Monotheists, such as Christians, see God as primary, and all things are because He wills them to be.
This proposition, however, can easily be shown to be false. For God cannot alter the truths of mathematics, and the fact that pi is 3.14… could not be other than it is. Hence, God could not create a universe in which pi was exactly 3.15; that is, one in which the circumference of a circle divided by the diameter would produce this number.
Aquinas dealt with this issue but botched it, when considering the question of “Whether created truth is immutable.”
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** Objection 1: It seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) “Nothing is more eternal than the nature of a circle, and that two added to three make five.” But the truth of these is a created truth. Therefore created truth is eternal.**
Aquinas responds:
Reply to Objection 1: The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and three make five, have eternity in the mind of God.
The first problem is the assumption that the nature of a circle is a “created truth.” That is, that it could be otherwise but God wills it to be thus. This assumption is prima facie false.
Regarding the larger question, Aquinas writes,
In like manner it has been already said that things are called true from the truth of the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be eternal. Now because only the divine intellect is eternal, in it alone truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else but God is eternal; since the truth of the divine intellect is God Himself, as shown already.
Aquinas misses the essence of the problem and falls into the semantic pit. He fails to separate a truth as grasped by the intellect and the same truth in and of itself. In short, he’s saying that the properties of a circle would not exist did God not conceive of them. I assert the contrary: the rules of number and pattern are the absolute foundation of That Which Is–they ARE “God.”
Pantheism holds that God is all and all is God. I consider myself a pantheist not because I believe that there is a separate entity called God that requires explaining, but because others have posited a God that requires un-explaining, or disproving. This, however, begs the question of why I call myself a pantheist and not an atheist.
The reason lies in how I and an atheist differently characterize That Which Is. Let’s do a simple thought experiment. Imagine now an absolute void. Not the void of space, since space is itself something, but absolute nothing. There is no time, either. There are however, those rules of pattern and number. Hence, absolute nothingness is, it turns out, impossible. It is my view that this absolutely primitive state was, in fact, infinite potential. There was nothing to prevent a near-infinite number of things from coming into being, and so they did: the Big Bang; perhaps an infinite number of Big Bangs.
Hence, I see this primal TWI as having properties that arise from those same rules of pattern and number. Just as a circumference/diameter must equal pi, our own universe must have come into being. And it came into being with a purpose: to be, to live, to think. It is this perception of, or belief in, purpose that separates me from and atheist. (And also my belief in an afterlife, but that I believe to have been factually proven–a different topic.)
Was Spinoza the original pantheist? I’m not sure, but he argued well in favor of it.
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Prop. XIV. Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.
Proof.–As God is a being absolutely infinite, of whom no attribute that expresses the essence of substance can be denied (by Def. vi.), and he necessarily exists (by Prop. xi.) ; if any substance besides God were granted it would have to be explained by some attribute of God, and thus two substances with the same attribute would exist, which (by Prop. v.) is absurd; therefore, besides God no substance can be granted, or consequently, be conceived. If it could be conceived, it would necessarily have to be conceived as existent; but this (by the first part of this proof) is absurd. Therefore, besides God no substance can be granted or conceived. Q.E.D.
Also, he got the idea of infinite potential, although I take issue with him on some points:
**Prop. XVI. From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways–that is, all things which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.
Proof.–This proposition will be clear to everyone, who remembers that from the given definition of any thing the intellect infers several properties, which really necessarily follow therefrom (that is, from the actual essence of the thing defined); and it infers more properties in proportion as the definition of the thing expresses more reality, that is, in proportion as the essence of the thing defined involves more reality. Now, as thc divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes (by Def. vi.) , of which each expresses infinite essence after its kind, it follows that from the necessity of its nature an infinite number of things (that is, everything which can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect) must necessarily follow. Q.E.D.**
The problem with this proposition (which is close to modern Many Worlds Theory) is that it ignores the problem of conflicting concepts. But I’d like to deal with that in a future post about Many Worlds Theory.
At any rate, both monothesists and atheists have big problems with the arguments I have posted above, but I will be happy to discuss them with any interested party.
