Is God the greatest criminal of all time?

[Grim_Beaker]

My responses have been: your consequences have not been shown to be reasonably likely OR to do enough harm that it overcomes the good of reduced child abuse. For example, not only have you not, IMHO, demonstrated how a reduction in child abuse would harm evolution, you have also not shown that it is reasonably likely that God would be unable to make humans evolve anyhow, nor is the premise that the forcefields must have been in effect for all time at all necessary to my argument in the slightest.

If you will recall my scenario’s were in reference to Objection 1 which I clearly stated does not address your premise. Since objection 1 doesn’t address your premise (nor the scenario’s which are related to objection 1) no more reasoning based on this objection will be done. I’m not trying to prove that there will be less evil in the world if child force fields exist, I’m trying to prove that there will be an imposition of free will.

'Cause I’m not arguing your solution! If you want to refute my argument, you have to actually refute it, not try to make me argue another one! I like the argument I’ve got, I’ve thought about it, we’ve hashed it out for a couple pages…

The key here is free will. As I said I’m not trying to prove that the world will be less evil with child force fields. I’m trying to prove child force fields infringe on free will. What’s the difference between your solution and mine? I think the definition of free will is integral to this debate. It’s your premise that your scenario doesn’t infringe on free will. I want to know what your opinion is of my scenario as that will help illustrate what you consider to infringe on free will, and why.

Hm. I can freely choose to wish that I could cause a person to instantly become retarded. I can choose to want this to happen and to try to cause this, but it will not happen. According to you, my free will has been infringed.

I don’t think we’re quite on the same level here. What I’m saying is essential to free will is the natural consequence of actions/thoughts. Let’s say that you did have the ability to cause a person to become instantly retarded. You act on that ability and the consequence is one more retarded person.

bolding mine…

Or: a abusive father freely chooses to want to strike his child with a lead pipe as that child plays obliviously. He attempts to do so. I see him and stop him from doing so (and call Child Services). He wished to do harm, but his choice did not have an effect. According to you, his free will has been infringed.

His choice did have an effect even though it probably wasn’t necessarily the one he desired. The effect is likely the removal of the child from his custody, perhaps jail time, perhaps court ordered anger management courses, whatever. Simply because his desires weren’t gratified doesn’t mean his free will has been infringed. He acts and suffers all the consequences, whatever they may be (and whether or not they were desired).

No. I don’t buy it. Clearly, being physically unable to do an evil thing does not impair our free will.

You’re right, being physically unable to do things (evil or otherwise) does not impair free will. What does impair free will is the inability to suffer all the consequences of what we are physically capable of doing (whether those consequences are the ones we intended or not).
Grim

[Gaudere]

What I’m saying is essential to free will is the natural consequence of actions/thoughts. Let’s say that you did have the ability to cause a person to become instantly retarded. You act on that ability and the consequence is one more retarded person.

Right. It this world, I can desire to make a person instantly retarded. I cannot actually do so. Has my free will been infringed because my desire and attempt have no actual consequence, becuase I do not have the physical ability to insta-retard?

His choice did have an effect even though it probably wasn’t necessarily the one he desired. The effect is likely the removal of the child from his custody, perhaps jail time, perhaps court ordered anger management courses, whatever.

Sure. And in Forcefieldwold his choice will have an effect, just not the effect he desires; he will not be able to harm his child, the warning light will go off, child services will investigate, etc.

Simply because his desires weren’t gratified doesn’t mean his free will has been infringed.

Yes, exactly.

He acts and suffers all the consequences, whatever they may be (and whether or not they were desired).

Also true in Forcefieldworld. He can try to bash in his child’s head with a lead pipe, he just won’t actually be able to harm the child and Child Services will investigate the incident. Just as in this world, an abuser can try to harm his child yet be prevented from doing so by another person.

You’re right, being physically unable to do things (evil or otherwise) does not impair free will. What does impair free will is the inability to suffer all the consequences of what we are physically capable of doing (whether those consequences are the ones we intended or not).

In Forcefieldworld we will be physically unable to abuse a child. Any consequences of the desire or the attempt will still happen, just not the abuse itself. Just as if someone attempted to abuse a child and another person physically prevented him/her from doing so (which I think we can all agree is a good thing). The forcefield is simply a physical restraint and warning system similar to having a person actually watching over the child themself.

