Look up the meaning of the words misdemeanor and felony. They are very helpful terms with clear distinctions.
Yes. Exactly correct.
Thanks much for the clarification.
DGF
…let me add: “In the Ninth Circuit.” 
Can you clarify your prior assertion about the stance of the Fourth Circuit? Is it reliant solely on Street v. Surdyka?
No… it rests on a line of Supreme Court cases: Terry itself simply refers to a valid stop “In approving the limited search for weapons, or “frisk,” of an individual the police reasonably believed to be armed and dangerous, the Court implicitly acknowledged the authority of the police to make a forcible stop of a person when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” (Quoting US v. Placer).
United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411 at note 2 (1981) (“Of course, an officer may stop and question a person if there are reasonable grounds to believe that person is wanted for past criminal conduct…”)
None of the progeny cases drew a line between felonies and misdemeanors. The Fourth Circuit has (so far as I can discern) never addressed a subsequent case that called for that distinction. Three circuits have:
Sixth, in Gaddis ex rel Gaddis v. Redford Township, 364 F.3d 763 (2004) – per se rule excluding misdemeanors.
Ninth, in Grigg.
Tenth, in US v. Moran, 503 F.3d 1135 (2007) - balancing test: “Several facts are essential to our holding: the officers had reasonable suspicion that Mr. Moran repeatedly committed the very same crime in question (criminal trespass on the Fergusons’ property); the officers received a report of the same crime earlier on the day of the stop; a reasonable officer could conclude that Mr. Moran was likely to repeat the crime in the future; the specific nature of the trespass and Mr. Moran’s reported history with the Fergusons and Pattersons indicated a threat to public safety; and the officers encountered Mr. Moran just minutes after the crime allegedly occurred. These facts implicate the governmental interest discussed above, which when balanced against the brief and nonintrusive nature of an investigatory traffic stop, render the officers’ actions in seizing Mr. Moran reasonable.”
Let me see if I have got this right: Starting at one extreme we have consensual encounters. A LEO can walk up to Daniele Watts and ask her for her ID. She can then say “Is this a consensual encounter, or a Terry stop ?”, and the LEO can’t legally say it is a Terry stop if he/she has no grounds for a Terry stop. (Additionally and sneakily, they also don’t have to directly answer “It is consensual. You are free to go.” in the alternative.) If they do have a basis for the Terry stop, they can detain you, they don’t have to explain their reasonable suspicions, probable cause or other justifications (at that time) and in most states you don’t have any right to resist what you might think is a false arrest or unreasonable detainment.
The reasonable basis for Terry stops is still confusing to me. On the one hand it seems that in the 9th Circuit, if the LEO has a reasonable suspicion that a felony has been committed, or that a misdemeanor is ongoing or an escalating threat to public safety, they can (start ?) make a Terry stop. But Bricker also said, in the part I quoted, that a 911 call gives reasonable suspicion. To do what, to start a Terry stop? Or is it to go all the way and do the part of the Terry stop where the LEO briefly detains and requires the party identify themself? If it does not got that far and gives the LEO only the right to initiate a Terry stop… well what does that even mean? What part of a Terry stop goes beyond a consensual encounter, but does not allow you to ask for ID?
In the above, Bricker corrected someone by pointing out that even if the LEO justified their stop under prostitution, when the only reasonable charge was public lewdness, they can later testify to the reasonable suspicion of lewdness to justify the stop. But is it the case that the only reasonable suspicion that LEOs can use for Terry stops is the one given by the 911 caller? Surely the caller is not expected to know whether the behavior they complain of is a felony, misdemeanor or code violation. Even if a dispatcher is, they can’t reasonably be expected to come up with all possible felonies and … special… misdemeanors that fit with what the caller has said. So when the LEO arrives at the scene, can they use the totality of the circumstances and their experience to decide what is things can be reasonably suspected? Can they use general facts, or do they need a specific fact about the parties they meet? What if for example, the responding LEO in this instance later were to testify: “In my experience, 97% of the public lewdness cases where I a complainant reports a black woman having sex in a parked car in the daytime are cases of prostitution.”
*LAPD and ACLU disagree about whether Daniele Watts had to show her ID -
The Los Angeles Police Department and the ACLU of Southern California have a serious difference of opinion on the matter. LAPD spokesman Andy Neiman told me she was required by law to identify herself; Peter Bibring, director of police practices for the ACLU of Southern California, said she was not.
