And being the one metropole, people move there from all over the country. You recruit may be from Saida, but his brother probably moved to Cairo to look for work.
Whatever government comes next in Egypt, it will want that $1.3 billion a year in U.S. aid to continue, which will be contingent on playing nice with Israel.
The Egyptian army is similar to the Iranian army in that it has it’s own business, own sources for corruption, and therefore it’s own power structure. That structure has been at odds with Mubarak over succession for a while. It has no real loyalty to Mubarak, and no real reason to keep him in power.
The Egyptian army is similar to the Turkish army, in that it has more respect and prestige than the government. They are going to be power players no matter what happens, and likely view weak democratic leaders as unable to successfully challenge their power. If they back Mubarak, they become married to him, so to speak, and lose their prestige and might just loose power in a successful revolution. Best to exert influence behind the scenes, and attempt to get a pawn in the presidency.
Egypt is not the US.
The US military are do not serve Barack Obama personally. Their primary loyalty is to the institution of the US government, with the reasonable assumption that the US government serves the people of the United States. The US military does not have to choose which part of the “US” they are serving because our people, government, and leaders are generally on the same page.
In Egypt, a “loyal” military would not be loyal to the institution of the Egyptian government because the “Egyptian government” does not exist outside of Mubarak. So in effect, a “loyal” government would be “loyal” to Mubarak personally- should he fall, his replacement would have to work to gain the military’s backing. And it’s tough to get an institution to back you personally unless you have something really good to offer them (like steady employment with room to advance.)
Now that it’s looking like Mubarak is going to fall, they have to decide if it’s worth their while to defend a sinking ship. The other option is to be loyal to the Egyptian people as a whole, which appears to be what is happening now.
The relationship between governments, people and militaries are fascinating, and the dynamics vary by situation. In the US, it’s easy to forget that they guy making the decisions is not the same as they guys with the guns, and when they come into conflict it’s often the guys with the guns who win.
No fucking kidding. Neither is my country.
Snipped pointless blither about USA as well about Egypt insofar as I don’t know we have any genuine Egypt experts here (and I am not aware ES has any such).
In any case, the entire argument about Army & people is premature, from what BBC is showing now, and doesn’t in any way explain the police forces, which are drawn from the same kinds of populations.
Institutional tradition matters.
Well, do you have an explanation then? Because this is actually what is happening.
Again, Mubarak used the police as his major security tool. This means they have good reasons to be loyal to him- if someone else gets into power, the current police will probably have to face up for what they have done over the years and certainly will not enjoy the current power and status they enjoy. You can dismiss and rebuild a police force with your guys, but it’s a lot harder to do that with a military. So the police have a bigger stake in Mubarak staying in power than the military does.
[quote=“even_sven, post:26, topic:569799”]
Well, do you have an explanation then? Because this is actually what is happening.
An explanation?
For the Army standing aside? You saw it. Tradition and strategy. The Army has refused (in 1977) to fire on crowds before.
That is, as far as I know, the only genuine data point there is. Everything else is hand waving and speculation by people who don’t know Egypt at all (that would be both of us). Everything I read by Egypt & Arab world experts suggests the Army is quite close to Mubarak and he is close to them. Maybe that is wrong, but I don’t see any informed rebuttals of that.
Anyway, the only data point I see is 1977.
In 1977 the riots were over food prices. Things got to the point where the army would have had to start doing something to maintain order but instead the regime blinked and cancelled planned price increases. Up until a couple of weeks ago it was the recieved wisdom that Egyptians only ever rioted or got really upset when food prices were too high and all any regime had to do to stay in power was keep them at a safe level. That’s actually fairly true all over the region. When the trouble happened in Tunisia the Kuwaiti government immediately gave every Kuwaiti free food for I think a couple of years. Four billion dollars worth anyway.
“Bring it on!”
Then again, how would they go about using US-supplied weapons against the US?
