I did not repeat it.
And, thanks for the explanation. But we are riflemen.
I strongly believe that 85% of Marine boot camp is just being told how amazing the Marine Corps is and why it’s just so spectacular to be a Marine. It’s as if they spend more time learning how great they are rather than actually learning how to be great.
That’s the impression I get from US Marines, UK Marines, and ROK Marines! Too bad they’re not learning how to be accurate. :rolleyes:
With facts or rifles.
Ex MP here, OIF and OEF vet. I’ve had a 74D, CBRNE specialist jump in the turret before. Also not uncommon to see 25U, commo, driving trucks or manning a crew served. In Afghanistan, my platoon lived on a police substation with the AUP, about 30 of us-- our cook and medic would guard 1 of the 3 towers we had just like the rest of us. Our cook would drive or gun-- didn’t matter to him; he wanted to.
When I was a gunner in Iraq, my truck commander/team leader was a medic (there was another medic in the squad). We were in the unit commander’s squad. We had PAC (Personnel actions clerk), supply-- all types of MOSes drive or gun. A cook was the commanders driver. Seasoned vet, on her fourth of fifth deployment. Very tactically sound. My old units have always been big on drivers training and pushing mostly everyone to qualify on as many weapons systems as possible, without discrimination. You got two thumbs and two eyes? Here, qual on this M2.
How did that work?
“I’ll kill you, then I’ll kill you again!” It’s like having Mo from Calvin & Hobbes as your platoon sergeant.
Not very well. The Americans tended to keep units and formations in combat for the longest time, bringing in replacements for losses. In theory this meant that the unit and or formation could remain in battle longer, in practice it reduced morale, broke down bonds between troops, as often men went into combat with newbies they had never met, while loasing comrades, and also meant that units tended to become less experienced as the battle wore on, and veterans were replaced by greenhorns. Notably, the British, and the US Army Pacific did not do this.
(If you are wondering, 100% and above losses occurred as over several campaigns casualties rose, and were made good by replacements. If a battalion has 800 men, it might easily suffer 2000 casulaties from Africa to the Elbe, with losses made up with fresh troops, and occasionally recovered soldiers).
The mission of the infantry is to close with the enemy by means of fire maneuver in order to kill or capture him, or to repel his assault with fire, close combat and counter attack.
Well, there is that phrase “the exigencies of the Service”, which can explain/justify things from an Electronics Technician peeling potatoes and scrubbing pots to carrying the mortar’s base plate on a patrol. That’s why I got off the plane as Infantry and left the airbase as Cavalry. And all US Army basic training graduates are classified as Basic Light Infantrymen. Probably the Marines have an equivalent. And I recall reading about the Marines in the Pacific having to send out Bakers and Musicians with rifles to do infantry stuff.
On the other hand, they’re not going to take a private fresh out of boot camp and make him a Gunner on a tank. The entry level position on an M-1 Abrams is Loader. Though on an M-4 Sherman as featured in Fury, there was an “Assistant Driver” who sat to the right of the driver firing a machine gun. Anyone who had minimal training on a Browning 1919 .30 cal could handle that. But he was NOT the Gunner.
The replacements for casualties themselves become casualties and are replaced who in turn themselves become casualties and are replaced…
The authorized strength of a US Infantry Division in WWII was 15,245 on 1 June 1941, later being reduced to 14,253 on 15 July 1943 and finally 14,037 on 24 Jan 1945. The ten US Divisions with the highest number of casualties in the war were:
[ul]
[li]25,977 3rd Infantry Division[/li][li]23,277 9th Infantry Division[/li][li]22,660 4th Infantry Division[/li][li]20,993 45th Infantry Division[/li][li]20,659 1st Infantry Division[/li][li]20,620 29th Infantry Division[/li][li]19,466 36th Infantry Division[/li][li]19,200 90th Infantry Division[/li][li]18,446 30th Infantry Division[/li][li]17,087 80th Infantry Division[/li][/ul]It gets worse when you consider that about 90% of the casualties fell on the 27 rifle companies of a division, which had between them an authorized strength of 5,184 (rifle company strength remained constant when the authorized size of the division was reduced in 1943 and 1945).
