Cecil’s column here could use updating for Stanislav Petrov. While we didn’t know until the 90s, in 1983 Petrov took the initiative in deciding that equipment reporting a US launch of nuclear missiles were malfunctioning instead of passing the information up his chain of command. Stanislav Petrov - Wikipedia
I’ll be sure this gets to Cecil’s attention, but I don’t know whether he’ll want to update that column (from 1984.) I can’t predict what things he thinks are worth updating and what not.
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[li] A hurricane might have more power than a hydrogen bomb, but its power is spread across a vast area – sometimes as big as half of the mainland U.S. A hydrogen bomb’s power is concentrated in a few hundred square miles.[/li][li] Considering the U.S. protocols for launching a strike, I doubt any of the near misses were all that close. Such authorization has to come from the President, and the protocol involves several cross checks before it is sent up to the chain of command.[/li]
This doesn’t mean that the people involved go watch some TV until they get the word to press the button. Planes can be dispatched, and systems primed, but nothing will be launched.
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I’m not sure what the Soviet protocols were, but they are probably similar – especially how centralized the state was. I have no idea what would have happened if Stanislav Petrov had forwarded the warnings to his superiors, but I have a feeling that a similar process would have taken place and verification from several radar sites would be ordered. This is especially true since only five missiles were detected which meant that the Soviet policy of retaliation wouldn’t have been threatened.
Nuclear war is one of those situations where it’s better not to act and then apologize afterwards.