I’m confused, too. Is the OP saying that US intelligence agencies did not report that they believed that Saddam had WMD? Clearly they did and they were wrong. I’m not aware of a foreign intelligence agency that concluded that Saddam did not have WMD. I ask the OP, which one dissented from the prevailing view of the time?
There is no doubt that there were individuals within intelligence agencies that had doubts, different conclusions, or better insight into what actually was the situation. But for whatever reason – groupthink, political pressure, incompetence, whatever – those individuals did not prevail in convincing the agencies themselves to adopt that view. With the possible exception of the alternate views on the narrow matter of the aluminum tubes, I’m just not aware of any intelligence agency anywhere that correctly predicted what we now know to be the truth.
I simply don’t see how the claim that “every intelligence agency believed Saddam had WMD” has been nailed.
One must be very precise with what we’re talking about. “WMDs” is nebulous – the difference and ramifications in the gulf between chemical and nuclear weapons is large.
As I understand it, most countries believed Saddam had large quantities of chemical weapons. That he did not was a surprise. What was not a surprise was that he did not have nuclear weapons or was anywhere close to obtaining them. The act of obtaining nuclear weapons is very hard to keep secret – combine this with arguably the most thorough sanctions in all of history and it doesn’t pass the smell test.
The problem is if Saddam had chemical weapons, well, who cares? Lots of countries have 'em. Any country with a university lab can make bio weapons. The mushroom cloud being the smoking gun etc. was what sold the war to the American public.
While this is all interesting, one must be careful not to miss the true goal of the invasion of Iraq. They aren’t lying when they say they wanted to democratize it. Well, some currents certainly go the other way – the idea of making a base of operations to strike at will in the ME. But there is a large segment of true believers – the rhetoric wasn’t an excuse, it was the true goal. Wolfowitz is no patsy.
Because not even the US intelligence agencies believed it, as the quote from the insider shows. The US agencies were strong-armed into toeing the party line so, but didn’t believe it.
Likewise the allies of the US had the same view but kept mum out of tact. I assure you it was made as clear as possible without being express, that the reason for those nations joining the war had nothing to do with ‘terrorism’ and everything to do with maintaining the US alliance. Perhaps that fact is not widely known within the US.
On the Thursday before the invasion I had lunch with two old friends (clients) in London. One of them keeps up with his West Point contacts from the Korean war.
They said: what we need to do is set up a permanent base in the area from which we can reach out and get those terrorists.
I pointed out that ‘those terrorists’ were malcontents in Saudi and that their own government did not like them, but would not appreciate US incursion.
I also pointed out that Saddam and Al Qaeda had nothing to do with each other.
Those two guys are well connected, and generally pretty smart (both came from top US management consultants a long time ago - not that necessarily means much nowadays). What they were saying came from some authoritative source.
And as I understand it most believed he had some; but not much, and with no means to deliver much of it to a target. After all those sanctions and inspections and the Gulf War, it was believed that most of what he had was either destroyed or decayed into uselessness.
Ms K wasn’t directly involved in the NIE. She was in involved with the folks in and around the OSP who fed “alternative” info to the WH that was made up to look as if came from the US Intel Community.
The NIE plainly states “Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons…”
That’s about as plain as it gets.
By the way, I have a little problem in taking the interviewee’s word as sacrosanct when she: (a) can’t remember Jay Garner’s name, (b) misidentifies him as an Air Force general rather than a former Army general, and (c) really is a person whose bona fides indicate that she ought to know better.
Also, Wikipedia says that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence interviewed her and she couldn’t cite any of her allegations. Ironically, the citation to that claim doesn’t work.
It’s not clear to me that the NIE was contaminated by the offal from the OSP that Ms K is on about.
She says:
Well, I worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and up until mid February I was in Near East South Asia, which is the office that owns the Office of Special Plans, they were our sister office.
The OSP wasn’t actually a part of the USIC. As such they didn’t submit material for the NIE. There’s no indication that MS K is referring to anything of the sort.
