With all of the technology and firepower that the forces fighting ISIS have trained on ISIS they still don’t seem to be destroying their capacity to fight, so what is ISIS doing that is so effective against the good guys?
Hiding in cities will certainly hinder our bombing attacks, but as soon as ISIS launches an attack we should be able to take out their tanks and heavy artillery, leaving only groups of soldiers which are difficult to deal with from the air. Why aren’t our drones more effective than they appear to be? What has ISIS figured out that most other fighters in the region haven’t? Or are we pushing them back further every day and soon there will be none of them left?
Right, but you can’t mount an attack if you are holed up in a cave. So is that what’s happening now? Is ISIS just hiding and waiting for someone to flush them out? Presumable they have to be resupplied somehow…
I would like to know how they keep all those tanks and mechanized artillery running without the huge supply chain required by modern first world armies.
ISIS soldiers don’t dress up in red tunics and march around in formed ranks. They dress and look much like any other person living in the Syria/Iraq region. From the air they are indistinguishable. Even personal weapons are not a signature because weapons are common among the general population.
Convoys of trucks could be refugees or simply trucks carrying dates, food, fodder etc.
These people are not stupid. They have known about drones for years and do their best to disguise their vehicles and positions.
They also use local populations as shields. Every time innocent locals are hit by a drone or missile strike, ISIS support grows.
We also need to realise that ISIS has brought a harsh kind of stable government to the region it controls and has popular support.
Reliable intelligence from local people - spies. Unfortunately a spy might instead point to his competitors building as an ISIS location, or be a double agent and point out a school.
Special forces soldiers infiltrate and spot targets. This is what the SAS did in the First Gulf War. Delta could do it but it does mean men on the ground.
They are predominantly a light infantry force. The media talks about all the heavy weaponry but if you really look at the stories of the fights they are light infantry fights supported by limited heavy weapons. Those weapon can have huge effects since we predominantly trained and equipped the Iraqi army as a light infantry force focused on internal security and small unit actions. It doesn’t mean they are the bulk of the force.
When they aren’t actively in a fight they can disperse and hide the heavy assets. The troops can dig holes which limit the effectiveness of air. Once they go in to the fight where ISIS forces are exposed and concentrated air power can swing the advantage to one side or the other. If you don’t have controllers on the ground to make sure you’re hitting the right side though…
I skipped addressing this part till I could confirm but it’s not this much firepower. From August 4th through November 22nd by this story they’d carried out 976 sorties with an estimated 30 more the night before publication call it 1006 total in 78 days. For some perspective the opening 24hours of the air campaign in the First Gulf War saw 2775 sorties flown. In 3.5 months the entire air campaign against ISIS has been a slow day compared to Desert Storm. Admittedly most of the strike now will be guided weapons versus dumb bombs but Desert Storm also saw things like B52 sorties against targets worthy of an entire heavy bomber load of dumb bombs.
Resupply of light infantry forces that aren’t engaged isn’t all that challenging. You can load up a good chunk of a basic load of ammo for a company size element in a car that can’t be effectively discriminated from civilian traffic. At higher levels getting and moving large quantities of ammo makes targets for air forces but that’s less of an issue when the tempo of operations is slow. Food and water become a bigger deal but for the portion of forces located in/near civilian infrastructure they can leech off that system. Fuel matters but it’s not a western mechanized force so the requirements are lower and again there’s infrastructure to leech off of. Sustained offensive operations become more challenging as resupply gets harder and is more essential as you burn through ammo at high rates. Major operations are challenging and logistics likely slows the tempo of operations for ISIS in that case. In relatively calm times it’s not nearly as challenging.
You don’t need to just hide in one hole either. You can hide for days, attack, then dig in like a tick in a couple hours. Shovels are like portable cave makers. Given the relatively slow pace of air operations the exposure is minor in the grand scheme of things.
This reality is why so much effort is being expended to design and improve drones. Air power changed warfare irreversibly, but it isn’t a constant presence on the battlefield. Drones can not only be located and launched from closer to, and faster to, a potential target, but the ‘pilot’ operating it remotely can be swapped out for a fresher, more alert one without breaking off patrols, and because they’re lighter they can have endurance far longer than conventional manned aircraft.
If we ever reach the point drones can maintain 24-7 coverage of extended territory, it’s going to change warfare in a distinct way. There are no longer windows of time to perform overt activity- you have to either maintain cover literally all of the time, or be forced to begin every action, even resupply, by deploying anti air weapons. Insurgents might still be around, but they won’t enjoy the same advantages.
In theory this is correct. However a century of real-world warfare tells a different story. There is no substitute for the man on the ground. If it were otherwise then armies would have no need of inserted covert soldiers, yet they are still trained and valued. Indeed there would be no work for the common soldier but in reality they are needed.
Drones, aeroplanes, helicoptors et al are remote from the actual people sought. The only person who can be certain is the man with eyes-on and that is very difficult to put in place.
In case you aren’t convinced, consider the three sadly failed recent rescue attempts of Western hostages. Drones probably helped but those people are still dead.