This quote indicates to me that you think I’m arguing the ideas:
Idea 1. Increased murders of adults as a result of artificially decreased child abuse is a reasonable consequence.
Idea 2. This makes stopping child abuse do more harm than good.
Idea 3. Grim Beaker is against child abuse
Regarding Idea 1.
I don’t think that it’s a reasonable consequence. In fact I find it highly unlikely. What I am saying is what if it did happen directly because of the artificial force field.
Regarding Idea 2.
The implementatin of the force field would be a bad idea if and only if it was the cause of a greater number of murders than previously.
Regarding Idea 3.
You, I, and everyone else all live in an exceedingly complex universe. I find no contradiction in my personal belief that…
Child abuse is to be condemned in all of it’s forms. And…
Changing the development of the primate family (of which Homo Sapien is one product) is a very dangerous, uncertain thing with an unknowable outcome. It is especially so without omniscience. See below…
I think it matters a great deal. Let’s say that events happened as follows…
Universe created by God via Big-Bang-mail-order-package.
Earth eventually becomes habitable
Evolution begins with very basic life forms
Few kajillion years pass
Early primates start to develop
And then…
When does God implement the force field? In this scenario, there is no distinctive point in history when BLAM Homo Sapien appears. Evolution is an ongoing process.
If the force field starts before Homo Sapien appears (i.e. an ancestor of the species) does starting at a more primitive level stunt the development of the species intended to eventually be human?
Or, let’s say that it was “little by little” as you suggest. How does this affect the development of our species? Does it hinder it? Help it?
What would happen to the development of a current day mammalian species (other than human) that was hierarchical in nature if we instituted some artificial protection mechanisms on their young?
Well, if even you think it’s terribly unlikely, how is it a good argument?
No, you have to show that it is reasonably to be expected that the badness of the increased adult murders outweighs the reduction in child abuse and child murders. Otherwise it is not an effective argument.
I do see some sort of contradiction there; you are arguing that child abuse is to be condemned, but that reducing it greatly is so iffy that it should not be reasonably considered. And then you jump on my case for asking if this means we shouldn’t try to reduce child abuse!
Do you have a reasonable argument as to why not being allowed to abuse children would stunt our species growth? Besides, I have a terribly easy way out–I can say that the forcefield springs into being as of today. Forcefieldworld would still appear better than our current world. So I think your pursuing this line of argument is fruitless.
Well, what dire consequences do you forsee if, say, monkeys could not abuse their offspring? You know, simply saying “what would happen?” is not an argument. If you do not wish to take whole-hearted unqualified refuge in “mysterious ways”, you need to have reasonably expected consequences that are detrimental enough to make Forcefieldsworld worse that our current world.
Goodness, must we be paralyzed with indecision about what “might” happen if we had an effective way to reduce child abuse? I think you are being unduly overcautious; we don’t know the full consequences of curing AIDS, either, but I doubt you’d argue that we shouldn’t therefore cure it. We can forsee reasonable consequences and work from that, we do not have to flail about impotently because we do not know precisely what will happen.
Don’t you think there is a fundamental difference between
A. Working as people with limited physical capabilities in a complex system we don’t fully understand to reduce apparent evil as much as possible. (i.e. My position of condemning child abuse and doing what I can to reduce it)
And…
B. Suggesting a change in the development of primates at the beginning of said complex system which might preclude the development of Homo Sapiens at all. (My position that we don’t have anywhere near the knowledge required to say what the result of implementing force fields millions of years ago would be)
Hierarchical animals, such as primates, often establish dominance through violent acts and gestures. This helps to ensure that the most healthy, strong, aggressive etc. pass their genetic material along. If the alpha male of the group can’t physically dominate all of the other monkeys, including the young and adolescent how does that affect the rate at which the most “successful” survival characteristics are passed on?
Two last questions…
So force fields turned on today would have no impact on our free will in your opinion?
If you had the capability to irrevocably turn on the process of “little by little” force fields millions of years ago during primate development you would do so?