There’s a fairly fundamental difference between policing a population, “looking in,” and defending a population, “looking out.”
One of the benefits of U.S. military aid to another country is that the aid brings with it military cooperation, joint exercises, training in the U.S., and other ways in which the U.S. military engages with the other country’s military. This gives the U.S. the opportunity to gain influence within the foreign military, to spread its values, and to gain intelligence regarding the tactics, efficiency, and personalities in the foreign military. Sometimes friendships are made between high ranking officers of the U.S. and the other military which enable ‘back channel’ communications, giving the U.S. the ability to bypass broken diplomatic channels.
This has worked to the U.S.'s advantage in Pakistan, where the U.S. and Pakistani military directly engaged to safeguard Pakistan’s nuclear weapons when the regime looked shaky. It’s worked in Iraq, both in helping the Iraqis to learn tactics and values from the U.S. military, but also to give the U.S. insight into the various factions at play within the Iraqi military and to give them more insight into the culture.
How much of a role this is playing in Egypt I don’t know, but I’d be willing to bet there are officers of high rank in the U.S. and Egyptian military who are in direct communication.
Violence has escalated with organized groups backing Mubarak wading into crowds. They are on horse or camel and wielding whips and clubs. Egyptians are claiming they are being paid and organized by the the army and Mubarak. It is far from over .
The protests seemed to be a reaction to Mubarak saying he would stay on for another 9 months. That would give him time to organize another government just as repressive as his. His intent was to install his son in power. That may still be his plan. If so, the violence is far from settling down.
Googling “Cairo población” gives me 24M in Cairo; the Egyptian notion of family isn’t the nuclear family, it’s pretty much anybody for whom you can find the proper spot in your family tree, and what was mentioned above was not soldiers “being from” Cairo but “either being from there or having family there”.
I strongly doubt there are any regiments where, say, 90% of the personnel don’t have close relatives in Cairo - close enough in this case being defined as “you can drop in for dinner unannounced”.
I work extensively in Sub Saharan Africa (in business, not aide), I haven’t any need for a Spanish person to tell me about extended family. In fact I am pretty sure I have more hands on experience with societies with extended family than just about anyone here.
Yes, I keep hearing this narrative about soldiers with family. It keeps being asserted, but I don’t see any data points only assertions. And there are plenty of examples of armies firing on their populations, and in Egypt, the police which I read are drawn from the same population does so, AND the paramilitaries.
And guess what, they have extended families - more so since I read they come from the lowest rungs of the population.
So family relations seems to me a huge assertion.
I think the difference is the Army is well-paid and nationally respected. It has that reputation to protect.
The Interior Ministry forces, as the direct agents of state oppression and torture are hated.
They, like the Tunisian Presidential Guard which was routed by the army, have nothing to lose. They know that things could go very badly for them if Mubarack doesn’t ‘win’.
The Army knows it loses badly if it fires on the pro-democracy demonstrators. That’s not to say the higher up kleptocratic generals won’t see that as a least worst option at some point though.
The Army has shown in the past it is willing to fire on the interior security forces. At the moment we don’t know what the reaction of the soldiers on the ground would be if ordered to fire on the demonstrators. We just know that the army isn’t backed into a corner but the internal security forces are.
We can guess from the stories in the press today that there are massive US diplomatic efforts underway to get Mubarack out and Sulieman in today.
It’s because the soldiers are draftees, and the police are volunteers. That’s the difference. Draftees rarely fire on their own populations.
Well, apologies I happened to step on your hammertoe then; I’m afraid you’re not one of the Dopers whose professional history I remember. Is there a specific reason my nationality offends you?
The draftees I know who were involved in Tejero’s coup happened to be away from home, but they had mates in their same regiments who were local and one of their biggest worries was not wanting to fire at their mates’ relatives, and what would those mates do if the order was given (would they refuse, and then the nonlocals be ordered to take them away or even fire on them?). They didn’t think about the legality of it all, it was all purely emotional. This was people for whom “esprit de corps” was something they’d heard about in movies; I don’t know anybody who happened to be in the Legión or the Paracas (the two branches which have any kind of “corps mythos” beyond the usual “I’m the mate of my mates” mentality which we’re expected to develop by 3rd grade at the latest).
