In what ways does "the cancer of McGovernism" still infect the Democratic Party?

[RTFirefly]

In this post in the “Opposition to the war could cost the Democratic Party” thread, Mr. Moto says:

I don’t for one second want a Democratic party that is like the Republicans. I would like one that is like the Democrats used to be, before the cancer of McGovernism infected the party.

Rather than hijack that thread, I thought it was worth a new thread to ask whether the Dems are still infected with “the cancer of McGovernism,” or whether they have pretty much moved beyond that?

While it’s up to those who speak of such a cancer to define it, I’d do so in two ways, pending Mr. Moto’s joining the discussion and doing so himself. Domestically, the fallout of the McGovern campaign was a place at the table for far too many interest groups - the ‘Save the Left-Handed Gay Whales’ contingent - who would often put their parochial interests ahead of the party’s. I would contend that this era in Democratic history effectively ended with Bill Clinton’s “Sister Souljah” moment in 1992. (Though this hasn’t stopped the DLC crowd for looking for such moments in the absence of any Sister Souljahs of any consequence.)

If either party has the need for a Sister Souljah moment anymore, it would of course be the GOP, the party of creationists, global warming deniers, Japanese-American internment justifiers, and similar cranks.

The other way would be a leftist isolationism, but I don’t see that that ever affected the party’s mainstream. Carter and Clinton both actively engaged the larger world in their presidencies. The main difference internationally between the two parties nowadays is the GOP’s much greater willingness to use our military to pick fights just for the sheer hell of it - not even as a first resort rather than a last resort, but in the plain absence of necessity.

Whether or not that’s the residue of McGovern, it hardly matters: it’s a Good Thing, and it sucks that our Executive Branch is still run by The Party That’s Had A Few Too Many And Wants To Punch Somebody Out.

Anyway, Mr. Moto (and other conservatives, and others of the “I didn’t leave the Dems, they left me” school), feel free to paint an alternative picture of the effects of McGovernism on the Dems, and how that ‘infects’ us still. Ball’s in your court.

[Frank]

In the context of the thread, I believe Mr. Moto was referring to McGovern’s strong stance against the VietNam war, and his desire to cut military spending. These, by some, were (and are) viewed as anti-military and soft on defense.

McGovern was, of course, a bomber pilot in WWII who won the Distinguished Flying Cross while Nixon played poker in the supply corps. Funny how history repeats itself.

[DanBlather]

@Frank

In the context of the thread, I believe Mr. Moto was referring to McGovern’s strong stance against the VietNam war, and his desire to cut military spending. These, by some, were (and are) viewed as anti-military and soft on defense.

McGovern was, of course, a bomber pilot in WWII who won the Distinguished Flying Cross while Nixon played poker in the supply corps. Funny how history repeats itself.

And of course we know that Nixon and the other conservative were right. The collapse of South Vietnam led to the invasion of the US by Vietnamese eager to spread their evil Pho and salad rolls.

[Mr.Moto]

Well, this is easy. We just need to look at history.

In 1972, the McGovern campaign and many congressional Democrats called for an immediate withdrawal of all troops from Vietnam, and also called for reduced military spending. The results of this were many.

Even though McGovern lost, this view quickly became Democratic party orthodoxy. It manifested in many forms, from the complete withdrawal of all military aid from the South Vietnamese government by a Democratic congress to the cancellation, delay, or scaling back of many military weapons and other systems. By the end of the 1970s, the military was quite hollowed out, and Democratic policy was a prime culprit.

Another problem was a withdrawal of Democrats, especially liberal minded ones, from the active duty ranks of the military. Even more worrisome than this was their disappearance from military policy studies of both the civilian and military variants. This led to a shortage of genuine Democratic military policy experts to serve Democratic administrations and legislators.

Now, I’m not sure the degree McGovern was a cause of this, or merely himself a symptom of a party that had gone off the tracks and had started to be run by a generation radicalized by Vietnam, rather than steadier hands whose experiences had been formed by other eras. Regardless, as his party’s nominee in 1972, he was clearly a different figure than Humphrey, Johnson, Kennedy, Stevenson, or Truman. And for defense policy, Democrats who came after McGovern were closer to him on defense matters than, say, Kennedy, who had gotten elected in 1960 in part by promising to address a “missile gap”.

Thus, McGovern can be used as shorthand here, for Democratic weakness on defense policy. And that is the cancer I referred to.

[DanBlather]

@Mr. Moto

Well, this is easy. We just need to look at history.

In 1972, the McGovern campaign and many congressional Democrats called for an immediate withdrawal of all troops from Vietnam, and also called for reduced military spending. The results of this were many.

Even though McGovern lost, this view quickly became Democratic party orthodoxy. It manifested in many forms, from the complete withdrawal of all military aid from the South Vietnamese government by a Democratic congress to the cancellation, delay, or scaling back of many military weapons and other systems. By the end of the 1970s, the military was quite hollowed out, and Democratic policy was a prime culprit.

