Is US aid to the Egyptian military playing a role in their current behavior

The Egyptian military said they are not going to attack civilians, and I have heard some in the military are working behind the scenes to get Mubarak out peacefully.

Egypt’s military budget is 3.6 billion. I think about half of that is US aid due to the camp david accords (something like 1.5-2 billion a year in military aid). So w/o US aid the military would probably be screwed since it seems to heavily dependent on US money, training and equipment.

So does the fact that the Egyptian military is heavily dependent on US foreign aid play a role in how they are acting? Either officially, behind the scenes or just because military officials put 2 and 2 together and a Tiananmen square situation could lead to cutoff of US aid or does US aid not really factor into what is happening?

In situations like this does the military usually refuse to shoot civilians? I am under the impression that the military is usually a source of domestic oppression in a dictatorship (along with internal security forces and the police). Are there generally divisions between the responsibilities of internal security forces vs. the military in a country for fear conscripts won’t fire on protesters?

On another note, if this revolution in Egypt succeeds, why did the Iranian one fail?

How would we know?

I did read that the Army refused in 1977 to fire on protesters as well, and I believe then American aide would not commence until the peace treaty, yes?

If that is so (I am not sure) then you have a basis to argue that not necessarily…

Never mind…

While the US certainly plays a role in just about every aspect of this conflict, i don’t think this particular case can be directly attributed to the US. I think a more likely explanation is that the military is part of the population that is pissed off (food crisises hit middle-class types most) and that they are not particularly loyal to Muburak. It’s my understanding that Muburak used the police as his main security apparatus and thus was more likely to curry favor among the police than the military.

Yeah, well another case of the possibility of bad guys getting hold of our toys and using them against us, I am afraid.

Uh, if by “bad buys” you mean “guys who were our best friends last week” and by “getting hold of our toys” you mean “using the weapons and training we freely, even lavishly, gave them.”

Mubarek is a military man, and '“part of the population” hit by etc is not an explanation as it fails to explain Tiananmen Square and many other examples.

I would opt for “appears to be strong tradition against” f what I read in the news the past week is accurate.

The troops in T Square were drawn from the other side of the country, weren’t they? My memories there are vague. Good luck fielding an Army division in Egypt whose members don’t have family in Cairo.

Sometimes the army shoots; sometimes it doesn’t; the reasons are widely variable. These kinds of mass revolutions don’t usually work out unless they can get the Army on side or at least neutral. (See Serbia, Lebanon (complicated by later developments but still), Tunisia vs. Iran).

No, I am talking about a group such as the Muslim Brotherhood taking power and using our weapons against us. The Muslim Brotherhood are not the people to whom we sent our armaments to in the first place.

In dictatorships the military is generally 100% behind the dictator (unless/until there’s a coup or whatever). However there’s that $1.5 billion a year in the picture here so obviously that kind of money is going to buy some influence. It really looks after the announcement that the army aren’t going to fire on protestors that Mubarak will be on his way soon. What happens after that – how much power the army will want to have in whatever emerges, whether they’ll prevent and/or try and influence which politicians/groups can run for election, whether they’ll try and influence any new constitution, how Egyptians will react to percieved undemocratic actions by the military – all remain to be seen.

I’m wondering if some of it is the higher ups not wanting to give orders that will cause the rank and file to mutiny.

Like Tom Scud points out, a percentage of the troops are going to either be from Cairo or have family there, they aren’t going to want to fire on people with whom they identify.

I’d say most if not all of it is that. A general whose soldiers won’t obey his orders is no longer a general - best not risk that happening.

That is what I have read, many units were from deep rural areas.

But Egypt is 80 million+ people. I should think - not knowing anything about how Egypt constitutes its Regiments - that at least some units are largely not from Cairo or entirely not from Cairo.

Perhaps, but I am sure the a % of the Chinese troops had family in Beijing.

However, we have one data point - at least if what I read in the news is right.

In 1977 the Army refused to engage the population.

Seems to me Army tradition is a very important aspect of this. Some Armies have a ‘tradition’ of firing on own civilians. Some don’t.

The first round of troops to Tiananmen Square did, in fact, refuse to follow orders and in some cases were helping the protestors. When the government realized they were facing not just a protest, but a genuine threat to their power, they called in tougher, non-local, more experienced troops. It’s the difference between the neighborhood beat cop and the National Guard riot squad. Our course the relationship between the PLA, the Party and the government is a complicated one that you could write books about, but needless to say the crack troops knew they had a lot to gain by doing what the government told them (career advancement, etc.) and not a lot to lose, given that any new government would probably dismiss them.

In the end, though, the military is an organization of individuals making individual decisions. When they decide they have better prospects with the new guy than they old guy, they are going to work in their best interests. For example, not paying your military’s salaries is a great way to find yourself deposed in a military coup.

In this case, the demographic that is the most disaffected are young educated people facing limited life prospects. To some degree, members of the military fit that description.

Given that the Muslim Brotherhood has shown absolutely no intention to “take power” by force or otherwise, and in fact has actively stated that isn’t their plan, I’m not sure what you are worried about except for the scary sounding name.

Especially when a big chunk of his army is conscript.

Yes, it is individuals, but it is individuals who are members of a body and in which personal identity is moulded / linked to traditions.

My family is a military family - although not me personally - and tradition was and is a very strong anchor for behaviour.

There’s a big difference between China and Egypt. Big as it is, Beijing has only about 2% of the population of China. Cairo has almost 10% of the population of Egypt.

(By comparison New York is about 6% of the population of the U.S.)

Fail in what sense?

I imagine Wesley is thinking of the 2009 demonstrations, not the 1979 revolution.

Try 20% (metropolitan area).