It did however repeatedly present ‘alternate intel’ to the Admin, and the press too apparently.
Right. Everyone- even Blix- thought that SH had WMD. But there is a huge difference between having nukes and thus being a “clear and present danger to the USA” and having some chem weapons and being a “clear and present danger” to the Kurds. Sure Saddam’s program of genocide vs the Kurds did make him an evil war-criminal bastard, but that could have been solved by a single smart-bomb with his name on it.
I still think that SH did have a few chem WMD but moved them to Syria. See this Wiki article:
*"Transported to another country
Rumors from top governmental officials have abounded of possible transportation of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction to foreign countries, namely Syria and Lebanon, right before Operation Iraqi Freedom began.
Former Iraqi general Georges Sada claimed that in late summer 2002, Saddam had ordered all of his stockpiles to be moved to Syria. The former number two in the Iraqi Air Force stated that with the arrival of inspectors on November 1st, he took the occasion of Syria’s broken dam and made an “air bridge”, bringing by air and by ground, moved them into cargo aircraft and moved them into Syria.[54][55] He also claimed that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s attempt to use 20 tons of chemical weapons in Amman, Jordan and kill 80,000 civilians came from a large cache in Syria, originally transported from Iraq.[56][57] Another Iraqi general, Ali Ibrahim al-Tikriti who defected before the 1991 Gulf War, claimed in 2006 that weapons are in Syria because of long military deals going back to the late 1980’s, where contingency plans would be activated if either country were threatened.[58] The credibility of both men was brought into question by Alex Koppelman who questions the closeness of Syria and Iraq after Syria fought against Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War.[59]
Claims were also made by Lieutenant General Moshe Yaalon, a former Israeli officer who served as chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces from July 2002 to June 2005. The General told the New York Sun in December 2005 that “[Saddam] transferred the chemical agents from Iraq to Syria.”[60] He had previously said in April 2004 that “perhaps” they had been transferred to Syria [6]. Even Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon said that “Chemical and biological weapons which Saddam is endeavoring to conceal have been moved from Iraq to Syria.”[61] These claims were considered by the Iraq Survey Group Duelfer report addenda, and stated that because of worsening violence in Iraq they were forced to stop after several months, and results remain inconclusive. It appeared that no official transportation of WMD’s took place, though a limited amount of unofficial movement could not be ruled out.[62] They did note that Saddam Hussein periodically removed guards from the Syrian border and replaced them with intelligence officers who would then supervise the movement of banned materials between Syria and Iraq. There was also particularly heavy traffic in large trucks on the border before the United States invasion.[63] In testimony before a Senate panel in October 2004, Charles Duelfer stated that this was true, but it was not possible to say if they were WMD-related, and later other officials concurred that there was no information that would indicate what they contained.[64]
Former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense John A. Shaw has also alleged that the Russians played an extensive role in transporting materials into Syria and Lebanon, and he claims he found that trucks were transporting materials to Syria and returning empty. Also, containers with warnings painted on them were moved to a Beirut hospitals basement. [citation needed] Russia and China were also alleged to have helped arm and then move WMD equipment."*
However, really even if SH had some minor amounts of WMD’s, it *machts nichts
as Iraq was NOT a “clear and present danger to the USA” (due to no Nukes and no serious nuke program) and I think GWB knew that. Thus, we had no right to invade. We wuz wrong.
(Note that they did find a *few *mostly harmless except to the environment old pre Desert Storm WMD munitions)
More water for the conspiracists’ fire of the WMD to Syria theory - Hussein did not believe that the US posed an existential threat, so why give up the goods?
THE IRAQI DOCUMENTS: A GLIMPSE INTO THE
REGIME OF SADDAM HUSSEIN
HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION
APRIL 6, 2006
Serial No. 109–184
Brigadier General Anthony A. Cucolo III, Usa, Director, Joint Center For Operational Analysis, United States Joint Forces Command
Lieutenant Colonel Kevin M. Woods, Usa (Ret.), Project Leader And Principal Author Of Iraqi Perspective Project, United States Joint Forces Command
[INDENT]*The Iraqi Perspective Project is a research effort conducted by United States Joint Forces Command, specifically the Joint Center for Operational Analysis, and it focuses on Operation Iraqi Freedom in the time period from March to May 2003.