Another problem was a withdrawal of Democrats, especially liberal minded ones, from the active duty ranks of the military. Even more worrisome than this was their disappearance from military policy studies of both the civilian and military variants. This led to a shortage of genuine Democratic military policy experts to serve Democratic administrations and legislators.

Now, I’m not sure the degree McGovern was a cause of this, or merely himself a symptom of a party that had gone off the tracks and had started to be run by a generation radicalized by Vietnam, rather than steadier hands whose experiences had been formed by other eras. Regardless, as his party’s nominee in 1972, he was clearly a different figure than Humphrey, Johnson, Kennedy, Stevenson, or Truman. And for defense policy, Democrats who came after McGovern were closer to him on defense matters than, say, Kennedy, who had gotten elected in 1960 in part by promising to address a “missile gap”.

Thus, McGovern can be used as shorthand here, for Democratic weakness on defense policy. And that is the cancer I referred to.

What bizzare reasoning. The Vietnam war was a waste of money, lives, and prestige for the US. The Democratic party was right to vote to end it. The reason that the Republicans won so many elections was their embrace of the “southern strategy” where they exploited the uneasy marriage of northern labor unions and liberals and the southern hatred of the Republicans dating back to the civil war and reconstructon. There was no cancer of the Democratic Party, but there was a cynical malignancy that comes from the Republican deal with the devil that persists to today, You can enact as much anti-working class, pro-military industrial complex legislation as you want as long as you make people believe you will keep n*ggers and fags in their place.

Eisenhower must be rolling over in his grave watching the chicken-hawks in charge of the Republican party cosying up to military contactors.

[RTFirefly]

@Mr. Moto

Thus, McGovern can be used as shorthand here, for Democratic weakness on defense policy. And that is the cancer I referred to.

Ah, shorthand. No actual, well, linkage.

Seems to me I could just as easily argue that Nixon’s corruption still infects the GOP.

[Mr.Moto]

I refer you to my answer above.

If we refer to McGovern only, he really wasn’t that important. He was a three term senator who himself lost reelection in 1980. And of course, in the 1972 presidential election, he carried only one state.

The movement that made such a marginal figure a presidential candidate, though, is significant. It has been called the McGovernite wing of the Democratic party by others, and I find this to be a useful nomenclature. And again, like I said before, it has to be distinguished from liberalism, especially that more robust and pro-defense liberalism such as that which dominated the Democratic party prior to 1970.

And it is quite clear that that new approach to military policy by Democrats had results. Do you deny that the military was in awful shape by the late 1970s? And do you deny that decisions made by Democratic congresses and the Carter Administration had much to do with this?

[BobLibDem]

At times it is appropriate to make cuts in defense. Did you quibble with George HW Bush in 1992?

The Secretary of Defense recommended these cuts after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And I make them with confidence. But do not misunderstand me. The reductions I have approved will save us an additional $50 billion over the next 5 years. By 1997, we will have cut defense by 30 percent since I took office.

I agreed with Bush I that the cuts in defense were a good idea. But why do Republicans get a pass on cutting defense?

[Mr.Moto]

Because 1992 was an appropriate time to cut defense. 1972 probably wasn’t. Context matters quite a lot here.

And as it turns out, the 1992 cuts likely went far too deep, especially given the state of defense expenditures since 1992. I believe it is now well past time again for another period of serious investment in the military.

[BobLibDem]

Why wasn’t 1972 a good time to cut defense? We were winding down the war. As Kissinger said, “Peace is at hand”.

[jayjay]

@DanBlather

Eisenhower must be rolling over in his grave watching the chicken-hawks in charge of the Republican party cosying up to military contactors.

In some cases, being so cozy that they’re the same person!

[Mr.Moto]

@BobLibDem

Why wasn’t 1972 a good time to cut defense? We were winding down the war. As Kissinger said, “Peace is at hand”.

While the Vietnam War might have been winding down, the Cold War certainly wasn’t.

Again, I ask a question most of you haven’t chosen to answer - was the state of military readiness in the late 1970s justifiable? If that state was too low, to whom does that blame belong?

[Frank]

@Mr. Moto

While the Vietnam War might have been winding down, the Cold War certainly wasn’t.

So what was wrong with cutting the costs related to the war?

Again, I ask a question most of you haven’t chosen to answer - was the state of military readiness in the late 1970s justifiable? If that state was too low, to whom does that blame belong?

You haven’t demonstrated that the state of military readiness was bad, except by assertion. I certainly don’t remember the Soviets conquering us, at any rate.

Supporting the military does not equal kowtowing to every military request for money that comes down the pike. You seem to believe that anyone who seeks to reasonably limit the expense of our military-industrial complex is by definition anti-military and soft on defense. That’s simplistic.

[crowmanyclouds]

@Mr. Moto

…If that state was too low, to whom does that blame belong?

How 'bout the guys in the pentagon who decided the military needs football teams and marching bands more than spare parts and bullets?