[Gaudere]

What’s the difference between your solution and mine?

I don’t care! Why should I bother to work through all the consequences of your possible-world when I already have a possible-world I’m quite happy with and we have both spend a great deal of time hashing it out! The only thing that changing the argument at this point would do is to disorient me by changing the argument at the last minute to one I haven’t even considered. Changing the possible-world at this point will do neither of us any genuine good, because either:

1. The possible-worlds are exactly analogous, in which case any argument you have that works with your possible-world will work equally well for mine.
   or 2) The possible-worlds are not exactly analogous, in which case any argument you have that works for your possible world will NOT work equally well for mine.

Frankly, either you can defeat my argument as it stands or you can’t.

[Grim_Beaker]

Also true in Forcefieldworld. He can try to bash in his child’s head with a lead pipe, he just won’t actually be able to harm the child and Child Services will investigate the incident. Just as in this world, an abuser can try to harm his child yet be prevented from doing so by another person.

Not the same. In our world you used your physical capability and choice to intervene in the situation, thus causing a change in consequences from the ones he desired. In force field world no one intervenes in the situation and, arguably the greatest, consequence is negated. In the first case the central consequence (the actual physical abuse) is diverted due to your choice, in the second case the central consequence just doesn’t happen. Let me quote myself (bolding mine):

He acts and suffers all the consequences, whatever they may be (and whether or not they were desired).

He suffers all the consequences of his actions. Not “all the consequences except potentially the most important one”.

Grim

[Grim_Beaker]

I don’t care! Why should I bother to work through all the consequences of your possible-world when I already have a possible-world I’m quite happy with and we have both spend a great deal of time hashing it out!

You misunderstand my intent here. I think the definition of free will is integral to determining whether or not it’s infringed when child force fields exist. I posited my new solution in order to get a better understanding of what you consider free will to be based on your response. So, without referring to a different hypothetical solution I’ll just ask the question directly. For purposes of this debate what conditions do you think must be in place for free will to exist?

Grim

[Gaudere]

Not the same. In our world you used your physical capability and choice to intervene in the situation, thus causing a change in consequences from the ones he desired.

And in Forcefieldworld, he is simply restrained by the forcefield, rather than a human. How does this remove free will from him to be restrained physically by a forcefield ratehr thna a person? In both, his will is thwarted.

. In force field world no one intervenes in the situation and, arguably the greatest, consequence is negated.

No, he is prevented from abusing in both worlds. If that isn’t the greatest consequence, what is?

In the first case the central consequence (the actual physical abuse) is diverted due to your choice, in the second case the central consequence just doesn’t happen.

No, in BOTH he can TRY but he is PREVENTED.

He suffers all the consequences of his actions. Not “all the consequences except potentially the most important one”.

I don’t follow you. In both worlds he is free to both desire to and attempt to abuse his child, but he is physically prevented from doing so.

For purposes of this debate what conditions do you think must be in place for free will to exist?

We must have the ability to choose one thing over another for our will to be free (this does not necessarily require an actual act; a person who could do nothing at all still has free will. A paralyzed person does nto have less free will than a non-paralyzed one). In the traditional free-will-arguing theist’s view, that I am accepting as axiomatic for the purposes of this debate, we must have the ability to make a moral choice of one thing over another.

[Gaudere]

BTW, please address my previous question:

I[n] this world, I can desire to make a person instantly retarded. I cannot actually do so. Has my free will been infringed because my desire and attempt have no actual consequence, becuase I do not have the physical ability to insta-retard?

[Scylla]

Gaudere: (By the way, nice multitasking!)
If were going to hypothesize the existence of God, in relation to discussing your forcefields, we probably need to decide what kind of God we’re talking about. Obviously it would be no surprise that the evil hateful God doesn’t use them.

[Gaudere]

Well, yeah, in my debate with Grim_beaker, we are positing an omnipotent omnibenevolent god. However, in my debate with you, there is no such assumption.

[Scylla]

That seems easy enough. What kind of omnipotence. Can God do anything, or just anything possible?

