Is God the greatest criminal of all time?

Great Debates
161

Let me start off with a recap of intrinsic and extrinsic capability.

If I have a fully functioning set of legs I can use those to walk, run, kick a soccer ball, jump, etc. Since I have that intrinsic characteristic I have a number of capabilities which are inherent to my being. Now, I may not be able to exercise each of those capabilities if factors extrinsic to my being prevent me. As an example the ability to walk may be inherent to my being but I may be prevented from doing so because I’m strapped to a chair. I have an instrinsic capability (to walk) but lack the ability to act on it now because of an extrinsic force (being strapped to the chair).

Not having an intrinsic capability does not infringe on free will. INTRINSIC! Inherent to my being! If I don’t have a capability inherent to my being free will is not infringed!

If: I have no legs I lack the intrinsic capability to walk.
Then: No infringement

If: I have no intrinsic capability to insta-retard
Then: No infringement

If: I have no eyes and therefore lack the intrinsic capability to see
Then: No infringement

I’m not arguing that “natural” consequences are the way the world is now. Natural consequences, as I define them, are tied closely to intrinsic capability. Before getting directly to natural consequences though I feel I need to show the relationship between intrinsic characteristics, capability, extrinsic forces, and consequences.

Let’s say we have a person named JoeBob…

A1. Intrinsic characteristic:

JoeBob has normally working hands and arms

B1. Intrinsic capability:

JoeBob can pick things up
JoeBob can stretch his arms/hands
JoeBob can throw things
JoeBob can strike things/people

C1. Consequences possible because of Intrinsic capability:

JoeBob can use a fork to eat
JoeBob can turn pages in a book
JoeBob can throw a football
JoeBob can abuse people
etc.

If there aren’t any extrinsic forces restricting his intrinsic capabilities then each of the consequences mentioned in C1 are possible. But, as soon as we add in an extrinsic force, potential consequences and capability change…

A2. Intrinsic characteristic:

JoeBob has normally working hands and arms

B2. Intrinsic capability:

JoeBob can pick things up
JoeBob can stretch his arms/hands
JoeBob can throw things
JoeBob can strike things/people

C2. Extrinsic force:

JoeBob is tied up

D2. Extrinsic capability:

JoeBob can pick things up if they're small enough and within reach
JoeBob can stretch his arms/hands a little

E2. Consequences possible because of intrinsic capability:

JoeBob can use a fork to eat
JoeBob can turn pages in a book
JoeBob can throw a football
JoeBob can abuse people
etc.

F2. Current consequences possible because of extrinsic force on intrinsic capability:

JoeBob stretches to avoid muscle cramps while tied
JoeBob tries to pick up small objects
etc.

As you can see the set of consequences due to intrinsic capability D2 is going to have a much greater range then the set of consequences after extrinsic forces (the set of possible consequences in E2). I consider natural consequences to be those in set E2. All of the consequences which can arise from intrinsic capability unobstructed by extrinsic forces. Any refererence from here on out to “natural” consequences is as per this definition.

No it wouldn’t. The forcefield is an extrinsic force NOT a natural consequence. As an extrinsic force it limits the set of intrinsic capabilities (category B2) to a subset of capabilities (category D2), and by extension the set of intrinsic consequences (category E2) is limited to a subset of those consequences (category F2).

Free will rule 1: Lack of an intrinsic characteristic doesn’t infringe free will

Free will rule 2: Existence of an extrinsic force does infringe on free will if that force acts to prevent a natural consequence (or set of natural consequences) in 100% of all situations and cases.

Do you mean…

Intent 1: “physically unable due to a lack of intrinsic ability to do a particular act”?

Or do you mean…

Intent 2: “physically unable due to an extrinsic force restricting an intrinsic capability in this specific case but not in all cases”?

Or do you mean…

Intent 3: “physically unable due to an extrinsic force restricting an intrinsic capability all of the time and in all cases”?

Answers…

Answer to intent 1: Yes, there are consequences, but they are only related to what you are intrinsically capable of doing. In other words the consequences are related to the desire (an intrinsic capability) not to the attempt (not intrinsically capable).

Answer to intent 2: Yes, there are consequences, and even though a particular natural consequence (or consequences) isn’t possible due to an extrinsic force in this specific case there is a possibility that a particular natural consequence (or consequences) will be available in the next attempt.

Answer to intent 3: Yes, there are consequences, but a particular natural consequence (or consequences) will never be possible.

Before asking another “What if I wanted to insta-retard and…” or “If I choose but have no physically capability…” style question please decide on what the…

  1. Intrinsic capabilities of the person are…

  2. Extrinsic forces acting upon said person… and the…

  3. Success rate with which those forces act to impair intrinsic capability.

After deciding on those 3 things apply the 2 laws of free will as I’ve worded them above to determine whether or not I consider something to be an infringement of free will.