“If officers have stopped you with a reasonable suspicion or they received a radio call about a crime suspected to be in progress — like there are people having sex in their car with the door open — they can demand ID," said Neiman. "You can’t have sex in public, it’s a violation of Penal Code 647A, lewd and lascivious acts.”
Bibring disagreed. “The LAPD says. ‘If we are investigating a crime, you have to show us your identification.’ To put it bluntly, that is not true."
When Watts refused to produce her ID, said Bibring, the officer had a decision to make. Since the alleged lewd act was no longer in progress, he could either let her go or continue to investigate it, which would involve asking the person who complained to come forward to make a complaint — technically, a citizen’s arrest. If the complainant declined (Neiman told me that, in his 28 years of policing, he has never seen anyone make a citizens arrest over consensual sex), he can’t detain her for simply refusing to produce her ID.
“In California,” said Bibring, “an officer cannot arrest someone for refusing to provide identification, even if you are being investigated for a crime*.”…
Bibring mentions that you have to show some form of identification but it’s only required that a person verbally identify themselves. ("Hello. My name is Inigo Montoya.)
It appears that the LAPD doesn’t accept the Grigg ruling AND the ACLU-type organizations are not challenging the issue in court (that I’m aware of 
). It appears that if the LAPD are investigating a reasonable suspicion, felony or misdemeanor, suspects can verbally identify themselves, or the suspects can be detained for a reasonable time period in an attempt to identify them. “No, no, no,” says the ACLU, without putting their pro bono where their mouth is. Who ya gonna believe, the guy with the handcuffs, radio, and a nice comfy cell, or the rights organization standing on the sidelines saying, “YOU shouldn’t let them do that to you”?
Could this be because the Grigg ruling is weak law and could be overturned by the next court? Is there some Department of Defense, Homeland Security, or Justice Dept. rule/regulation that the LAPD is relying on or the ACLU wants to avoid? Can the LAPD simply refuse to recognize Grigg?
How is the ACLU going to challenge the matter? On principle? Who has standing?
Grigg was a 9th Circuit decision, so your statement that it was weak law makes no sense. The law is the Fourth Amendment. And do you not know what the “next court” would be?
You sure write a lot for someone of such great ignorance.
The ACLU could represent Watts. The case certainly seems fairly straight forward. Either Grigg is the law under the 9th’s jurisdiction or it isn’t. The LAPD doesn’t seem to think much of the misdemeanor with no public safety issue exception.
Even under the 4th Amendment, police can detain, for identification purposes, someone suspected of a felony. The Grigg ruling seams to have separated the detention for identification of misdemeanors based on whether or not there is an ongoing public safety issue.
My “statement” about Grigg possibly being a weak law was actually a “question”. Which is why I chose to use a question mark at the end of the sentence.
The “next court” could be any petit court under the jurisdiction of the 9th Circuit that disagrees with Grigg. Up to the 9th and then on to the SCOTUS. Maybe.
The 9th Circuit was not the first, nor the only, court to find a distinction between misdemeanors and felonies on this issue.
Grigg isn’t a law, weak or otherwise. Schoolhouse Rock should have taught you that legislatures write laws.
Except Watts isn’t being charged with anything that would require a challenge to the Grigg decision. She’s being charged with public lewdness. The police never saw her commit the act; the charge is perforce based on testimony and photographic evidence from witnesses from before the police arrived. The question of whether the police detained Watts in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights isn’t relevant to those charges.
Yes, for completed misdemeanors. Police may still detain a person about to commit, or in the process of committing, a misdemeanor.
I have no idea what the phrase “weak law,” means. Grigg is the precedential caselaw in the Ninth Circuit. Any trial court in the Ninth is bound to apply it, and I challenge you to discover any example of the failure of any court to do so.
The Ninth can overrule itself, of course, and the Supreme Court can overrule the Ninth, but so far, that hasn’t happened.
(post compressed)
It’s been claimed that the LAPD didn’t have the authority to detain Watts in this particular circumstance. It’s the LAPD that doesn’t seem to accept the Grigg ruling. I question why they don’t.