Because the projections of casualty rates were so skewed, a number of divisions in the US still in training were stripped of personnel to provide replacements, some of them twice, so they didn’t even have to leave the US to suffer over 100% ‘casualties’ of a sort. From here:
3rd, 9th, 4th, 1st, 36th all fought in Africa and or Sicily ahd or Italy, in addition to NW Europe. 29th, 90th and 4th were all assault division on D-Day.
What caused such high casualties to 30th and 80th?
That’s a Marine Corps concept I was explaining above, about all enlisted Marines regardless of technical training in typing or avionics or cooking or arty FDC also qualifying annually with a rifle, and as such being basic riflemen. After finishing boot camp, all Marines attend basic infantry training, again regardless of MOS. They started this shortly after I finished basic in 1980, so while I didn’t get that training, I got some of it years later at the staff academy held at the School of Infantry at Camp Lejeune. We Marines are certainly not claiming this concept is unique to the Marine Corps, and Basic Light Infantrymen might be the USA equivalent.
That’s not a real thing either.
That is unique. I did’t know that. It certainly gives more credence to their every Marine a rifleman mantra.
After 13 weeks of boot camp (and please note that for the Army, basic training is 10 weeks), Marine graduates get 10 days of leave. Then, before going for their MOS training, all enlisted Marines attend the SOI: School of Infantry. For non-infantry Marines that lasts 29 days. For the east coast it’s at Camp Geiger (at Camp Lejeune, NC, where the SNCO Academy was that I attended in the early 1990s), and for the west coast it’s at Pendleton in California.
17 weeks total, for basic training.
Maybe I also speak for SanDiegoTim when I say this: Every Marine is a rifleman.
10 weeks of Basic vs 13 weeks of Boot Camp. Its not about the length of traini g, its about what is being taught. Look at what the Marines are learning in those extra weeks. Considering the Marines spend the extra time doing driver’s training and learning Marine history, that doesn’t support your claim. The Army doesnt teach these things at Basic, so its not like Marines are getting extra warrior training at boot camp that Army POGs arent. Why not say “Every Marine is a driver first!”? Since you all receive drivers training at boot camp, that could be your mantra. Doesnt sound as hard cirps, though. Does it?
But, like I said, the fact that Marines are sent to the 29 day course after basic is something unique that no other service is doing.
What do they learn at the SOI?
Do all Marine officers go to Marine infantry officer school?
Extensive combat time and the vaguarities of war. The 30th landed at Omaha beach on 15 June 1944, the 80th at Utah beach on 3 August 1944 and only caught the tail end of the fighting in Normandy. The break off point of the 10 divisions with the highest casualties is entirely arbitrary; those that didn’t have the dubious distinction of making the top ten list didn’t have a huge drop-off in casualties. I just hit ‘previous division’ from the 80th and ‘next division’ until reaching the 83rd because I knew the 79th and 83rd were early follow-up divisions to the initial landings at Normandy, the 79th landing at Utah beach on 12-14 June and the 83rd on Omaha Beach 18 June 1944. Casualties in the 79th were 15,203, in the 83rd they were 15,910.
More to the point: Do those Marines who will eventually actually have the MOS of 0311 have further training? Nope, they have different training. The myth-repeater (although he denies he’s repeating the myth) clearly indicated that non-infantry MOS Marines have a different training course than those with infantry MOS. So, no, it’s not true that “every Marine is a rifleman”. Now, it’s completely true that “every Marine qualifies with a rifle”. That, of course, does not mean that every Marine has been gifted with the same knowledge that an actual rifleman (MOS 0311) has.
Perusing the link that Bullitt provided regarding training, I see a lot of what’s covered in the SOI was covered for me during my BCT with the Army. And, yet, not every soldier is a bullet stopper, er, infantryman. To sum up: Basic knowledge does not equal specialized knowledge.