Oh, so the ancient primates shouldn’t have tried to reduce child abuse, but we should, is that it? <grin> Look, God is bloody omnipotent, right–the only way the forcefields could prevent human evolution if God wanted it to happen is if it was logically impossible for him to do so, and I just don’t see that. Heck, you were having God instantly multiply the size of the planet and change its orbit every time the population increased, I don’t think a few tweaks of evolution are unreasonable for the Big Guy. Besides, you’re simply once again asking “what if” rather than arguing that development of primates prevented in any small degree from abuse likely would prevent human evolution–you need to argue why it would, not just say that it’s complex. Heck, I could argue that if primates were not allowed to abuse their offspring, their offspring would be smarter and healthier and human evolution would occur more rapidly. Abuse of children genuinely does not seem likely to improve a species’ health and well-being; genetically sound children will be killed or crippled by abusive parents, or they will reach adulthood with impairing psychological trauma leading them to an early death, poor child-raising abilities of their own or predilictions towards killing their own offspring (genetic death).
In addition, as I mentioned previously, all I have to do is make a possible-world better than our current one, which I could do by having the forcefields come into effect right this second. So your argument against possible effects on evolution have no place to stand on, since it’s not necessary to my world to have the forcefields around forever.
Oh, so we shouldn’t prevent child abuse, because it impairs evolution? 'Sides, he could dominate, he just couldn’t abuse. Remember, the forcefields can tell the difference between necessary discipline and abuse. (I don’t know why I’m still arguing this, since as noted, I don’t need the forcefields to have existed for all time.)
I don’t see any more impairment than we have right now because we cannot, say, curse people we don’t like with diseases, though we may like to. Obviously, God has decided that is OK to disallow. What impairment of free will do you see from being physically restrained from child abuse?
Hm, why the jump back in time? Why can’t I turn then on today, or six months ago? I think I would if I were God–remember, the forcefields as set up currently have a Omnipotent deity running them. If you could instantly move everyone to a world just like our own except it had the forcefields, set up and run by God, who was watching over them to make sure children were protected from abuse for the duration of their childhood–would you? If your only solid reason for objecting to the forcefields is because you think “if it were good, God would have done it,” you’re relying fully on “mysterious ways” and there’s no argument. But if you honestly think a world with the forcefields would be worse for some reason (like when you argued that God could create a world without evil, but it would be worse than what we have now because we would have no free will), you need to come up with arguments that show how it could reasonably expected to be worse–no free will, we’re all Barney clones, etc.
But you agree they would do good then, right? And so it would be better.
I don’t think it’s as easy as all that to switch from being a physical abuser to being a mental one. People who use violence are usually different from people who use emotional manipulation; I don’t think it’s reasonable to claim that what will invarably happen is that some guy goes to burn his toddler with a cigarette, sees he can’t so anything, and resolves to use emotional manipulation to make the child feel worthless for the rest of his/her life instead. The first few attempts at abuse would result in Child Servies being called in, anyhow (don’t forget the warning light), and they could counsel the parents or remove the child if necessary. That ought to at least do some good. Hell, if we assume that parents prevented from physically abusing will just start emotionally abusing and it’ll be just as bad/even worse, perhaps we should just give up on preventing physical abuse, hey? I don’t think so, and I don’t think you do either! 'Sides, I bet I can add a feature to my forcefield that sets off a warning light when emotional abuse is detected, and then the parents could get counselling. Sound OK to you?
I think Beak’s argument can be restated as follows.
Gaudere: Um, God, I don’t mean to be disrespectful or anything but don’t you think the world just might be a little better without child abuse?
G*d: Ah, but w/o evil, there’s no choice; without choice, there’s no free will.
Gaudere: [Proposes force field idea.]
G*d: Oy vey! Do you know how complicated creating the world is? Stars. Planets. Fibonacci Numbers. It’s really complex. All sorts of tradeoffs. I don’t want to talk about Universe v 3.0.
