Regarding giving the name and address, I think the case law is pretty clear that the State may demand such information.
In this case petitioner’s refusal to disclose his name was not based on any articulated real and appreciable fear that his name would be used to incriminate him, or that it “would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute” him. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951). As best we can tell, petitioner refused to identify himself only because he thought his name was none of the officer’s business. Even today, petitioner does not explain how the disclosure of his name could have been used against him in a criminal case. While we recognize petitioner’s strong belief that he should not have to disclose his identity, the Fifth Amendment does not override the Nevada Legislature’s judgment to the contrary absent a reasonable belief that the disclosure would tend to incriminate him.
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada, Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177, 190–91 (2004).
Whenever the Court is confronted with the question of a compelled disclosure that has an incriminating potential, the judicial scrutiny is invariably a close one. Tension between the State’s demand for disclosures and the protection of the right against self-incrimination is likely to give rise to serious questions. Inevitably these must be resolved in terms of balancing the public need on the one hand, and the individual claim to constitutional protections on the other; neither interest can be treated lightly.
[…]
Disclosure of name and address is an essentially neutral act. Whatever the collateral consequences of disclosing name and address, the statutory purpose is to implement the state police power to regulate use of motor vehicles.
California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 427-32 (1971).
However when it comes to demanding an explanation, if an explanation would constitute an admission of criminal activity, and if the answer is actually used to punish or prosecute the individual, I think that would violate the 5th Amendment.
Here, Martinez was never made to be a “witness” against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Self–Incrimination Clause because his statements were never admitted as testimony against him in a criminal case. Nor was he ever placed under oath and exposed to “ ‘the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt.’ ” Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974) (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964)). The text of the Self–Incrimination Clause simply cannot support the Ninth Circuit’s view that the mere use of compulsive questioning, without more, violates the Constitution.
[…]
We fail to see how Martinez was any more “compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself” than an immunized witness forced to testify on pain of contempt. One difference, perhaps, is that the immunized witness knows that his statements will not, and may not, be used against him, whereas Martinez likely did not. But this does not make the statements of the immunized witness any less “compelled” and lends no support to the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that coercive police interrogations, absent the use of the involuntary statements in a criminal case, violate the Fifth Amendment’s Self–Incrimination Clause. Moreover, our cases provide that those subjected to coercive police interrogations have an automatic protection from the use of their involuntary statements (or evidence derived from their statements) in any subsequent criminal trial. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307–308, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985); United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558, 74 S.Ct. 716, 98 L.Ed. 948 (1954); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 155, 64 S.Ct. 921, 88 L.Ed. 1192 (1944). See also Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 278, 103 S.Ct. 608, 74 L.Ed.2d 430 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment); Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 662, 91 S.Ct. 1148, 28 L.Ed.2d 388 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in result). This protection is, in fact, coextensive with the use and derivative use immunity mandated by Kastigar when the government compels testimony from a reluctant witness. See 406 U.S., at 453, 92 S.Ct. 1653. Accordingly, the fact that Martinez did not know his statements could not be used against him does not change our view that no violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Self–Incrimination Clause occurred here.
Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767-70 (2003).
That being said, the only case I can find that references a compelled explanation under the Alabama stop & frisk statute is this dicta,
Under the facts of this case, Officer Neville acted appropriately in investigating the situation. Even without the threat of domestic violence, Officer Neville would have been authorized to stop and investigate. The appellant and his companion had stopped their vehicle in the middle of a public roadway and had turned on the hazard lights—a signal that often indicates that a motorist is in distress. Officer Neville had no way of knowing whether the situation involved simply a motorist in distress or something more sinister, such as domestic violence. Under these facts, he would have been remiss had he not stopped to investigate. Once he stopped, he was entitled to obtain an explanation of the situation from the appellant and his companion. See § 15–5–30, Code of Alabama 1975.
State v. Mitchell, 722 So. 2d 814, 821 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) (emphasis added).
The Mitchell court did not go into further details because under the facts of the case, the police did not demand an explanation but observed the defendant visibly intoxicated and arrested him for driving under the influence. Self-incrimination was not a consideration in that case.
So ultimately, for me, I would use a two part test.
- Would the explanation incriminate the individual, and if so,
- Has the explanation been used against him? (including as probable cause for arrest, where before there was only reasonable suspicion)
As a counterexample, I would say the police could compel an individual to disclose where he hid a bomb with only reasonable suspicion to go on, and thus prevent a tragedy, but they couldn’t use any testimony or evidence resulting from that admission to arrest or prosecute the individual, or even extend his detention.
~Max