Iraq: given Middle East history, how likely is the U.S. to screw up?

Given how little most Americans apparently know about world history, especially anything outside of the U.S. or Western Europe, and given the U.S. record in trying to effect regime change, either directly or behind the scenes, in other areas of the world with more familiar social structures, I’m not so optimistic. Please convince me why I should be…

[warning, the article is long, but IMO worth it]

“The Wall Street Journal on ‘Desert Quicksand’: Past Mideast Invasions Faced Unexpected Perils”

By HUGH POPE and PETER WALDMAN
Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

As President Bush steers the U.S. toward war, history offers a sobering lesson.

For two centuries, foreign powers have been conquering Mideast lands for their own purposes, promising to uplift Arab societies along the way. Sometimes they have modernized cities, taught new ideas and brought technologies.

But in nearly every incursion, both sides have endured a raft of unintended consequences. From Napoleon’s drive into Egypt through Britain’s rule of Iraq in the 1920s to Israel’s march into Lebanon in 1982, Middle East nations have tempted conquerors only to send them reeling.

Little wonder that even many Arabs who revile Saddam Hussein view the prospect of a U.S.-led invasion of Iraq with trepidation. “Unless the Americans are far more subtle than they’ve ever had the capacity to be, and more subtle than the [colonial] British, it’s going to end in tears,” predicts Faisal Istrabadi, an Iraqi- born lawyer in Michigan who has worked with the State Department on plans to rebuild Iraq’s judiciary. “The honeymoon will be very brief.”

Again and again, Westerners have moved into the Mideast with confidence that they can impose freedom and modernity through military force. Along the way they have miscalculated support for their invasions, both internationally and in the lands they occupy. They have anointed cooperative minorities to help rule resentful majorities. They have been mired in occupations that last long after local support has vanished. They have met with bloody uprisings and put them down with brute force.

[really big snip with lots of historical examples]

“The idea that you can change the Middle East with guns and bayonets is wrong,” says Bob Dillon, U.S. ambassador to Beirut at the time [during the Suez crisis].

Some in Israel worry U.S. leaders may harbor the same illusions in Iraq that Israel brought with it to Lebanon. If the Americans conquer Baghdad, says reserve Col. Meir Pial, author of a dozen military histories, “they’ll have to sponsor a new government. It will be
seen by the people as a government cooperating with the conqueror, so it will need support.” He predicts that “the longer the Americans stay, the deeper they will find themselves in the mud.”

Bush administration officials acknowledge the minefield they’re facing but express confidence the U.S., with its record of democratizing defeated tyrannies in Germany and Japan, can succeed in Iraq. In particular, the administration believes it will avoid past pitfalls by
mounting a devastating military strike and following it quickly with billions of dollars in reconstruction and humanitarian aid, according to a Bush official. U.S. officials are also optimistic that Iraq, with its deep-rooted educational and civil-service systems, its history of secularism, its utter exhaustion after three decades of totalitarianism – and its oil wealth – is exceptionally ready to leapfrog forward.

“Iraq’s a sophisticated society,” Mr. Bush said on March 6. “Iraq’s got money … . Iraq will serve as a catalyst for change, positive change.”

I’d say the chances are about one in . . . one.

I think the chances of Bush accomplishing the vision that has been laid out to be close to zero. The chance for catastrophe is too high.

I can only hope that my assessment is sorely lacking, and that the US knows what it is doing. History certainly doesn’t support them, though.

Even if we appear to succeed and get out within two or three years, I suspect we will be back when the “new republic” balkanizes. While maintaining the integrity of a unified Iraq is noble, the difficulties will be enormous.

Given this Administration’s disastrous handling of the Middle East so far the prospects aren’t good.

I’m moderately optimistic. First of all, it should be easy to wind up with an improvement on the current regime.

Second, the Iraqis have suffered under such a terrible regime that they may be particularly focused on avoiding anything similar.

Third, the world is a smaller place. We’re all connected. E.g., here’s a blog written by an Iraqi. Iraqi citizens are more aware than ever before what kind of life we in the West enjoy. Once they get Baywatch, there’s no turning back! :cool:

I’m somewhat pessemistic, feeling that the US has already screwed up in a huge way by mounting an invasion in the first place. Our adminstration seems to have gone back to the notion of ‘manifest destiny’, and furthermore assumed, like the British in the early 20th century, that we are dealing with unsophisticated tribesmen who can be subdued with a few strokes of the lash and easily distracted with presents of free water and food.

Given an apparent lack of clearly uncorrupt, popular alternatives to the Ba’athists, I find it hard to believe that any postwar government will be percieved, within or outside of Iraq, as anything other than an imposed puppet of the US.

Given a likely fairly quick US victory (although maintaining a years-long occupation without taking losses through periodic terrorist actions is something else again), I see the administration tempted to sort out Iran before they become a nuclear power as well.

The current administration certainly seems to be quite accepting of an antagonistic relationship with the majority of the countries of the world on this and other issues. While the long-term results of this stance are difficult to determine, I really can’t see an overall benefit to us.

Finally, I have yet to see a convincing explanation of how the horrendous cost of this adventure (the minimum falling somewhere between $75 and $200 billion) will provide a tangible improvement to our security, domestically or for our forces in the region.