Gaudere: Ah, so you’re not omniscient/omnipotent then?
G*d: Force fields, never work. No way. No good.
By this time, we might conclude that G*d’s behavior is mysterious (eg why wouldn’t they work?) or perhaps she’s limited by tradeoffs (an admission of non-omnipotence). Or perhaps force fields might really be a bad idea after all, inferior to the status quo (although after reading the above exchange, I can’t see why).
grienspace: Let me add the Biblical line above that:
I can think of 2 interpretations of the above. Perhaps Peter is referring to JC’s imminent return to Earth and/or the upcoming political triumph of the Jesus movement.
Or Peter may be saying that Heaven is so incredibly blissful, and so incredibly prolonged, that the pains and tears of this lifetime, however vivid, intense, unjust and gratuitous they seem, pale in comparison to what lies beyond.
If I was God, I’d buy the patent for the forcefield, and have them installed everywhere. I’d throw big MegaGodbucks at you to improve it in subsequent years, and underwrite your R&D efforts to improve such loopholes as may crop up, be they physical, emotional, nutritional, or what have you.
I would say “fuck free will!” and leave “Mysterious Ways,” to U-2.
I would make liberal use of lightning bolts upon evildoers, in a proactive fashion, and send them straight to hell which I would remodel to resemble the DMV in Newark New Jersey. The damned would not burn or suffer any torture other than having to wait in line for surly and incompetant service people to process their lengthy bureacratic requests for a transfer to Heaven. Once they had truly repented and seen the error of their ways I would instantly whisk them to Heaven, which I would remodel to resemble a meadow by my aforementioned lake well stocked with booze, BBQ, Rock and Roll, and a nightly orgy. When you got bored with Heaven you could go back and live another life on earth or even as an E.T. on some other planet.
Unfortunately, I am not God. And, if he’s around, he’s not overtly answering my requests, suggestions, or even taking my calls.
So, if he is around, and he does care (and sometimes I really think he is and does, other times I’m sure he’s not and doesn’t,)it gives me some solace to think that there’s a damn fucking good reason why horrible unjust shit has to happen.
The alternative; that he is there, and there’s not a good reason, is unbearable.
So, given the existance of God, what’s the reason?
Paul, not Peter. Somehow, the vision of a political triumph of the Jesus movement is not my vision of the glory to be. The sons of God, an honoured group, are yet to be revealed, and when that happens, I expect to be surprised.
We all no doubt at one time or another have dreamed of Utopia, but I am certain of one thing. It will be nothing like I expect. It will be better. Both your interpretations would fit for me except equating the sons of God who I expect will be drawn from millenia with the jesus movement per se.But let me add the concept of universal salvation which you did not acknowledge in your interpretations. The sufferings of the present age are not to separate the damned and the saved, but to prepare us all for the glory to come.
“Mysterious ways” is the only good argument that I can see if you demand a wholly good, omnipotent God, I agree. But when I see it not left at “mysterious ways” alone and arguments advanced as to the putative benefits of child abuse, I tend to argue. Under normal circumstances, anyone trying to justify child abuse would be ripped apart, but bring God into the picture and suddenly child abuse has these wonderful benefits we don’t dare interefere with. Amazing that God can be held to a lower standard than we demand of our fellow humans; “mysterious ways” all you want, but I don’t like to see arguments for the preservation of child abuse advanced that are so weak (IMHO) that any person attempting to use them would be soundly trounced. We’d never allow a human to abuse a child and claim that it’s good because it means s/he won’t kill the child later on; why do we let God?
(I actually think “mysterious ways” looks a bit weak when even after lots of thought there doesn’t seem to be any conceivable good from permitting child abuse. However, MW can’t be disproven; all you can do is raise doubts that it really makes sense.)
That does seem to be what he is saying. However, I don’t think it is a good argument on Peter’s part. No matter how blissful things are later, shitty things are still shitty things. They may become less traumatic as time passes, but it isn’t erased if a lot of nice stuff happens later. Which would you prefer: brutal rape and miserable death and then an eternity of bliss, or a happy, normal life and then an eternity of bliss?
