You just haven’t been paying attention, then. The attacks that are continuing are coming from people who are extremely well armed. They’re not a bunch of malcontents with old rifles. An SA-7 anti-aircraft missile was fired at a U.S. plane.
Got that? Two tons of C-4, and 11,000 RPG’s. You stll think this is a ragtag band of loyalists and malcontents?
It seems to me that what we’re seeing is either Saddam’s actual war plan, or at least a contingency plan. Caches were hidden throughout the country, and the Fedayeen and Republican Guard was trained in squad-level guerrilla tactics and given order that, come an invasion, they should fade into the woodwork and begin sabotaging reconstruction efforts and harrassing the occupation forces with the intent of breaking the will of the American people and having them leave the country. I don’t know if there is active central control, or whether each guerrilla cell is operating from pre-written orders or just improvising. But clearly, they have the resources of the former Iraqi government behind them. These are hard-core types.
The Fedayeen have a sword tattoo on the back of their hands - they are marked men. They probably can’t survive in Iraq - they’ll be arrested and killed if they’re found. They can’t fade back into the population. There are thousands of these monsters still in Iraq, and they have nothing to lose. I think this is what makes up the core of the guerrilla war.
Sorry, Beagle; I didn’t see your post when I replied. I didn’t mean to ignore you.
Don’t get me wrong; I think it’s an entirely good thing that 'Uday and Qusay are dead. I hope that it makes things easier for the CPA and associated military forces in Iraq, though I’m not sure I want to bet on this one way or the other just yet (I already talk far too much about things I know far too little about). I do think it’s important that we not overstate the importance of 'Uday and Qusay, however: while they were important, and evil, I believe that their deaths alone neither justify the war nor win it. We musn’t lose sight of those things (NBC weapons, the state of Islamist extremism, and the reconstruction of postwar Iraq) that can really have such an effect.
I also agree that it is good that a regime as evil as Saddam’s is gone, though I respectfully disagree that uprooting unsavory governments is a good reason to go to war. That, however, is something that reasonable people can disagree on, and an argument for another thread. In the meantime, sorry I missed your reply.
How can we be sure that the two will not be portrayed as martyrs, and that the Baath regime is beind the anti-troops attacks, as opposed to a resurgent muhadeen?
I, for one, will certainly admit that the deaths of Uday and Qusay will certainly boost morale of both the U.S. military and the Iraqi populace.
I am however very interested in finding out the particulars of their deaths. As I predicted after that incident at the Syrian border, they didn’t survive the apprehension process. No doubt when and if Saddam himself is found, he will also be dead.
Had they survived, had they been arrested, what would have happened next?
This kind of simplistic khayali crap is what has gotten Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz in trouble.
The power is from multiple sources.
Yes, fear is one.
Blood ties is another, as important.
Ethnicity or socio-religious power ties (Sunni Arab, Sunni Turcoman, Arab Xians all in groups, stand to lose in the new order) are of enormous importance, above all in this type of society.
Arab and Iraqi nationalism, be it in Baath form or not, is yet another.
Resentment of foreigners, tied to nationalism and clannishness is yet another.
Perhaps, perhaps not.
Equally I might hypothesize that removal of the Sadaam component might eventually allow a broadening of opposition to the US, e.g. the Shiites seem to be siting this out despite widespread expressions of dislike for the US. I might hypothesize the Sadaam Hussien clan angle helps keep them on the sidelines. Remove it, and you may have a whole new world of problems.
Assertions.
Very clearly something has survived direct body blows to the “personality cult” and I am going to advise all that the personality cult issue is rather badly misunderstood in this Arab context.
Of course, you can all go on soaking up the Rummy and Wolfie show agit prop that gets regurgitated here. It’s been so bloody accurate so far.
Appeal to an authority that has shown itself rather incompetent in dealing with this culture and similar cultures. Non argument.
In the end this is an important propaganda ‘victory’ but not something to be blow out of proportion as to be frank, even the best informed are not clear as to the real character of this guerilla war. Drawing overblown conclusions is not warrented.
Third or fourth such incident Sam, although first time reported in the Media. Review my postings where I hit on this much earlier from the international sec. coordination clearing house.
As to being extremely well armed, I would not count RPGs as being “extremly” - however some sub component does seem to have access and skill in explosives, and I’ll go for that.
Malcontents, patriots, tribal blood fued and Baathists are probably all part of the mix.
I agree on this.
Well they trained in irregular warfare, the ‘fedayeen’ so that would not be new. I doubt it was a day one plan, but probably a fall back in the last days, or perhaps immediate post 9 April period.
Some probably are. Are all? I don’t believe there is information to make categorical statements with at present.
