Look, this deal prevents Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, which I thought was the whole point all along. How is there any downside?
I’m with the opposition. Bibi screwed the pooch.
The downside is that it will probably not prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, while at the same time giving it a long more money to spend on groups like Hezbollah and the Assads.
It’s my view that in any world without this deal, it becomes easier for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, and less likely that their regime will change in any significant way (not that I’m particularly optimistic that the regime will change, but I think reduced sanctions + nuclear inspections are the best chance). Do you disagree? Or do you feel that these things are not worth the trade-off for the possible assistance that Hezbollah, Assad, and others might gain?
How can they manage it under the noses of foreign inspectors? Nuclear weapons are not something you can smuggle inside a swallowed condom.
:dubious: Lifting economic trade sanctions will make Iran richer, no doubt. So? You won’t find much support for the notion that Iran should be kept poor as a matter of foreign policy. Besides, making a poor country richer is the best way to politically liberalize it.
They are much less likely to get a nuke with this deal than without. And as their economy improves with sanctions lifted, they will have incentives to not sponsor activities that destabilize the world order. I think for most it comes down to :
- Obama supports it, therefore it’s evil
- You can’t trust Muslim nations to honor agreements
- Iran is evil because Bush said so.
So far everyone is concentrating on Iran-Israel.
However, the real key to this deal I think is that it may represent a shift: to the realization that both Iran and the US/West is more concerned about Iran-ISIS, and the general state of conflct between Sunnis and Shi’ites in the region.
In that conflict, nuclear weapons will do Iran no good at all, and the US/West and Iran are emerging as allies of a grudging and guarded sort - the US cannot afford to be seen as anti-Sunni, yet also cannot tolerate infinite expansion of ISIS.
From that perspective, it makes sense on the one hand to strengthen Iran (no matter how nasty they remain), and on the other for Iran to slow down slightly on their nuke project - which is more a matter of vanity or prestige for them than anything else at this point. Iran would of course like to see Israel destroyed, but it is unlikely to be the highest priority for them at this particular moment - in ISIS, they have a more immediate issue to deal with. (Again, assuming they are operating with some degree of realism, which seems likely).
Meanwhile, Sunnis everywhere (including those who hate ISIS) in the ME have much to fear from Iran and its backing of Shi’ite revolutionaries - the more the West cares about ISIS, the less they will care about Iran-backed Shi’ite militias causing trouble. These Sunnis are more likely immediate losers on the deal than Israel, at least in the short term - no doubt Iran will use its economic muscle to support Shi’ite causes.
The concern of course is that the West is doing what the West often does - concentrating excessively on the situation at the moment at the expense of the big picture. The fifty thousand dollar question from a ‘realist’ perspective is: is ISIS really that big a threat, or purely a local flash-in-the-pan problem? Will the strengthening of Iran prove do be of more significance in the long run? The Sunni-Sh’ite divide remains the big ME problem of the day - not the Israel-Iran divide, although both the right and the left in the West remain fixated to the point of myopia on Israel. However, it is not clear that from this perspective, the deal is a good one for the West.
Can you explain what, specifically, leads you to this conclusion?
Because Arak is going to be decommissioned, so no more plutonium (at least in significant quantities). Thousands of tons of LEU is being disposed of. Uranium production facilities are now subject to monitoring. The number of centrifuges is reduced by a great margin.
I understand that many would prefer that Iran have no uranium and no centrifuges. But that doesn’t mean that having a small amount of LEU and getting rid of two-thirds of enrichment capability, with most likely no access to uranium ore that isn’t monitored by the IAEA, means that there’s a clear path to the Iranian bomb. Those are pretty substantial hurdles in my estimation – why do you think that an Iranian bomb is likely?
There is no doubt that Iran can get a nuke now, assuming it wants one. The deal only slows them down - it doesn’t stop them. I don’t think even the deal’s most fervent supporters claims that it will out and out prevent Iran from getting a bomb.
From what I have read, the idea was to extend Iran’s “breakout capacity” - that is, the time necessary for Iran to actually make a nuke, should it exert every effort to do so - from a couple of months to a year or so, and to hold it there for ten years (assuming that Iran is scrupulous about adhereing the the terms of the agreement, which is a bold position in and of itself).
In short, it is a limitations regime, not a prevention regime. A prevention regime is almost certainly beyond the ability of the West to obtain by mere negotiation (a point in favour of the deal).
I strongly believe that a “limitation regime” as you call it was always the best possible outcome. A continuation of the sanctions would not have stopped Iran from getting the bomb either, if it really went for it. Even if Russia,China and Europe would have agreed to maintain the sanctions, which is doubtful.
And what else is there? All out war without a UN mandate? Does anyone think that would have been viable?
No-one claims it will prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons.
The claim is that it will delay Iran from getting them for 10 years or so - that’s the “best case” scenario, as stated by the deal’s supporters, assuming Iran adheres without fault to the terms of the agreement.
Naturally, those who oppose the deal think the 10 year delay is hopelessly optomistic … but that’s what the debate is over: how long the delay period is, not whether Iran will be “prevented” from getting a nuke.
Supporters of the deal point ot that, absent a deal, the delay period would be a lot shorter.