Scylla:
Why is the thought of a less-than-perfect God unbearable? I’m not scared of a neutral deist God, or even an evil one. Hell, the fundie God is going to roast me and mine for all eternity, yet I’m still perfectly capable of imagining he exists and drawing logical conclusions from what it would mean to the world if this were so. The thought of a less than perfectly good God is so scary you can’t even posit him as a logical excercise?
I suspect that most contemporary Christians would agree with you. This interpretation states that Paul was making a prediction: “JC is down, but not out. He’ll come back to life soon (like he did a few years back) and all the known ancient world will worship YHWH. It will be a kingdom of God.” This is a concrete prediction which was partially born out (minus the JC part) when Constantine established Christianity as a state religion some 300 years later. That is, when an empire makes JC-worship (or YHWH worship) the state religion, that empire is a kingdom of God.
I realize that this is a minority interpretation.
Grien points out correctly that it’s Paul. D’oh!
[back-peddle, giving the man his due] Well, to be fair, Paul was addressing certain Romans currently being persecuted by the Empire. He was giving them a pep talk: look, I know how oppressive things seem, but you’re struggling for a righteous cause and soon it will be all worthwhile. I don’t think he was necessarily addressing pointless suffering, but rather suffering for a worthy cause.[/back-peddle]
Still, the story of Lot suggests that Christian doctrine might apply Paul’s words to spiritually pointless hardship as well.
No, but the idea of the bungling, inept, and incompetant God, is as unsettling as watching the pilot and crew of the Jumbo Jet you’re going to fly on stumble into the plane drunk and wired from a three day bender, as they swat at imaginary butterflies circling their heads.
Yeah, but if they really are doing that, isn’t it better to know so you can put your affairs in order, tell your wife you love her, try to get off the damn plane, knock out the pilots so they can’t take off, etc.? Or should you just close your eyes really tight and believe firmly that they’re the best pilots ever and stone cold sober? I genuinely believe that the truth is a useful thing to know, and willfully refusing to even consider possible truths because they scare you is not the way to sensibly determine what is true. If you genuinely wish to find out the truth about a proposition, it’s not really effective to say, “hm, there are three possibilities, A, B and C, but A and B scare me so I will believe C.”
I dunno, I can consider the possibility of an evil or incompetent God without fear. Even if I knew for a fact that God existed and was cruel or bungling, it doesn’t scare me so much. If that’s the way it is, well, that’s the way it is and I better learn to deal with it. If there is pointless suffering (which I believe there is), so be it; I don’t need life to be fair for it to be worthwhile.
What if we were to expand on the idea of protecting children from abuse. In addition to the force-fields which prevent physical abuse let’s say that there’s also a fabulous machine which intercepts all other forms of abuse and automatically protects the child (i.e. abusive language is unheard, emotional abuse in any form doesn’t reach the child, etc.). Even though people are still capable of thinking of abusing children, just as in your example of force fields, children can’t be abused in any form. Is there an imposition on free will in this case?
Y’know, I’m starting to really wish you’d make an argument rather than simply asking questions that don’t even deal with my particular premise. You’re not answering why you think my solution would infringe on free will. Why not? Either say “mysterious ways, the end” or make a good argument as to why Forcefieldworld would be worse than our current world. I am not positing an ideal world, nor do I need to, nor do I have to prove why your idea of a totally abuse-free childhood does not infringe on free will.
Originally, you posited a “ideal” possible-world that ended up with us all as Barney-clones, as if that was evidence that we could not visualize a possible-world that genuinely does appear better than our world and does not infringe on free will or end up being some sort of monkey’s paw. So I posited a world that would seem to greatly reduce child abuse and not infringe on free will, and I don’t believe you have yet shown why it can be reasonably expected that Forcefieldworld is worse than our current world or that it infringes on free will.