CMC fnord!

[According_to_Pliny]

I think there’s needs to be a lot more of George McGovern in the campaign.
Populism is popular. All those red states are full of common men to be championed.

[BobLibDem]

@Mr. Moto

Again, I ask a question most of you haven’t chosen to answer - was the state of military readiness in the late 1970s justifiable? If that state was too low, to whom does that blame belong?

If the performance measure is stopping invading armies then I’d have to conclude by the lack of successful invasions that the military readiness was adequate. Precisely what military threat did the US fail to meet in the 1970s?

[Mr.Moto]

Obviously, military readiness can’t be measured by the lack of an invasion. However, it can be measured.

Trends in Selected Indicators of Military Readiness, 1980 through 1993 from the Congressional Budget Office.

In 1980, General Edward C. Meyer, then Army Chief of Staff; used the term hollow army in Congressional testimony to describe the imbalance that existed at that time between the number of Army divisions and the number of combat personnel available to fill those divisions. Soon after his testimony, the term hollow force was being widely used to characterize not only the shortages of
experienced personnel but also the shortages of training, weapons, and
equipment that undermined military readiness during the mid- and late 1970s.
Today, much of what is known about the hollow force of that period is based
on anecdotal evidence. Press reports written in 1980, after the military’s
failed effort to rescue U.S. citizens held hostage in Iran, sometimes
sensationalized the impact of readiness problems on U.S. military capabilities.
Nonetheless, there is persuasive evidence that many units were not well
prepared to fight.

In 1980, according to reports published at the time, less than 40
percent of all divisions, air squadrons, and ships were rated by their own commanders as fully or substantially combat ready. (The remainder were
rated as marginally combat ready or not combat ready.) The problem was
even more severe in some of the reserve components: in 1977,43 percent of
Army National Guard and 54 percent of Army Reserve units were rated as
not combat ready.

Personnel problems played a major role. DoD instituted the All-
Volunteer Force in 1973 on the premise that military pay would be
competitive with pay in the private sector. Yet by the late 1970s, military
compensation was not adequate to attract and retain high-quality personnel.
As the quality of new recruits declined, discipline, morale, and training
suffered. In addition, low retention rates among noncommissioned officers
(NCOs) led to shortages of experienced personnel, particularly among NCOs
with technical skills that could be used in the private sector. The Navy
suffered from a reported shortage of 20,000 petty officers. The impact of such
shortages on readiness was publicly, and perhaps intentionally, highlighted in
1980 when the commander of the U.S.S. Canisteo, a Navy supply ship,
reported that he was unable to deploy because of a lack of experienced
personnel in the engine room.

These personnel problems were aggravated by shortages of fuel, spare
parts, and ammunition that restricted training opportunities. Without
sufficient skilled maintenance personnel and spare parts, the ability of even
the most modern ships and aircraft to perform their missions was reduced.
In 1980, the Air Force’s First Tactical Fighter Wing, with 66 F-15 fighters,
failed a mobilization test; because of a shortage of parts, only 23 of the
aircraft were capable of performing their mission.

How did these problems develop? Between 1969 and 1975, public
disillusionment with the nation’s role in Vietnam encouraged rapid reductions
in defense spending. Expenditures on national defense, adjusted for inflation,
fell by 31 percent. Limited budgets, together with rising oil prices and
increased personnel costs resulting from the elimination of the draft, meant
that the acquisition of modern weapons by the military, which had been delayed by the Vietnam War, was delayed still further. Thus, when the
defense budget did start to rise slowly between 1976 and 1981, DoD
emphasized the procurement of new weapon systems. According to General
John Chain, Director of Air Force Operations and Readiness in 1980, “Our
aircraft at the end of the Vietnam War were tired and were facing a new
generation of Soviet equipment We had a choice: We could have either
bought a new airplane or we could have bought spare parts for our old ones.
We couldn’t buy both.”

In the eyes of some critics, the decision to emphasize modernization
over readiness was an error in judgment that left existing units unable to
operate. Yet the underlying problem, as General Chain’s comment suggests,
may have been an imbalance between defense resources and national security
commitments that made it impossible for DoD to buy both readiness and
modernization.

Bolding is mine.

[Sevastopol]

@Mr. Moto

Obviously, military readiness can’t be measured by the lack of an invasion. …

That is not obvious at all.

How better to measure the effectiveness of a defence force?

[BobLibDem]

So if I understand this right:

1. Military spending from 1969-1975 under presidents Nixon and Ford decreased by 30%.

2. The GAO report cited stated that defense spending rose slowly from 1976 to 1981 under President Carter.

3. George HW Bush proposed 30% reduction in defense spending in 1992.

My conclusion is that Republican presidents are weak on defense, except for the madcap spending of Ronald Reagan

[Mr.Moto]

By the metrics mentioned in my link, obviously, keeping in mind that our military isn’t a strictly local defensive force, as it is needed for treaty commitments and the projection of power and protection of our interests on a global scale.