The Defeat of Political Islam Many analysts who follow Egyptian politics have repeatedly stated that the Muslim Brotherhood, a very well-organized political faction that hijacked the revolution in Egypt, would be dominant for years to come due to the weakness of the opposition and liberal forces.
To strengthen their argument, these analysts pointed at the Brotherhood’s strong organization, resolve, and political acumen. Moreover, President Morsi’s firing of the top brass of the Egyptian army in August 2012, following an attack by jihadists in Sinai who killed 16 Egyptian soldiers, and the eclipse of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) which had ruled de facto since the resignation of President Mubarak, convinced many that the old concept of Egypt being a military society ruled by a junta of officers belonged to the past. It was believed that the army had lost its resolve to fight the Muslim Brotherhood as long as its interests – mainly economic – were protected. Events proved this analysis wrong: The Muslim Brotherhood lost its power because it did not correctly assess the opposition, because it was eager to dominate all key positions in the state, and because it did not foresee the possible coalition between the liberals and the army.
The Brotherhood’s loss is definitely a gain for those struggling against jihadist and Brotherhood-inspired groups in the Arab world, sending a message that political Islam can be subdued by moderate and liberal forces.
Underestimating the Liberal Current in the Anti-Muslim Brotherhood Movement
There is a misconception about Egyptian domestic reality that is anchored in superficial knowledge of the forces within the Egyptian body politic. Since there is no real way to take the pulse of the “street,” most information, including polls on domestic opinion in Egypt, comes from biased sources that do not reflect the situation on the ground. As a result, many analysts fell into the trap of the Brotherhood’s propaganda and underestimated the strength of the opposition. They concluded that there was no way the opposition could overcome the Brotherhood’s apparatus.
In fact, a look at the results of the presidential elections indicates that 49 percent of the voters opposed the Muslim Brotherhood. Some even claimed that Morsi lost the elections, and that SCAF, manipulated by the U.S., conceded victory to Morsi in order to avoid bloodshed.
In any case, since the beginning of his presidency, one could see that the Brotherhood’s efforts to change Egypt into an Islamocracy were met by opposition that became more vociferous and emboldened by the day. Years of Mubarak’s dictatorship were not to be replaced by a Muslim Brotherhood dictatorship.
Unwillingly, Morsi had to call on the army to restore law and order, and as events unfolded, especially after January 2013 when cities along the Suez Canal declared a revolt and announced their autonomy, Morsi became more dependent on the same army he had wanted to confine to the barracks.
It was Morsi’s mistakes that brought the army and liberal forces together, a development he could not have foreseen. When Morsi realized that the army had sided completely with the opposition, he tried a last-minute maneuver to replace the Defense Minister and Commander of the Egyptian Army, Gen. Abdul Fattah al-Sisi.
But Gen. Sisi had taken the initiative first, and instead of being sacked like his predecessor, Field Marshall Tantawi, he was the one who announced to Morsi that he was no longer president.
This reflected the Brotherhood’s shortcomings in their political analysis of the domestic reality in Egypt. Vulnerability of Regimes Facing Mass Protest Events in Egypt have illustrated once more the strength of mass protests.
Most of the regimes in the region cannot withstand the shock of mass protests, and the use of live ammunition against such protests can only worsen the situation. Both in Egypt and Tunisia, regimes fell because of mass protest, and because the army chose not to take part in the protest and open fire.
**The situation in Egypt that brought the end of Morsi’s presidency was an unwritten alliance between the army and the mass protest movement. **
In such an eventuality, the regimes stand no chance to survive.
Again,** the role of the army in politics is primary: It has always been the main factor that will maintain regimes in the Middle East, and it will remain so in the near future.**
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The new reality is that the Middle East is not homogenous and the interests of all the various groups must be considered.