[Grim_Beaker]

I[n] this world, I can desire to make a person instantly retarded. I cannot actually do so. Has my free will been infringed because my desire and attempt have no actual consequence, becuase I do not have the physical ability to insta-retard?

Your free will hasn’t been infringed. Even though you lack the physical ability to insta-retard all of the things you actually are capable of doing (thought and action) and all of their accompanying consequences are still available to you. I also wouldn’t necessarily say that your attempt has no consequences. It wouldn’t have the consequence you desired but it would have other consequences (i.e. time wasted trying to futilely insta-retard, perhaps a change in your desire once you realized it was futile, maybe a new desire related to trying to attain that physical ability, etc.)

No, he is prevented from abusing in both worlds. If that isn’t the greatest consequence, what is?

In this context I meant “greatest” to mean “most far reaching”. Of all the consequences which could come out of this situation (jail time, lost custody, abused child) IMHO the most far reaching consequence is the actual abuse of the child.

No, in BOTH he can TRY but he is PREVENTED.

In both, his will is thwarted.

In both worlds he is free to both desire to and attempt to abuse his child, but he is physically prevented from doing so.

Yes, in BOTH cases he can TRY but he is PREVENTED. However, even though the result is the same the two methods used to thwart his will have different implications. The forcefield scenario has a 100% success rate against physical abuse. Repeat the scenario a thousand times using the force field and in no case will he succeed in physically abusing the child. The possibility for him to succeed doesn’t exist. Repeat the scenario a thousand times where you restrain him and the possibility does exist that he will succeed in one of those instances.

As I mentioned above, out of all the possible consequences which can result from his actions IMHO the actual abuse of the child is the most far reaching. When I said…

He acts and suffers all the consequences, whatever they may be (and whether or not they were desired).

I meant that there are numerous possible consequences for his abuse attempt and that each of them would have to be possible (even if each consequence had differing levels of probability).
Grim

[Gaudere]

Your free will hasn’t been infringed. Even though you lack the physical ability to insta-retard all of the things you actually are capable of doing (thought and action) and all of their accompanying consequences are still available to you.

So, if I am incapable of insta-retarding, incapable of doing one particular evil, my free will is not infringed. Logically, therefore, if I am incapable of child abuse, incapable of doing one particular evil, my free will has not been infringed.

I also wouldn’t necessarily say that your attempt has no consequences. It wouldn’t have the consequence you desired but it would have other consequences (i.e. time wasted trying to futilely insta-retard, perhaps a change in your desire once you realized it was futile, maybe a new desire related to trying to attain that physical ability, etc.)

Also true of would-be child abusers in Forcefieldworld. So I assume that you concede that the attempt would in fact have consequences, then, and your argument that Forcefield world does not have any consequences for a child abuse attempt is negated.

In this context I meant “greatest” to mean “most far reaching”. Of all the consequences which could come out of this situation (jail time, lost custody, abused child) IMHO the most far reaching consequence is the actual abuse of the child.

Yes, but in both of my examples, both in this world and Forcefieldwolrd, the abuse is prevented. So why do you claim it removes free will when it is prevented in Forcefieldworld?

However, even though the result is the same the two methods used to thwart his will have different implications. The forcefield scenario has a 100% success rate against physical abuse. Repeat the scenario a thousand times using the force field and in no case will he succeed in physically abusing the child. The possibility for him to succeed doesn’t exist. Repeat the scenario a thousand times where you restrain him and the possibility does exist that he will succeed in one of those instances.

Our current world has a 100% success rate against insta-retarding. Repeat the scenario a thousand times in this world and in no case will I succeed in insta-retarding anyone. The possibility for me to succeed doesn’t exist.

Is my free will infringed?

++++++++++++++++

*Besides, if I made the forcefield fail 1% of the time, my possible-world would still be superior and your argument that it removes the possibilty of actual abuse is completely negated. *

I meant that there are numerous possible consequences for his abuse attempt and that each of them would have to be possible (even if each consequence had differing levels of probability).

It is currently utterly impossible for me to insta-retard someone.

Has my free will been infringed?

