One idea that has been tossed around as a means of gaining immortality is the idea of uploading one’s consciousness into a machine, in such a way that the uploaded personality would be totally indistinguishable from the original person. The question really isn’t about fighting the hypothetical posed by that technology, but whether the uploaded consciousness would truly be the same person.
I would say no, it’s not, and being replaced by this uploaded personality would be akin to being murdered by an identical twin. While it would preserve your personality forevermore, it wouldn’t be true immortality in the sense of continuing to exist in the same consciousness forever without stopping. One possible solution to this that has been proposed is performing a gradual transfer in such a way that the person would never actually lose consciousness and so would continue being the same entity before and after the transfer. However, I’m still not convinced that this would work. But I would be interested in a way of getting around this problem, since this seems like one of the most likely ways of possibly obtaining immortality, at least in my lifetime.
In a way, ‘you’ have to be fundamentally fully copyable – just consider that ol’ ‘every cell in your body is replaced every seven years’-chestnut. If you think that the you you are now is fundamentally the same you you were seven years ago (and if I’m not just parroting urban legends here), then there seems to be nothing that ties you to the underlying substance, and a substitute substrate and copying procedure could in principle be devised.
This is very close to what I’m talking about; I’d say that using some kind of backup like that just results in a legion of clones that all die, not one continuing existence. It’s very similar to the Ship of Theseus paradox, but I would say that the ship remains the same ship, but a person transferred in such a way would just die and be replaced by a copy.
Or (and I think this is the more logically supportable one, even though I dislike it). You don’t notice yourself being continually destroyed and remade.
But from the point of view of each clone consciousness (and selfness) is as continuous as waking up from a night’s sleep and can continue ad infinitum.
Yes - and there’s no real difference between an abrupt change of hardware and a gradual one. The compelling nature of the illusion of continuous self is the stumbling block, but it’s not a real one.
I’m actually pretty much on the same page in that respect, perhaps even going a bit further to say that there really isn’t anything such as a continuous and consistent ‘you’ or ‘self’ to worry about. Of course, the illusion of such is quite a stubborn and persistent one, to the point that I’d definitely hesitate before undergoing any kind of copying procedure.
Think about how you would feel if an identical you was out there. If you think you might try to get rid of the other you, then don’t copy yourself because the copy will feel that way, too.
If instead you feel that the more you the world has, the better, copy away.
I feel I must bring in nonduality, perhaps there is no line separating self from consciousness, or even further all matter. Essentially what Mangetout said.
Why should I care if the person who wakes in my bed tomorrow imagines himself me, after I have fallen asleep tonight? It’s fundamentally the same question.
Indeed. Every night, your consciousness ceases to exist for eight or so hours. (At best, you experience a few half-remembered, nonsensical dreams–if indeed those can really even be said to be things “you” experience–and you are subjected to many hours of essentially total annihilation of your “self”.)
Subjectively this doesn’t bother us, but how do you know “you” don’t really DIE every single night, with a new person being re-created by your brain every morning (with an identical or at least similar personality and access to the same memories–just like a science fictional clone-with-downloaded-personality)? It’s true that there’s no significant “hardware” replacement in one night’s sleep, but who’s to say that your you isn’t fundamentally the “software” or your personality–which ceases to be and then has to be re-built by the “hardware” each morning.
Just a little something to think about before you go beddy-bye tonight.
Because I believe that that person who wakes up in the morning will be the same person as myself (if I didn’t believe this, life would indeed be rather pointless and I wouldn’t care that that person thinks he’s me). On the other hand, I can easily imagine a scenario where my consciousness could be copied without the original being destroyed, and so there would be two of me, and I can’t exist as both of them at the same time, so the other one must not be me. The consciousness that goes to bed at night also never truly “turns off” completely in the same way that I can shut down a computer program, copy it 100 times, send it out over the internet, and have 100 indistinguishable programs.
Given that our minds may be dependent on the fundamental fuzziness of matter itself, is it even possible to make an exact brain copy down to the smallest measurable unit? How much physical memory would that take?
And what if there’s a part of our minds that is purely metaphysical and can’t be reproduced by recording 1s and 0s on a chip, anyway? (Though that might be a different debate.)
I don’t see any reason to consider any of those questions important to the issue, unless the existence of some metaphysical self is being argued.
If we consider the brain to be an enormously complex biochemical computin g device (of some sort), what is the real difference (from the POV of the process being performed) between:
–The process occurring entirely in one place
–The process occuring partly in one place, then being completed in another
–The process being suspended midway, then resumed
I’m not sure I understand what you’re getting at here. What I’m saying is that if the copy of me and me can exist at the same time, then the copy is obviously not ne.
