
Your reply,
Ha. You can’t explain “how natural history can be applied to humans.” You showed that it is. You explained the apparent inconsistency. But maybe if I keep saying this, others on this thread with believe me.
So that would be a big “No” on your ability to explain how natural history can be applied to humans?
And an equally big “No” on your ability to provide an example of someone referring to human natural history in a manner that is compatible with your usage of “phylogenetic history”.
That pretty much settles the issue then.
Lot’s of Google bombing, but o actual evidence of anyone else using "natural history: in the way that you do and no ability to explain how it can be applied to humans in a way that doesn’t make it synonymous with history/anthropology.
Since you can’t even tell us what “natural; history” means, clearly it can not be applicable to human races.
Issue settled.
So, races don’t meet the “natural history” requirement of subspecies.
And races don’t have any shared geography, as already established.
And races don’t share any distinctive morphological features, as already established.
And races don’t share any ancestral commonality, as already established.
So races don’t exist in any biologically meaningful manner.
Gee, I sure got roasted in this thread didn’t I Chuck? Your own references established that races are not biologically meaningful.
Female to male transition has been documented, one authored a book on it where they talked about the experience of taking large doses of hormones, it affected their outlook and way they thought in ways they didn’t imagine.
Ok. I now get what Blake meant. But many of the definitions that he pointed to don’t include “natural environment.” And, as I have pointed out since, people do use the term “natural history” in context to humans in the sense of “human natural history.”
The apparent contradiction is even recognized.
“Biological anthropology has come to be defined as human natural history notwithstanding the contradictions between a naturally determined world and the industrial world common to modern living populations.” (Race and other misadventures: essays in honor of Ashley Montagu in his ninetieth year p.87)"
So that would be a big “No” on your ability to explain how natural history can be applied to humans?
And an equally big “No” on your ability to provide an example of someone referring to human natural history in a manner that is compatible with your usage of “phylogenetic history”.
That pretty much settles the issue then.
Lot’s of Google bombing, but o actual evidence of anyone else using "natural history: in the way that you do and no ability to explain how it can be applied to humans in a way that doesn’t make it synonymous with history/anthropology.
Since you can’t even tell us what “natural; history” means, clearly it can not be applicable to human races.
I’m ending dialogue with Blake. We don’t seem to be able to come to any agreement on this matter. If anyone else wants to follow up on his points, I will discuss those with them.
I haven’t read any of this thread up until this point, but I got started debating related issues in this pit thread, and Blake suggested I move said debating to this thread, so here I am. I’ll repeat the two most relevant parts of what I said there:
Post #352
I hate hate HATE to post anything that might possibly put me on the “racist” side of this or any other issue. But in any argument of this sort, I always feel like the anti-racist side somewhat overreaches. That is, I think the “correct” statement to make is something like “races, as traditionally defined, are vague and ill-defined enough that they would rarely be of any actual scientific use; and furthermore, they carry with them such unpleasant historical baggage that even in the rare cases when they might possibly have some meaning it is almost certainly best off not to use them”, or something along those lines. Something which can exist in a world in which well-meaning marrow transfusion centers might use “race” as a first (and not definitive) crude filtering system to help find matches.
However, I feel that anti-racist people go beyond that to something like “races have absolutely zero scientific or genetic meaning whatsoever, period. Any statement that tries to make even the slightest correlation between perceived traditional race and any inborn characteristic is always wrong wrong wrong wrong period no matter what period wrong, la la la, and anyone who ever even considers making such a claim or statement must be someone who’s trying to fool us into agreeing with some harmless claim because then we will have to agree that blacks are dumb, so we will scorch the earth and never given an inch”.
Post #388
It’s ironic that one of the things that makes race so hard to discuss is that there is no firm definition of race, but one of the things that makes this particular conversation so difficult is that there is also no firm definition of “biologically meaningful”. Here are a variety of different ways one might define “biologically meaningful”, as it applies to ways-to-group-human-beings:
(1) A set of groups is “biologically meaningful” if brilliant but naive scientists (ie, aliens who come to study human biology and have zero knowledge of or interest in earth culture) would arrive at these (or nearly identical) groupings totally on their own. For instance, they would almost certainly come up with an idea of male vs female that almost precisely matched our own.
(2) A set of groups is “biologically meaningful” if brilliant but naive scientists would come up with a set of groupings which, while clearly different from ours, would have at least some commonality… that is, elements in the same group in our system would be more likely than pure chance to be in the same group in their system. For instance, we might divide people into children, adolescents and adults, while the alien scientists would divide by various other age-related criteria. So the groups would be different, but clearly related.
(3) A set of groups is “biologically meaningful” if we could take those groups, present them as fait accompli to brilliant but naive scientists, and those scientists, using purely biological/genetic factors, would then be able to perfectly measure and define those groups, and sort further individuals into those groups with near-perfect precision.