Personally, my opinion is that nukes aren’t any more the most significant issue for either side - whether it is better to have an economically powerful Iran is far more significant: the conflct of real importance is the regional one between Sunni and Sh’ite nations and militias, not whether Iran becomes a nuclear power.
In that struggle, the fact of comming to a deal is more significant than the actual terms of the deal. My “read” is that this indicates that the deal-makers in the West now consider Sunni extremists (mainly, ISIS) as a bigger threat than Sh’ite extremists - because there is no doubt that the immediate impact of the deal will be to empower Sh’ite extremists funded by Iran.
This (politics aside), rather that the existential threat posed by Iranian nukes, is what annoys Israel so much - and of course not only them: Sunni nations and factions are the primary target. The issue is whether a richer Iran is overall a good thing or a bad thing in the region and in the world. This isn’t a completely obvious question.
I agree with what you said, but I think you’ve missed a difference in the claims for the criticism of the deal.
Supporters clearly aren’t saying that this is an iron-clad, foolproof way to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. Like you say, the agreement is intended to make it nearly impossible for Iran to get a nuclear weapon in an overt manner (such as by using its stocks of LEU to make HEU), and harder for Iran to get a nuclear weapon in a covert manner (by establishing new controls on ore, metallurgy, and fissile materials in general), under the theory that Iran could build a secret lab somewhere, but it wouldn’t be much use if they don’t have much nuclear fuel to send to it, and it’s easier to track mining and international trade than it is covert construction.
Critics are saying that Iran now has a path to a nuclear weapon, or as Alessan stated, it is now likely Iran will have a nuclear weapon. I’m trying to understand how they view this agreement as making the acquisition of a weapon likely, or perhaps inevitable, when I see it as making it substantially harder, but not impossible.
It’s an issue of time. Even under the current deal, assuming that its supporters are correct about how the deal will work, Iran could still get a bomb - fully complying with the deal - in a decade or so.
In a decade or so, presumably with any luck Alessan will still be around. That means he risks being nuked (if that is what Iran intends). This deal will not stop that outcome. However, assuming its supporters are correct about it, the deal will delay that outcome by a decade or so, over the situation without a deal.
Personally, again, I think the more pressing concern from an Israeli perspective is that he risks being shot at or blown up in a more conventional manner by Iranian-funded Shi’te militias, armed with cash the deal releases to Iran. The counter to that is that Iran may be more concerned with ISIS than Israel.
No, that is incorrect. While some restrictions relax after a period, other obligations, such as Iran signing and abiding by the Additional Protocol to the NPT, are permanent. Obviously, one cannot abide by the NPT and its Additional Protocol and develop a nuclear weapon.
At least one nuclear non-proliferation professional is extremely pleased with the deal. He makes the point that a much better deal could have been reached 10 years ago, most likely.
One of the objections being raised is that this gives Iran a ton of $$ to fund their “terrorist activities”. My question is two-fold, and I have no idea what the answer is, so I would appreciate input from the experts here (like Ravenman).
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How legit is the US’s claim about Iran’s terrorist activities, or funding terrorists. One often hears that they are “the largest state sponsor of terror in the world”.
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How much do our other negotiating partners share in that view? IOW, is this something Germany, France etc agree to? What about China and Russia?
#2 is probably more important for me wrt this deal because it seems that unless our negotiating partners share our view on the subject, they are never going to agree to take it into account when negotiating this deal. Which leads to question #3:
- Is it just a complete non-starter to think we can have some kind of nuclear deal that also includes issues of state sponsorship of terrorism?
The nukes are the biggest red herring in this whole deal. No country is in a position to use nukes against another without crippling and massive repercussions. Does anyone except the most xenophobic Republicans actually think that Iran’s first move with a nuke would be to deploy them against Israel or the US? You can repeat all you want about their leaders wanting to wipe Israel off the map even though that is a mistranslation, but what would happen if they actually tried it? Israel has upwards of 200 nukes and any object they detect streaking through the skies at them that even smells like a nuke will be met with disproportionate retaliation. Then 10 minutes later, the US will launch its nukes from subs and carriers around the middle east towards Iran. Nukes are the least worrisome part of this deal, there’s no point talking about them. Iran will be basically in the same position it will be with or without nukes
What Iran wants is money, respect, and influence, and the US and the other countries of the G5+1 are in a position to give it to them in exchange for allaying their fears about nukes. Its the easiest path for Iran to take to offer us weapons they’ll never use in exchange for reducing sanctions. The only reason this deal has taken so long is the decades of mistrust and extremists on both sides
How about ‘the restrictions actually enforced under the deal itself’ such as inspections and enrichment restrictions.
In short, the part that is based on ‘verification and not trust’ as per the particular contents of the deal.
I don’t often agree with you, but I’m kinda on the same page here. I’m not at all sure that Iran ever really wanted nukes. But it sure was advantages for them to have us THINK they wanted them.
Suppose they did, so what? How can they test it to see if it works, without giving away the game? Or is the plan just to make one and pray it works? Faith based physics? Then how do they make one small enough to fit on the long range ballistic missile they also don’t have. Load it onto a WWII era surplus bomber, that will then fly through some of the more sophisticated air defense systems?
Now, if their prospective enemy was kind enough to mass troops on their border, they might load Fat Achmed onto a semi-truck and drive it to the target. Outside of that, what possible use would they have for one?