Sorry about that Gaudere. I’ve been coming at this debate from a couple lines of thinking, one of which doesn’t directly relate to your original premise as I understand it.
If I understand correctly, your premise is: “God could have made child force-fields without imposing on free will, why didn’t he?”
The implication of that statement though is: “Child force-fields don’t impose on free will”
I have 2 objections with your solution. The first objection has nothing to do with imposing on free will. Nor does it have anything to do with your premise (assuming I understood and worded your premise correctly as shown above).
Objection 1: I believe that it is presumptuous to advise God. All of my “what if x,y, or z bad thing happened because of force-fields” scenarios, hereafter called PBT (“Possible bad things”), were intended to illustrate some possible negative consequences to advising God. This objection doesn’t deal with your premise of course. I’ll cease and desist on reasoning related to this objection since, now that I think about it because…
I no longer think you’re presuming to advise God. And…
It’s clear that your responses pretty much fall under the “Well, God will monitor the situation and fix that detail” category. And…
It really doesn’t have anything to do with your premise.
Objection 2: I feel free will is imposed on when there are no natural consequences to our actions. Is it really a choice if it has no effect?
Parent: Which would you rather wear? The blue shirt or the red shirt?
Child: I choose the X-Color shirt.
Parent: You get the blue shirt.
(doesn’t matter if child picks the blue or red shirt, child always gets the blue shirt)
If I do have to prove that your solution does infringe on free will why don’t you have to prove that mine doesn’t? After all, my solution has the same essential characteristics that yours does, namely:
Protects children from abuse
Does not impair thought
Does not impair action
Impairs consequences of action
Or is it your opinion that my solution doesn’t infringe on free will either?
Yes, that’s about it. Since your previous possible-world showed a “better” world that inevitably removed free will (with an implication I saw of the “our current world is clearly the best way to set things up, see, you try to make things better and they end up worse”), I created a possible world that does not to all appearances infringe on free will and does appear to be genuinely better. I believe the only answer to my possible-world is wholehearted “mysterious ways” (very mysterious, too, since after quite a few posts I’ve yet to see anything that I think comes even close to justifying child abuse), but arguing as you did for your possible-world that clearly the world would be worse if set up differently has yet to be convincing.
I think it’s overly timid to refuse to posit reasonable consequences of possibilities and work from there. I find it frightening when people argue that God can justify child abuse from reasons that seem ridiculously flimsy to me. Better to say “I don’t know” than argue that abuse is good since otherwise we’ll stop evolving! If strained justification like that can allow God to permit child abuse, it seems a short hop to allow such justifications to allow us to permit child abuse. And that’s what I find dangerous–the tendency to avoid saying “I don’t know” in favor of actually trying to argue that abuse might be good…since I don’t want people to actually start believing that there is some current solid reason to justify child abuse. If we won’t allow our fellow humans to abuse their children based on the assumption that they might murder the kids if we don’t let them abuse, we better not let God allow abuse for that same reason.
No, I don’t think they do. My responses have been: your consequences have not been shown to be reasonably likely OR to do enough harm that it overcomes the good of reduced child abuse. For example, not only have you not, IMHO, demonstrated how a reduction in child abuse would harm evolution, you have also not shown that it is reasonably likely that God would be unable to make humans evolve anyhow, nor is the premise that the forcefields must have been in effect for all time at all necessary to my argument in the slightest. I think my arguments against your possible ills are hardly simply, “uh, God’ll fix it”. We are indeed positing that God is omnipotent, so I can hardly be blamed for having him do omnipotent-sort things that aren’t even as half as radical as your insta-change of earth’s size and orbit.
Hm. I can freely choose to wish that I could cause a person to instantly become retarded. I can choose to want this to happen and to try to cause this, but it will not happen. According to you, my free will has been infringed. Or: a abusive father freely chooses to want to strike his child with a lead pipe as that child plays obliviously. He attempts to do so. I see him and stop him from doing so (and call Child Services). He wished to do harm, but his choice did not have an effect. According to you, his free will has been infringed.
