Mind Uploading and the Self

[Tibby]

This thread brings back memories of one I started a couple of years ago. The issue is entirely dependent on whether or not there is continuity of consciousness. There appears to be a significant number of people who believe that consciousness is discontinuous from moment to moment and what we perceive as being our feeling of “self” flowing in time is merely an illusion. This position is often illustrated by stating that you die when you go to sleep and a new person with all your memories wakes up in your bed the next morning and that this person is no more you (or no less you) than a clone who has downloaded all your memories. Conversely, looking backward in time, you could say I’ve inherited the memories of many now deceased Tibbytoes, and the next one, who should be arriving any moment now…(POP)…ah, here I am…has inherited all of that last Tibbytoe’s memories, may he rest in peace, and…(POP), oops, there I go again, now where was I?..(POP)…shit!, this is getting embarrassing…(POP)…hey, don’t blame me for the way that last Tibbytoes cursed, he doesn’t speak for me…(POP)…(POP)…(POP)…

I’m sorry, but I just don’t buy that mechanism of action for the workings of consciousness and our sense of self as it’s expressed temporally. I think it’s merely an interesting thought experiment along the lines of the the Many Worlds Interpretation in quantum mechanics—doesn’t break any known laws of nature/ universe, but probably has no basis in reality. I believe that we percieve our sense of self flowing in time, not as an illusion constructed by our minds trying to make sense of a chaotic chain of death and rebirth, but because there really is continuity within the matrix of our brains, from the moment our minds ignite until brain death. I do believe I have a vested interest in the “me” who wakes up tomorrow, one that I do not have with a cloned version of me with my downloaded memories, whom I can readily sense as not being “me”, because he’s over there and I’m right here inside my brain. He’s a poser who may be able to fool both himself and my mother, but not me, I’m the real deal.

I don’t buy into the “discontinuous theory of self” (I made this term up, maybe there’s a better label for it?), not only because it doesn’t “feel” right—you have to admit, it doesn’t “feel” right—, but mainly because it strikes me as being the more complicated of the theories and the one least likely to survive Occams razor. I just don’t think evolution would select such a complicated smoke and mirror show process for the brain when a more parsimonious construct is readily available: the one that “feels” correct…the one that doesn’t involve lots of mind deaths and rebirths…the one that simply has a continuous sense of self that extends through time as one and only one, entity. Perhaps, there may be a way for this unique sense-of-self entity to be “transfered” to a different substrate than the original brain it was born into, but maybe not. If it can be transferred, however, it would need to be done in toto, wherein only one “self” exists at any one time (anything else would be a paradox without resolution).

Correct me if I’m wrong, but I think those who believe in the discontinous interpretation of “self” believe so primarily because they don’t believe there is anything physically continuous within the brain from birth to death that could harbor a continuos mind, hense, continuos sense of self. They claim that since your body continuosly regenerates (i.e. you’re not the same person today that you were yesterday), there is no reason to believe a continuos sense of self can survive a changing substrate of the mind. I believe this is false on two fronts: 1) I think a unique sense of self can survive a gradually changing brain matrix (perhaps even into a non-biological one); 2) I think enough of the original brain does persist until brain death (or extreme dementia) to harbor ones sense of self for an entire life, uninterupted. We discussed this physical persistance/non-persitence issue ad nauseum in that other thread (hi, Mangetout!), with no quarter given to either side—so perhaps it’s best to agree to disagree on that point (even though, I’m really correct :D).

On moral grounds, things get even shakier :). I think it’s an accepted social contract that we can put ourselves and our loved ones a bit ahead of eveyone else. No one could fault me for making plans to make things better for myself and my family in the future, even if it means putting us ahead of people who may be more deserving. I’m going to try to get that job promotion even if deep down I know that the other guy may be better qualified. I’m going to give my sister one of my kidneys, even though some other girl in renal failure may be a better person. But, if I believe that those people who wake up tomorrow in my and my family’s bed tomorrow really aren’t going to be us, but instead are going to be memory-stealing zombies from hell, then I should do everything in my power to make things as bad as possible for them!

[DSeid]

Well these last two posts do summarize the positions somewhat.

Buran states

I can certainly agree that Bob-A is a version of Bob and in a sense the same person from the instant the backup is taken, but only from that instant the moment he is awoken and begins to experience sensory input he becomes a different person.

And that is true. And of course the Bob in the body that shares physical continuity can say only the same exact thing.