Oh but it is a necessary part of your argument. Your argument is:

“God could have made the world a less evil place with child force fields without infringing on free will, so why didn’t he?”

The assumption in that argument is that:

“Child force fields don’t infringe on free will”

If I demonstrate that 100%-physical-abuse-preventer-child-force-fields infringes on free will then one of the foundations on which your argument rests is invalidated. Therefore the argument is invalidated.

Grim

162

All right, I’m going to start out arguing this as if the forcefields do prevent 100% of child abuse, though that’s not necessary as I point out below. However, I think your logic is incorrect, and so I will work from the 100% effective forcefield platform for the nonce.

If I understand you correctly, “intrinsic capabilities” refers to “capabilities inherently possible in a particular world”; i.e., in this world we have the intrinsic capability of running but not flying. “Extrinsic” is some sort of “outside force” that prevents exercise of a intrinsic capability. Now, let’s think about what “outside force” is in this instance. That my brain is not formed in such a way that I can use psychic powers to insta-retard; this is clearly an intrinsic limitation, and not a limitation due to an “outside force”. That my arms are not formed in such a way as to allow me to fly; this also is clearly an intrinsic limitation, and not a limitation due to an “outside force”. Now, if children are formed in such a way that an adult is incapable of abusing them, is this an “outside force”? I do not think so. It is something inherent in the world and in the children; in Forcefieldworld, child abuse is not a capability inherently possible in this particular world. The forcefield is not an “outside force”; it is inherent and natural to Forcefieldworld, utterly denying the possibility of child abuse–exactly as in this world our inherent and natural arm shape utterly denies us the possibility of flapping our arms and flying to the moon.

Yes, but these “intrinsic” capabilities are only intrinsic in a world where they are a natural part of your set of capabilities. For example, in a world where people’s legs were formed in such a way that they could not walk, one would not have the intrinsic capability to walk, right? In a world that was formed in such a way that there was no dry land, a person could not run. In a world where people are formed in such a ways that they cannot instantly retard someone, they lack the capability to instantly retard someone. And in a world where children are formed in such a way adults cannot physically abuse them, they cannot be physically abused. Intrinsic characteristic depend wholly on the makeup of the world you are in.

Perhaps there is some world where people’s arms are formed in such a way that they can fly with them. In that world, they would have the intrinsic capability to fly; in this world we do not. “Intrinsic” and “extrinsic” and “natural” and “possible” only have meaning in their particular world, and you cannot claim that because something is intrinsically possible in one world that it is must be intrinsically possible in all possible worlds. Clearly, that is not so; flying is intrinsically possible in a world where people have wings, yet it is not intrinsically possible in a world where they do not. In Forcefieldworld, because of the physical structures of children (the forcefield) it is intrinsically impossible to abuse them, just as because of the structure of our arms in this world it is intrinsically impossible to fly.

Child abuse is intrinsic to this world. It is not intrinsic to Forcefieldworld. Therefore, in Forcefieldworld, your free will is not infringed by being unable to do something that is inherently impossible in Forcefieldworld. Obviously, in a world where X act is impossible, X act is NOT an inherent capability of your being. In a world where one cannot fly, flying is not an inherent capability of your being. In a world where one cannot abuse children, abusing children is not an inherent capability of your being. It’s really quite simple.

Why ever not? It is an inherent part of Forcefieldworld. Its activation is a natural consequence of abuse in that world. It is utterly and completely natural. This, I think is the crux of our argument; you do not accept that in Forcefieldworld being unable to abuse a child is precisely as natural as us, in our world, lacking the ability to instantly retard someone. However, I cannot follow as to why such you think a natural effect like the forcefield is not a natural consequence in Forcefieldworld.

See, you keep using the word “natural” as if to imply that prevention of child abuse in Forcefieldworld is preventing a natural consequence. It isn’t; in Forcefieldworld, child abuse is not a natural consequence, therefore no natural consequences are prevented. Just as in our world, the act of insta-retarding is not a “natural consequence” of a desire to instantly retard someone, in Forcefieldworld the act of child abuse is not a “natural consequence” of the desire to abuse. I don’t see how I can make this clearer. In Forcefield world child abuse is not a possible natural consequence, just as instantly retarding someone is not a natural consequence in our world.

Now, back to discussing the issue of preventing 100% of child abuse:

::utterly exasperated:: Well, the fact that I didn’t mention a 100% effective forcefield at all in the quote use might’ve tipped you off to the point that it is by no means “one of the foundations” of my argument. I don’t have to argue that the forcefields have to work 100% of the time for my argument to be effective. All I have to do is show a possible-world that definitely appears markedly better and does not infringe on free will. I can do that even if I only prevent 99% of abuse. I only argue about having free will despite being utterly incapable of a particular evil because I think your argument is incorrect.