[Scylla]

Well if God is omnibenevolent and omnipotent, that still leaves some possibilities to be refined:

Omnibenevolence:

1. To humanity?

2. To all living things?

3. To all things?

Omnipotence:

a. God can do all things?

b. God can do all things possible?
Who are we dealing with?

[Grim_Beaker]

bolding mine…

Also true of would-be child abusers in Forcefieldworld. So I assume that you concede that the attempt would in fact have consequences, then, and your argument that Forcefield world does not have any consequences for a child abuse attempt is negated.

I never argued that the Forcefieldworld wouldn’t have any consequences, just that 100% precluding the chance of one possible consequence infringes on free will.

So, if I am incapable of insta-retarding, incapable of doing one particular evil, my free will is not infringed. Logically, therefore, if I am incapable of child abuse, incapable of doing one particular evil, my free will has not been infringed.

I think we need to clarify the way in which we’re using the word “capability”. There are two types of capability, intrinsic and extrinsic. Person A may have the intrinsic capability of running to the opposite end of a field but may lack the extrensic capability if an unscalable wall has been built in it’s center. If you are intrinsically incapable of committing a particular evil free will has not been infringed. If you are extrinsically capable of committing an evil and all natural consequences are possible then free will has not been infringed.

Yes, but in both of my examples, both in this world and Forcefieldwolrd, the abuse is prevented. So why do you claim it removes free will when it is prevented in Forcefieldworld?

Already explained. It’s the method used to prevent the abuse NOT the result. You keep stressing the result. The result isn’t what I’m concentrating on. It’s the implications of the method that infringe free will. One method precludes any chance of physical abuse succeeding (the force field), the other method does not (the scenario where you detain the abuser).

Our current world has a 100% success rate against insta-retarding. Repeat the scenario a thousand times in this world and in no case will I succeed in insta-retarding anyone. The possibility for me to succeed doesn’t exist.

Is my free will infringed?

It is currently utterly impossible for me to insta-retard someone.

Has my free will been infringed?

Already explained. I’ll try to clarify this. If you have capability to do something (whether thought or act) and you make use of said capability then it must be possible for the full range of consequences to happen. In this case you don’t have the capability, therefore, no infringement.

Besides, if I made the forcefield fail 1% of the time, my possible-world would still be superior and your argument that it removes the possibilty of actual abuse is completely negated.

Are you admitting that it must be possible (even if only 1% of the time) to physically abuse children for free will to exist?

Grim

[Gaudere]

Person A may have the intrinsic capability of running to the opposite end of a field but may lack the extrensic capability if an unscalable wall has been built in it’s center. If you are intrinsically incapable of committing a particular evil free will has not been infringed. If you are extrinsically capable of committing an evil and all natural consequences are possible then free will has not been infringed.

I don’t follow you here. What are “natural consequences”? If we had a forcefield, it’s effect would be a natural consequence. Therefore free will would not be infringed, right? You can’t just define the world we have right now as “natural” and claim that anything that is different than the way it is now will mean we won’t have “natural consequences” and thus infringes on free will.

Already explained. It’s the method used to prevent the abuse NOT the result. You keep stressing the result. The result isn’t what I’m concentrating on. It’s the implications of the method that infringe free will. One method precludes any chance of physical abuse succeeding (the force field), the other method does not (the scenario where you detain the abuser).

I don’t see why it matters. I have absolutely no ability to do all sorts of evils that I may desire to do. Is my free will infringed?

If you have capability to do something (whether thought or act) and you make use of said capability then it must be possible for the full range of consequences to happen. In this case you don’t have the capability, therefore, no infringement.

Wait, wait, wait…so if we don’t have the capability for child abuse, our free will is not infringed?

What consequences are “possible”? Any consequences that might happen in that world! Therefore, in Forcefieldworld, the possible consequences do not involve child abuse. In Insta-Retard-world, the natural consequences do involve the capability to instantly retard someone; therefore I suppose you would argue that the fact that we cannot instantly retard someone means that the full range of consequences do not exist and thus we do not have free will.

Are you admitting that it must be possible (even if only 1% of the time) to physically abuse children for free will to exist?

