DSYoung, You can dismiss the referenced math out of hand if you wish (I doubt either of us is capable of checking its accuracy, and I’m certain that neither of us is willing), but when substituting your own (e.g. ‘50% chance of immediate loss of game’) you shouldn’t stop after Step 1. Assign some reasonable probabilities to the rest of the scenarios.
The odds of converting 4th & 2 are actually greater than 50%, but for the sake of argument let’s say it’s 50/50. Likewise assume for simplicity that following a Jets TD the Patriots will never score before the end of regulation.
If they go for it, 50% of the time they succeed, and they then go on to score a TD, say, 20% of the time. 50% of the time they fail – in this case, NE either scores or runs out the clock (100% NYJ lose) 95% of the time; the other 5%, the Jets get the ball back with a 10% chance to score a TD.
Tie probability = (.5.2)+(.05.1) = .105 = 10.5% chance of overtime by going for it.**
If they punt, it is blocked 1% of the time (100% NYJ lose), there is a great run back 10% of the time (effectively no different than going for it and failing, 99.5% NYJ lose), and the punt nets a median of 35 yards of field position 89% of the time.
In those instances 33% of the time New England effectively runs out the clock, 65% of the time the Jets force a 3 and out and get the ball back at their own 20 (which is generous; in this case the Jets score a TD 10% of the time), and 1% of the time the Jets force a turnover (in which the the Jets score a TD 50% of the time).
Tie probability = (.1.005)+[(.65.1)+(.01*.5)] = .0705 = 7.05% chance of overtime by punting.**
You can dispute some of my assumptions about probabilities if you wish, but I tried to be as generous as I reasonably could about the benefits of punting, and I think you’d have to tweak my assumptions pretty severely – and well beyond what’s plausible – before punting becomes as good as going for it, let alone clearly superior.
It’s possible I made an error somewhere in the math, but I don’t see one. Going out for a bit. Be back later.
But, but, you already had him, remember? That was before he was a genius though.
I always view the Browns through the lens of being a Steelers fan but they definitely have a lot of weapons. A new coach there comes to a team with a good line, depth at QB (injuries notwithstanding), a workhorse RB, several playmakers (Edwards, Winslow, Cribbs). On defense, Shaun Rogers and the LBs are solid, the corners are inexperienced but look promising. Draft a top-notch safety and you have a pretty potent team. As a Steelers fan of course I hope they implode again but there’s a lot there for a new coach to work with.
I would be careful about reading too much into a game like that. Most good teams have those weeks where they don’t show up for whatever reason and/or the bad team plays out of their mind.
As to the Brown’s talent, I don’t claim to know the ins and outs of the roster, but I’ve gotten the impression over the last decade or so that Cleveland has done one of the worst jobs drafting in the entire league. Joe Thomas is a very good player, but who else is there? Braylon Edwards and Kellen Winslow might be good players, but each seems like they might have some kind of issue that stops them from really being a successful NFL player. After that, who does Cleveland have really? Shaun Rogers? The guy can be a beast, but I doubt someone that big can have an impact over a whole season. Cribbs is a nice return man, but I’m not sure if he is anything more. Brady Quinn is still pretty much unknown.
That said, if the NFL has shown anything its that teams can turn around very quickly. I’m just not sure it can be done with many of the players currently on the roster.
So a coach that puts up 8-8 every single year should be kept in perpetuity? Bollocks.
is that the team shows no sense of direction or improvement.
The case for firing Gruden is not that he went 9-7 this year, but that he’s 45-53 over the last 6 years, that his offenses are consistently mediocre, and that due to Gruden’s approach of always bringing in veterans team’s prospects for serious improvement are minimal.
Tuesday Morning Quarterback also runs a “stop punting” bit in just about every weekly article- see here, for example- and has been following a high school called Pulaski Academy that went to a no-punt system and started winning games.
Ding ding ding! Winner.
It doesn’t make any sense for you (furt) to criticize Gruden, though - you said in an Eagles thread that you’d rather have a guy who won a Super Bowl and then didn’t do squat for five years than Andy Reid, who fields competitive teams every year but can’t win a Super Bowl. Well, in Gruden you’d have your guy.
Ah, but now you’re cheating. Your cite says you only need a 37% chance to convert, but you’re using 50%. Plug 37% in and run the numbers and let’s see how good your cite is.
63% of the time you give the opponent a first down in easy field goal range, when you’re down by 7 with only 3:00 left in the game. And they say that’s a good call? I’m thinking that cite stinks to high heaven.
Also, many of the “always punt” analyses ignore that some punters are better than others. Look what Jeff Feagles did to the Panthers. Many have pointed to that punt as the play of the game.
Thankfully, Coughlin doesn’t subscribe to the nonsense in that chart. (Though he does go for it on fourth down.)
Putting 37% into his numbers gives a 7.9% chance of making overtime, still slightly better than the 7.05% for punting. Varloz’s formula puts the break-even point at about 33%, quite close to the 37% the site gives.
Now there are some considerations for the specific game that support punting. The game was very low scoring, so the Jets may have had a better than usual chance of forcing a three-and-out. They have a good return man in Washington. However, looking at it all I’d say going for it is probably the right call. I’d definitely say it’s not an obviously wrong call.
They were on their own 20. Since the next category is “from your 21 to 35”, your own 20 falls into the first category. There is no conditional; he says punt.
Clevelanders weren’t quite so admiring of Belichick when he *was *the Browns’ coach, remember?
Which only illustrates that the Big Jump isn’t necessarily from Coordinator to Head Guy, but from the first Head Guy job to the second. Belichick is not the only coach to admit having made a lot of mistakes in his first top job, enough to deserve firing, but that he was able to learn from them and be a good one later on - and that he’d have been dogged forever by those early mistakes if he’d been able to stay where he was.
And then there are many cases of a top assistant just never being able to make the transition from making recommendations to making decisions, readily admitting it, and going back to being a top assistant. Crennel may be one such, whether or not you accept the criticism that Belichick was really the Pats’ DC during that great run. Clearly Romeo thought he could do it, and, at his age, he knows he wasn’t going to get a second shot even with the Rooney Rule in place.
Be cautious about hiring Parcells proteges - other than Belichick, the record isn’t good. Tuna’s insistence on keeping his assistants in the background, a tradition which Belichick has carried on, hasn’t led to their succeeding elsewhere, unlike Bill Walsh’s people. That applies to Pioli, too, btw (he married Parcells’ daughter, ftr) - he’s been apparently content to support Belichick for a long time now, and has never shown much interest in being his own man if it means being with a bad team for which he’d be responsible. He’s turned down opportunities to be a GM elsewhere before, and with every passing year, must get more entrenched in a very comfortable comfort zone.
Mangenius got the shaft - the Jets’ collapse was mainly Favre’s fault. Blame the front office for getting him, not the head coach.
Probably because they don’t have any bearing on how likely you are to stop the other team from gaining a first down, which is essentially what they’d need to do to win either way.
Jets ball on approximately their own 23, 2:00 left with 3 timeouts, you give them a 20% chance to score a TD.
Jets ball on their own 20, 2:00 left with 0 (or maybe 1) timeouts, you give them a 10% chance to score a TD.
Timeouts must loom large in your calculations, since they double the chance of scoring. Either this was an oversight on your part, or you are giving huge weight to an aspect of the game (timeouts) that the chart completely ignores. Neither possibility seems to support your case.