Tibbytoes does understand the position taken by some in this thread by and large but not quite. I’d prefer a term that emphasized not discontinuity but the perception of continuity as the key feature. Maybe the “continuity of perceived self” position. The whole issue is not “entirely dependent on whether or not there is continuity of consciousness” vs. “discontinuous from moment to moment” but that the self of the moment always experiences a continuity with the self of the past.

[begbert2]

@Tibbytoes

This thread brings back memories of one I started a couple of years ago. The issue is entirely dependent on whether or not there is continuity of consciousness. There appears to be a significant number of people who believe that consciousness is discontinuous from moment to moment and what we perceive as being our feeling of “self” flowing in time is merely an illusion. This position is often illustrated by stating that you die when you go to sleep and a new person with all your memories wakes up in your bed the next morning and that this person is no more you (or no less you) than a clone who has downloaded all your memories. Conversely, looking backward in time, you could say I’ve inherited the memories of many now deceased Tibbytoes, and the next one, who should be arriving any moment now…(POP)…ah, here I am…has inherited all of that last Tibbytoe’s memories, may he rest in peace, and…(POP), oops, there I go again, now where was I?..(POP)…shit!, this is getting embarrassing…(POP)…hey, don’t blame me for the way that last Tibbytoes cursed, he doesn’t speak for me…(POP)…(POP)…(POP)…

I’m sorry, but I just don’t buy that mechanism of action for the workings of consciousness and our sense of self as it’s expressed temporally. I think it’s merely an interesting thought experiment along the lines of the the Many Worlds Interpretation in quantum mechanics—doesn’t break any known laws of nature/ universe, but probably has no basis in reality. I believe that we percieve our sense of self flowing in time, not as an illusion constructed by our minds trying to make sense of a chaotic chain of death and rebirth, but because there really is continuity within the matrix of our brains, from the moment our minds ignite until brain death. I do believe I have a vested interest in the “me” who wakes up tomorrow, one that I do not have with a cloned version of me with my downloaded memories, whom I can readily sense as not being “me”, because he’s over there and I’m right here inside my brain. He’s a poser who may be able to fool both himself and my mother, but not me, I’m the real deal.

I don’t buy into the “discontinuous theory of self” (I made this term up, maybe there’s a better label for it?), not only because it doesn’t “feel” right—you have to admit, it doesn’t “feel” right—, but mainly because it strikes me as being the more complicated of the theories and the one least likely to survive Occams razor. I just don’t think evolution would select such a complicated smoke and mirror show process for the brain when a more parsimonious construct is readily available: the one that “feels” correct…the one that doesn’t involve lots of mind deaths and rebirths…the one that simply has a continuous sense of self that extends through time as one and only one, entity. Perhaps, there may be a way for this unique sense-of-self entity to be “transfered” to a different substrate than the original brain it was born into, but maybe not. If it can be transferred, however, it would need to be done in toto, wherein only one “self” exists at any one time (anything else would be a paradox without resolution).

Correct me if I’m wrong, but I think those who believe in the discontinous interpretation of “self” believe so primarily because they don’t believe there is anything physically continuous within the brain from birth to death that could harbor a continuos mind, hense, continuos sense of self. They claim that since your body continuosly regenerates (i.e. you’re not the same person today that you were yesterday), there is no reason to believe a continuos sense of self can survive a changing substrate of the mind. I believe this is false on two fronts: 1) I think a unique sense of self can survive a gradually changing brain matrix (perhaps even into a non-biological one); 2) I think enough of the original brain does persist until brain death (or extreme dementia) to harbor ones sense of self for an entire life, uninterupted. We discussed this physical persistance/non-persitence issue ad nauseum in that other thread (hi, Mangetout!), with no quarter given to either side—so perhaps it’s best to agree to disagree on that point (even though, I’m really correct :D).

Actually, the best argument for the “discontinuous theory of self” that I know of is that it’s a natural way of percieveing the functioning of a purely materialistic brain. At any given moment, your brain/body/whatever-houses-your-consciousness is in a given state, which encompasses your current awareness, including self-awareness, and all of your memories of the past as well. A moment later, your brain/body/whatever-houses-your-consciousness will be in a different state, which houses an updated awareness, with the prior moment now being part of your memory.

The second state there is only connected to the prior one by the happenstance of similar prior physical position (usually) and a recalled continuity of memory - if suddenly had all your memories erased, it would be reasonable to call that a discontinuity with whatever prior self you had, making you a different person now. Similarly, if you suddenly teleported ten feet to the left, it would seem reasonable to call you the same person, because you remember being the same person. The memories seem more important to the self-defintion than the physical location (especially given that we change locations all the time, albeit not instantly).