(4) A set of groups is “biologically meaningful” if we could take those groups, present them as fait accompli to brilliant but naive scientists, and those scientists, using purely biological/genetic factors, would be able to sort further individuals into those groups… not perfectly, but better than pure chance would dictate. (For instance, “I have divided people into groups based on the last digit of their social security number” would presumably fail this test.)
(5) A set of groups is “biologically meaningful” if scientists would active seek information about these groupings while doing various science-y things. For instance, scientists doing large survey health research would almost certainly want to get information about the age and gender of the various subjects being studied. Would the scientists spontaneously say “hey, it would be very helpful if we also had grouping-data-X for each of our subjects”? If so, then it’s biologically meaningful.
(6) A set of groups is “biologically meaningful” if scientists who were studying large numbers of people while doing various science-y things might not spontaneously think to ask for this piece of grouping information, but, if they were presented with this grouping information already-existing, would ever possibly find any scientific use for it. (Ie, scientists might not spontaneously ask “hey, which of the ill-defined and socially constructed racial groups does each subject fall into”, but if they happened to have that data along with their information, might notice “hey, people who self-identify as Asian have a higher incidence of condition X, that probably bears further investigation”.)
Now, do I think that race passes any of those tests? I think it likely passes 4, almost certainly passes 6, and possibly passes 2 (note that those are the weaker versions of 3, 5 and 1, respectively). But my point is not to make some positive claim about the usefulness of race. My point is that if you’re making the claim that race is 100% biologically meaningless, then you’re making the fairly extraordinary claim that not only does it not meet any of those 6 criteria I just listed, it also doesn’t meet any other similar such criteria. Unless, that is, you can prove that there is a single well-understood well-defined definition for “biologically meaningful”, which I’m skeptical of.
By this reasoning television viewing habits are biologically meaningful
I could, after all, readily group people by the television station that they most frequently watch. For example, all the people who watch Channel 6 in Mumbai, all the people who watch Channel 8 in Mumbai, all the people who watch Channel 143 in Mexico City and so forth.
And if I then presented those groups to brilliant but naive scientists, those scientists, using purely biological/genetic factors, would be able to sort further individuals into those groups using purely biological/genetic factors at rates better than pure chance would dictate.
I assume that you agree that this is possible?
The brand of soap purchased would also be a biologically meaningful classification, for exactly the same reason. The political party that a person voted for at the last election would also be biologically meaningful, although the name of the candidate would be more meaningful still. The sports team that they barrack for would be biologically meaningful. The given name of their second cousin would be biologically meaningful.
I’m assuming that you agree that who a person voted for, their brand of deodorant and their favourite TV show are not biologically meaningful categories. So clearly there is a flaw in your reasoning.
The problem is that any classification scheme that even vaguely maps onto geography will be judged valid by the standard that you are applying here. People, like all organisms, tend to most closely related to people who live close to them than they are to organisms that live further away. As a result any classification scheme at all that acts as a surrogate for geographic location will be judged to be biologically meaningful by this standard.
Race, of course, is often a surrogate for geography, albeit a poor one. But it will meet these criteria because even though the correlation to geography is weak, it still exists. Any of the other criteria that I just listed, such as favourite TV station, will be usable with any biological test that will group people into race. However TV viewing habits will provide a much tighter correlation than racial assignation because it maps much more tightly to geography.
So by this logic, whether someone enjoys watching Channel 6 Action News or not becomes not *just *biologically meaningful, but much *more *biologically meaningful than their race.
By this standard the brand of soap that people use, the political party they vote for, the route that they drive to work and the colour of clothes that they wear are all biologically meaningful.
After all, scientists have looked at all of those things and said "“hey, people who do Y have a higher incidence of condition X, that probably bears further investigation”. The number of factors that scientists consider when they examine problems is legion.
I doubt if you could actually name a single factor of any sort; social, sexual, dietary, linguistic, tonsorial or otherwise; that scientists have not looked at and said “hey, people who do that have a higher incidence of condition X, that probably bears further investigation”.
Since your standard of “biologically meaningful” in this case forces you to accept that literally *everything *about a person is biologically meaningful, I assume that you agree that the standard is not useful?
I’ll simply repeat what I said in my very first post in this thread:
This is quite easy to see when you examine racial classifications between cultures. If you try to tell a Chinese Tiawanese that they are the same race as a Vietnamese there reaction will vary from amusement to puzzlement to offence. To them, it is quite clear that Vietnamese are distinct race. To Western Europeans OTOH, it is quite clear that they are the same race. Similarly, Western Europeans would never consider themselves the same race as most Sri Lankans, yet to most Chinese, they clearly are the same race.
In short, if aliens came to Earth from another planet tomorrow, the chances of them classifying human populations in any way at all that resembles any existing racial scheme is billions to one against. The boundaries for human “racial” groups are so completely arbitrary that unless someone is told beforehand where those boundaries are, there is no chance they will draw them in the same place.
This standard is falsified because even humans here in Earth can’t agree on a racial classification schemes that have any commonality If humans have never independently produced schemes with commonality, why would you believe that an alien species would be able to do so?