Where do you get this information from? I see a presumption of isolation, I am not sure that is a supportable presumption. It may be true, it may not be.
In the same manner I would take the quotes from rj above with a grain of salt. It is not clear to me that this is not posturing by the interviewees.
I have a question for you to speculate on regarding the inherent Catch-22 which it seems to me to be attached to being the successful informant on these matters.
Obviously, it’s in the US interests to be seen to be making good on their debts. They’ll no doubt make a bit of PR matter out of handing over the $15 million US Dollar bounty.
But how long do you think the “lucky bastard” is really gonna live? I mean, for crying out loud, there are gonna be some really, REALLY pissed off people about this - and the informant is gonna be seen in THEIR eyes as “Vengeance Target Number One” in the entire country. As far they’re concerned, the informant is a rat, and rats die.
Is it not likely that the US is painting a cross-hair on the informant, and any future informants? Even if efforts are made to protect anonymity, the sudden appearance of $15 million dollars of buying power in a fairly impoverished nation is gonna stand out at the neighbourhood level - surely?
I don’t know. It depends on the context. If they publicize the informants at this stage, it might be a death warrent. If not…that is if we do not publicize, I am not sure what the down side is.
The real PR part is the killing (presuming this stays confirmed, I recall the Syrian fiasco) of Sadaam’s sons. I suspect short term impact will not be that great. Killing Sadaam, on the other hand, might very well be.
Again, a lot depends on the character of the resistance (which I suspect to be multiple) and the evolution in context of other efforts. Despite the obsession with the guerilla war aspect, what concerns me most about these efforts is the near silence in re the funding of reconstruction. There is none, for practical purposes, and I don’t see any success without some substantial efforts.
In essence, if one does not address the real complaints of the population, beheading the resistance will only delay the problem -every colonial entity which ever fought one of these modern wars has found this.
Economics is the key, security is only a (albiet important) tool.
I take your point (regarding the possible dilemma the US faced once their location was established) however, ‘Under House Arrest’ (or similar) doesn’t read so well in the US morning papers as does ‘Saddam’s sons dead’, nor does it give a, now, absolutely vital fillip to the morale of US ground forces in the region
London_Calling, it is possible that they were simply assassinated. However, the BBC report of the incident is that fewer than a dozen soldiers were sent to the house and that they actually asked to inspect it, at which point they were fired upon. They retreated and waited for a platoon-strength reinforcement to arrive, then entered the house. When fired upon from the structurally reinforced second story, they retreated again to await a gunship rocket attack.
Had this been a deliberate assassination, I suspect that sending in Rangers or some other team before daylight might have been a more efficient use of resources than using grunts from the 101st. (With no disrespect to the 101st, they do not make good assassins.)
So how come no real effort is being made to actually capture and try these people? Even given the possibility that perhaps fire was returned I seem to recall the last attempt they made on a convoy envolved destroying it rather than attemptting to capture the boys.
I just heard a quote on the radio by an officer (Sanchez?) saying (roughly) “Once we capture and kill Sadam…”
So is there no pretence that he is to be tried? I mean I know he and his sons are vile pieces of work but even the Nazis were given a trial.
I have also wondered why 200 soldiers and helicopters had to blast the house the 4 were hiding in, instead of just incapacitating the occupants with gas or flashbangs or negotiating with them.
Surely if they were that high up the ladder they’d be of good use, interrogation could reveal where Saddam is or even where the WMD stockpiles are.
Apparently, the US soldiers didn’t know Saddam’s spawn were inside the house until afterward.
I really wouldn’t want to play Monday-morning quarterback to guys who are risking their lives on the ground. They judged that “incapaciating the occupants with gas or flashbangs” would be unnecessarily risky. They made the call, there’s no reason to doubt them, and that settles it.
I don’t think Uday and Qusay would allow themselves to be taken alive. Based on their family history, I would guess that they would much rather die in a firefight with US troops than be tried by the Iraqis, or—worst of all—be seen as informers by Saddam. Throw in martyrdom, and it’s easy to understand.
Apparently, you’re wrong. News reports have been unanimous that the military was tipped off ahead of time that the Hussein Boys were in the house. E.g.,the current story on CNN, which notes:
See also this summary of Gen. Sanchez’s briefing on the operation.
If they knew why didn’t they wait them out a la Noriega?
I mean 4 guys armed with AK47s could have been surrounded and seiged out of the place. The troops could have been brought out of effective range kept up surviellence, lights and rock music until the 4 either surrendered or commited suicide. Either way no one put at risk and they could claim to have tried to gain th vital intellegence these guys had plus the human rights violations trial.