Watts, and an ACLU-style organization, can challenge the LAPD’s detention policy. Was Watts illegally detained or wasn’t she? In a city the size of LA, it would be remarkable that this is the only instance of a similar LAPD detainment over the last seven years. I agree with you that any court in the 9th is bound to apply Grigg but the LAPD and the LA prosecutor’s office (or whatever it’s called) doesn’t seem to have done so. Some part(s) of this puzzle is missing. I publically wonder why the LAPD hasn’t incorporated the Grigg ruling in their rules, regulations, and training.
While it’s not a technical legal term, I used the term “weak law” to suggest that another court might not agree with the Grigg ruling of separating a completed misdemeanor with no public safety issues from a completed misdemeanor with public safety issues. I consider a “strong law” to be a law that is much less likely to be overturned (or have a challenge to it accepted by the SCOTUS if it should get that far).
Then I’ll use the term Grigg ruling in the future.
The LAPD doesn’t seem to have accepted the Grigg ruling. I wonder why. How is this possible? What part of the puzzle is missing? Schoolhouse Rock never covered the detainment of assholes who walk away from police interviews.
Is this correct regarding Terry stops:
If the LAPD are to be the complainants, the ones that observe what they will claim is illegality, and they have a reasonable suspicion that someone has committed a felony, they can do a Terry stop. If they have a reasonable suspicion of a misdemeanor that threatens public safety or threatens to escalate, they can make a Terry stop.
Now LAPD is in the 9th circuit, so they may think they can make a Terry stop for misdemeanors like playing music too loud, but Grigg says they can’t. The recent posts question why LAPD doesn’t know or agree with this, but right now I don’t really care about Grigg or not. I wan’t to know what happens when the police are not the complainants. Someone has called 911. **Bricker **says this provided reasonable suspicion. Is that true, and if so, reasonable suspicion of what ? Is it anything that may then occur to officers on the scene? If the LAPD is called for something that sounds like public lewdness, but then they see blood spattered around, can they do a Terry stop on reasonable suspicion of a felony?
Finally, does every Terry stop include the right to ask for ID? It seems that every TS includes the right to frisk.
A court in another circuit may not agree with the reasoning, to be sure.
The LAPD is going to do what it can get away with. In fact, even when the seizure law is crystal clear, police officers routinely flout it. Youtube is loaded with videos in which police stop people for carrying guns, in states where such conduct is absolutely legal, and demand ID. These videos have a common theme: the officer strongly insists on ID, the videographer keeps repeating he hasn’t done anything illegal and often cites court cases to the officer.
The problem is that any given person has very little in the way of damages, and a suit for a five-minute detention just doesn’t make financial sense. I suppose the ACLU could get behind a sympathetic plaintiff, but their budget is not infinite and there are better causes to champion.
Yes.
The answer is: totality of the circumstances. The information relayed by the 911 caller, together with the officers’ observations and all inferences fairly drawn therefrom, constitute the circumstances that must provide reasonable suspicion of a felony, misdemeanor in progress, or completed misdemeanor involving public safety.
The right to frisk only exists if, in addition to reasonable suspicion of a crime, the officer can point to specific articulable facts that made him concerned for his safety.
The point of a Terry stop is a brief investigative detention to allow the police time to confirm or dispel their reasonable suspicion. They do have the right to ask for ID, and a person that witholds his identity can cause his detention to be extended while the police continue to investigate.
Is there a strict definition of this? As in, misdemeanors X,Y and Z are PS issues, and A,B and C are not?
Two people having sex in public doesn’t directly injure anyone. However, if the dude’s plowing his GF on the hood of his car, parked on the side of the road, they’re creating a distraction for drivers, and might cause an accident.
With Grigg, it was a loud radio, which doesn’t seem to present a safety issue directly or indirectly, it’s entirely a nuisance.
This is why “comply, then sue” is not a practical solution in most situations involving law breaking cops. Even if someone could show monetary damages for cop harassment, they’d have to give up a lot of their time and money just to make that case in court. So if we subject ourselves to this philosophy,this means that cops can pretty much get away with whatever they want as long as they pick on someone too broke or too busy to sue them. Which is almost everyone.
If you’re not damaged enough to make it worth suing, then not enough harm has been done to you to make it worth making a fuss about.
Either the cops have done an egregious wrong, in which case it’s worth suing and getting compensation for that wrong, or they haven’t, in which case there’s no issue. But yes, cops - or anyone else - can get away with almost anything as long as it doesn’t cause enough harm to anyone else to be bothered with.