John Rawls' Contractarianism?

OK this is for a paper in my Ethics class, and I know you don’t do homework for people, but I just need clarification of Contractarianism.

I’ve read my notes and the book, but I’m still a little confused. Basically for this paper, I was given a story. An up-and-coming reporter gets an assignment to do some investigative reporting. A local health food store is allegedly changing labels on their produce from “genetically modified, or containing genetically modified ingredients” to “this product has not been genetically modified, and contains no genetically modified ingredients.” She’s supposed to get a job there in order to get pictures or other documentation for this story. To do this, she’d have to lie on her application and leave out the fact that she worked as a reporter. She doesn’t think it’s the right thing to do, because “Our reputation has been built on honesty and integrity, so how can I start out by lying on the application?” I’m supposed to resolve the ethical issue using deontology, contractarianism, and egoism. The other 2 I understand.

So can someone explain Contractarianism? I understand the veil of ignorance and things like that, but my book says “According to Rawls, the best model for ethical thinking is an open rational discussion among all parties involved to reach an ideal, perfect and fair contract, if possible.” Does that mean that the reporters, the employees at the store, and the customers sit down and right out a contract? That makes no sense at all. It seems like ethical decision making would be a real pain in the ass.

I’m not really sure what they want. Rawls typically is seen as a political philosopher, not an ethicist, even though his basic instrumentarium has been adopted by many (such as Normal Daniels) to derive a theory of ethics, based on reflective equilibrium.

I think they mean that you should derive a principle that would have some bearing on this case by imagining what moral principles people would adopt behind the veil of ignorance. In other words: what moral principles would be adopted by rational agents in a contractual situation.

This gets close to deontology, and indeed, I tend to lump Rawls (who is a bit of a Kantian) into deontology.

I’ll happily make way for a different interpretation of the question.

well, before I started re-reading my notes and all, I thought that contractarianism was similar to utilitarianism, in the “protecting the most vulnerable” sense. You know, make sure you do what’s good for everyone, or as many people as possible.

I thought that with contractarianism, lying would be justified, because lying would allow you to expose a potentially harmful situation to the public. I dunno, the more I read about it, the less it makes sense.

No, ‘contractarianism’ (which is not common term, I’m used to seeing ‘contratualism’) is quite the opposite of utilitarianism. The latter has as supreme norm the greatests good for the greatest number.

Rawls took the position that your acts should be guided by the principles a rational group of people would choose in the ‘original position’, behind the veil of ignorance. If the application of these principles would in fact lead to a lesser good than could be achieved by a strict utilitarian calculation, he would still favor the principle. BTW, rule-utilitarianism can get quite close to this position as well.

The tricky part is that Rawls theory is meant for deciding on the basic structure of society. It is not so very good for deriving concrete ethical principles. A general rule against lying would be more acceptable than no rule against lying, but you could also envisage a rule with several exceptions, which seems even more attractive.

BTW, leafing through Rachels, I see a definition that might be of use to you. He defines (on p. 152, refering to Hobbes) Social Contract theory of morals as the idea that morality consists in the set of rules governing how people are to treat one another, that rational people will agree to accept, for their mutual benefit, on the condition that others follow those rules as well.

ok it’s starting to make more sense, but I’ve got another question. In my notes I wrote that it’s non-consequentialist. But then my book gives an example of affirmative action regarding the “diference” principle- “inequalities are justified only if they benefit the worst off.” That sounds like a consequentialist theory to me- you’re looking at the consequences of an action.
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Yes, you’re right. It is non-consequentialist. However, it does discount the consequences, but not in the specific case but only in the general case, as seen in the original position.

Come to think of it, it is even more subtle than that. A rule such as affirmative action (Rawls has other examples, though) is acceptable not because the aggregate utility is the most of all alternatives (which need not be the case), but because it is acceptable to everyone in the original position, since everyone benefits in comparison to alternatives, even if the benefits are not spread equally. Consequentialism is (mostly) maximizing for the aggregate, while contractualism is maxi-min IIRC: it maximizes the result for the least well off.

ok it’s starting to make more sense, but I’ve got another question. In my notes I wrote that it’s non-consequentialist. But then my book gives an example of affirmative action regarding the “diference” principle- “inequalities are justified only if they benefit the worst off.” That sounds like a consequentialist theory to me- you’re looking at the consequences of an action.
:confused:

I see my previous post also answered your last question, and even before you posted it. Yay me! :wink:

Now go off and write that paper, you.