Using information gathered through dozens of interviews with senior Iraqi military and political leaders during the fall and winter of 2003–2004, and making use of thousands of official Iraqi documents, we have a comprehensive historical analysis of the forces and motivations that drive our opponents’ decision.
Now, to accomplish this, the project leader, Kevin Woods, led a small team of professionals in a systematic 2-year study of the former Iraqi regime and military. This book is the first major product of that effort.
Essentially, Kevin and his team crafted a substantive examination of Saddam Hussein’s leadership and its effect on the Iraqi military decision making process. Moreover, we believe it goes a long way toward revealing the inner workings of a closed regime from an insiders’ point of view.
The overall objective of the project was to learn the right lessons from Operation Iraqi Freedom, and while the practice of self-critique and gathering lessons learned are distinguishing feature of the U.S. Military, **in almost every past instance our understanding of events remained incomplete because any assessment was limited to a ‘‘blue’’ or a friendly view of what happened.
While we often had a relatively complete picture of what our adversary did, we remained in the dark as to what motivated his actions.**
In this case, by shedding light on the actual ‘‘red team’s view,’’ this study hopes to contribute to a more fully developed history of the war.
It should be noted that this is the first such effort by the United States Government since World War II, when the United States conducted a comprehensive review of recovered German and Japanese documents, as well as interviews with key military and civilian leadership of our former enemies.
Though this is an important first step, we acknowledge that our understanding of Operation Iraqi Freedom remains incomplete.*
The second assumption that Saddam made had to do with the nature of his opponents. Through the distortions of his ideological perceptions, Saddam simply could not take the Americans seriously. After all, had they not run away from Vietnam after suffering what to him was a ‘‘mere’’ 58,000 dead? Iraq had suffered 51,000 dead in just one battle on the Fao Peninsula against the Iranians. In the 1991 Gulf War, the Americans had appeared on the brink of destroying much of Iraq’s military, including the Republican Guard, but then inexplicably stopped—for fear of casualties, in Saddam’s view. Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo all added to Saddam’s belief that the Americans could not possibly launch a ground invasion that would seriously threaten his regime. At best they might be willing to launch an air campaign similar to OPERATION DESERT FOX in 1998 with a few small ground attacks around Iraq’s periphery. But from Saddam’s point of view, the idea that the Americans would attack all the way to Baghdad appeared ludicrous.
A few senior military officers believed that the coalition might launch a ground campaign, especially given the enormous buildup that was taking place in Kuwait. But even they believed that as in OPERATION DESERT STORM, the Americans would wage a sustained air campaign before they launched their ground forces on an invasion of Iraq. Therefore, the entire Iraqi leadership—military and civilian— was surprised by Coalition ground forces beginning their offensive into Iraq at the same time the air campaign was starting. Adding to their incomprehension were the speed and power of the American offensive, which were simply beyond their understanding of military operations and logistical capabilities.[/INDENT]
Mr. Shaw said he acquired his intel about [Iraq's WMD going to Syria](http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20041028-122637-6257r.htm) from a "good friend" of Dick Cheney's and that this info was derided by the DIA as "**Israeli disinformation**." After the Shaw launched the story, the Fox news reported "[it isn't clear how this person has the authority or the knowledge to speak on such a matter.](http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,136897,00.html)"
In the recent past, it seemed that Jack Shaw did some [illegal and questionable things](http://news.arcticnews.net/archive/aa_anc040705/anc2.htm). But, then a [DoD press release seemed to have cleared him](http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2004/08/iraq-040810-dod01.htm). Subsequently, [the exonerating press release had to be pulled](http://www.defense.gov/releases/2004/nr20040810-1103.html) because "information has become available that indicates it may not have been accurate at the time it was issued. The matter is under review to determine the facts and circumstances involving the information contained in the original release."