No. I don’t buy it. Clearly, being physically unable to do an evil thing does not impair our free will. If that is so, then God has already impaired our free will.
'Cause I’m not arguing your solution! If you want to refute my argument, you have to actually refute it, not try to make me argue another one! I like the argument I’ve got, I’ve thought about it, we’ve hashed it out for a couple pages…now you’re trying to take it away and make me argue a different one that I didn’t choose and I’m not as familiar with. I’m not going to do the work of figuring out a wholly new possible-world and answering all your objections all over again when you haven’t, IMO, been able to refute my current argument. If you can’t refute my current argument, just say “Uncle” (AKA “yep, the reason God didn’t set up Forcefieldworld is 100% Mysterious Ways since I can’t see any reasonable consequences of Forcefieldworld that would make it worse than our current world”) and let it drop.
::Shrug:: After a couple of thousand years in the afterlife, all that suffering won’t seem as important. <Not-omnibenevolent G*d>
The life span of the average soul runs to approximately 8.6 billion years. The 0-110 year veil of tears that you and your associates pass through represents not the tiniest sliver of Your Big Plan, never mind The Big Plan. Your lifetime simply doesn’t give you enough information to evaluate the Grand Design. Sorry about that. <Mystery G*d>
Note that mystery G*d isn’t saying that our little world is the best of all possible worlds. (Maybe it’s a 1450 on the Scoville scale.) Rather, she’s claiming that The Big Scheme is optimal.
You got me there. Knowledge is generally a good thing to have, and I have no desire to argue that ignorance is bliss on this (note proper use of bolding) Message Board.
That there is no God, I have considered. If it’s provable, it’s useful info. Proceed as is if you are on your own (a good idea in any event.)
That God might be evil, I have considered. Again, useful if proven. (God is enemy. Thwart and destroy if possible. You are better off with #1)
That God might be a moron is a new thought to me. I’m not sure how it’s useful. Replace? (could it even be done?) advise God? (if he’s a moron would he listen? Is a moron God still smarter than a genius Gaudere?) Destroy God? (Would we better off on our own with a bungling yet benevolent God than with no God? Do we have the right to destroy this being who’s just trying to be helpful simply because he’s inept?))
Assuming we can’t get off the plane, is no pilot better than a drunk one?
If it is the truth, it’s probably useful to know. At least then you have a chance to perhaps do something; I’d certainly rather know than not.
Depends on how stupid/incompetent he is. At any rate, if he is a moron, knowing this at least gives us somewhere to work from, and it would make it quite easy to understand child abuse. “Oh, that God–he’s just a fuckup.”
As to our responsibilities to a dangerous moron God–a non-human (Oh, hush, Christians, you know what I mean) sentience, in my human-centric opinion, is a teeny little bit less valuable than a human sentience. If humans will suffer terribly and die because of his bungling and we could avoid this by destroying him and there is no alternative besides destruction, I would consider it acceptable, though regrettable, to destroy him. It was nice of him to create us, even if he did screw it up, but I believe we do have a responsibility to our species. It’s like if you and your siblings had a mother who was so stupid that she kept accidentally killing your sibs; I believe you do have a right to kill her if that is the only way to save your sibs’ lives. Of course, you should explore every possible alternative before killing someone who does not mean harm, yet you should not allow many innocents to suffer and die for the sake of preserving the life of one incompetent innocent who keeps harming them.
Well, since the plane can’t take off without a pilot, it’s a hell of a lot safer than it would be with a drunk piloting. Anyhow, best to know if the pilot is drunk if he in fact is, so you can evaluate the risks and benefits.
There’s also the possibility of a mostly-good god, a mostly-bad god, a sorta-good-sorta-bad god, a neutral god, a powerful but not omnipotent god, an omnipotent but not omniscient god, an omniscient but not omnipotent god, a really smart but not omniscient god, and so on and so forth; our choices aren’t merely wholly good, wholly evil, incomptent or no god at all.