163

You keep referring to worlds as having intrinsic capabilities, characteristics, etc. “Forcefieldworld has X intrinsic capability”, “Forcefieldworld has Y intrinsic capability”. Are you saying it’s the world that bestows the force field on the child or is it inherent to the child, or is it both?

1. Inherent to the world: If it’s inherent to the world then any child leaving that world would be bereft of the child force fields.

2. Inherent to the child: If it’s inherent to the child then the individual child is protected no matter what world they live in.

3. Inherent to the world and child: If it’s inherent to the world and child (as a combination together) then any child who left or arrived at that world would be bereft of the child force fields.

Before I continue I want to know if you mean 1, 2, 3 or something else altogether.

Grim

164

Forcefieldworld is a “possible-world”, it is an entirely new universe with new physical laws, etc. (if need be). It’s as if God never made this universe we live in now; instead he made the universe that would give birth to Forcefieldworld, in which people are inherently unable to abuse children. It’s not like the world is “magic”, somehow–you can’t leave the Forcefieldworld universe, just as right now we can’t leave our universe to visit the universe where people can fly. It is as if there is only one universe, and it is Forcefieldworld. Each evaluation of what is and is not intrinsic is wholly dependent on what universe you are in–our intrinsic ability to fly is not infringed because we are simply inhernetly unable to fly in this universe, therefore it is not an intrinsic ability of ours, even though people can fly in Birdland and it is therefore an intrinsic ability for them.

The forcefields (and therefore inability to abuse) are inherent to the entire human Forcefieldland universe, just as in our world insufficient psychic powers :wink: (and thus inability to Insta-retard) are inherent to the entire human universe. (Aside: I do not think it would impair free will if some people have the ability to insta-retard and some do not, and some have the ability to throw up forcefields and some do not. Therefore, theoretically the universes could mix and each person could carry along “their” powers without an infringemnt on free will; if you were born with the capacity for forcefields, or insta-retarding or born without legs, these are ALL inherent capabilities. But I have enough trouble with two seperate universes, I don’t want to toss them all together.)

For example:

  1. In Birdland Universe it is intrinsically possible to fly, but because the people there have no legs they it is intrinsically impossible for them to kick someone.

  2. In our universe, it is intrinsically possible to kick someone but it is intrinsically impossible for us to fly overhead and crap on their car.

  3. In Forcefieldland Universe, it is intrinsically possible to kick adults, but because of the forcefields it is intrinsically impossible for them to kick (abusively) children.

  4. In Insta-Retard Universe, it is intrinsically possible to instantly retard someone just by wishing, but they have weak throat muscles and so it is intrinsically impossible for them to spit on anyone.

  5. In Waterland Universe, people have legs but no dry land, so it is intrinsically impossible run. However, it is intrinsically possible for them to kick people.

Etc., etc. Each of these possible worlds has their own set of “inherent” abilities; the people in our universe lack the inherent abilitiy to insta-retard, the people in Forcefieldland lack the inherent ability to abuse children, the people in Waterland lack the inherent ability to fly.

165

So if God created a separate universe where people were born with the aforesaid forcefields (so 2 universes now… ours and theirs) and he transplanted one of the force field children to our universe that child would still have the force fields correct?

Grim

166

Geez, I post an aside and that’s the only thing you respond to? It was a thought, a brief tangent, not part of my “real” argument–if you’ll note, the rest of my post worked from the assumption that the one universe that we are talking about at the time is the only one that exists. As per quantum physics, you cannot in any way move an object from one universe to another, and doing so would change the features of that universe into something wholly new. For example, in this world it is inherently impossible to travel faster than the speed of light. However, if God moves something moving faster than the speed of light from a universe where it is possible, he has utterly changed the inherent nature of the universe so that it is inhernently possible for things to move faster than the speed of light. It is also, again, not necessary to my argument to have people move between universes, so do you really want to pursue this if in the end you will be no further along to defeating my argument whether you argue sucessfully or not? Certainly in this world we cannot move to another universe, so why should the capacity to move from one universe to another be necessary to my possible-world? My two universes only conceptually exist together; when I am in each, they are the only universe existing. Changing the argument so that they both exist simultaneously and we are moving people from one to the other is quite a tangent, and I don’t like moving on before the previous argument is done. Let’s settle a few things before we move on: Does a Forcefieldworld that prevents 99% of child abuse does not infringe on free will? Does a Forcefieldworld universe where there are NO other universes to move people to and from not infringe on free will?

167

But why should WE be punished for something did some milennia ago? that makes as much sense as nuking a nation because a snail from there bit you.

And if he’s going to let someone torture you simply so that he wins a bet, how exactly is that NOT cruel?