AFAICT, the DoD page revoking the exoneration was last updated 2005-08-25.
Coincidentally, the previously cited article about what prompted the FBI to investigate the actions of Mr. Shaw mentioned the port of Umm al Qasr. At the Summit, Mr. Shaw also mentioned port of Umm al Qasr. He said there were floodable storage areas in Qasr that had held WMD. He also said that in Umm al Qasr, the Soviets loaded Iraqi WMD onto ships so as to sink the weapons and possibly other untold evidence in the depths of the Indian Ocean.
Starting about 45 sec in he begins to talk about shopping the WMD to Syria story to the DIA. He says the DIA told him that the WMD to Syria thing is “Israeli disinformation.”[around the 60 second mark] He then says that there was an effort to discredit him and the people associated with the story even though one of them was one of “the Vice Presidents very best friends.” [around the two minute mark]
Oh, come on. You provide a link to a search result of 84,000 web pages having to do with Tenet and “slam dunk?” You want me to go through every one and seek out some point that you’re trying to make?
As far as the meaning of “slam dunk,” Bob Woodward is the person responsible for finding the story in the first place. He interviewed the folks in the room and he said that the context was that Tenet was saying that “we have the goods on the Iraqis, there’s no doubt about it.” If someone reads Woodward’s book and says, “No, slam dunk means something else,” what standing do they have to provide a better context for the remark than Woodward? Seriously, if I read Woodward’s book, and then come up with a theory that “slam dunk” actually means that Tenet was listening to the NBA on a hidden portable radio and that Kobe Bryant just scored two points, it is absolutely silly to assign that alternative view as having an equal or greater plausibility than the way Woodward (again, the guy who actually interviewed the people in the room) says it happened.
Of these intelligence agencies that allegedly concurred most robustly with our own, how many of them got thier “intelligence” from the same sources, or even from us? We are the “big dog” when it comes to this sort of thing, and apparently the best we could do was the aptly yclept “Curveball”. So absent any independent corroboration, of what possible significance is the bleating plea of “They all thought the same as us!”
If we passed intel on Saddam on to the Elbonians, and then they concur with our wildly implausible conclusions, so what? An echo is not an opinion, no information is added.
Actually, if you listen to Hans Blix interview on Fresh Air, he states
(1) That this was his initial belief although it was based largely on the U.S. claiming this with such assuredness (along with Saddam’s general caginess on the matter over the years).
(2) That as the inspections went on, he became more doubtful of this. And, in this regard, see this article from CBS written about a month before the war began.
So, while it is hard to prove a negative such as “Saddam doesn’t have any WMD,” the inspections were strongly suggesting that our reasons for believing that he did have WMD were faulty. (The fact that the Administration’s case for war was falling apart may have even been part of the reason why they felt they had better rush and start the war…although I haven’t heard any evidence one way or the other on this.)
Blix’s book, “Disarming Iraq,” is really a fascinating read. Let me quote just one paragraph, page 215:
And, more relevant to the OP, on page 262 Blix wrote:
So Hans Blix, in his own modest way, says that he doesn’t have any reason to believe that foreign intelligence agencies didn’t think Saddam had disarmed, as is argued by the OP.
I think this is still a viable debate because there are more than a few people who give Bush a bit of a pass for invading Iraq because they think he honestly thought there were WMDs in Iraq. If America really believed he just made the whole thing up, the Democrats wouldn’t be “taking impeachment off the table”
The issue isn’t whether Bush thought there were WMDs at one time or another, but whether he exercised due dilligence in checking his assumptions before the war, and if he refused to pay attention to the increasing evidence that there weren’t just before the invasion. There is a big difference between someone believing in WMDs in June 02 vs. March 03.
As for impeachment, there are many reasons the Democrats are not interested in pursuing it besides thinking Bush was honest or competent.
