Militarily speaking (tactics/strategy) how could Iraq be handled better?

Great Debates
1

I realize that it is easy to be an armchair general but I find myself wondering if the situation in Iraq could be handled better by the military, when I see patrols picked off such as this: http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/ap/20040621/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_18

Sometimes I ask myself what famous generals from the past would have done such as Genghis Khan, Sherman, Alexandar the Great ect. I suppose they had different ethics that allowed them to be more brutal but still I wonder if tactically and strategically there are better ways to handle the situation. Any ideas? More troops and larger patrols? Systematic sweeps of all homes? Cordon off all cities? Or hand over responsibility to the Iraqi’s and hope for the best? How does one defeat urban guerrillas?

2

Most ancient conquering armies who wished to retain the lands (the Mongols being a prime example) left the people pretty much alone. They let local rulers maintain their positions (under Mongol authority, of course) and collected a tribute off the top. This meant that they didn’t have to waste time and manpower enforcing their rule - given that there were amazingly few Mongols for an empire as vast as theirs, they could never have done a conventional conquest.

But what you want to look at isn’t how they did it - it is for how long they maintained peace afterwards. The empire of Alexander the Great was brilliant, but short (though vestives remained as autonomous states for some time).

As far as Iraq goes, we should have probably left most of their army intact on the lower levels, and used them to enforce rule, not American troops. Maybe a more crude and less than ideal solution, but better from an American point of view. We lack the manpower to patrol the entire country, and the more control we try to exert, the more resistence we will face.

One of the funnier things is that Saddam was targetted largely for gassing “his own people” - people he ironically viewed as (and who sometimes were) terrorists. We vastly underestimated the political scene in Iraq, and our military was simply unprepared for the kind of urban guerilla warfare it is engaged in now.

Frankly, we should have known, since the same thing happened in Afghanistan (which we also don’t control, but shhhhhhhh).

3

WTF is a vestive?

sighs and takes another Advil

4

Even in the not-so-ancient world, the typical play in the Middle East was to completely obliterate one city that resisted as a message to the others.

5

I think there is a modern precedent for what we facein Iraq…consider the case of General (later Marshal) Hubert Lyauty , the French general who “pacified” Algeria in the 1920’s. What the general did: he announced to all of the local leaders that french rule was to be unchallenged, and disloyalty wouldbe deverely punished. Small local rebellions soon started up, and the army’s response was ruthless…rebellious villages were burnt to the ground, and rebels were captured and hung The bodies were left hanging, both to mock islamic practice and to terrify other potential rebels. In the cities, rebels were rounded upin mass arrestes, and the ringleaders executed (or sent to “Devils Island”-in French Guinea). Attacks upon French soldiers were responded to savagely…and entire village was torched in response to the killing o fone soldier. In contrast . those who accepted French rule were given government jobs and good salaries.
When it was all over, the rebel movement had vanished…and over 200,000 algerians were dead or in jail. The general got promoted to Field Marshal, and retired to France.
Are we ruthless enough to do this? I don’t think so…so we had better prepare to be leaving…around June 30th! :frowning:

6

Cut the losses, walk away now, and promise not to do such a stupid thing again.

7

Not exactly.

When it was REALLY, all over, the children of those 200,000 Algerians grew up and sent the French to hell.

The paradoxical weakness of collective punishment, as described in it’s most complete and ruthless form, is that the collectively punished, being unable to discern any more wrongdoing on their part than attached to the busboys at the Windows on the World, take it amiss that they are being punished for being in the wrong place (bad village) at the wrong time.

Every time another doper fulminates about "nuking all the blahblabadyblah terrorists and all of their friends and families and anyone who speaks their language, etc…the proclaim their strategic unity with Al-Quaida.

He, after all, is at least quasi-apologetic when he calls for collective punishment of the west.

8

Zagadka pretty much nailed it in my view.

Rather than taking pictures of naked insurgents jerking off, this administration would have done much better by trying to treat them with just a little more dignity and making an effort to include them in the new government.

9

Have you all forgotten that the purpose, the alleged one anyway, was their liberation? Most of the replies here have dealt with how a *conquest * would be successful, for a time. A discussion of military methods is beside the point, other than to emphasize that they should be in support of letting the locals feel in control of their own affairs, not suppression of that sentiment.

10

I spent about 6 months in Iraq last year and will be going back soon, probably next month.

I think the Americans should have a) deployed more troops early on to establish order and b) adopted a “go softly” approach similar to that used by the Brits in the south.

In general, British troups do not tear around the countryside buttoned up in armored vehicles, don’t wear a lot of body armor, try to mingle more with the populace, and have more restrictive rules governing the use of deadly force than the Americans.

I saw an incident in Basra where a British soldier got into an altercation with a local mob and someone in the mob made a grab for the British soldier’s rifle. The event devolved into a big fistfight between British soldiers and the mob, but not one shot was fired. I think it was resolved in a way that minimized violence and resentment by the locals.

In Baghdad, I saw two Iraqi construction workers get into a shoving match/beginnings of a fistfight as two US soldiers were walking by. One of the GI raised his M16, pointed at the heads of the construction workers and screamed (in English): STOP FIGHTING! over and over. If ever a moment was a metaphor for our occupation in Iraq, that was it.

When I was there, I worked with an Arab American and when we traveled together, the difference in the way he was treated by British and US troops was as different as night and day. The British troops in general were much more respectful while the US troops were pretty rude/disrespectful until they saw the US passport.

I think this is an issue of US troops not being trained for nor having the same kind of experience as British troops.

11

It’s gotta speak to leadership too, I should think.

12

I thought that my proposal was much more friendly to this idea.