It is not your nationality, it was the silly lecture about extended family from a fellow European.
That I can credit, but rarely is also not never. I’m advancing the only data point I can find about Egypt, that it has an institutional tradition as well in this area, as an explanatory factor - not that just maybe those units maybe have family that maybe is in the crowd.
Sure, but well-paid directly contradicts arguments above (not yours per se) and also the ‘agents’ argument in my mind gets to Institutional culture and traditions. Those others have extended family too, and they come from poor families according to what I read - a lot of the grunts at least. I’m no expert in this region / area, but no one seems to have a different fact set so for the moment I’m accepting that.
I have lots of doubts in my mind about this narrative that the Army is “on the side of the people” given what I read in the UK analytical press.
This article, for example, Egypt’s army is the power behind the throne. And Mubarak knows it, which paints an army that is far more involved in Mubarak affairs than the story posters here are advancing.
I’d go with this analysis, and again emphasize that the only argument I’m advancing is that:
(i) Merely asserting soldiers have extended families or they’re presumably under the same stresses as the population doesn’t explain things in my opinion,
(ii) Institutional tradition, which at least has a data point confirming, and institutional interest show greater explanatory power.
Even if there are units that are unreliable, I have a hard time believing that the Egyptian army at 500k strong lacks elite units that could, if the Army believed it necessary, do the job.
I’m reacting, to restate, to what I am reading in the UK analytical press & media (Guardian, Independent, BBC) that paint a much more ambiguous picture than what I was seeing above.
Another thing that worries me about this narrative, according to what I read - and I am just reading this stuff now so for the time being I am convinced, but I am also trying to get a grip here, that Sulieman and all these guys are military in the end, and there is a major risk that the Army can lash out if pushed.
Sorry, but a second thought / question: I have read in some coverage that a portion of the Army that is in the street is the Republican Guard, which Wikipedia describes as
I never entirely trust Wikipedia, but this jibes with what I have read so far. So, the question in my mind is even if the conscript argument holds - I am not sure about it - that doesn’t mean it holds for these guys, but is it accurate that many / some good portion of the Army down there is RG? I’m sure someone somewhere knows how to read the unit writing on those tanks, etc.
Also Wikipedia tells me that c.1990 that about 1/2 of the army was conscript, not 100%. So that opens up a wider question as to whether the units down there (anyone able to read their unit emblems?) are from conscript heavy units (does the Egyptian army practice cadres or do they do like the US and mix in recruits [if I understand the US practice])
The army isn’t on anyone’s sides but its own. And the definition of ‘side’ will vary with rank. The top kleptocrats will want to keep their snouts in the trough and if that means Mubarak given his marching orders no doubt they’ll issue them.
But if that opens the floodgates and they think it threatens to sweep the trough away then they might come to a different conclusion.
I don’t think we can talk of the army as one entity. Junior officers may have different interests and the conscripts another.
The Free Officers Movement in the 1952 coup being a case in point.
It’s a complex situation. It might be if things really go tits up the next President of Egypt, or at least ‘king-maker’ is some Tank Commander no one has ever heard of.
I’ve no doubt the top ranks want a change of President and then back to business as normal with as few democratic concessions as they can get away with.
The US, from what the NYT is saying and which is pointedly not being contradicted, want Mubarak gone yesterday and Suleiman in charge.
I believe, from the way the security apparatus has been attacking journalists and human rights activists that Mubarak intends a bloody crackdown. Evil doers fear the light. Whether the top army will allow this and whether officers or soldiers will obey is the wild card.
My gut feeling is that he’ll be thrown overboard by the top brass soon.