Things only start to get hairy if you somehow get more than one person with continuity of memory back to a single prior person. This doesn’t happen too often in practice, though, so we don’t usually worry about it much.

[Buran]

@DSeid

Well these last two posts do summarize the positions somewhat.

Buran statesAnd that is true. And of course the Bob in the body that shares physical continuity can say only the same exact thing.

However what I was trying to get at is though at the moment of copying and before any sensory input is processed Bob and Bob-A are arguably the same person after two months down the line (with Bob-A still not activated) what good does it do Bob to have Bob-A. Bob is no longer the Bob that made the copy, he has two more months of experience and is therefore an entirely different person to Bob-A just as he’s a different person to who he was two months ago even with no backup existing.

I simply struggle to conceive this as providing a real means of immortality and have never been able to accept it as such when reading about it in sci-fi books. For example in the climatic battle of the above named Stross book one of the characters makes multiple copies of herself to fight the main bad guy with a number of them being killed in the process which the author makes out to be no big deal, however for each of those clones they are and feel like an individual unique conciousness, it does them no good at all to have ‘X’ number of copies running around that are similar to them but not the same, their unique conciousness is switched off permanently and forever when their body/brain is killed

And as for copying being similar to sleeping at night I always viewed sleeping as more again to a car engine idling, there is no complete break in conciousness, our mind just enters a different level of awareness.

[begbert2]

@Buran

However what I was trying to get at is though at the moment of copying and before any sensory input is processed Bob and Bob-A are arguably the same person after two months down the line (with Bob-A still not activated) what good does it do Bob to have Bob-A. Bob is no longer the Bob that made the copy, he has two more months of experience and is therefore an entirely different person to Bob-A just as he’s a different person to who he was two months ago even with no backup existing.

I simply struggle to conceive this as providing a real means of immortality and have never been able to accept it as such when reading about it in sci-fi books. For example in the climatic battle of the above named Stross book one of the characters makes multiple copies of herself to fight the main bad guy with a number of them being killed in the process which the author makes out to be no big deal, however for each of those clones they are and feel like an individual unique conciousness, it does them no good at all to have ‘X’ number of copies running around that are similar to them but not the same, their unique conciousness is switched off permanently and forever when their body/brain is killed

Well, if you wanted to achieve a specific goal which might go unfinished if you died too quickly, then backing up yourself makes perfect sense - the goal isn’t to achieve an infinitely long life (or illusion of life) by stringing together the experience of a succession of copies; the goal is to always have one (or more) of yourself around working on the goal until it’s done. Afterwards, of course, the remaining dozen of yourself can all pat yourself on the back and go on your separate ways, all happy in a goal finally accomplished.

As you note, if your goal is immortality, making copies is not a good way to do it - no clone will have the experience of living forever; they’ll just have the experience of the life up to the ‘save point’, and the life after the ‘restore point’ up until their natural death, which will always be about the same amount of time as limited by their mortality, just with longer and longer “naps” in the middle as later and later copies are ‘restored’.

But if Bob’s goal is to present an unending continuity of himself for some external purpose, such as working on a goal or overseeing his progeny or empire, then Bob would take much peace of mind from the fact that when he is old and frail or shot by those pesky rebels, there will always be a younger, more fit version of himself (Bob-A) stepping forward to carry on the work.

[Buran]

@begbert2

Well, if you wanted to achieve a specific goal which might go unfinished if you died too quickly, then backing up yourself makes perfect sense - the goal isn’t to achieve an infinitely long life (or illusion of life) by stringing together the experience of a succession of copies; the goal is to always have one (or more) of yourself around working on the goal until it’s done. Afterwards, of course, the remaining dozen of yourself can all pat yourself on the back and go on your separate ways, all happy in a goal finally accomplished.

As you note, if your goal is immortality, making copies is not a good way to do it - no clone will have the experience of living forever; they’ll just have the experience of the life up to the ‘save point’, and the life after the ‘restore point’ up until their natural death, which will always be about the same amount of time as limited by their mortality, just with longer and longer “naps” in the middle as later and later copies are ‘restored’.

But if Bob’s goal is to present an unending continuity of himself for some external purpose, such as working on a goal or overseeing his progeny or empire, then Bob would take much peace of mind from the fact that when he is old and frail or shot by those pesky rebels, there will always be a younger, more fit version of himself (Bob-A) stepping forward to carry on the work.