Put bluntly, the seeds of democracy are not sown overnight. While there have certainly been some notable historical cases, you generally can’t topple a dictatorship and expect a democracy to grow up suddenly. Thus, the best way to go about it is to leave as much of the state as you are willing in place, even if you dislike them (this was done with Nazi Germany and Japan), and replace the facets more slwoly, over time, in a more stable manner.

Running in and declaring anarchy is NOT the best concept for liberation.

13

Zagadka hit the nail on the head. By dismanteling the Iraq army they left Bushco with no choice but to continually put our troops in harms way. Whose idea was this anyway?

If nothing else, the fear of the Iraqi army by the populace might have stopped some of the violence.

14

Be safe. Home soon, and God bless.

15

The people who have to think so are in Iraq, not here.

Put bluntly, the seeds of democracy are not sown overnight. While there have certainly been some notable historical cases, you generally can’t topple a dictatorship and expect a democracy to grow up suddenly.
[/quote]
That steers clear of the root of the problem. Democracy can’t grow at all unless that’s what the people are ready for, and want more than anything else. We don’t know that and still don’t, Bush just assumed it, and so do you. I would point out that there is no precedent for successful democracy being imposed externally, or left behind by well-meaning occupiers for that matter. Look at the history of postwar decolonization and the crop of dictatorships that arose in place of the in-name-only democracies left behind by the colonial powers. Look at even Japan, for that matter, with the industrial elites running the permanent-fixture LP the same way they’d run the wartime government.

If what the various Iraqi peoples want more than anything else is *first * is to get an occupying power out, and then they’ll work out the rest (even if it means partition), then we need to consider complying.

But you’re right about the willy-nilly destruction of the institutions. That was utterly without merit, even if it would have been hard to clean them out of the fascist-Baathists that had been running them.

As to the more-direct question in the OP:let’s listen to the Army Chief of Staff:

16

Reeder, Bremer was the official who issued the order to dismantle the Iraqi army. There have been reports that it was ordered from higher up in the administration, but I’m not sure if that is confirmed.

There is little doubt, however, that when the final history of the US occupation of Iraq is written that the dismantling of the Iraq military so quickly after the conflict will be deemed one of the biggest mistakes. The Atlantic Monthly had a good article on the planning leading up to and immediately after the war a couple of issues ago called “Blind Into Baghdad” which I think did a good job of capturing some of the mistakes made.

I think there are two questions that could be asked about the tactics IMHO(at least two questions): What could have been done differently? and What can we change about our tactics now?

Looking at the present, I think internationalizing the occupation, or at least giving the coalition a UN mandate is a step in the right direction. It gives the presence a legitimacy in the eyes of Iraqis that has been missing up to now. I’m not sure if it will be too little too late though, I hope not.

Gorsnak I agree with you that it speaks to leadership. I think there was a fundamental misunderstanding within the administration about what our military is good at. Defeating a military on the batttlefield and winning the peace are two very different missions and I think they got lumped together by some of the civilian leadership.

I think the US will need to make several major steps to start to rebuild trust with the Iraqi people. I think one such step should be a series of truth and reconcilation hearings similar to what South Africa, Peru and other countries have held.

Often, at these hearings, perpetrators of misdeeds testify fully as to their role in atrocities and lesser misdeeds in exchange for immunity from prosecution. I think the US should sponsor truth and reconciliation commisions at which US personnel testify about their misdeeds (prisoner abuse as well as avoidable civilian deaths, abuse of power, etc.) alongside members of the Hussein regime who would testify about their misdeeds. The hearings would be public and televised and would allow for victims to testify as well.

I know this is a bitter pill to swallow for the US but I think it is necessary. It would also help put US misdeeds in perspective by putting it next to Hussein era abuse.

elucidator thanks for your well wishes, right back at you.

17

I think the emphasis on rebuilding the Iraqi Army wrong… I feel internal security should be a police matter and that police forces should receive the true emphasis.

Armies are for external threats mostly… and the emphasis on the army means that Bushie and Co. are thinking about controlling insurgents more than establishing order through Iraqis.

Security against external threats is easily done by US troops. Eventually an Iraqi army will be necessary of course.

As for the OP... either you go soft and nice peacekeeping or you go Algeria style counter insurgency.
18

I agree entirely - see my thread, Development of Culture about the folly of introducing industrialization and democracy into cultures that aren’t prepared for them.

Well, this is the tricky part. We could easily leave, and a cruel theocracy could easily take its place, in which case we have done a vast disservice to the region and caused many more problems (for them and us). As it stands, already, we have tens of thousands of people already pissed as hell at us for killing their family members, millions for invading their country. Odds that one Osama will crop up from those? Pretty good, I think.

That is where I propose institution something more along the lines of a “temporary” constitutional monarchy. I mean, a real old school one, not like England’s. And even if it is a theocracy. Find the most capable leader, give him a decent constitution to work under, some basic checks and balances, and let them develop the rest. Foistering democracy straight onto them isn’t going to work, or if it does, will only work after a lot of force. Square peg, round hole.

19

Well, I think that is their problem; they want to use the army for internal peacekeeping.

The way Bushco sees it, we invade, there are insurgents. You use the army to put down insurgents, but you don’t want US casualties, so you use a new Iraqi army. Stupid, but so is Bush.

For what it is worth, I’ve seen several articles on the training of the new Iraqi police forces. Lots of urban combat training, though I think that is shortsighted. As it stands, the Iraqi police forces are inept and corrupt, where they exist. Where they don’t, it is basically warlords (hence the above need for the army).

20

Well, Iraq went to shit overnight again.

http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=514&e=1&u=/ap/20040624/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_62

I swear, Kimmitt is earning “Asshole of the Year” award.