And more importantly, which scheme do you believe that they would agree with? It seems to be putting the cart before the horse to say that aliens would be able to produce a scheme that agree with a human scheme, without telling us which scheme they would agree with. They can’t agree with them all, since the schemes do not agree with each other. For example, would they agree with the Chinese scheme where Vietnamese and Philippinos are the same race and a different race from Koreans? Or would they agree with the many European schemes that called them all the same race?
No, we are not. We are simply pointing out that those criteria are not valid. If they were valid then the race “Watched Two and a Half Men Last Tuesday” would be a biologically valid category.
As I said in the pit thread, you are engaging a classic fallacy of composition. Specifically:
Races can divide people based upon geography.
Biology can divide people based upon geography.
Therefore races can divide people based upon biology.
You can’t reach a logical conclusion working from a logical fallacy, which is why your standard forces you to conclude that the political party that somebody votes for is biologically meaningful.
The issue isn’t whether race meets the criteria that you have set out. The issue is whether the criteria themselves are valid. I hope that I have shown that they are not valid.
That’s relatively easy if we can agree on two non-controversial premises:
Biology is a science. Science is the study of the objective world in a rational manner.
If you accept those premises then for something to be biologically meaningful it must be both rational and objective.
Agreed?
As we have pointed out ad nasueum in this thread, no standard of race is rational and objective. Therefore no standard of race is biologically meaningful.
(1) Biological reality, Biological meaningfulness, and taxonomic validity
Here was the original discussion:
.
I then went on to point out that the thread was about "biological meaningfulness.’ As an example of the importance of this distinction, Pigliucci and Kaplan argue that there are ’ biologically meaningful’ (their words) races by the ecotype definition. I’m not saying that I agree with them. I am just saying that the terms "biologically meaningful’ and “biological reality” is not exhausted by “being a valid taxonomic group according to the International Code of Zoological Nomenclature.” So making the distinction is not without worth.
This is a trivial point, though, so let’s just drop it. I now understand what you were saying and I think you can understand what I was saying.
(2) Piddly differences
Here was the original discussion:
The types of differences that I am using to diagnose human subspecies (dental patters, craniofacial patterns, etc.) are consistent with the types of differences used to diagnose other subspecies. The point about tigers, above, was that the types of differences do not need to be consistent between subspecies pairs. In species A, subspecies (1) could, in principle, be different from subspecies (2) in color and craniometric patters and subspecies (2) could be different from subspecies (3) in length and size. In that sense, the differences do not have to been consistent between subspecies. (Again, I wasn’t sure in what sense you mean consistent.)
Now, it goes without saying that mean differences can be used to diagnose subspecies.
There doesn’t need to be unique characteristics in the sense of subspecies (1) having polka dots and subspecies (2) not.
To diagnose subspecies, the author looks at craniometric differences (which are phylogenetically concordant). In table 2, you can see the means and standard deviations of the 10 out of 40 variables for which significant differences were found. In variable 13, the first listed, the standardized difference is about 1. For none of these variables is the between population difference greater than the within population difference. (Just decompose the variance.)
The variables correlate within populations, however. They are not random. (And in that sense they show consistency). This allows one to do a multivariate analysis (e.g., canonical discriminant analysis). Using multiple variables, the populations can be reasonably separated and individual can be assigned with a high degree of accuracy to them.
Now this is all that I am saying that can be done with major human populations.
I’ve explained his already. For populations to qualify as a subspecies, all members of population (1) do not need to share some trait that some or all members of population (2) lack. (BTW could you quote the exact passage saying that in all instances “Gorilla gorilla berengei *canines are larger than those of the other two subspecies”.) I’ve cited Colin Groves and numerous others on this point:
Why the fuck do you think that there’s a 75% rule?
And as I have pointed out, variance in the traits does not need to be greater between than within populations. Since we are looking at “multiple, independent, genetically based traits,” and since the traits are consistent in the sense that they are correlated within populations, one can use multivariate analysis to separate populations and accurately assign members to their populations. This is exactly what phillips (2009) did. I quoted Pilbrow (2007) to this effect:
I’ve pointed to craniometric, dental, and caniofacial difference. If you throw enough variables into a canonical discriminant analysis, you can discriminate human populations and assign members reasonably accurately to them (>75%). See for example, page 66, in “Modern variation and evolutionary change in the hominin eye orbit.” Small mean differences which are correlated within populations allows for this.
I already provided the cites. The same can be done for genes. And I already provided examples of this being done for nonhuman populations.
I won’t even discuss this point unless we agree on the others, about which I seem to be obviously correct. (If “unique geographical range” precluded the overlapping of ranges it would preclude hybridization; and this isn’t by the definition).
Can you provide cites? I’m going by clustering diagrams which show the relative genetic differences. Maps differ, sometimes, for some population depending on the genes sampled and for a definitive answer to the ‘who goes where’ question we would have to look at analyses using whole genomes. I’ve come across this same problem in the non-human literature, though I will have to dig for that citation.