No. But since it’s not necessary to my argument for 100% of child abuse to be prevented, I figure I can save on the pixels. However, if you really want to argue that we must be physically capable of doing any particular act, I suppose I could argue with you just for the sake of good logic. However, why argue that being 100% prevented from an act impinges on free will, when being 100% prevented from an act is not a necessary part of my argument? It’s like when you kept arguing about primate development before; you’re focussing on an irrevelant detail if you genuinely wish to disprove my arguement.

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

You seem to argee that in this world being physically unable to do an evil action does not infringe on free will. You seem to agree that in this world desiring to do an evil thing and being unable to do so still will have consequences. However you argue exactly the opposite when we’re talking about my possible world; you argue that being physically unable to do an evil act does infringe on free will, and that if one is physically prevented from doing an evil, that there are no consequences to the attempt! You’ve changed your arguemnt it a bit with the “natural consequences” bit, but “natural” (or even “possible”) is a fallacious argument; you’re assuming any deviation from our current world is unnatural. That is, you’re simply asserting that if the world were any different, we wouldn’t have free will simply becuase the options and consequences would be different–“unnatural”, as you put it. Or you assert that Forcefieldworld denies us “possible” consequences. It doesn’t, because those consequences are not possible in that world, just as insta-retard consequences are not possible in our world. Your “possible consequences” argument simply doesn’t work.

Answer me this:

1. Does being physically unable to do any particular evil act infringe on one’s free will?

2. Does being physically unable to do any particular evil act mean the attempt and desire has no consequences?

[Scylla]

::sniff::

I guess I’ll just go play with myself then.

[Measure_for_Measure]

Scylla:
The problem of evil is a sort of impossibility theorem. You can have an omnipotent God, you can have a benevolent God. You just can’t have both at the same time.

(Incidentally, there is also an analogous argument called the problem of good. That allows omnipotence, an evil God, but not both at the same time.)

If you believe that the above types of God are ruled out (and you’ve handled the free will and mystery-God issue), that still leaves a theist with a huge variety of Gods that may exist. Even given clever argumentation, I think its unlikely that the characteristics of the Almighty will be able to be narrowed down much further.

[Scylla]

*Originally posted by flowbark *
Scylla:
You can have an omnipotent God, you can have a benevolent God. You just can’t have both at the same time.

Why not?

[Measure_for_Measure]

Grim:

I think you can argue that preventing someone from insta-retarding somebody else, blowing up the world, or breaking a child’s bones limits their freedom. I sort of doubt it limits their free will, as long as they are left with a meaningful set of alternative activities (eg stealing, lying, double parking, balancing their checkbook, building an Hawaiian basement, etc.).

If there were instant penalties for all manners of sin (large and small), it would certainly be a different world, but it’s not clear that it would reduce humanity to the automaton or Barney level. Still, a discussion about the meaning of free will in that context might be illuminating.

Regardless, Gaudere has constructed her example so that Forcefieldworld has substantially less suffering than the status quo, with (IMHO) rather small effects on freedom. Why a God who is fully benevolent with respect to this world AND omnipotent would choose the status quo over Forcefieldworld would be a mystery to me.

Some members of this board have argued that the Bible doesn’t indicate that the Almighty is omniBenevolent. So IMHO, the problem of evil represents a puzzle for Christians, but not necessarily an especially crushing refutation. Here, the question might shift to whether the status quo allows a God who is sorta benevolent and omnipotent. I speculate that a Christian might reply that negligence is ultimately more ethically binding on humans than it is on the Almighty.

[Measure_for_Measure]

Scylla: Disclaimer: There may be solutions to the problem of evil that allow a benevolent and omnipotent God. My background in philosophy is pretty limited.

Let me quote Hume:
"If the evil in the world is form the intention of the Deity, then he is not benevolent.

If the evil in the world is contrary to his intention, then he is not omnipotent.

But it is either in accordance with his intention or contrary to it. Therefore either the Deity is not benevolent or he is not omnipotent."

Epicurus (4th century, BC) also posed the problem of evil. I sorta doubt that we’ll settle it here.

I gave one answer to the problem of evil earlier (as did you for that matter): in my version, our perspective is far too limited to judge whether the Almighty is benevolent or not, provided you believe in a incredibly lengthy afterlife. Speaking as one shrimp to another, I’m not sure whether my response is adequate or not.