Sure, I can see that, that’s well described. So its a form of immortality but not of personal immortality, problem is its often presented as the latter in a lot of media. I certainly wouldn’t be any more reluctant to die knowing that there is another version of me out there because that is a different person, they aren’t me. Of course I’d be interested in meeting my clone just to see how I come across as a person. It would be particularly interesting if you could copy clones into different bodies to see how their experiences differ especially if by some magically advanced scientific process you could pool all their experiences together at the end of the experiment ie; have an opposite gender clone, have a clones of different races, take different occupations, live in different parts of the world, have clones of different sexual orientations…

d/r

[wsbenge]

@DSeid

Our bodies play a role too. Our brains react to hormonal and chemical backgrounds and interpret signals (fast heart rate, etc.) from our bodies in a complex dance. The brain out of its context, out of its relationships to the world, and without the processing that occurs distal to it in the rest of the body, would be a different consciousness than within that context.

Of course the technology to do this is very much a fantasy. Of course the in the human the hardware is the software and the dynamic whirling vortexes of activity resultant of the hardware and the experiences that are any individual self are massively nonlinear and chaotic.

I wish I had started visiting this site a long time ago. What an enjoyable topic!

What am I? I don’t really know. As stated above, we seem to be a mixture of hardware and software. What would we save, and upload, and still be ourselves?

We know the force hormonal imbalance causes on behavior.

Most of us have seen the effects of nerve malfunctions, like Alzheimer’s. Dyslexia frustrates my daughter no small amount, when the neural pathways let her down.

I have seen ghosts, and I don’t have a clue what they are. Is that a copy that could be uploaded?

What is an immortal soul, and what does that mean to us? I am similar to who I was 40 years ago, but … not quite as impulsive, among other things. What would I be like, if I lived 5000 years? (Probably wouldn’t marry again. Paul the Apostle was quite correct about the adversity of marraige. )

Is the multiple aspect of who we are responsible for the idea that, while we are immortal, there is truly no such thing as reincarnation … since this is the only time I will be wsbenge?

If I am immortal, what am I doing here? Purpose of life, and all of that. It certainly isn’t about whether I live or die, exist in sickness or health.

As alluded to above by others, life is short, in any event. What portion of us COULD be uploaded, and what would we want to keep? There are a few files I wouldn’t mind deleting.

[Vox_Imperatoris]

@Buran

Sure, I can see that, that’s well described. So its a form of immortality but not of personal immortality, problem is its often presented as the latter in a lot of media. I certainly wouldn’t be any more reluctant to die knowing that there is another version of me out there because that is a different person, they aren’t me. Of course I’d be interested in meeting my clone just to see how I come across as a person. It would be particularly interesting if you could copy clones into different bodies to see how their experiences differ especially if by some magically advanced scientific process you could pool all their experiences together at the end of the experiment ie; have an opposite gender clone, have a clones of different races, take different occupations, live in different parts of the world, have clones of different sexual orientations…

d/r

I agree completely on the fact that it would be useful if you merely wanted to provide the world the continuing experience of Your Awesomeness. But I want to live forever, darn it!

Valete,
Vox Imperatoris

[Tibby]

@begbert2

As you note, if your goal is immortality, making copies is not a good way to do it - no clone will have the experience of living forever; they’ll just have the experience of the life up to the ‘save point’, and the life after the ‘restore point’ up until their natural death, which will always be about the same amount of time as limited by their mortality, just with longer and longer “naps” in the middle as later and later copies are ‘restored’.

But if Bob’s goal is to present an unending continuity of himself for some external purpose, such as working on a goal or overseeing his progeny or empire, then Bob would take much peace of mind from the fact that when he is old and frail or shot by those pesky rebels, there will always be a younger, more fit version of himself (Bob-A) stepping forward to carry on the work.

I believe the distant clone of the future will have the experience of living forever—or at least the life experiences of all the clones he was preceded by with memory upload. Say, at age 65, your clone downloads your memories into his brain, he, for all intents and purposes, has lived your life, then goes on to live his life, gaining 65 more years of life experiences until clone number 2 downloads those combined 130 years of life experiences, to which he adds 65 more years, ad infinitum.

The question then becomes, how many memories can a human brain hold? What’s the hard-drive capacity and do you need to defrag as you approach 0-gb free space? My guess is that evolution selected for a brain-drive capacity able to hold a lifetime worth of memories plus a buffer of maybe another lifetime or so (no need to expend biological resources maintaining a supercomputer when a small drive Compaq will suffice). So, if you want Begbert2, version 10 to retain all the memories from the time he was born, he’s going to need 5 heads, or one giant brain.